Prisoners of Palestine: A tragedy of two peoples

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During his fieldwork in the Nablus area of ​​the West Bank under Israeli occupation between 2007 and 2020, anthropologist Joshua Rickard told two impressive stories:

Story one:

In the West Bank, there is a small village called Burin, which is famous for its rich figs. Every year during the harvest season, villagers take figs to Nablus and surrounding villages to sell them, and then use the money in exchange to purchase vegetables and other daily necessities. One year, during the harvest season, the Israeli army set up checkpoints on the only way out of the village, preventing villagers from passing through. But the villagers were anxious to get the figs to the market and sell them, so they used tractors to transport the figs over the mountain roads overnight. A few days later, the Israeli army noticed this and confiscated the tractor. But the villagers couldn't let the figs rot at home, so they hired donkeys to transport the figs over the mountains overnight. A few days later, the Israeli army noticed that the villagers were smuggling figs, so they came and took the donkey away. "Then what did you do with these figs in the end?" the anthropologist asked the village chief. "We ate a lot of figs that year," the village chief said.

Story two:

On the edge of Nablus, there is a small town called Asira ash-Shamaliya, where a game similar to "soliders-and-shabab" is popular among children aged 8 to 12. Children aimed sticks at each other and pretended to shoot, threw soda cans at each other and threw firecrackers behind trees to simulate throwing bombs and flash bangs in a fight. This kind of war game may be commonplace in other places, but this game has a completely different meaning locally. Because the prototype of the game was a battle between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian fighters, the locals saw the whole process, and the details of the battle spread among the children. Local people also came to watch the children play like this, as if they were using games to act out the battle scenes at that time. This game simulates the story of Mahmoud Abu-Hannoud, one of the main leaders of Hamas, being hunted down by the Israeli army.

Abu-Hannoud is an important commander of the famous "Al-Qassam Brigades" affiliated with Hamas and has escaped assassination attempts by the Israel Defense Forces many times. One of the assassinations occurred in this small town. At that time, more than 100 Israeli soldiers, coordinated by helicopter gunships, raided the village where Abu-Hannoud was hiding. Under the darkness, there was intensive shooting, bombs and flash-bang grenades. The villagers were either controlled by Israeli soldiers, or they set fire to garbage tankers or fired randomly in the air to attract the attention of Israeli soldiers and cover Abu-Hannoud's escape. There was also a villager who was a member of Fatah. He not only helped hide Abu-Hannoud, but also bandaged his gunshot wounds. In order to cover up the blood stains, he also killed a sheep at the door.

Abu-Hannoud is a household name in the Nablus region. In order to escape assassination, he voluntarily surrendered to the "Palestinian National Authority" in the West Bank (the agency represented the Palestinian government, and "Hamas" was considered an illegal armed force by the government at the time) and was imprisoned in Nablus. In prison. Soon after, Israeli warplanes raided the prison again to kill him, but he managed to escape again. It is said that he also rescued three jailers during his escape. Finally, while fleeing in a car, he and his two brothers were hit by a missile fired from an Israeli helicopter. All three died tragically on the spot. The scene was recorded on camera and broadcast on major Palestinian and Israeli television stations.

The Israeli-occupied West Bank can be seen in these two stories. How to understand the messages conveyed by these two stories depends on our systematic understanding of the history and current situation of the grievances between Palestine and Israel.

Instead of accusing one party of "state terrorism" in an all-or-nothing way, this article believes that the two countries, Palestine and Israel, in a spiral of hatred, are more like being in a prisoner's dilemma, and each exhibits certain national tragic characteristics: they There was no need to go to this step, but why did it come to this step?

On October 7, 2023, Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip launched indiscriminate attacks on dozens of towns and settlements in southern Israel. Its atrocities include rocket attacks on cities and settlements, deliberate shooting of civilians along highways and city streets, taking large numbers of hostages, and causing the Re'im music festival massacre and the Kfar Aza massacre. massacre) and many other tragedies. As of October 12, this terrorist attack has killed more than 1,300 people, injured 3,300 people, and over 200 people were abducted to the Gaza Strip. Most of the casualties and abductees were civilians. In addition to Israeli nationals, they also included many Thais, Americans, Nepalese, French, Argentinians, Russians, etc. Among them, at least 2 and 3 Chinese citizens died. hurt.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said this was the most serious attack on Israel since the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

This terrorist attack that shocked the world has once again triggered a confrontation between the Western world and the Islamic world: on the one hand, there is strong support for Israel and the victims of the terrorist attack, while on the other hand, there is a loud defense of the tragic situation of Palestine.

The impact of this incident was so great that even in the Chinese-speaking world, which lacked direct interests, two completely opposite camps were divided to attack each other. For a time, there were endless explanations for the grievances between Palestine and Israel, but few people noticed that these two countries could not have ended up in the situation they are today.

As a third-party non-direct stakeholder, this article will try to re-evaluate and measure the grievances between Palestine and Israel from a third-party perspective. Chinese readers can temporarily put aside their anger at terrorist acts and look at how the enmity between Palestine and Israel happened from the perspective of tragedy . In the end, whether you are willing to let go of your indignation against one party or not, you will find that through this new perspective, we see some of the flaws in human nature, and this is what makes people feel sad and unfortunate.

1. Source of hatred: 1948 War

When public opinion circles blame the grievances between Palestine and Israel on the "1967 War", Israeli historians also have a struggle between the old and new historical schools around the "1948 War". The historical background of the "1948 War" is that Israel established an independent state from the former British Mandatory Palestine. However, as soon as the state was established, it was involved in wars with Arab countries. The most serious consequence of this war is that about 800,000 Palestinians left their homeland and entered neighboring countries or migrated to other areas and became refugees. This large-scale collective exodus became a lingering historical trauma in the hearts of Palestinians, and was later called the "Nakba" (Nakba). To a large extent, it can be said that the "1948 War" formed the prototype of future Palestinian-Israeli grievances and the international relations in the Middle East: whether it is future Middle East wars or Palestinian-Israeli conflicts, we can see the shadow of the "1948 War" .

Generally speaking, New Historians tend to believe that the Israelis and British colonists are the source of the grievances between Palestine and Israel, but the Old Historians tend to defend Israel’s official ideology and blame the misfortunes to the British colonists and the Arabs themselves. Avi Shlaim, an Israeli-born historian at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, is one of the most famous representatives of historians of the New Historical School. His distinction between the old and new historical schools can be simply summarized as follows:

• 1. The official statement of Israel is that Britain does not support the establishment of a Jewish state, while the New Historicists believe that Britain is unwilling to establish a Palestinian state;

• 2. The official statement states that Palestinians left their homeland voluntarily, while the New Historicists claim that Palestinian refugees are caused by Israel’s forced expulsion;

• 3. The official statement says that the geopolitical balance is originally in favor of the Arabs (because neighboring countries have come to support the Palestinians in launching a war against Israel), while the New Historicists say that it is actually Israel that has the advantage in personnel and weapons;

• 4. The official statement presumes that the Arabs have a unified and coordinated plan to destroy Israel, while the New Historicists find that the Arabs have serious internal differences;

• 5. The official statement blames the intransigence of the Arabs for destroying peace, while the New Historicists accuse Israel of being primarily responsible for bringing the grievances between Palestine and Israel into a dead end.

But there are problems with both views. In fact, whether it is the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Arab Salvation Army (ALA), or other Arab coalition forces, they all have problems in unified organization, coordination and battlefield management. It is these problems that caused the exodus of Palestinians. The exodus of Palestinians also made it difficult for those who stayed to establish a Palestinian state at the same time as Israel. Moreover, Arab countries did not help the Palestinians establish a state of their own before Israel seized the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1967. However, after Israel captured these places, the Palestinians went through a series of international activities, guerrilla warfare and war of attrition, and finally paid a huge price to establish a fragmented state in the Israeli-occupied areas. Objectively speaking, Palestine at this time has missed the best opportunity to establish a state.

Regarding the history of the "1948 War", Shay Hazkani, a historian at the University of Maryland, may be one of the historians closer to the middle ground. The "1948 War" does not seem to be as clear-cut as most historians' narratives. Instead, it is closer to the historical reality: it was a messy war. Perhaps even more so on the Arab side. First of all, the Arabs were far from being unified in their organization and mobilization. Instead, they were complicated, chaotic and full of contradictions. In contrast, many Jewish soldiers were veterans of World War II who had experienced hundreds of battles. They were ahead of the Arabs in terms of combat experience and battlefield management.

But there are complications for combatants on both sides. On the Israeli side: Ashkenazi Jews from Europe look down on Mizrahi Jews from the Arab region and even ask the latter to reconsider their relationship with the Zionist movement; Jews from the United States Sabra Jews, who were born in Mandatory Palestine, were considered violent and chauvinistic nationalists, while local Jews believed that American Jews were too soft-hearted and unmanly. On the Palestinian side: The Palestinians demand that the Arab Salvation Army fulfill its commitment to rescue Palestine, but the Arab Salvation Army blames the Palestinians for just fleeing in large numbers; volunteer soldiers from Arab countries are angry with their commanders for the inefficiency and incompetence of army command, and the commanders He was also on guard against these soldiers at all times, lest they rebel. On the other hand, the Israel Defense Forces also tries to instill violence and hatred in its soldiers - for example, it teaches Ashkenazi soldiers that violence is in line with Jewish tradition; it also teaches Mizrahi soldiers that killing Arabs is to avenge their ancestors. But such indoctrination may not be effective, because Ashkenazi soldiers do not believe that Judaism has a violent tradition, and Mizrahi soldiers do not hate Arabs so much. Of course, the Arabs also instilled common hatred in the soldiers, such as condemning the Jews for illegally crossing the border and violating the traditional borders of the Islamic world. However, the volunteer soldiers were more concerned about the corruption of their respective governments and military management that led to battlefield defeats. Even though this situation is common in other war mobilizations, for the armies of both parties that are also hastily established and lack long-term coordinated training, this situation means that battlefield management is likely to be difficult to achieve uniformity and consistency. This It also laid the foundation for chaos and out-of-control behavior on the battlefield. It can also be said that the war was started and ended in a hazy manner, and the grand deployment of the military strategy may not be accurately implemented. The victorious party may not win morally, and the defeated party may not lose by force.

1.1 History of the war

As a prehistory of the "1948 War", the British incited rebellion in the Arab region in 1916 and promised to support the Hashemites in Jordan to unify the Arab region. At that time, World War I was raging in Europe, and the Arab region was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, which was on the side of the Allies. Based on strategic considerations, the British set fire to the Ottoman Empire's backyard and finally succeeded in dismantling the former overlord of Asia Minor. However, the British did not keep their promises to the Arabs. Especially in 1917, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration, which publicly endorsed Zionism in the form of a legal document and supported the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. At that time, the Jewish population only accounted for 9% of the total population of Palestine, and the promises made back then were not mentioned at all to the Arabs, who accounted for the vast majority of the population. The British's perfidy angered the Arabs, and nationalist fervor in the Arab region grew further. Immediately after the end of World War I, Britain and France rushed to carve up the Ottoman Empire, and the Palestinian Mandate fell into the hands of the British. The British later included the Balfour Declaration in the 1922 Trusteeship Charter, completely ignoring the demands of the Arabs. This move was tantamount to humiliating the Arab world.

Between 1919 and 1925, colonial rebellions against Britain and France broke out in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and other places. The Arab generals of the former Ottoman Empire who led these rebellions were all hailed as heroes. Inspired by these heroes, young people in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq and other places spontaneously formed paramilitary organizations. Although the Arabs borrowed the British Boy Scout model, pan-Arabists demanded that these organizations develop into military organizations. During this period, a martial spirit and respect for masculinity were arousing in the Arab region. Arabs believed that it was racial degeneration that led to the tragic fate of the Arab region becoming a European colony. So from Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Nablus to Aleppo, the younger generation showed great enthusiasm for physical fitness, military training and military parades. Although these paramilitary groups had not yet formally waged war against the colonists, they were undoubtedly preparing for war.

At the same time, the Jews in the Mandate of Palestine, under British protection, expanded their land aggressively, and their population doubled between 1922 and 1931. As the Palestinian settlement economy gradually lagged behind the Jewish settlements, Palestinians became increasingly dissatisfied with systemic unfairness, and their main social elites were unwilling to cooperate with the British. In 1920-1921 and 1929, violent conflicts broke out between Palestinians and Jews. Among them, in 1929, the Palestinians carried out the "1929 Hebron massacre", which resulted in the tragic deaths of 67 to 69 Jewish civilians. By the mid-1930s, many Palestinians had lost their land as a result of the global Great Depression and a wave of Jewish land purchases. In 1936, under Hitler's persecution, a large number of Jewish immigrants fled from Germany, causing the Palestinians to feel an existential crisis. The Palestinians launched general strikes and armed riots against the British and Jewish communities. The British brutally suppressed the uprising, resulting in the deaths of 3,800 Palestinians and 300 Jews by 1939. During this period, internal strife among the rebels resulted in the deaths of another 1,200 Palestinians. The rebellion was led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji, a former Ottoman officer who would again lead the Arab Salvation Army in the 1948 War.

As conflicts with the Palestinians become more frequent, Jews also feel a strong existential crisis. Both the left and right wing of the Jewish community have begun to support the use of violence against Palestinians. The Haganah, the predecessor of the Israel Defense Forces, also began to preach a violent creed. But soon after World War II broke out, Britain reversed its previous pro-Jewish policies in order to appease the Arabs: In 1939, the British government issued a policy document calling for restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchases, and the revocation of the 1937 partition of Palestine into two National proposal. Such a capricious policy immediately caused a backlash from the Jews and even led to bloody conflicts. In 1942, under the influence of David Ben-Gurion, the future father of Israel, the Jews announced their determination to establish a Jewish state after the end of World War II. In the eyes of Arabs, this was undoubtedly tantamount to a declaration of war. So the Palestinians also rushed to prepare for the paramilitary organization to fight against the Jewish "Haganah" after the war. On one side is Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari, who recruited people from the city to form "al-Najjada" based on the British Arab officers in World War II. On the other side is Amin al-Husayni, who imitated the Hitler Youth to form "Futua". (al-Futuwwa).

Although the paramilitary organizations founded by the Palestinians also participated in the "1948 War", they did not play a prominent role in it. The Palestinians failed to integrate and develop the two military forces into one, which put the Palestinians in a passive position before and after the "1948 War". After the 1948 war, even though the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were in Arab hands, the Palestinians did not have the military power to support their own path to statehood, and they had no way to get rid of the control of Egypt and Jordan, not to mention that Egypt and Jordan still had There is no intention to support the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank.

Different from the Jewish "Haganah", the Palestinian "Nagada" and "Ftuwa" or the current "Fatah" and "Hamas" all have warlords, governments and Political factional nature. A very sad fact is that even when the Palestinians were at their weakest, they did not forget their internal struggles and suspicions, and failed to combine their limited forces and organizations to form a larger force. Today we can still see infighting between Hamas and Fatah over the dominance of the Palestinian National Authority. In 2007, "Hamas" and "Fatah" launched a fire in the Gaza Strip, resulting in hundreds of casualties. In the end, "Fatah" was completely expelled from the Gaza Strip, regardless of the cost of using fire to replace the political struggle of a modern country. This kind of party control of the military and government has extremely bad effects, and can even be said to seriously damage the political ecology. At present, when "Hamas" is being suppressed by Israel, "Fatah" is not lending a helping hand.

1.2 Chaos of war

On November 30, 1947, a large number of young adults gathered outside the Presidential Palace in Damascus. The petitioners shouted: "Palestine, we are willing to serve you! We are willing to die for you! Even if countries around the world oppose it, Palestine will still be an Arab state." Palestine for the people!" Radio Damascus reported this event. Young people accuse the new Syrian republic of being heartless and indifferent to the fate of the Palestinians. The congregation threatened to transform the school into a military barracks in response to the growing ambitions of the Jews.

Militants have put intense pressure on Syrian President Shukri al-Quwwatli. What directly triggered strong indignation in the Arab region was the formal vote by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to adopt the "Palestine-Israel Partition Resolution" the day before. According to this resolution, the Arab countries with a population of two-thirds of the Palestinian Mandate were allocated 43% of the Palestinian territory, while the Jewish countries with a minority population were allocated 56% of the land, and 45% of the population on this land was Arab. This resolution was not only rejected by the Palestinians, but also strongly resisted by the Arab region. Feeling the rising hostility of the Arabs, Ben-Gurion ordered the Haganah to switch to an "offensive defense" mode in December 1947: Any attack against the Jews must be resolutely counterattacked by destroying their strongholds, or for the purpose of expelling its people and occupying its land. In January 1948, Ben-Gurion also approved a policy authorizing attacks on the families of Arab militants, including women and children.

The suffering of the Palestinians has once again triggered strong indignation in Arab countries. The warlike mood of the Syrians coincides with Syrian President Shukri al-Quwwatli's intention to contain King Abdullah of Transjordan, the Hashemite family, and the ambitious King Abdullah is interested in restarting the "Great War". "Syria" plan is bound to threaten the survival of the Syrian Republic. The Syrian president realizes that King Abdullah may intend to take advantage of the chaos to seize land in the West Bank. However, King Abdullah relies on the army led by the British, and the Syrians are not in a position to confront him head-on. At the same time, King Abdullah's nephew and Iraqi regent Abd al-Ilah of Hejaz intends to send troops to intervene militarily in Palestine. The situation will also be conducive to King Abdullah's seizure of land in the West Bank. The Syrians hope to directly intervene militarily in Palestine, but it is inconvenient for their own country to send troops because their soldiers are poorly equipped, poorly trained, and not loyal to the country. Moreover, the Syrian army was trained by the French colonial government, and its main generals were drawn from ethnic minorities and rural areas, because the French intended to use this army to suppress the nationalist arrogance of Syria itself. As a result, the best option before the Syrians is to recruit international volunteers, so that the Syrians do not have to risk defeat and avoid direct confrontation between Syria and the British, because Palestine is still in the hands of the British.

Therefore, driven by the Syrians, the Arab League established the Arab Salvation Army (ALA) in early December 1947 to formally intervene in the situation in Palestine. At this time, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (Grand Mufti of Jerusalem) Amin al-Husayni demanded that the Palestinians take control of this pan-Arab volunteer army. However, it is obvious that the Palestinians do not have a strong enough voice at this moment. The Arab countries are all planning behind the scenes and do not want the Palestinians to gain a military advantage. If all countries are truly sincere, the Palestinians should seize military command, which will undoubtedly help preserve some of the Palestinian territories after the war so that they can establish a Palestinian state on these territories. However, it is clear that the Arabs have no plans in this regard. Although the Arab coalition entered the war nominally to expel the Jews and eliminate the soon-to-be-established Israeli state, and to establish a unified Palestinian state in the mandate, the participating parties did not make plans for the preparation of a Palestinian state.

Eventually, the leadership of the Arab Salvation Army fell into the hands of Lebanese Fawzi al-Qawuqji. As mentioned above, this man was born in the Ottoman Army. He has been regarded as a national hero for leading Arab uprisings against the British many times. Fawzi al-Qawuqji cooperated with the Axis powers during World War II due to his anti-British stance and was reused by Nazi Germany. However, he was detained by the Soviet Union until 1947 after the war. When he returned to Lebanon, large crowds cheered him and begged him to rescue Palestine. Some even shouted directly at him: "We want Palestine!" Fawzi al-Qawuqji was undoubtedly warmly welcomed by militants in Syria and Lebanon, and even some Palestinians had expectations for him. But for the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who led the local Palestinian armed forces against the Jews, this was a very unpleasant thing: the 1936-1939 Palestinian uprising led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji seriously challenged the Grand Mufti’s religion and political authority, and there are other rifts between the two. Under such circumstances, it may not be possible to ask the Palestinians to cooperate with the Arab Salvation Army in their operations. Facts have proved that the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem did not use his influence in the Palestinian area to call on the Palestinians to actively join the fight. Later, soldiers of the International Volunteer Army generally decried that Palestinians seldom joined the Salvation Army in combat, while even Jewish women personally took guns to the battlefield. This happened not without reason. At least the Palestinian leaders failed to fulfill their due obligations. This shows from one aspect that there are serious rifts in the pan-Arab camp, which directly affects the war against the Israelis.

On May 15, 1948, the day after Israel declared its independence, Egyptian regular troops attacked the southern region of Palestine (now Israel). Immediately afterwards, the Transjordanian and Iraqi regular troops launched an offensive into the eastern part of Palestine, and the Syrian army also took the opportunity to invade from the northern region. But before that, the Arab Salvation Army, which was temporarily established and hastily trained, had already fought deep into the hinterland of Palestine.

At first, the Arab Volunteer Army soldiers (also known as the Arab Salvation Army) were welcomed by Palestinians on the street. People shouted: "Long live the Arab countries! Long live Arab Palestine!" For a time, all kinds of free food, accommodation and facilities were opened to the volunteer soldiers, and the streets The streets are filled with flowers, laughter and friendship. Optimism spreads among Palestinians and their allies as volunteers vow to rescue Palestine. This optimism gave the Palestinians a blind confidence that the war would be successfully won soon, and the Palestinians would not even have to join the army to fight. That optimism soon faced a head-on blow.

Although the Palestinians have specially set up institutions to provide material supplies to the volunteer soldiers, arbitrary expropriation of Palestinian property, non-repayment of borrowed money and theft are becoming more and more frequent. Palestinians also began to attack the volunteers, and there were even reports that a volunteer general raped a Palestinian mother and her son. In order to prevent such chaos from happening, the combat units of the Volunteer Army were required to withdraw from the city and keep at least 5 kilometers away from residential areas. However, these Volunteer Army originally promised to protect the Palestinian residents there. The commander-in-chief of the Volunteer Army, Fawzi al-Qawuqji, also ordered many times to improve military discipline, which shows how lax the military discipline of the Arabs was at that time. At the same time, the Volunteer Army also experienced non-combat attrition, such as a series of accidents such as gun misfires, ammunition explosions, traffic accidents, and accidental injuries to friendly forces due to lack of training or weapon failure.

As the war continued, the chaos became more serious, sometimes to the point of being ridiculous. The Salvation Army's top commander, Fawzi al-Qawuqji, originally expected to win a beautiful victory in a small city called Mishmar ha-'Emek in the Jezreel Valley. On April 6, 1948, the headquarters specially invited reporters to the front line to observe how this victory was won. The Iraqi commander who was attacking the small town confidently told reporters that he would meet in the city in 20 minutes. However, the battle turned out to be unfavorable, and the commander had no choice but to prevaricate the reporter, saying that he had no intention of taking over the small town. On April 7, under the leadership of the British, the Jews and the Arabs were about to reach a ceasefire agreement, but the command proposed a ceasefire condition that required the other party to surrender or massacre Jewish civilians. At this time, the Arab propaganda machine began to trumpet that the Arabs and Palestinians had won a battle here, saying that 9 enemy transport vehicles were destroyed, 180 people were killed, and 210 were injured, and that the Arab flag was flying over the small town. Wait. But in fact this small town remains unchanged. On April 8, after evacuating women and children with British assistance, the Jews formally rejected the British proposal for a ceasefire (because the Arabs demanded the Jews surrender). With no worries at all, the Jews launched a desperate counterattack until the Arabs could not even defend their own Palestinian villages. After the Jews came, they forcibly evicted the villagers and blew up the houses. The order for retaliation was issued directly from Tel Aviv. But on the Arab side, the propaganda machine had no intention of stopping. In addition to continuing to publish information to intimidate civilians from fleeing, it also spread false news that the Jews were fleeing.

As Arab countries entered the war one after another, Jewish soldiers committed more and more atrocities, many of which were authorized by the Israel Defense Forces. Some witnesses who saw the city looted and destroyed by Israeli soldiers said that the tragedy was like experiencing a major earthquake. This also includes deliberate retaliatory massacres and attacks on civilians in places such as Dawayima. Although not all Israeli soldiers do this, after all, the Israel Defense Forces is composed of Jews from all over the world, and these Jews even have different languages ​​and races. Some soldiers said in letters home that Israeli soldiers saw or heard the IDF committing crimes, and even had their faith shaken. More commonly, they strongly condemned the abuse of violence, at least initially. Many times, such atrocities are also the result of revenge. For example, in Operation Hiram, the Salvation Army, which was covered by the Syrian army, was easily defeated by the Israeli army. But the Israelis came to take revenge this time, because two Israeli soldiers accidentally encountered the Salvation Army the previous month, and their heads were cut off and stuck on sticks, which were displayed to the public in the village of 'Ailabun. The Israelis recovered the soldier's head through Operation Hiran. In retaliation, the Israelis massacred 15 Palestinians and looted the village of 'Ailabun.

The atrocities committed by the Israelis have had a huge psychological shock effect and caused great panic among the Palestinians. The Palestinians have to consider whether to stay or go. At this time, Palestinians were deeply disturbed by conflicting rumors. On the one hand, the Arab Salvation Army created a lot of false propaganda about victory, but the reality is that the number of refugees is increasing. On the other hand, Arabs have been issuing warnings, strictly prohibiting Palestinians from leaving their homes, and asking Palestinians to defend their homes. At the same time, rumors about Israeli atrocities have made people panic all day long. Eventually the Palestinians realized that neither the Salvation Army nor the Holy Jihad could protect themselves. Then there was a tragic scene of a large number of refugees fleeing with their families. Despite the Salvation Army's best efforts to prevent the refugees from fleeing, more than 230,000 Palestinian refugees had fled their homes by the end of April 1948. The top commander of the Salvation Army also issued a notice, accusing Palestinians of fleeing in large numbers out of fear of the enemy's false propaganda and panic. The Salvation Army issued a ban, but it still couldn't stop the panic, so it threatened the Palestinians that if they just fled for their lives, the Salvation Army would blow up all their homes. But this still could not stop the flood of refugees fleeing. Soon, there were reports that the Salvation Army had killed some refugees, but still failed to stop the flow of refugees. Rumors about how Jews slaughtered villages and hunted Arabs at will reached the ears of Palestinians vividly. All kinds of violent rumors are exacerbating the panic of the Palestinians, and these situations were also recorded by those who witnessed it at the time. But the Palestinians can no longer trust the Arabs, who have failed to deliver on their promises to protect Palestine. In Haifa, 30,000 people fled within three weeks. Until the Arab regular army entered Haifa, less than 6,000 people remained in the city. News of Haifa's escape spread to other cities, continuing to cause new panic.

Even so, the Arabs did not kill innocent people indiscriminately. For example, during the siege of Jerusalem, the Arabs massacred 77 Jewish doctors, nurses and teachers before escaping. Some of them were burned alive. This is the famous "Hadassah medical convoy massacre". ).

Although both sides are attacking civilians to vent their anger, Israelis, unlike Arabs, will not be deterred by panic. You rarely see similar documents saying that Israelis have large-scale panic because of the tragedies caused by Arabs. This back-and-forth retaliatory attack still remains in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Palestinian guerrillas and militants launch terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, and Israel retaliates in kind against the Palestinians. Even if it does not deliberately target civilians, it still It caused a large number of civilian casualties, especially when Palestinian armed forces (such as "Hamas") hid their troops among the people, and civilians were used as human shields.

But in 1948, when the state of Israel was founded, the IDF attacked Palestinian civilians based on the principle of revenge from the founding father Ben-Gurion. When the attack occurred, it was indeed deliberately targeting civilians. This tactic, although brutal, had the effect of creating panic. This kind of psychological warfare is completely irresistible to Palestinian refugees. In this case, the amplification effect of panic is completely conceivable. In addition to the fact that the massacre does exist, sometimes rumors and rumors also play a role in fueling the flames. For example, there are rumors about the atrocities committed by Israeli soldiers in places such as Haifa, Tiberias and Jaffa.

Just spreading such rumors is enough to break down the Palestinians' psychological defenses, let alone what if it is true?

One after another, Palestinian cities and villages were emptied out. In addition to a considerable part of the retaliatory expulsions by Israeli soldiers, it cannot be ruled out that the situation mentioned by King's College London historian Efraim Karsh: the Palestinians may have strategic and policy confusion, such as the "Arab High Council" (AHC) It is possible to proactively organize the evacuation and evacuation of civilians in some areas (although it is far from saying that all the Palestinian exodus was caused by this reason). This may be done out of humanitarian considerations, because rumors about Israeli soldiers killing innocent people indiscriminately make people worry about the safety of civilians; of course, it does not rule out strategic considerations, because after evacuating their families and civilians, the Arab camp can avoid There will be no need to worry (but this explanation does not necessarily make sense). However, the surrounding Arab countries soon closed their borders and strictly prohibited men of military age from escaping - the Arab countries required them to go back and pick up guns to defend their homes. The Salvation Army has realized the destructive consequences of the Palestinian exodus on the war: it not only weakened the supplies of the Arabs, but also greatly reduced their recruitment of soldiers, and caused a panic of a major defeat, shaking the morale of the army and damaging morale; in addition, for the war From an economic point of view, it is simply a huge disaster.

Of course, given the historical environment at the time, policy chaos was more convincing than coordinated coordinated action. Because the Palestinians do not have a unified government, nor is there any institution powerful and influential enough to coordinate all actions in the entire mandate, it is unrealistic to expect the same action to mobilize all Palestinians. For example, some Palestinian-controlled business committees have banned the delivery of food and drinks to areas experiencing material shortages, Palestinian traders in Haifa have refused to relieve the shortage of flour in Jenin, and Gaza has refused to export eggs and beverages to Jerusalem. Poultry, Hebron inventorying supplies out of the city, Jerusalem sabotaging and obstructing the shipment of flour to Hebron. At the same time, there is still a lot of smuggling. Palestinian food is also smuggled into Jewish communities, and Jewish goods in turn flow to Palestinian markets. Even manufacturers in Transjordan preferred to sell their textiles to the enemies of the Arabs. This reflects another aspect: both Arabs and Palestinians lack the ability to coordinate, coordinate, and cooperate with each other. Or figuratively speaking, whether it is military, economic, or social organization, the Palestinians feel like they are in disarray. Even today, this impression of a mess is not groundless. This kind of fragmented organizational structure is not conducive to controlling the spread of panic or stopping the spread of refugees in a timely manner. Even the normal supply of the army is a problem.

After the Arab coalition forces entered Israel to fight, many towns and villages have been deserted. The panic has not been eliminated by the entry of the coalition forces, and the coalition forces have not been able to stop the refugees from fleeing. The loss of 800,000 people has dealt a heavy blow to Palestine. Not only has the economy been devastated, but the remaining people have been unable to establish a country of their own. Whether it is the Arab Salvation Army, coalition forces sent by various countries, or local Palestinian armed forces, they all lack unified dispatch, command and coordination. This situation shows both the lack of modern military management and warfare technology and the many cracks in the Arab camp. Not only does the Palestinians give people the impression of being scattered, but the lack of coordination among the various armies also gives people the impression of being scattered. Although the Arab Salvation Army came to rescue the Palestinians in a moral spirit, its chaotic social organization and battlefield management caused strong dissatisfaction among the Palestinians.

After the Gaza Strip and the West Bank fell to Egypt and Jordan respectively, neither the League of Arab States, nor Egypt, nor Jordan had any intention of establishing a partial security regime in these two lands - even if its purpose was to regain Palestine. In order to establish an Arab state dominated by Palestinians throughout the territory of the mandate, it is obviously better to have a peaceful regime than not to have one. For example, forming an army and a government is definitely more strategic than relying on guerrillas and terrorist attacks to increase the bargaining chips. Meaning, and the Palestinians’ subsequent actions hardly resemble government behavior. Before the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinians were virtually leaderless. But from the Palestine Liberation Organization to the current Palestinian Authority (PA), the Palestinians have only had a symbolic government, and its ruling power is almost based on a piece of loose sand, like a castle built on quicksand. And judging from its naming, such a government is even a bit nondescript, or at best, it looks like a provisional government.

In fact, the "1948 War" was not necessarily a failure for the Arab camp, because the Arabs controlled the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. But for Palestine, it was the worst of defeats: Palestine lost a large number of its population and did not gain sovereignty under Arab occupation. The "Fatah" armed force, which was later established in 1959, fought guerrilla warfare and launched terrorist attacks against Israel while participating in the Lebanese Civil War. Its movement trajectory over the past several decades has been nominally seeking the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. However, in fact, before Israel occupied the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1967, it did not seek to establish a Palestinian interim government in the occupied territories of Egypt or Jordan. , and even promote the founding of the country. The elimination of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state are not conflicting options, and as Israel becomes stronger and the Palestinians become weaker and weaker through war after war, the need to eliminate Israel to achieve the goal of establishing a Palestinian state becomes more and more important. unrealistic.

2. A fragmented country

Palestine, a country that only established itself overseas in 1988 and established a government in the occupied territories in 1994, has not only been cut into fragmented and disconnected pieces, divided and surrounded by Israel, but its population and areas of control are also intertwined with Israel. distributed.

One wonders, since Palestine does not feel like a "state within a state" - that is, a small state whose territory is surrounded by another state - but more like a "secondary state" built on the state of Israel. ". This title is not meant to disparage Palestine. The reason why Palestine is like a "second-level country" is that it has both sovereignty and no sovereignty at all: Although the United Nations and nearly 140 countries recognize Palestinian sovereignty, Palestine is a country that is partially embedded within the Israeli state-controlled areas and partially controlled by Israel. Israel divides the encircled countries, and the Israeli government accepts the necessity and reality of establishing a Palestinian state. On the other hand, it does not officially recognize Palestine. Although it has established communication channels with the Palestinian government and state in name only, it is not diplomatic relations. And readers have noticed what was mentioned in the first two stories: the Israel Defense Forces not only set up checkpoints and confiscated transportation vehicles in the Palestinian territories, but also hunted and killed Hamas elements in the Palestinian territories many times, which obviously ignored Palestinian sovereignty. .

After the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, relations between Palestine and Israel eased. However, after Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by extremist Jews in November 1995, the situation between Palestine and Israel changed again. It was not until September 2000 that the "Second Intifada" broke out in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, and Palestinian-Israeli relations began to take a turn for the worse again. As a result, Israel has strengthened its division and blockade of the occupied territories. The two stories at the beginning of this article are actually about Palestine, which is divided and blockaded. On the one hand, it lives in hostility, and on the other hand, it is a normalized resistance movement in life. The normalized resistance movement further aggravates Israel’s opposition to Israel. Local segmentation, lockdown and surveillance.

In his fieldwork in the West Bank, anthropologist Joshua Rickard argued that parallel to Israel's physical division and blockade of the area (resulting in territorial fragmentation), there was also the emergence of social and political fragmentation among Palestinian communities. change. Even in Nablus, factional power struggles and conflicting interests alienate it from the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian elite.

Jewish settlements and military blockades dotted across the West Bank have divided Palestinian communities into fragments. The flow of information, goods and people are severely restricted and hindered, and surveillance is everywhere. In the words of Joshua Rickard: Palestine is like A panopticon . Although the Palestinian National Authority is an authoritarian regime, its influence and control over Palestinian communities is limited. This has also exacerbated the differences among political factions, large and small, and worsened social conditions in remote areas because the central government cannot Reconciling contradictions and imbalances between various places. Distrust of central government and trust among individuals and communities are widespread. For more than 70 years, Palestinians have been accustomed to using violence to unite and divide Palestinian society. Years of isolation have made Palestinian communities increasingly lack common ground, and the abnormal has become the norm. Social solidarity has been undermined, and Palestinians rely more on kinship ties to maintain community ties.

According to Joshua Rickard's description, Palestinian national consciousness or national identity is more like "pan-Palestinianism" based on the common experience of resisting Israel and hating the blockade, and is somewhat different from nationalism in the usual sense. different. Either there is something wrong with the Palestinians' imagination of the "national community", or what the Palestinians are actually doing is destroying the "national community". Because this "pan-Palestinianism" is more like a fragmented small group based on a common daily experience and hostile relationship with Israel, rather than a consensus on a unified nation-state. As Joshua Rickard has noted, Palestinian collective identity was largely formed in response to colonial occupation and the sense of exclusion felt by the Arabs living on the land.

To a certain extent, it can be argued that the politicization of Palestinian daily life and the collective sense of Palestinian identity are usually achieved through long-term, daily political movements. This political movement both unites Palestinians and divides Palestinian settlements. In other words, this kind of normalized political movement is not only the glue that strengthens individuals' dependence on their own communities, but also increases the risk factors for hostility between this community and other communities and between this community and the central government.

Joshua Rickard believes that under the polarization of Israel’s similar “divide and rule” methods, the general social mentality of Palestinians has changed significantly, and Palestinians in various communities no longer think that they are the same as other Palestinians. However, if we look at the history of the "1948 War", the "dispersed" state of the Palestinians is not so much aggravated by partition and isolation, but rather preserved as it is. The only difference lies in the current circulation of people and goods. It's greatly restricted. This situation has actually already occurred during the British colonial period. You can hardly find Palestinian community leaders who are truly worthy of the name. Even the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem is not the leader of the Palestinians. Various Palestinian cities and settlements are dissatisfied with each other. , each doing his own thing. The so-called "Palestinians" are more like the Arabs who live together in the Palestinian Mandate. They are not based on the identity of a nation-state. They do not feel that there is any difference between themselves and the Lebanese, Jordanians and Syrians in imagining a national community - but In fact, other nations do not see it this way, because they have their own unified nation-state. The Palestinians have never understood what a unified nation-state is. To some extent, it can even be said that the Palestinian imagination of a unified nation-state has given way to a common understanding of a hostile relationship with Israel. Or it would be an exaggeration to say that the Palestinian national identity is based on a hostile relationship with Israel. Without this common enemy, it should be self-evident whether Palestinians will turn against each other.

3. Prisoner’s Dilemma

Israel is probably one of the very few countries in the world that has never issued a national map stamp. This shows from one perspective that Israelis are confused about the identity of their country. On the one hand, Israelis do not consider the Arabs living in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip to be Israelis. On the other hand, in reality, these people live in the Israeli state and have no relationship with the Israelis. Always in flux. Some scholars said: "Israel and Palestine seem to be constantly changing and may become something else at any time."

The 1947 United Nations "Palestinian-Israeli Partition Resolution" was actually only a suggestion and not legally enforceable. The newly established state of Israel quickly gained a foothold in the United Nations, but the Arabs (also known as Palestinians) living in the mandate areas and the surrounding Arab countries did not accept the "Partition Resolution" and held a completely negative attitude towards this new country. So far, most Muslim countries still refuse to recognize Israel and do not establish diplomatic relations with it, including Israel's neighbors Syria and Lebanon, as well as other Middle East and North African countries such as Iran, Iraq\Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, and Qatar. , Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. Even Malaysia and Indonesia do not recognize Israel. It can be said that Israel lives in a land of four wars surrounded by powerful enemies. This is the origin of Israel's strong sense of existential crisis since its birth. Even if Israel has safely survived many wars with Arab countries and won in the end, once it fails, it may have to face the crisis of national subjugation again.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Israelis and Arabs (including Palestinians) mutually refused to recognize the two-state partition plan. Things seem to have changed slightly since the 1980s. On issues surrounding Palestinian sovereignty and territory, both sides seem to recognize but not recognize each other. Both Palestine and Israel are huge realities that the other will have to acknowledge. However, Palestine is in a rather passive position: the Palestinian National Authority can neither exercise authority over its own national affairs nor decide on the movement of people, nor does it have a national army to protect its borders, nor can it levy taxes on its own land; Its people are neither Palestinian nor Israeli citizens and have almost no civil rights; its administrative powers are limited to narrow plots and areas.

The situation in Palestine is also confusing to Israel. It's as if Palestine is indeed under Israeli jurisdiction, but no one feels that Palestine is part of Israel. The Palestinians believe that the Israelis are promoting settlement and colonization of the Palestinian areas, and regard their pursuit of national independence and liberation as an "anti-colonial struggle." However, this “anti-colonial struggle” is quite controversial. From the beginning of "Fatah" to the rise of "Hamas", Palestine's "anti-colonial struggle" has more commonly involved sneak attacks by guerrillas and terrorist attacks against civilians. Rather than suppressing the rebellion, the Israelis' revenge is not fundamentally different from what they did in the "1948 War", although Israel no longer regards retaliation against the other party's civilians as its main combat goal. To put it another way: these two countries are not so much a colonial and anti-colonial relationship, but a simple spiral of hatred. If Israel's retaliation is of a counterinsurgency nature, it should be aimed at destroying the other party's political and military organizational structure, but Israel does not want to eliminate the Palestinians' own government. At first, the Palestinian liberation movement used violence as a tool to increase its bargaining chips. Later, after Fatah and the PLO were tamed, they no longer used armed attacks as their primary option, but turned to diplomatic struggles. But the international diplomatic struggle between Israel and Palestine is not like China’s aim of strangling Taiwan’s international living space. The taming of Fatah and the PLO does not necessarily mean the victory of colonial suppression. On the other hand, "Fatah" gave up armed insurrection, which can also be considered as realizing that it is increasingly unrealistic to use asymmetric fighting to increase its negotiating leverage, because Israel has never changed its hardline stance since 1948. Violence is never the best way to convince Israel.

However, Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, still insists on pursuing a line of violent resistance. In terms of its repeated attacks on Israeli civilians, the nature of revenge is more realistic than the nature of revolution. Although "Hamas" regards Israel as a colonial regime from Europe and says it is promoting Western hegemony in the Islamic world, this statement is a bit high-sounding and its propaganda is greater than the actual situation. "Hamas" certainly needs to legitimize its violent activities, and its political platform shows unrealistic idealism "from the river to the sea", which can indeed attract its audience to a certain extent. Even if it conceals its ideal of eradicating Israel and establishing a new Palestinian state based on the actual situation, it has launched frequent terrorist attacks again and again without increasing any substantive bargaining chips for itself. In other words, Hamas has not only failed to obtain any substantial progress in its liberation struggle that is conducive to Palestinian independence through violence. Some scholars even believe that both sides seem to be accustomed to using violent conflicts as a language of communication, and war has become a way for both sides to perceive and understand the other's behavior. Even if there is no military victory, as long as political confrontation and military stalemate are maintained, both sides are saying that they are themselves. victory. Has Hamas made any progress? Some people may believe that the relatively peaceful environment in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is the result of Fatah's military struggle. What did you get in exchange? Panopticon? In the brief period when Palestinian-Israeli relations were the most peaceful, can it be considered that peace was obtained through military struggle? Can it be considered that the two "Oslo Accords" benefited from the final victory of the military struggle? After the second Palestinian uprising in 2000, the blockade of the West Bank and Gaza was tightened, and the peace process was completely disrupted. What did Palestine gain?

Even if it is true, as the above-mentioned scholars said, that war and violence are the languages ​​used to communicate between Palestine and Israel, and the purpose of the war is to exchange for ceasefire agreements and negotiations, that is to say, "war forces negotiations," the Palestinian militants seem to be trapped in a Cognitive illusion, mistakenly believing that one's own side has the ability to obtain substantive ceasefire conditions through the threat of war. Obviously, in the attack on October 7, 2023, "Hamas" not only failed to achieve its goal, but was ignored by Israel in negotiations Appeal: This Israeli military operation is different from the past because this time it is aimed at eradicating Hamas. Therefore, the so-called "war to force negotiations" is just a hypothesis. War may not force negotiations, nor may tangible benefits be obtained from negotiations.

"Hamas" is a political party, a military organization, and a government - this form follows the organizational tradition of the Palestinians in the "1948 War". It may be effective for the scattered Palestinians, but its negative impact may be worse. As many people have realized, the idealists of "Hamas" insist on armed confrontation with Israel. In fact, they are relying on war to consolidate their legitimacy in the Palestinian National Authority and at the same time consolidate their power in Gaza: "Hamas" "We will not miss any opportunity to fight within Fatah." If the armed struggle of "Hamas" does have any results, it will be recognized by the Palestinian National Authority, win the Palestinian parliamentary elections, crowd out and attack "Fatah" through war means to occupy the Gaza Strip (and ultimately force " Fatah legally recognizes its dominance in Gaza)...These results are a victory for Hamas, but not for Palestine. "Hamas" pursues destruction and construction at the same time, and fights against Israel and "Fatah" at the same time. This strategy is unsustainable.

"Hamas" squeezes out "Fatah" not only because of political struggle, but also because of serious differences in ideology and political lines. While Fatah is committed to fighting for and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of Palestine through peaceful means and complex diplomatic activities, Hamas is doing its best to weaken the influence of Fatah's political line on the people and replace it with It advocates the ideological and political line of jihad. The peace process represented by the "Oslo Accords" was interrupted by Hamas's repeated terrorist attacks. These terrorist attacks not only challenge Israel, but also challenge "Fatah". Sure enough, the people began to become disillusioned with Fatah. But the Palestinians are in trouble: a 2010 poll showed that 71% of Palestinians believed that the Palestinian National Authority's peaceful resistance policy would not help end the Israeli occupation and curb Israeli settlement and immigration, but 49.1% of the people did not. Opposing a return to armed confrontation with Israel, 54.8% believed that armed confrontation would not achieve the goal of Palestinian national independence. In other words, after "Hamas" used the war to weaken "Fatah"'s political line, it did not increase its prestige among the people. Palestinians do not think that the "Hamas" route is better.

4. Conclusion: Prisoners of Palestine

Not only does Palestine seem to be a prisoner in a panoramic prison in reality, but its political line of seeking national liberation and independence is also in trouble. Its relationship with Israel has also fallen into a form of prisoner's dilemma. Especially when Hamas seeks armed confrontation with Israel, the spiral of hatred continues to expand. The jihadist ideology of "Hamas" is not so much a resistance to colonial oppression, but rather a tool to consolidate its own political power through the spiral of hatred.

Judging from the internal strife among the Palestinians, Palestine has not emerged from the state of disunity during the "1948 War", nor has Palestine found a final way out that suits itself. Israel's division and encirclement of Palestine is certainly likely to bring about a change in the social mentality of the Palestinians, but to a certain extent it only preserves the fragmented state of Palestine that existed during the "1948 War".

Palestine's tragic fate is undoubtedly unfortunate. Compared with the more than 800,000 people in exile, the 150,000 Palestinian minority who remain in Israel are not necessarily unfortunate. Today, the descendants of these 150,000 people are part of the Israeli people, and their national identity with Israel is greater than their national identity with Palestine, although they are still Arabs and sympathize with the unfortunate fate of Palestine.

The relationship between Palestine and Israel is like an active volcano. This stalemate of low-intensity war is a huge torment for the people of both countries. If Arab countries had supported the establishment of a Palestinian state after the "1948 War", Palestine would have been able to avoid terrorist activities from the "Palestine Liberation Army" to "Hamas" to a large extent. But unfortunately, the Arab countries seemed a bit too ambitious at that time (with the goal of first annihilating Israel and then establishing a Palestinian state), which caused Palestine to miss the best opportunity to establish a state. This was also the direct source of Palestine's long-term fall into guerrilla warfare and terrorist activities, because there was no The government's Palestine is a mess. It was not until 1967, after Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank, that Arab countries began to support the establishment of a Palestinian state. This was obviously more irritating than sincere - because if Arab countries sincerely supported the establishment of a Palestinian state, why not do so between 1948 and 1967? What about the establishment of a Palestinian "peaceful regime" in Gaza or the West Bank in time? This gives people the feeling that either Arab countries have their own evil intentions, or that Arab countries lack long-term planning and strategic vision.