The Rebirth of Liberalism and Political Virtue

Recently, during my travels, I had some exchanges with friends from various fields and positions. These friends have basically read the two articles I wrote this year, "The Spiritual Civil War that Has Started" and "The Chinese Heir to the May Storm", and they are very interested in the ideas in them: liberal friends want to know more about what I have done. The left-wing youth I said, and left-wing friends want to hear my specific vision for the "anti-nationalist coalition". Based on this situation, I would like to sort out a series of thoughts I have come up with since 2015, so that all my friends know my awareness of the problem, and it is also convenient for all parties to make accurate comments.

A few years ago, I was a standard "academic liberal intellectual." "Academic," "liberal," and "intellectual" are all three things that are repulsive to some friends I know now, but at the time, that identity did make me proud. I wrote in "The Big Cat, and the End of an Era", and until 2012, when I went to give a lecture at the Chinese Youth Academy, I believed that academic liberalism would have a place in China's future reforms. What happened in China later was described in detail by Zhao Sile in "Their Journey". Although I didn't fully pay attention to what the activists did at that time, I also knew about the arrest of lawyer 709 and the "Charity Law". It was introduced, marking "the end of an era".

Coincidentally, in June 2015, after I finished writing an article in memory of Big Cat, Duan Media was established in July. Zou Sicong, who was the editor of the China Review Group at the time, asked me for a manuscript. I wrote the very immature piece "Mainland Neo-Confucianism and Left-wing Liberalism", trying to apply my research on political philosophy and contemporary political thought to reality. Political analysis. The turning point, however, was my second post above, "The "Sinicization" of Left-wing Liberalism, and I can't recall what prompted me to write this, probably for Arendt and republicanism. read. The controversy caused by this article exceeded my expectations. Brother Lin Yao also specially wrote an article "Also on "The Sinicization of Left-wing Liberalism" to systematically refute me. Looking back now, "The Sinicization of Left-wing Liberalism" is not rigorous in its discussion, and there are many misunderstood expressions, but it is basically the same concept as what I have done in the past two years. . What surprised me in particular was that I had noticed two more dynamic groups than liberals who had the potential to form a strong opposition: feminists and Christians.

In 2015, the arrest of the "Five Sisters of Feminism" triggered a huge wave of solidarity. I also began to learn about what the "Youth Feminist Action Group" did. For example, Zheng Churan launched the "Occupy Men's Restroom", Zhao Sile sued the Guangdong Provincial Public Security Bureau over the C&E system, and Qiu Bai sued the Ministry of Education over homophobic textbooks. From these events, I have a vague feeling that these new generation of female activists have more sensitive tentacles on justice issues than liberals, are more willing to take action, and are more likely to capture the public's attention. On the other side, I get to know more and more Christians. Among them, the most influential teacher is Zhang Jun from the University of Toronto. He is in the same political philosophy group as me, and he is willing to share some politics with me in private. philosophical thinking. He once said in a group that Christians are not afraid to sacrifice their lives to feed tigers for the sake of their faith. Let me ask, do liberals have such determination and spirit of sacrifice? This rhetorical question shocked me a lot.

At that time, I had already begun to feel that there was no hope for liberalism to follow the previous line, so it was necessary to rebuild the "subject of political opposition" (this term first came from Han Gan). What was the previous route? That is the "gradual reformism" I mentioned in "The Twilight of Liberal Conservatism in China" (the third article published in Duan Media): on the one hand, push the government to establish the rule of law and complete market-oriented reforms; on the other hand, realize The ultimate result of the self-enlightenment of the people and the construction of civil society is the democratic transformation of Chinese politics. Behind this line, there is a joint plan of a group of liberal intellectuals;

"First, in philosophy, we introduce Burke's 'The French Revolution', Isaiah Berlin's 'negative freedom' theory, Hayek's 'Spontaneous Order' theory and Francis Fukuyama's 'End of History'. This introduction is not necessarily intentional, and these thinkers are not all conservatives, but the Farewell Revolutionists put together some parts of their thinking and can spell it out wonderfully. 'liberal conservatism' scheme.

With the help of Hayek and Isaiah Berlin's theories, the Farewell Revolutionists re-distinguish the 'Enlightenment' into the 'Scottish Enlightenment' and the 'French Enlightenment' in the history of Western thought (to preserve some room for enlightenment) ). In their view, the 'Scottish Enlightenment' promoted 'negative liberty' and 'evolutionary reason', while the 'French Enlightenment' promoted 'positive liberty' and 'constructive reason'. British and American political systems and political practices contain respect for 'negative freedom' and reverence for 'evolutionary rationality' reflected in experience, tradition, and convention, so Anglo-American society never experienced a violent social revolution, and political The social cost of transformation is much lower than in Continental. The French Enlightenment, represented by Rousseau, put aside its own empirical tradition to pursue 'rational construction', and envisaged a kind of freedom that can only be achieved in 'general will' - 'positive freedom'. This insane idealism not only led to the 'bloody horror' of the French Revolution, but was also the source of totalitarianism in the twentieth century.

At the same time (on this basis), they conduct a comprehensive reflection on modern Chinese history, claiming that the fault of the century-old Chinese intellectuals is that they have been radicalized since Kang Youwei. The 'New Deal' and 'preparatory constitution' in the late Qing Dynasty were originally a great opportunity to steadily move towards constitutional government, but the intellectuals did not give the Qing Dynasty enough time. The government of the Republic of China established by the Revolution of 1911 lacked authority and had very shallow foundations. Not only that, the 'New Culture Movement' of 1915 carried out a comprehensive critique of traditional Chinese culture, thereby destroying the moral foundation of traditional China and eventually leading to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution.

Farewell revolutionists also studied the experience of democratic transition in Taiwan, South Korea, Chile and other countries and regions, and concluded that a period of authoritarian rule is conducive to promoting economic development, and when economic development reaches a certain level, democratic reforms are carried out, and social unrest It is less likely that transitional democracies will turn into populism (as has happened in most Latin American countries). Huntington's own "Political Order in a Changing Society" has several formulas that say that the degree of political unrest is proportional to the degree of social mobilization and inversely proportional to the degree of economic development, social mobility, and political institutionalization, which is also used as corroboration. "

Later, I made a supplementary discussion on this in the series "China Berlin Studies" and "Mainland Liberals in Taiwan": The liberal conservatism of the 1990s seemed to be making great strides and victories, but in fact it was to a certain extent. It has paved the way for the comprehensive conservatization of Chinese politics and Chinese political thought; some of them have also turned conservative or even reactionary in their actual positions. The two intellectual examples cited in The Twilight of Chinese Liberal Conservatism are Gan Yang and Yao Zhongqiu (Autumn Wind), because they best embody the tortuous path from liberal conservatism to cultural-political conservatism, And this mentality coincides with the overall ideological transformation of the country. Since then, I have been systematically criticizing liberal conservatism and cultural-political conservatism on the one hand, and, on the other hand, I have also been exploring the sources of new political opposition, and the forces that motivate, mobilize, and unite them. Way.

In 2016, I wrote many articles on political philosophy, "The Future of Liberalism in the Debate of Reform and Change" and "The Dangers of Dispatching, and the Limits of Intellectuals" belong to the first effort, and the rest belong to The second attempt. This year, I had a high level of enthusiasm for understanding Christianity, because the number, organization, and spiritual strength of Christians dwarfed the liberals (I believe Liu Zhongjing's conversion to Christianity is related to this). The theme of "Liberal's "Mind Power" is to mourn Mr. Jiang Xulin, but it was written based on Mr. Zhang Jun's questioning. Teacher Jiang Xulin believes that liberals should gain strength from various traditions and values. I agree with this, but I am disappointed by his negative attitude towards political resistance. This is why, although I fully agree with what Tocqueville said later, Christianity in the early nineteenth century in the United States played an irreplaceable role in maintaining the moral ties of the society as a whole, but I still did not consider that Christians can be used as liberal political leaders. Allies, because Teacher Jiang Xulin’s idea is not an exception: there is a general anti-political attitude among Christians.

In 2016, I also continued to monitor other liberal activities. Brother Jia Jia came to Shenzhen, set up a public account and an immigration company, and publicly raised the banner of "early hair and early migration". I have no moral comment on immigration, except that I think immigration is the way out for the middle class, not the way out for liberalism. I am also disappointed by the divisions within the liberals after Trump's victory, especially some liberals who have converted to Christianity, looking to Trump to restore the world order, or at least bring America back to the "city on a hill" era . In the middle of the year, I met with Zhao Sile and asked her about the situation of activist groups and NGOs. The seedlings raised by the previous generation of liberal activists (mostly in prison) have relatively less self-identified as "liberals", they have a rejection of the so-called "overall plan", or Said that among them, there is a clear tendency of "depoliticization". Although I think that doing public welfare is morally higher than immigration, and I admit that people who do NGOs do not have any obligation to assume such responsibilities, I still feel melancholy.

After this year, I also began to wonder if the so-called "politicization" was just a dream, because as far as I could see, I could not see the possibility of "politicization" at all. There has always been a saying in "gradual reformism" that the growth of China's middle class is a key part of China's move towards freedom and democracy. Because the material needs of the middle class have been largely satisfied, they will have higher pursuits (such as participating in politics), and they will also realize that only when their basic rights are realized can their expectations for a better life be truly fulfilled. guarantee. This awareness will make them an important driver of social change. Many overseas Chinese studies have revealed that this assumption does not apply to China. I have also observed that the middle class in China, for the most part, can be satisfied with the various benefits brought about by the growth of wealth, and if they have further needs, they will seek religious solace (this is why I have gradually become more interested in Christianity. Lose faith, because for most Christians, instead of fighting for freedom of belief, Christianity itself is a sanctuary from reality), or try to emigrate. The upper class of the middle class is even more "reactionary". They are not only extremely satisfied with the status quo, but also hope that the authorities will implement various measures to safeguard their vested interests and prevent class mobility. I do not deny that there are some in the middle class who are strongly wary of power because they have been enlightened by liberalism, or out of a natural sense of justice, or their own interests are violated by power, but in general, the middle class is expected to Class has become the main force driving change in China, and it is becoming less and less realistic now.

Therefore, in 2017, I worked tirelessly to criticize the "middle class fantasy", not only criticizing the fantasy of the middle class, but also criticizing the fantasy of the middle class itself. I have written three articles about "non-marriageism" because I have always felt that marriage in China is to some extent a microcosm of the overall reality, rather than, as some of my friends have said, a reality that can be overcome from pain A haven for rest in the marriage: the conditions offered by both parties before marriage reflect all the prejudice against class and gender in this society; the motives for the union of the two parties are mostly based on the consideration of certain practical interests; even those known as "model marriages" "The men and women are nothing more than using marriage to pass on their social status. This is why "non-marriageists" are despised and oppressed in all aspects of Chinese society: they are under tremendous pressure from their parents, colleagues, friends and public opinion, and some are even forced to commit suicide; governments at all levels have introduced various policies to prevent them from not marrying or exploiting them financially. Even some people with liberal tendencies believe that not getting married will lead to low fertility, accelerate the aging of society, and affect economic development.

After the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, I wrote an analysis article on future trends, which was widely disseminated. I have a hunch that the government's control of daily life will become more severe, and I also think that the good days of the middle class will not be sustainable. I am particularly pessimistic about China's education, not only because of the intensifying stratification within it, but also because the control imposed by the authorities on education will become more and more pervasive: children of the middle class will be trained through the baptism of red education and Sinology education. The successor of a party state, not a "free individual"; the Chinese government creates obstacles for middle-class children to study abroad by restricting international education and capital outflow; among overseas students, the proportion of hardcore nationalists is also gradually increasing It is not unrelated to certain arrangements and infiltrations by the authorities. I want to send a message to those middle-class friends: Do you really want your descendants to live in such an environment? If not, what can you do?

During the summer vacation, I communicated with some readers through the backstage of the official account, and found that some of them were very thoughtful, so I added some readers and created "Camus Lectures" at their request. Among these readers, the more prominent ones do not belong to the mainstream groups in society: overseas students with left-wing liberal tendencies, scholars who are critical of the academic system, lawyers who do not believe that the law is fair to everyone, public welfare practitioners, women's rights activists, LGBT and non-marriage. In general, a group of people of all fields and of all ages who still have ideals in philosophy, politics, literature and art. In addition to continuing to sort out the context of contemporary Chinese thought, criticizing statism and previous liberal lines, and expressing some of my readers' voices, this is also a focus of my writing at this stage.

The emergence of the "Eight Youths" incident was another turning point for me. I did not participate in the first wave of solidarity, nor did I pay much attention. I just saw some people retweet messages of solidarity in the Moments, and some left-wing friends made positive comments on the matter. What caught my attention was Zhang Yunfan's statement, which was issued when he himself had been released and the others were still being chased. Although he is a "Mao Zuo", he did not use too much language of the Cultural Revolution in his statement. He even mentioned the "Constitution" and "the right to freedom of speech". Personally, I feel that this is a prudence or compromise in his public voice in order to gain support from a wider opposition force than Mao's left. Most importantly, Zhang Yunfan showed a clear anti-nationalist tendency in his statement, a firm gesture that neither begged the authorities for mercy nor "advised" them. This makes me believe that there are some differences between the new generation of Mao Zuo and the old Mao Zuo, and this difference may open up some space for union. This is where The Spiritual Civil War Has Begun.

After the article came out, a left-wing friend approached me and said, you have a good feeling about politics, but why do you insist on being a liberal? I said, is it a liberal or a leftist, does this label still matter now? You have some friends of the academic left who are talking about Lukács, Gramsci, Badiou and Zizek in radical left circles, while using the tattered but unripped piece of the authorities. In the coat of Marxism, there is arbitrage at both ends. Such leftists do not yet have the backbone of academic liberals. Ask yourself, are there few such people?

Later, when I raised money for Tao Chongyuan's sister, Qiu Huo defended me, using the word "political virtue". I think this statement is very good. A person's "political virtue" is indeed more representative of his essence than the faction he belongs to. In the next article, I want to focus on the ideas of left-wing youth I know and their "political virtues".