183 | In-Depth Interview｜Anthropologists Walking in Afghanistan: The Taliban is a Passively Accepted Option

In August this year, the news that the United States withdrew from Afghanistan and the Taliban regained power attracted worldwide attention. Yukinoshi also launched a series of articles, exploring the thinking and practical possibility of academic knowledge on political changes and specific habitats; especially including the role and future of anthropological fields in difficult environments:
Afghanistan Anthropology Book List
Ignorance is Catastrophic: On the Development of American Islamic Studies (Part 2)
Ignorance is Catastrophic: On the Development of American Islamic Studies (Part 2)
The Struggle for the "Regime of Exception" in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier
Newsletter Summary | Past and Present in Afghanistan
Summary Newsletter | Afghan Women in Distress
This article is an exclusive interview of The Paper with anthropologists Nancy Lindisfarne and Jonathan Neal. Based on their long-term fieldwork, these two scholars who specialize in Afghan rural areas have conducted specific explanations and discussions on Taliban regime strategy, Pashtun culture, impacts of climate change, current status of women's rights, knowledge and politics, etc.

Author / Edited by Wang Lunyu and Xu Zhenhua Pengpai/Original text published by Zhang Wuwei/September 18, 2021

"There is a lot of nonsense about Afghanistan in the United Kingdom and the United States. These nonsense obscure some important truths." This is anthropological scholars Nancy Lindisfarne and Jonathan Neal from the United States (Jonathan Neale) comment on the first sentence of a Western article on the situation in Afghanistan. For the two, the Taliban won not because most Afghans like the Taliban, but because people can't stand the cruelty and corruption brought about by the US occupation.

Nancy Lindisfarne is currently a research fellow at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, UK. His books include Bride Swapping: Politics and Marriage in Tribal Societies (1991), Misplaced Masculinity: A Comparative Ethnography (1991), Thank God We Are Secular: Gender, Islam, and the Republic of Turkey "(2001), "Voices of Afghan Villages: Stories from a Tribe" (2020), etc. Jonathan Neal is an independent scholar who has long cooperated with Lindisfarne. He has published many plays, novels and non-fiction works, and has been active in trade unions and social movements for a long time.

Starting from the interests of major powers, many scholars and politicians regard the Afghan people as the background of political disputes and even as a tool to seek interests. But Lindisfarne and Neil have first-hand experience. They have mastered the Dari and Pashto languages that are widely used in Afghanistan, and they have contacted a large number of people from all walks of life in Afghanistan. The duo, who have a lot of research on Afghan rural society, started fieldwork in Afghanistan as early as the 1970s. Recalling the Afghan civilians they met during the field, they can still recall how Afghans formed their own "survival wisdom" in an environment full of extreme poverty and war, and used this to overcome difficulties with dignity, dignity and mutual love.

For example, in the article "Class, Gender and Neoliberalism" (Class, Gender and Neoliberalism) co-authored by the two, the author pointed out that the starting point for examining the situation of rural women in Afghanistan should not be limited to "the difference between men and women", but also We can see aspects such as multiple households gathering children, the impact of economic level on gender division of labor (the richer the family, the more obvious the gender division of labor), and male parents investing time in childcare, etc. For them, Pashtun men in rural Afghanistan in the 1970s spent significantly more time raising children than British men. Childcare in these rural tribes will not become a burden that housewives have to face alone. To some extent, the joint participation of men and women and the collective makes the Pashtun childcare culture appear to be more "progressive" than the seemingly modern Britain . However, this is actually because the local area is plagued by poverty and hunger, and only collective life can make people have more hope of living.

Grateful for the "complex, bitter, oppressive but also full of love" situation in Afghanistan, they do not accept that the Afghan problem is attributed to the backwardness of the local people in traditional structures such as ethnicity, religion, and tribe. The duo emphasized that Afghanistan, like other parts of the world, has a particular system of gender inequality intertwined with a particular system of class inequality, while factors of great power rivalry and foreign invasion have always plagued local society.

In particular, both lament that issues such as class and women's liberation have been to some extent torn by left or progressive forces within Afghanistan that at different times in history have firmly sided with foreign interventionists (the Soviet Union and the United States). Seen as externally imposed, failed to gain support from the larger rural population.

In an exclusive interview with The Paper (www.thepaper.cn) recently, Lindisfarne and Neil mentioned that, compared with the rough judgment that "Afghans supported the Taliban", legal fairness and the belief in peace Eagerness, desire to get rid of extreme poverty, response to foreign intervention and other factors can better explain the "destructive" offensive caused by the Taliban in Afghanistan, which has become the result that Afghans have to accept .

Afghans are accustomed to compromise. Extreme poverty and long-term war make people yearn for order and peace. But the problem before the Taliban is not just to use force to establish a new political and social order. Lindisfarne and Neil believe that how to balance the conflicts of tribes, sects, factions, politicians, classes, genders, and various factions will be an imminent problem for the Taliban.

The Taliban's Tactics and Moral Basis

The Paper: We know that the Taliban originated in the Pashtun tribal areas more than 20 years ago. In terms of ethnic composition and class representation, what changes have taken place in the Taliban in the past 20 years?

Lindisfarne: When the Taliban emerged in the 1990s, most of its members belonged to Pashtuns, and their behavior showed a clear "Pashtun chauvinism", sometimes with racist tendencies towards other ethnic groups. So at that time they were unable to form a trusted government with support from other peoples.

The Taliban later learned from the experience and began to try to appear inclusive. After 2001, the Taliban tried to portray themselves as the defenders of all Muslims in Afghanistan, which allowed them to recruit members of other ethnic groups, including a small number of Hazaras, in areas such as northwestern Afghanistan. The La people are mainly Shiites and have been persecuted for a long time).

There's one more thing the Taliban are doing smartly too: They've upped the ante on diplomacy, at least on a technical level. Since 2014, they have established a representative office in Doha, the capital of Qatar, and have been active frequently in the Gulf region, which is impressive.

The Taliban's progress on these fronts is understandable. Persisting in guerrilla warfare against American occupation with such a disparity in power, they must use and adapt new tactics intelligently, or they will surely be defeated.

Neil: Also we should focus on what they haven't changed, which can explain a lot of things as well. When they first came to power, Taliban judges gained a local reputation for impartiality, force and sternness. Although its overly strict law enforcement is disliked by many people, people in rural Afghanistan generally regard Taliban judges as relatively honest and fair. After 20 years of guerrilla warfare, that doesn't seem to have changed for now. This is very unusual, especially in a place like Afghanistan. It is very rare for a political force to go through more than 20 years of ups and downs without becoming corrupt at the root.

When I say the Taliban are more honest and impartial, I mean their judges generally don't take bribes. This has allowed the Taliban to gain the support of many poor people. In every other Afghan government before it, the acceptance of bribes by judges and low-level officials alike was routine, with few exceptions.

The Paper: The Taliban have indeed made many statements showing a moderate image recently, but to what extent does this reflect changes in the logic and principles of the Taliban's governance? And to what extent can it be attributed to a technical adjustment to strive for international recognition?

Lindisfarne: I think it's both, and generally they do want to govern Afghanistan for the long haul and realize that they need to learn how to govern. Of course, what they want is an ultra-conservative, undemocratic regime, but that doesn't mean they ignore equality. However, at this point in time, it is difficult for the outside world to make a clear judgment, and we need to continue to observe.

But I would still say that after 43 years of civil war and great power military intervention, Afghans are desperate for peace. If external interference ceases and the Afghans are left to themselves, I believe they will be able to gradually form some kind of internal compromise. I can even imagine that this kind of internal compromise might also include Hazaras who belong to Shia.

The Paper: Frankly speaking, the vast majority of Afghans we have interviewed recently have deep doubts about the Taliban. Of course, the selection of this "sample" is very limited. Most of them come from cities and belong to the educated population who can speak some English more or less. What do you two think of this mentality of many urban residents?

Lindisfarne: Just now we talked about the inclusiveness of this country at the national level. Indeed, there are still class issues, which are very obvious, especially in cities. Still, the Taliban face far less skepticism in the countryside. It is only natural that these Kabul citizens who wish to flee have such a mentality. Although the Taliban has released words several times to reassure people, saying that they will not retaliate against the "collaborators" of the US military, but from the perspective of these people, who knows? There are too many uncertain factors.

Neil: First of all, to be clear, this is a war against an occupying force (led by the United States) and it is also a civil war. Historically, every regime change in Afghanistan has been accompanied by a lot of bloodshed and violence. However, so far, the Taliban's seizure of power has not caused a large number of deaths.

A large number of Afghans with foreign ties are now watching, fearful, suspicious, apprehensive and uncertain about the future, but few of them have any nostalgia for the previous government. More ordinary people lock themselves at home, pay close attention to the current situation, and think about when they can go out? Should you continue to work? Still, none of these individuals intend to speak out against the Taliban.

At the same time, during the long guerrilla war, the Taliban gained a lot of support from the rural grassroots areas, which was an important source of strength for them. Facing a regime that no one remembers like the Ghani government, it is enough to have a small but stable base.

polysemy of equality

The Paper: Since we talked about the countryside, the two of you are familiar with it. How did the Taliban break through in the countryside?

Neil : We did fieldwork in Afghanistan in the 1970s. At that time, all judges in Afghanistan were corrupt. We had a lot of contact with ordinary Afghans at that time, and now we also maintain online contacts with various Afghans. One message that can be repeatedly confirmed from our exchanges with them is that the judges in the Taliban-occupied areas are obviously more clean and honest than their predecessors too much. The investigation by the US military, the enemy of the Taliban, also recognized this fact.

Lindisfarne: For example, we have a friend who lives in a village in eastern Afghanistan. She has a land ownership dispute with other people. We all know that the judges of the Ghani government either dealt with it too slowly, and the lawsuit may not be settled for several years, or they openly accepted bribes, making it impossible to have a fair verdict. In the end, only the option of going to a Taliban judge could be accepted by both parties in the dispute. It is hard to imagine that they personally went outside to find a Taliban judge, and then invited them to the village to preside over the ruling. Similar cases began to appear in the newspapers about 11 to 12 years ago. It can be said that grassroots justice is an area where the Taliban opened up earlier .

The Paper : The judges and officials of the Taliban seem to some grassroots people to be more just than the Ghani government. Where does the Taliban members' pursuit of justice come from? Does it have to do with some particular interpretation of their religious teachings?

Lindisfarne: There are indeed very important traces of equality in Islamic teachings: to achieve the equality of every Muslim, fairness must be reflected in laws and other levels. But Neil's story will explain that even in the Islamic legal system, there are issues of private property rights, and conflicts between values and class relations arise.

Egalitarian readings of Islamic teachings are also linked to cultural factors: elements of Pashtun culture demand equality, respect for others, seek compromise, and try to maintain decency. The identity of the Pashtuns can be summed up by the local slang phrase "We speak Pashto, we do what Pashtuns should do". The reason why this recognition makes people proud is that it is associated with generosity, sharing, and charity.

Admittedly, the situation within the Pashtuns is complex. In some places where property control becomes more important, class differences may emerge in Pashtun society. For example, in the Pashtun society of Pakistan's Swat County (editor's note: once ruled by the Taliban), the gap between rich and poor is relatively obvious. Because the land here is more easily controlled by certain people, a clear class society is formed.

But there are many places where Pashtun societies have a more pronounced egalitarian, sharing orientation in animal husbandry and agriculture. I think that if people have more freedom from the control of specific tribes, there will be more egalitarian attitudes.

I still remember the scene from my first trip to Afghanistan in 1968. I've been to Iran before, and the locals there have an unrealistic vision of a foreigner wearing a watch, always thinking that such a person is rich. But in my travels through Afghanistan, I have seen many Afghans who have not experienced colonial rule, and they do not care about these symbols of wealth for foreigners.

People who seek dignity and decency hate inequality, but people also try to preserve their wealth. So it all needs to be discussed in the larger political and economic context. Factors such as Islamic teachings, Pashtun culture, and economic structure are independent of each other, but they are also interrelated.

Neil: Lindisfarne wrote five years ago on "Class Politics of the Taliban." While the Taliban and wider Afghan society were very disgusted with the Soviet-style class discourse due to the Soviet invasion, it also needs to be understood that you can take away the class discourse and the Soviet-style discourse, but you can’t change the fact that class exists. In rural Afghanistan, conflicts between landlords and tenant farmers still exist widely. As in previous decades or even centuries, landlords can always take two-thirds or even four-fifths of the harvest. Therefore, from the perspective of realism and war strategy, if the Taliban want to gain support in rural areas, they must at least make some efforts to win over poor people such as tenant farmers.

Of course, we cannot think that the Taliban "speaks" for the interests of the poor . The situation in rural and tribal areas of Afghanistan is very complicated, and the trend of conservatism, which tends to protect the private property of landowners and tribal elders, is also strong. If the wind changes, it is not unimaginable for people to change their homes.

Also, "egalitarian behavior" and "egalitarian economy" are different. When I first learned Pashto, I found it difficult to say "thank you", in Pashto, people would just say "you give me something", and "thank you" seemed superior. This is the embodiment of equality in Pashtun culture. So generation after generation, Pashtun societies have exhibited egalitarian attitudes, no matter where they live.

Yet egalitarian ideologies can also mask social inequalities. There will also be inequalities in Pashtun and even Afghan society, just like in Afghanistan's various neighboring countries. The locals have a slang term: Afghanistan, a land of exploitation. This is what people say when they want to blame the government for causing problems.

Lindisfarne: It's important to note that Afghanistan, as an extremely poor country, has actually been negatively affected by climate change for some time . The country has recently been hit by an almost unprecedented drought. In other words, even if the war is not considered, the people there already live in an extremely fragile environment. Therefore, people are always willing to make various compromises in order to survive.

I just mentioned the villager friend who would rather go to a Taliban judge than to seek help from officials of the Ghani government. These people have long been used to compromise with those who are in power at the local level, whether it is the Taliban, tribal elders/landlords, Americans, Kabul government, otherwise they would not be able to survive.

the law of survival

The Paper: The realism and survival-oriented tendencies mentioned by the two may not be ignored. In fact, we have recently heard Afghan interviewees describe the Taliban soldiers they encountered. According to them, although these grassroots members consider themselves devout, they usually cannot answer basic doctrinal questions.

Lindisfarne: Yes, these Taliban soldiers usually don't understand any specific doctrinal issues, because forty years of war have completely destroyed the opportunities for young people to receive even informal education, let alone formal schooling. . When the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, many young Pashtuns living in border refugee camps became a group of relatively educated people through religious schools. Many of them became the backbone of the later Taliban. But other than that, grassroots members of the Taliban may not be able to read, let alone discuss teachings.

Neil: When we were doing fieldwork in Afghanistan in the 1970s, we often heard urban residents say that rural people were unqualified Muslims. When the British colonized Afghanistan, we often heard similar complaints from urban residents. In fact, through my contact and observation with rural Afghans, I found that due to lack of education, they often have little religious knowledge and cannot discuss religious issues, but at the same time, they all believe that they are very devout Muslims.

The Paper: Regarding the new generation of Taliban soldiers, what are the characteristics of their growth experience? And how did you become part of the Taliban? And how are they different from the "predecessors" Taliban (from the 1990s to the beginning of this century)?

Lindisfarne: Frankly, we don't know. It is necessary to point out that the situation in rural Afghanistan today is much worse than it was in the 1970s. However, the "survival wisdom" of Afghan farmers that has been formed since the 1970s has survived. These people are very alert, observant of people and things around them, sociable, not very complaining, and very strong. The same is true for the new generation of rural residents (the main source of Taliban fighters), after all, their living environment is as difficult as it was 20 or even 40 years ago. It must be admitted that these character traits are especially well suited to long-term guerrilla warfare.

Neil: Some 43 years of a civil war filled with fear, betrayal, and poverty, it's hard to imagine what more could be done for these Afghans. I still remember an Afghan friend telling me last year that in the Pashtun areas he knew, many villagers would go to join the Taliban, no matter who led the local Taliban. They will say to these Taliban leaders, whatever you do, what we want is peace. The way Afghans dress may not have changed much, but their mentality has certainly changed.

The Paper : In your article "Afghanistan: The End of Occupation," you quoted Richard Tapper as saying that "tribes are not atavistic institutions." As you said, tribes and religions are not symbols of backwardness, but often originate from modern society and continue to play a role in modern Afghanistan. What role will "traditional factors" such as tribes and religions play in Afghanistan in the future?

Lindisfarne: The considered "traditional" Pashtuns gave birth to the Taliban, but it is precisely the same people who produced a group of idealistic, impressive, dignified and left-wing values in the 1930s Politician fighting against imperialism. Therefore, when we discuss binary oppositions such as "modern" and "traditional", we need to be more reflective and aware: this may not be an effective framework. For the Taliban, so-called "modernity" is not so much a goal that they may pursue or abandon, but a powerful discourse that compels them to respond.

In the 1970s, a lot of land had actually been nationalized, and people had tenure: if one could deter thieves and gain the respect of the rest of the community by doing so, then one could continue to use the land. In fact, in arid lands, people’s paper certificates of land ownership are of little significance, and what is more important is the defense of the land: can they mobilize enough brothers and friends to protect themselves.

Historically, the state machine has always been able to use the "divide and rule" strategy very well, creating and utilizing tribal conflicts, which is beneficial to the state machine. In a future Afghanistan, the Sunni-Shia dispute will be a real issue, a real division within Afghanistan, within Afghanistan, between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban, between Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Different forces have different opinions. This can turn into horrific racism if not handled well.

Neil: In rural Afghanistan, we need to distinguish between "big landowners" and "elders." The former usually owned large tracts of land and their "rule" was violent, with a reputation for cruelty and danger. In the 1970s, when we conducted field surveys in Afghanistan, these landlords still had many vile acts of wantonly beating civilians and occupying other people's land.

The "jihadist" struggle against Soviet aggression changed the land situation a lot, and some warlords from different ethnic backgrounds (such as Tajik and Uzbek) were bred. Wars are going on in Afghanistan all the time, and the military power can easily attract ordinary people to participate. According to the few information we have now, the power of these big landowners seems to have been weakened during the civil war and the Taliban's seizure of power, but more evidence is still needed to judge. Although these people were once wealthy, they no longer had the power and wealth of the past, and could no longer be called a huge force.

The local elders own some modest estates, are considered people with wisdom in life, enjoy local prestige, and therefore often serve as arbitrators in disputes. One point of particular concern when looking at the future state of Afghanistan is rural land ownership.

Discussions of "justice" in the context of Afghanistan should be cautious. Afghans are likely to have high demands for equality, but this is not the same as going back to the socialist values of the last century. The more pressing problem is that the drought in Afghanistan caused by climate change will cause serious land and food problems, and international organizations controlled by the United States may refuse to provide assistance to Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. The US sanctions will make it difficult for international aid organizations to provide assistance to Afghanistan. The people provide food. Potential tragedies will increase the Afghan people's hopes for peace.

The Paper: We mentioned the problem of food supply. Afghanistan may face a serious famine problem. After the Taliban took control of the country, they need to solve this problem. For the Taliban, how did they solve relevant problems in the areas under their control?

Lindisfarne: In fact, the Taliban is willing to accept assistance from non-governmental organizations, whether it is education, medical care, and most importantly, food. Because the Taliban have no choice but to do so, the drought has caused severe food shortages. I sometimes lose my voice because I can't imagine how Afghans survive such a difficult environment.

Neil: People in the cities would make money, and the money would be sent to relatives in the countryside. In cities, such as Kabul, which has achieved great development, people have a relatively abundant food supply. However, Afghanistan has yet to establish an industrial system capable of supporting a national food supply, so resources available to the Taliban after taking power are still limited.

The Paper: The food issue has once again proved that the "survival wisdom" of Afghan villages is very important. In your fieldwork in the 1970s, do you remember anything that illustrates the "wisdom of survival"? How do they figure out how to deal with land disputes, food shortages, etc.

Lindisfarne: There's a lot in the book Afghan Village Voices . Everything in this book is about strategies for living. All stories are about how they guard their homeland, how they protect themselves, how they keep their decency, how they continue to love, continue to face difficulties with their brothers and sisters, and most importantly, to survive at the same time.

Neil: The people I met in my fieldwork were poorer than Lindisfarne was at the time. The hardest thing for them is that they lose the support of their network of relatives. If in one unfortunate year he lost his flock, he lost his fortune forever. In the group Lindisfarne surveyed, if you lost some sheep, your cousins might still be able to help you.

Lindisfarne: Even so, there are people who have lost the support of relatives through misfortune. It may be because relatives have died, and their land has been robbed and no one is willing to support them. Bad things will always happen to them. One of the most basic things that many people have mentioned is that a family can survive if they stay together all the time. Everyone can share a long story about a neat family. If a person can stay with their family at all times, they can all survive in the end. This is probably the most important moral precept for them.

female tragedy

The Paper: Chinese public opinion is very concerned about the rights and interests of women in Afghanistan. You mentioned in your article that the feminist agenda in Afghanistan has been largely influenced by the aggressive state. Today, feminists and women's rights workers in Afghanistan encounter many difficulties, worry about many things, and even "flee for their lives". How should feminists in Afghanistan achieve their goals?

Lindisfarne: This question is very complex. Much political propaganda from the United States sells the idea of war by rationalizing the aggression in Afghanistan as "liberating the women there," which began after 9/11. Even American feminists and progressives agree with this view. However, on the one hand, American progressives say they are going to save Afghan women, and on the other hand, the United States is sending planes to bomb these women, as well as their brothers, children and fathers. It's a confusing rhetoric, and the ideological "turn" (among progressives) has been huge.

We need to realize that the Taliban is certainly sexist, but so is the whole country of Afghanistan, as are many countries. We as feminists have to fight sexism, but the Taliban are not necessarily sexist to a greater degree than other people. Afghan women are not passive either, they are no more passive than anyone's sisters, mothers, women they know, women themselves are not passive.

Both Soviet and American invasions justified their actions with the issue of women's rights. Although it will affect attitudes towards women's rights, I think people on the ground will slowly reform the wisdom about women's rights, and then people will come back to feminist positions again. Afghanistan certainly should be. I don't think the people I know in rural Afghanistan are any more sexist than those in rural England.

Neil: The Taliban was successful in the sense of defeating imperialism, superpowers. But if this is proof that women's rights are a product of imperialism, it's wrong.

The Taliban's malice towards women's rights is actually consistent with Hillary Clinton, because Hillary believes that "feminism is an American and a democratic value." This is actually consistent with the view that "feminism is part of communism" during the Soviet invasion. These perspectives see feminism as a product of power from above, but for us, feminism is "down to earth", bottom-up.

It must be admitted that Afghan feminists are the most tragic. They bear a heavy price for collaborating with forces from abroad. In any case, getting men and women to live together as equals is clearly not going to be achieved by tearing the Afghan people apart with the might of the military, as the United States has done.

The Paper: There is a strong debate within the Taliban, and some factions are trying to show a more decent stance on women's rights. But there are more conservative and extreme forces that do not endorse this position. How do you view this potential split? And there are terrorist groups far more radical than the Taliban active in Afghanistan today, attracting former members who believe the Taliban is no longer "pure" enough. How to view these differences?

Lindisfarne: Extremist groups like ISIS are not only sexist, they are misogyny. They regard women as weapons and use rape and other bad methods. This will be a tricky question. Our concern is that ISIS and the Pakistani Taliban are ruthless when it comes to women. I only hope that the Afghan Taliban can control this radicalization from "Islamic State".

Neil: The Islamic State branch in Afghanistan grew out of the Taliban. This stems from two disputes within the Taliban: first, whether to negotiate with the United States; second, whether to regard Shiites as enemies.

When we discuss the factions of the Taliban, we need to realize that many leaders of the Taliban can recognize the two opposing positions at the same time. They recognize that the Taliban needs to be more moderate and make appropriate compromises in order to obtain foreign aid. To free people from poverty, aggression and bombing. But they still have a pious religious stand in their hearts.

Different leaders will strike a different balance. If there is to be a so-called moderate compromise, such as the establishment of a coalition government in which former President Karzai also participates, it will need to be accepted by the Taliban grassroots. After all, if the regime finally established by the Taliban has faces such as members of the Masood family and President Ghani who has fled, people will suspect that the Taliban cannot avoid the corruption of the previous government. In general, the compromise agreements reached at the top cannot directly determine the brutality of the grassroots.

Lindisfarne: When the Taliban first started, they needed to prove their purity, and they did stupid things like blowing up the Bamiyan Buddha. Despite their stupidity, they still have a purpose to justify themselves, to highlight that the Taliban have a better stand on Islam than the older generation of "jihadists" who are loathed by Afghan society for their corruption. Much of what the Taliban do to prove purity is extreme and stupid.

Competing in purity has always been the method used to gain power. Purity in Islamic teachings is no longer a problem, but compromises on money (such as whether to accept aid from foreign NGOs) will still be a problem for the Taliban, because this will make the Taliban questioned about the loss of purity.

knowledge and power

The Paper: The United States and the United Kingdom may have the best Afghan researchers in the world. The United States clearly has these resources to avoid strategic mistakes. Why did it make so many mistakes, such as trying to forcefully sell a political model to an unfamiliar country? Is this a great mystery?

Lindisfarne: No, it's not a mystery. Bush (former US President) needs a scapegoat, and Afghanistan is the weakest country that can act as a scapegoat. The United States will not take bombing actions against Saudi Arabia, which also has ties to Al Qaeda. The United States just chose the weakest Afghanistan, and they don't care about the life and death of the Afghan people at all. None of the good scholars I know who study Afghanistan and the Middle East have actually received any official inquiries from the United States. Of course there were anti-war actions in academia, but the government didn't care at all.

Neil: In fact, before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, it did consult scholars who had studied Afghanistan through intelligence agencies. Everyone said that they should not invade Afghanistan, but the Soviet Union still did not change its invasion plan. The United States doesn't even ask.

The Paper: Undertaking questions about knowledge and power, Ghani, who once served as the president of Afghanistan, came from an anthropological academic background. This is a very rare power position and opportunity for anthropologists. Why did he change his country and save the people? Failed in life?

Lindisfarne: I have had contact with Ghani, he comes from a wealthy family, he received a university education in the United States, and he supports neoliberal positions. This is his class background. I remember meeting him in Kabul in the late 1990s and he was already a little 'crazy' because he was so powerless with the difficulties facing Afghanistan and it caused him a lot of anxiety. He was actually a very decent person, but in the end he became a puppet of the US neoliberal position to occupy the regime. His book on the plight of Afghanistan is actually a cliché of "look forward", "neoliberalism is good", "free market solves everything".

Neil: In general, don't "get" the president of your home country in the event of foreign aggression. But in any case, don't give up research. For anthropologists, they should play to their strengths in staying grounded, doing solid fieldwork, and giving marginalized people a voice.

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"In-Depth Interview｜Anthropologists Walking in Afghanistan: The Taliban is a Passively Accepted Option":

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183. In-Depth Interview｜Anthropologists Walking in Afghanistan: The Taliban is a Passively Accepted Option