Preparations for the Vietnam War in 1979

From February 17 to March 16, 1979, there was a local war on the border between China and Vietnam. The Chinese side called it a "self-defense battle against Vietnam" and the Vietnamese side called it the 1979 Northern Border War (Chiến tranh biên giới). phía Bắc, 1979) or the Vietnam-China Border War (Chiếntranh biên giới Việt-Trung). The two sides disagree on the cause of the war, but there is no doubt that the war was initiated by China on February 17. At this time, it was less than three months after the CCP finished the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the 11th Central Committee, which “shifted the focus of work to economic construction”. Since the focus of work should be shifted to economic construction, why start a war?

I — International context and perception of the CCP regime

On August 12, 1977, Hua Guofeng, who finally passed all the organizational procedures through the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee and officially became the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, announced at the Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China that the Cultural Revolution was over and that the world must be realized through "grasping the principles and governing the country". Dazhi. This is the general program of his administration, and all work under his leadership can only serve this general program. The primary goal of diplomatic work is, of course, to create the best possible international environment for building construction. According to the analysis of Zhonghua Guofeng in the report of the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in terms of the international situation, the CCP believes that the main threat is the Soviet Union. At the same time, due to China's backwardness, it needs the support of western developed countries in economic construction. Then, to continue the diplomatic tendency to move closer to the developed Western countries since the end of the Mao era, and at the same time increase the restraint on the Soviet Union, is the inevitable requirement of Hua Guofeng's general strategy of governing the country.

On July 15, 1977, on July 15, 1977, the day before the official establishment of Hua Guofeng's status, the Vietnamese party and government delegation flew to Laos. During the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee, on the morning of July 18, the two sides signed the Laos-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation [1] , which strengthened Vietnam's influence. Under the general trend that Vietnam and the Soviet Union are getting closer and farther away from China, this treaty is a proof for China of the Soviet Union's expansion of influence, and it can be felt at any time in the process of China's turn to economic construction. huge external military threat. At this time, Deng Xiaoping, who had just returned, as the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and chief of the general staff, began to gradually accept the transfer of military power from Ye Jianying after the 11th National Congress. When considering how to create a good international environment to serve the general program of domestic economic construction, "governing the country" and "governing the country", he is naturally more likely than others to link diplomacy and military as the primary elements. Consider it holistically.

II — The process of military power transfer

1. The power vacuum left by Ye Jianying's retirement after the Eleventh National Congress

Deng Xiaoping made his official comeback at the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee in July 1977. Immediately there were signs that Deng Xiaoping was not willing to be bound by the "wise leader" Hua Guofeng. After the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in August, there was a symposium of the Military Commission. On August 23, at this symposium, Deng Xiaoping said in his speech: "A certain period always has a certain period's guidelines, and a certain department always has a certain department's guidelines. As far as the current situation is concerned, the struggle to expose and criticize the "Gang of Four" It is our guideline, we must carry out this struggle to the end, but there must be a time limit. For the army, rectification is at least a guideline of three to five years; preparation for war is a guideline before the war [2] .”

Hua Guofeng's guideline was to expose and criticize the "Gang of Four". He captured the "Gang of Four" before he seized power. For China, this guideline was a matter of political legitimacy. Deng Xiaoping sees this as temporary, and has begun to try to find another explanation, which is already a blatant contempt for Hua Guofeng's political legitimacy.

Also at this Military Commission symposium, Deng Xiaoping said that he would assist Ye Shuai in the daily work of the Military Commission. Ye Jianying heard the secretary's report on the 25th and instructed: The documents submitted to the Military Commission for approval can be sent to Comrade Xiaoping first [3] . Ye Jianying made this move when she was over 80 years old and in poor health. Instead of sharing power with Deng Xiaoping, she was giving power to Deng Xiaoping. This high-level power transfer process began immediately after the end of the eleventh year.

On August 31, Deng Xiaoping gave instructions on the procedures for submitting documents to the Office of the Special Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: "It is recommended to send it to Vice Chairman Ye for approval and send it to Chairman Hua for approval. If Vice Chairman Ye is not in Beijing, you can send it to me for approval" [ 4] . For the power vacuum left by Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping took the initiative to fill it up.

The document submission process is a matter of power distribution. The main issue for Ye Jianying to review is the power transfer and distribution of the army.

2. The change of Ye Jianying's attitude

On May 14, 1977, according to the calculation method of the Chinese lunar calendar, it was Ye Jianying's 80th birthday. That night, many party and state elders, including Deng Xiaoping, who had just actually returned, came to celebrate his birthday. Ye Jianying wrote a poem "Eighty Books" [5] :

Eighty-nine, no labor is needed, and there are people in the Long March Relay.

The mentor's entrepreneurship goes down through the ages, and his peers follow him.

Hundreds of millions of idiots broke down together, and the hegemony of the five continents fell.

The old man likes to compose an ode to dusk, and the green hills are illuminated at dusk.

In this poem, Ye Jianying has a review of his life - where he came from, where he went; what careers he participated in; and the career he has been engaged in all his life is inherited by someone - "there are people who come to the Long March Relay". This poem, which summed up Ye Jianying's retirement intentions throughout his life and was quite satisfied with the later generations, was publicly published on the first page of the People's Daily two days before the Third Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee [6] , implying that Ye Jianying was about to retreat. Ye Jianying's move involves a question, who will fill the power vacuum left by Ye Jianying's retirement?

Ye Jianying's birthday in May coincided with the closing day of the National Industrial University Daqing Conference. It can be said that he has finally completed a series of the most urgent deployments since the arrest of the "Gang of Four". satisfy. At this time, all preparations for the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee are ready. Next, the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee was held in July, and the Eleventh National Congress and the Eleventh Plenary Session were held in August. Later, the development of the situation may not be as Ye Jianying wished. Judging from another poem written by Ye Jianying in Guangzhou in November, Ye Jianying's attitude has completely changed in the past six months.

On November 11, Ye Jianying flew from Beijing to Guangzhou. Guangdong is Ye Jianying's hometown and the base of Ye Jianying's political forces. Ye Jianying returned to Guangzhou this time to "investigate and research while resting". On November 20th, Ye Jianying wrote the poem "Pine Garden" at the Pine Garden Hotel in Guangzhou [7] :

The green hills are surrounded by green screens,

Pine Garden never gets old.

I will fight for another ten years,

Return to reading Yinnamei Waterfront.

The difference from expressing feelings half a year ago is that now Ye is not only doing "investigation and research", but also "working hard for another ten years". This poem shows the change of Ye Jianying's attitude. Different from his previous efforts to assist and support Hua Guofeng and his intention to retire, he now has to restart his political position and continue to fight for politics.

3. Deng Xiaoping's role in Ye Jianying's attitude change

On the same day that Ye Jianying flew to Guangzhou on the 11th, Deng Xiaoping also arrived in Guangzhou by special train [8] . Deng Xiaoping set off from Beijing on November 8 [9] . "On the way, Comrade Xiaoping talked to military and political officials in Hebei, Henan, Hubei and other provinces respectively" [10] .

This time Deng Xiaoping talked about preparations for the December plenary meeting of the Central Military Commission. The title of the keynote report for this meeting was decided very early on, and it was called "Grasp the Gang and Govern the Army and Prepare for War". This topic sounds like it is closely matched with Hua Guofeng's "grasp the outline and govern the country". But the fact is just the opposite. After departing from Beijing on November 8, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly studied this "outline" on the train.

"He (Deng Xiaoping) said: What is the guideline for this document? How is it called a guideline? Exposing and criticizing Lin Biao and the 'Gang of Four' can be called a guideline, but this is temporary, and we still have long-term considerations. How about class struggle as the guideline? Comrade Luo Ruiqing was very keen, he said: 'We can no longer mention class struggle as the key link, this is a stick to beat people.'" [11]

Deng Xiaoping wanted to go back to Mao Zedong's class struggle, but Luo Ruiqing stopped him. Originally, Mao's "taking class struggle as the key link" had been resolved by Hua Guofeng by concentrating all struggles on the "Gang of Four". Deng's concern at this time is how to make Hua Guofeng's legitimacy "temporary". Although he could not find a substitute at the moment, he was unequivocal in taking time out of the political legitimacy of China.

Whether Deng's trip can persuade Ye Jianying on the content of the "gang" is the key to determining whether he can persuade Ye Jianying to change his full support for China. During their stay in Guangzhou, Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping hosted two or three discussions on the specific content of the "Guide" [12] . In hindsight, Deng Xiaoping successfully persuaded others, including Ye Jianying, to accept his very different "Guangzhou" from Hua Guofeng in Guangzhou.

The change of this "outline" was a slasher for Hua Guofeng. In fact, Hua Guofeng lost the full support of the military headed by Ye Jianying, and all the changes started from then on. Ye Jianying certainly understands what it means, but since it has been agreed, he can only continue to plan. Ye Jianying's poem written on November 20 shows his state of mind when he just made up his mind.

III — Avoid Hua Guofeng's Guangzhou Conspiracy

During Ye Jianying's "rest and research and investigation" in Guangzhou, he "conversed with Deng Xiaoping, Xu Shiyou, Wei Guoqing, Su Zhenhua, Luo Ruiqing, Yao Yilin, Liang Biye and others who were in Guangzhou successively" [13] .

After the Eleventh National Congress, Deng Xiaoping was the third-ranked leader of the party-state, and Ye Jianying himself ranked second. It is not a trivial matter for people No. 2 and No. 3 to meet alone in a city 3,000 kilometers away from Beijing. Deng Xiaoping is also the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and chief of the general staff. Looking at other people, Xu Shiyou was a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, a member of the CPC Central Military Commission, and the commander of the Guangzhou Military Region; Wei Guoqing was a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Military Commission, and the director of the General Political Department of the PLA; Su Zhenhua was then a member of the CPC Central Military Commission. Member of the Standing Committee and the first political commissar of the Navy, who actually held the power of the Navy; Luo Ruiqing was then a member of the Standing Committee and Secretary General of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China; Yao Yilin was then the deputy minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade; Liang Biye was a non-voting member of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China and deputy director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army.

The standards of Ye Jianying's meetings were so high! Why are there so many high-profile conversations? During his "rest and investigation", Ye Jianying "heard several reports from Hua Nan (then president of the People's Liberation Army Daily), the document drafting group of the Central Military Commission plenary meeting who arrived in Guangzhou from Beijing, and made a report at the Military Commission plenary meeting. proposed drafting and revisions” [14] . That is to say, Ye Jianying was in Guangzhou at this time to prepare for the plenary meeting of the Central Military Commission.

After the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in August 1977, the composition of the new leadership of the Central Military Commission is as follows:

Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China: Hua Guofeng;

Vice-Chairmen of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China: Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen;

Members of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission: Li Xiannian, Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian, Wei Guoqing, Su Zhenhua, Zhang Tingfa, Su Yu, Luo Ruiqing;

Standing committee members: Yang Yong, Liang Biye, Zhang Zhen. [15]

Although there are five vice-chairmen of the Military Commission, the real power is in the hands of Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping. Among the members of the Standing Committee of the Military Commission, Li Xiannian was also mixed with sand by Mao Zedong into the Military Commission. At least on the surface, he was not very involved in factional conspiracy. Wang Dongxing and Chen Xilian, two obvious supporters of Hua Guofeng, did not participate.

Negotiating with so many heavyweights in the military before the meeting meant that the contents of the plenary meeting of the Central Military Commission had already been decided at that time. Ye Jianying's poems show that he no longer supports Hua Guofeng, the nominal chairman of the Military Commission, but wants to fight again under a different political position. The private negotiation in Guangzhou, then, rather than in Beijing, was apparently to avoid Hua Guofeng and his limited supporters in the military. The next process verifies this.

On December 3, Ye Jianying returned to Beijing [16] , and on December 7, the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission convened in Beijing to discuss the issue of cadres [17] . The report of this meeting was negotiated in Guangzhou by Ye, Deng and other military veterans in the absence of Hua Guofeng. Hua Nan and others who drafted the report stayed in Guangzhou for nearly a month, but did not draft it in Beijing. This report has already begun to exclude Hua Guofeng's influence. "As propaganda at the time, Comrade Hua Guofeng was not overly highlighted, and he was mentioned very little in the document." [18] As the drafter of this report, Hua Nan should have read the report at the Standing Committee of the Military Commission. But Luo Ruiqing said to him: "I will read the report of this meeting. I am going to refute some questions, and it is estimated that some people will disagree." "As Comrade Luo Ruiqing estimated, he just finished reading the document, and some comrades did not agree He said with satisfaction: The role of Chairman Hua was not mentioned enough. Comrade Luo Ruiqing refuted Lenin's statement on the relationship between the masses, classes, political parties and leaders at that time, and the theme report passed smoothly.” [19] It can be seen that the thematic report passed by the Standing Committee of the Military Commission was not only the result of a conspiracy in Guangzhou, but also passed without changing the words. Once the Standing Committee of the Military Commission is approved, there will be no obstacles in the plenary meeting of the Central Military Commission. From December 12 to 31, a plenary meeting of the Central Military Commission was held in Beijing [20] . At the meeting, this keynote report was read by Ye Jianying, the actual top leader of the army, [21] , which shows that the purpose of the Guangzhou conspiracy has been fully achieved. This series of operations on the military side was advanced in a fully mastered process under the full preparation of the veterans Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping.

IV — The turning point of Sino-Vietnamese relations from hot to cold to hostile

On November 20, 1977, Deng Xiaoping returned to Beijing after the conspiracy of the military giant Guangzhou. [22] At this time, Deng Xiaoping should have finally persuaded Ye Jianying to give up his full support for Hua Guofeng, which is why Ye Jianying wrote a poem in Guangzhou on this day, "I will fight for another ten years." Deng Xiaoping's return to the North after completing the set purpose of his trip also shows that Ye, Deng and other dignitaries in the military should have completed their consultations and set the tone for the upcoming Plenary Session of the Military Commission. On the same day, on the afternoon of November 20, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam Le Duan led a delegation to Beijing to start their visit. Le Duan and his party were warmly welcomed by Hua Guofeng. Deng Xiaoping only appeared once at the welcome banquet on the evening of the 20th [23] . After that, Hua Guofeng and Le Duan held talks for two consecutive days, but they did not announce whether there was any outcome of the talks. On the 23rd, Le Duan and his party flew to Guangzhou [24] , when Ye Jianying was in Guangzhou. Ye Jianying and Vietnam's late leader Ho Chi Minh have a deep relationship and have been in close contact since the 1930s. On Ho Chi Minh's 70th birthday, he specially invited Ye Jianying to bring his children and family to Hanoi as a guest . However, Ye Jianying did not meet with Hu's successor, Li Duan, and was only received by Wei Guoqing, a local official in Guangdong. This is not normal, Ye Jianying has no reason to see Li Duan, both in public and private. Such a result only shows that Le Duan is warmly welcomed by Hua Guofeng, but has not achieved substantial results. In Beijing, Deng Xiaoping only appeared once at the welcome dinner, and Li Duan did not gain much from Deng Xiaoping. So Le Duan went south to Guangzhou to talk to Ye Jianying, but Ye Jianying did not talk about it, which indicated that the Sino-Vietnamese relationship had collapsed at this point in the visit and was irreversible.

Le Duan left Guangzhou and flew back to Hanoi on the 25th [26] , completing the last visit of high-level officials from both sides before the Sino-Vietnamese War.

What Le Duan's visit has revealed is only the prelude to the great reversal of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Previously, Vietnam had an absolutely positive image in the CCP's propaganda mouthpiece. From the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China, the starting point of Sino-Vietnamese relations from indifference to confrontation is not this visit, but after the end of the plenary meeting of the Central Military Commission in December.

The meeting ends on December 31. The next day, on January 1, 1978, the third page of the People's Daily detailed the statement issued by the Cambodian ambassador to China on December 31 on the Cambodia-Vietnam conflict [27] . On January 2, the fifth edition published a brief introduction to the statement issued by the Vietnamese side on December 31. [28] This seemingly objective report appeared in the People's Daily, which seemed out of place. This should be a starting point for the Sino-Vietnamese relationship to turn cold in the public eye. On January 10, "People's Daily" put together the reports of Cambodia and Vietnam accusing each other, but gave Cambodia a more conspicuous opportunity to accuse each other in the title [29] . In general, however, no particularly pronounced tendency has been publicly revealed [30] . Since the day before, positive reports about Cambodia have increased. By January 16, the tendency to be openly exposed finally could no longer be held back. On this day, the People's Daily International magazine published a lyric "Long Live, Heroic Cambodian Revolutionary Army" that enthusiastically praised the Cambodian army. [31] The People's Daily finally resumed its usual reporting style. 's one-sided stance was made public. Therefore, the previous seemingly neutrality was nothing but a process of indifference to Vietnam, and the goal was to transition to support for Cambodia. For the mouthpiece of the CCP, who has used the ideology of class struggle for decades to promote and guide public opinion, the objective and neutral news reports are an intolerable betrayal of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the end of the All-Army Political Work Conference on May 24, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council made a public statement on the expulsion of Chinese nationals from Vietnam. There have been no public reports of hostility. After May 24, the day after day condemnation of Vietnam created a public opinion atmosphere for the war.

It can be seen that the turning point of relations with Vietnam came after the plenary meeting of the Central Military Commission in December 1977.

1. The plenary meeting of the Central Military Commission was a turning point in Deng Xiaoping’s launch of the Vietnam War

There are 63 members of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China [33] . The theme report of this small-scale meeting, attended by dozens of people, is "Grasping the principles and governing the army to prepare for war", which has two striking substantive contents: one is to rectify the leadership [34] , "the army is not talking about Discipline is not allowed" [35] ; the other is to prepare for war, "the war may one day be fought" [36] . The issue of cadres was discussed at the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission on December 7. [37] These contents can be summed up as follows: organize personnel, seize military power, and prepare for war.

As mentioned earlier, this meeting completely avoided Hua Guofeng and prepared the whole process in Guangzhou. It was Deng Xiaoping who played the central role and connected this meeting. Later, Deng Xiaoping was the one who contributed the most to the implementation of the spirit of this meeting, from arranging personnel and grasping military power to preparing for war. In the end, from the beginning of this meeting to the fight against Vietnam, Deng Xiaoping benefited the most, and later was able to Deng Xiaoping was the chairman of the Central Military Commission. It can be said that this meeting was the most important link for Deng Xiaoping to take over military power from Ye Jianying, who was already 80 years old, by launching the war against Vietnam, so as not to let military power fall into the hands of Hua Guofeng, who was 17 years younger than Deng Xiaoping. It was a pivotal link from the Central Work Conference in August 1977 until after the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee when Deng launched the Vietnam War. While Deng was fighting for his political life, the Vietnam War played a role in linking the past and the future for Deng Xiaoping, linking the general line of all political actions.

The process from planning to implementation of the Vietnam War and Deng Xiaoping's overthrow of China and seizing military power were completely integrated. For Deng Xiaoping, attacking Vietnam and attacking Hua Guofeng were two sides of the same coin.

2. Signs of the Sino-Vietnamese War Decision on November 20, 1977

If we correlate all these seemingly unrelated events, we conclude:

First, after the plenary meeting of the Central Military Commission, Sino-Vietnamese relations immediately turned. The "preparation for war" proposed at this meeting should be aimed at Vietnam, and Deng Xiaoping's subsequent series of diplomatic activities also proved this.

Second, how to hold the plenary meeting of the Central Military Commission was agreed in advance by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping to avoid Hua Guofeng in Guangzhou.

Third, Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping arrived in Guangzhou on November 11. During this period, they avoided Hua Guofeng and met with many dignitaries in the military. When Deng Xiaoping returned to Beijing on November 20, he stated that the content to be discussed had been negotiated before. On November 20th, Ye Jianying's poem that he was going to struggle for another ten years is also evidence that the discussion has been established and that he will try again. All this shows that the decision to "prepare for war" in Vietnam should have been made before November 20. Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and party and state elders had already made the decision, and they had been vented through Yao Yilin and Chen Yun.

Fourth, Le Duan visited China on November 20 and held talks with Hua Guofeng for two days. At this time, it was impossible for Hua Guofeng to know that Ye, Deng and other elders had just made the decision behind his back. Due to the decisions of the elders such as Ye and Deng, no matter how much effort Hua Guofeng makes in this round of diplomacy, he will only get zero points.

To sum up, although the Sino-Vietnamese War had the background that Vietnam and the Soviet Union were getting closer and closer and China was getting farther and farther, but on the Chinese side, first, it completely broke with the Soviet Union and turned to the West. "The general strategy is to create a favorable international environment, which is the objective requirement of the highest diplomatic goal; secondly, to prepare for war and to seize military power is also what the elders of the party and state have done after the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and before the dust of the redistribution of decision-making power is finally settled. The last fight. After Mao Zedong's death, the political situation was in an extraordinary period. It was not until after the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that the overall reorganization of the power structure in the post-Mao era really started. And this kind of overall power adjustment cannot be completed in just a few months, which often takes a year or two or even longer.

V — Redistribution of power in preparation for war

After the Plenary Session of the Central Military Commission in December 1977, Deng Xiaoping's new round of foreign affairs activities showed that he had implemented the CMC's "preparation for war" policy, which began with his visit to Southeast Asia. From January 26 to January 31, 1978 [38] , Deng Xiaoping visited Myanmar; after returning from Myanmar, Deng Xiaoping did not return to Beijing, but stayed in Chengdu for a few days, and then directly visited Nepal from Chengdu.

From February 3 [39] to February 6 [40] , Deng Xiaoping visited Nepal. The intention of visiting Nepal can be seen from a later event. On April 2, Deng Xiaoping met with the delegation of the Nepal National Council. Vice Chairman Ngai Ngawang Jigme attended the meeting .[41] Together. Stabilizing the borders of Tibet is part of preparing for war.

By the time of the All-Army Political Work Conference from April 24 to June 6, 1978, not only at the top but the entire army was mobilized to prepare for the Vietnam War.

During his visit to Myanmar and Nepal, that is, during his stay in Chengdu, on the morning of February 1, Deng Xiaoping pointed out when listening to Zhao Ziyang's work report: "As for the issue of the leadership, the general policy is that in the past, the 'Gang of Four' would attack a group of Old guy, we have to invite them back now. The task of the old guy is to find a successor first. The successor cannot be a cadre who came up on a rocket" [42] . Of course, the biggest cadre "on the rocket" is Hua Guofeng. Zhao Ziyang was Deng Xiaoping's trusted and beloved general. At this time, Deng Xiaoping had just begun to express his attitude to compete with Hua Guofeng among his trusted followers. Four months later, on June 2, Deng Xiaoping's speech at the All-Army Political Work Conference, which was published in the full text of the People's Daily on June 6, was to express to the whole party and the whole country that he wanted to compete with Hua Guofeng. .

During the All-Army Political Work Conference, the Dalian military parade took place. Deng Xiaoping took the opportunity to join forces with Ye Jianying, Luo Ruiqing and other military giants to attack Su Zhenhua mercilessly. After Su Zhenhua, the most important follower, lost power, Hua Guofeng's influence in the army had been stripped away by Deng Xiaoping.

On May 24, the All-Army Political Work Conference is drawing to a close. The political mobilization for the Vietnam War has been completed.

On December 25, 1978, Vietnam launched an all-out attack on the Cambodian Khmer Rouge, and on January 7, 1979, it occupied Phnom Penh and destroyed the Cambodian Khmer Rouge regime. On February 7, China launched the war against Vietnam.

VI - Conclusion

If there is no threat of war, it is difficult to find an excuse to adjust the military deployment on a large scale and change military generals. The Sino-Vietnamese War actively launched by Deng Xiaoping was completely integrated with his struggle for domestic military power.

Without a foreign war, there would be no excuse to replace generals on a large scale, and it would be impossible to arrange one's cronies to various core positions to truly control the army. Before this transfer of military power, Deng Xiaoping was in charge of scientific research and education, and was on the fringes of the central power. After the transfer of military power through the "self-defense against Vietnam", Deng Xiaoping became the actual leader. On March 16, the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam was completed. At the report meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the situation of self-defense and counterattack against Vietnam, Deng Xiaoping pointed out in his report: "We must resolutely safeguard the great banner of Chairman Mao." At this time, it was the climax of the "theoretical retreat" to reflect and criticize Mao Zedong. For the first time, Deng Xiaoping did not repeat Ye Jianying's words. He not only put forward his own independent political views, but also launched a "theoretical retreat" proposed by Ye Jianying. fight back.

Deng Xiaoping was the most active participant in the initial preparation and launch of the "Battle of Vietnam in Self-Defense", and he was also the biggest beneficiary of this war.

[1] "Vietnamese Party and Government Delegation Visits Laos", "People's Daily", July 21, 1977, fifth edition.

[2] Hua Nan dictated, and Fu Yi compiled "Documentary of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Military Commission in 1977", edited by Zhang Shujun, "Historical Turning China 1977-1978" (Changsha: Hunan People's Publishing House, 2009), p. 95.

[3] The Academy of Military Sciences of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Ye Jianying Chronicle 1897-1986" (Beijing, Central Literature Publishing House, 2007), p. 1130.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid, pp. 1125-1126.

[6] "People's Daily", July 14, 1977, first edition.

[7] Chinese People's Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences: "Ye Jianying Chronicle 1897-1986", op. cit., p. 1134.

[8] Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, "Deng Xiaoping Chronicle 1975-1997 (Part 1)" (Beijing, Central Literature Publishing House), July 2004, p. 237.

[9] Ibid, p. 236.

[10] Hua Nan dictated, Fu Yi compiled "Documentary of the 1977 Central Military Commission Plenary Meeting", edited by Zhang Shujun, "Historical Turning China 1977-1978" (Changsha: Hunan People's Publishing House, 2009), p. 95.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid, p. 97.

[13] The Academy of Military Sciences of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Ye Jianying Chronicle 1897-1986", op. cit.

[14] ibid, p. 1134.

[15] Li Anzeng, Wang Lisheng, "1976-1982 Chinese Contemporary History" (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2004), p. 117.

[16] The Chinese People's Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences: "Ye Jianying Chronicle 1897-1986", op. cit.

[17] The Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, "Deng Xiaoping Chronicle 1975-1997 (1)", op. cit., p. 246.

[18] Oralized by Hua Nan, compiled by Fu Yi, "Documentary of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Military Commission in 1977", edited by Zhang Shujun, "Historical Turning China 1977-1978" (Changsha: Hunan People's Publishing House, 2009), p. 97.

[19] Ibid.

[20] The Chinese People's Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences: "Ye Jianying Chronicle 1897-1986", op. cit.

[21] Hua Nan’s oral narrative, op. cit., p. 98.

[22] The Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, "Deng Xiaoping Chronicle 1975-1997 (1)", op. cit., p. 240.

[23] "General Secretary Le Duan and others arrived in Beijing, and the Chairman arrived at the airport to warmly welcome the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council. Chairman Hua Guofeng of the Vietnamese Party and Government Delegation presided over the banquet. Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Vice Chairman Wang Dongxing attended the meeting between Chairman Hua Guofeng and the State Council. General Secretary Le Duan delivered a warm and friendly speech at the banquet", "People's Daily", November 21, 1977, first edition.

[24] "General Secretary Le Duan and others left Beijing for Guangzhou. Chairman Hua went to the airport to see off Vice Chairman Li Xiannian, Vice Chairman Wu De, etc. and thousands of people also came to the airport to say goodbye. After Comrade Geng Biao and others accompanied the visiting Vietnamese comrades to Guangzhou, Guangdong Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Revolutionary Committee held a banquet to warmly welcome them, and Comrade Wei Guoqing and Comrade Le Duan toasted.

[25] Lu Di, "The Revolutionary Friendship between Ye Jianying and Ho Chi Minh", in "Hongyan Spring and Autumn", No. 6, 2006.

[26] "General Secretary Le Duan led a Vietnamese party and government delegation to return from Guangzhou to China, including Wei Guoqing, Comrade Geng Biao, etc., and more than 2,000 people from Guangzhou to the airport to say goodbye", "People's Daily", November 26, 1977, No. 4 Version.

[27] "Cambodian Ambassador to China Bi Jiang held a press conference to read out the statement issued by the Democratic Cambodian Government in Phnom Penh, introducing the relevant situation of the armed conflict on the Cambodia-Vietnam border and clarifying the position of the Democratic Cambodian Government", "People's Daily", 1977 January 1, 3rd edition.

[28] "According to the Vietnam News Agency, the Vietnamese government issued a statement on the Vietnam-Cambodia border issue. The Vietnamese Embassy in China distributed a press release on the Vietnam-Cambodia border conflict," People's Daily, January 2, 1978, 5th edition.

[29] "The Ministry of Information and Propaganda authorized by the Democratic Cambodian government to issue a statement accusing the Vietnamese side of not mentioning the fact that the Vietnamese army has invaded the Cambodian territory for dozens of kilometers", "People's Daily", January 10, 1978, fifth edition.

[30] "The Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam held a press conference to issue a document to trace the historical situation of the Vietnam-Cambodia border issue since 1975", People's Daily, January 10, 1978, 5th edition.

[31] "Long Live, Heroic Cambodian Revolutionary Army (Cambodian Lyrics)", People's Daily, January 16, 1978, sixth edition.

[32] "Remarks by the Spokesperson of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council on the Issue of Expelling Overseas Chinese from Vietnam", People's Daily, May 25, 1978, 2nd edition.

[33] The Academy of Military Sciences of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Ye Jianying Chronicle 1897-1986", op. cit., p. 1130.

[34] Deng Xiaoping, "Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982)" (Hong Kong: Life and Reading Xinzhi Sanlian Publishing House, Hong Kong Branch, 1983), p. 70.

[35] ibid, p. 78.

[36] ibid, p. 75.

[37] The Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, "Deng Xiaoping's Chronicle 1975-1997 (Part 1)" (Beijing, Central Literature Publishing House), July 2004, p. 246.

[38] "Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping leaves Beijing for Myanmar at the invitation of President U Ne Win and Prime Minister U Maung Maung Ka for an official goodwill visit", People's Daily, January 27, 1978, first edition. "Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping Arrives in Chengdu After Successfully Concluding His Visit to Friendly Neighbor Myanmar," Zhao Ziyang and other officials from Sichuan Province, Chengdu troops, and Chengdu City greeted him at the airport, People's Daily, February 1, 1978, first edition.

[39] "Official Goodwill Visit to the Close Neighboring Kingdom of Nepal, Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping Arrives in Kathmandu, Prime Minister Bista welcomes King Birendra at the airport and meets Deputy Prime Minister Deng", February 4, 1978, first edition.

[40] "Successfully concluded official goodwill visits to friendly neighbors Myanmar and Nepal. Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping returned to Beijing. Li Xiannian, Dengkui, Wu De, Yu Qiuli, Chen Xilian, Geng Biao, Chen Muhua, Deng Yingchao, and Wang Zhen warmly welcomed and congratulated him on further developing China-Myanmar-China-Nepal friendly relations. Important Contributions, 7 February 1978, first edition.

[41] "Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping meets with Vice Chairman Ngai Ngawang Jigme of Nepal's National Council Delegation", People's Daily, April 3, 1978, 4th edition.

[42] The Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, "Deng Xiaoping Chronicle 1975-1997 (1)", op. cit., p. 262.