Why didn't Beijing's high-level officials inspect the disaster area as soon as possible?

Original address (including the source of the document): Why didn't Beijing high-level officials inspect the disaster area immediately?

Since July 29, under the influence of the super typhoon "Dusuri", the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region has suffered heavy rains and caused severe floods. But the strange scene is that as of press time, the central government has not yet set the tone for the severe floods in Hebei Province, including Zhuozhou and Bazhou, and has not established a national flood control and drought relief headquarters as usual. Chinese leader Xi Jinping is not surprised He did not show up at the rescue site.

On August 5, Xinhua News Agency published a long article which was reprinted by various official media. The article highly praised Xi Jinping's command of Beijing's flood control and disaster relief, saying that as early as early July, Xi Jinping had already made important instructions on flood control and disaster relief. However, this article deliberately downplayed and blurred several issues: 1. The large-scale torrential rain and flood disasters in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region were downplayed as only a local area in Beijing was severely affected; There is no mention of serious floods; 3. No mention of whether Xi Jinping personally visited the front line of the flood to supervise the flood fighting and rescue work.

In the memory of the Chinese public, since Xi Jinping took office, he has never rushed to the disaster area as soon as his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao did to guide flood relief work. The disaster relief work this time is no surprise. Just like the flood relief work in previous years, it was poorly organized. The official media was picked up by netizens to use a large number of fake photos and staged photos to promote the disaster relief work.

In addition, since the floods in Hebei, China's major official media have avoided reporting on the disaster situation on the front page or in important positions, and only mentioned the disaster relief work in a relatively inconspicuous position. These give people an intuitive impression: the floods in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei do not seem to be that serious. However, judging from the video data of the disaster area constantly flowing out on the Internet, this is not the case. These anomalous signs do not make sense. Why is there such a situation? Why don't high-level officials in Beijing come to the front line to supervise the disaster relief work?

1. The general secretary walked around the disaster area

Since Xi Jinping took office in 2013, he has never been to the disaster area or the scene of a major safety accident to supervise disaster relief and rescue work in the first place. From the 2013 Lushan earthquake, the 2014 Kunshan Zhongrong factory explosion and the Ludian earthquake, the 2015 Tianjin Binhai New Area explosion, the 2016 Anhui and Hubei floods, the 2019 Xiangshui chemical plant explosion and sixteen province floods, the 2020 Wuhan Pneumonia and southern floods, Zhengzhou floods in 2021, Guangdong floods in 2022, Fujian floods, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei floods, and Harbin floods in 2023, Xi Jinping may directly bypass the disaster area (or disaster site) to inspect other places, or send Beijing High-level Delegates went to inspect, or did not visit until several months after the disaster. This gives people the impression that Xi Jinping seems to always go around the disaster area (or disaster site), and never appear at the scene of emergency rescue and relief in the first place.

For at least the past 30 years, the leaders of major countries in the world have generally gone to the disaster area or the site of the incident as soon as possible when there is a major emergency. The "first time" here usually does not necessarily refer to the same day, because of safety factors, it is usually within a few days. For example, during the Wenchuan earthquake on May 12, 2008, Hu Jintao arrived in Mianyang on May 16 and Wenchuan on May 17 (Wen Jiabao had already arrived at the scene on May 14). In the "September 11 terrorist attack" that shocked the world in 2001, the then US President Bush only arrived at the disaster site on September 14.

It is undoubtedly an abnormal phenomenon for leaders not to inspect the disaster-stricken area until the end of the disaster relief. There are usually other reasons for this than the personality of the leader.

There are different opinions on why Xi Jinping did not visit the disaster area. Some people think that it is based on security considerations (including assassinations and coups), and there were rumors of "infighting" in the so-called "Beidaihe Conference" a few years ago. Another theory is that Xi Jinping wants to emulate Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in playing power games, but like the above speculation, it can neither be falsified nor given a strong explanation.

For example, the theory of "personal safety" may not hold water. If it is only because of Xi Jinping's own safety concerns that he cannot go to the disaster area immediately, it is always reasonable to send the prime minister or vice premier to inspect the disaster area, right? However, we have seen that after 2016, fewer representatives of Beijing’s high-level companies have been formally sent out, and most of the time they only rely on instructions to command in different places. This year's floods in Zhuozhou made even the leadership of the Zhuozhou government disappear collectively, and even netizens posted "missing notices" everywhere, asking loudly about the whereabouts of the leaders of the city government. In addition, Xi Jinping is not completely refraining from visiting the disaster area. A month after the Lushan earthquake in 2013, Xi Jinping visited the disaster area. More than half a year after the Ludian earthquake in 2014, Xi Jinping also visited the disaster area. One month after the flood in Anhui in 2020 subsided, Xi Jinping also went to the disaster area (at that time, it was also revealed by the media that there were female police officers posing as victims of the disaster). Xi Jinping often inspects various parts of China, and may not be the first to visit disaster-stricken areas. The risk of assassination or coup is higher. It is reasonable to say that it is reasonable to consider that the disaster may pose a risk to the personal safety of the leaders, but Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (including the then Prime Minister) must have the same concerns, but they were able to overcome all difficulties and go to the front line. This shows that the disaster factor is at least not the primary reason why the current leaders did not go to the disaster area to supervise the first time.

2. Tacitus Trap

The term "Tacitus Trap" is not imported, but comes from the Chinese esthetician Pan Zhichang. The "Tacitus Trap" refers to a government whose credibility is bankrupt, and no matter what it does, it will arouse criticism and doubt.

Chinese party media have noticed the "Tacitus Trap" in 2011 at the latest. "China Youth Daily" published an article on November 2, 2011, disclosing that some people used the "Tacitus Trap" to criticize the Ministry of Railways, the Red Cross, the government's improper handling of the Shaoyang shipwreck incident, the government's opaque information, and officials' personal morality. , and even the weather forecast has been criticized. By 2012, "People's Daily" also published an article acknowledging that the "Tacitus Trap" was becoming a frequent challenge to social management. In 2014, "China Youth Daily" reported according to the China Youth Public Opinion Monitoring Office that the impression of the negative event overshadowed the party's after-the-fact remediation, and the "Tacitus Trap" that "no one believes it no matter what" has been formed. That is to say, Chinese official media has directly or indirectly admitted that there was a crisis of credibility in Chinese society at that time, and since then, Chinese party media and official media have quoted this term very frequently.

On March 18, 2014, at the expanded meeting of the Standing Committee of the Lankao County Party Committee in Henan Province, Xi Jinping also specifically reminded the entire party to pay attention to the "Tacitus Trap." This shows that not only the party media and official media have noticed that the "Tacitus Trap" is becoming a real risk, but even Xi Jinping himself has noticed it.

But things turned around in 2017. "People's Daily" warned the government not to fall into the "Tacitus Trap" in early January of that year, but in mid-December it published three full-page articles in a row, denying that the "Tacitus Trap" was an inevitable law of political science, saying This is imposing Chinese national conditions with Western discourse, which does not conform to the reality of Chinese society, and even denies that the Chinese government has a crisis of credibility. The change in wind direction in 2017 may mean that the Chinese government has changed its strategy when dealing with the "Tacitus Trap". Since then, the enthusiasm for citing the "Tacitus Trap" in Chinese party and official media has plummeted.

However, in 2019, Reference News Network meaningfully brought up the old story again—at the beginning of the article, it straight to the point repeated Xi Jinping’s speech about the “Tacitus Trap” in Lankao County, Henan Province on March 18, 2014, which was accepted by China Daily 》Reposted by media such as Chinese website and World Wide Web. Even so, the use of the term in Chinese party and official media has remained fairly marginal and has plummeted in recent years. For example, in 2022, the "Liberation Daily" still uses this term in relatively marginal places to warn party and government officials to beware of the loss of credibility.

Judging from this situation, the Chinese government encountered contradictions and entanglements when it encountered the "Tacitus Trap". On the one hand, it admits that there is indeed a crisis of credibility in Chinese society, and on the other hand, it regards the "Tacitus Trap" as a challenge to Chinese politics by Western discourse (although it was actually invented by the Chinese), and then does not recognize the crisis of credibility of the Chinese government, or at least thinks that Under China's national conditions, the crisis of credibility is not insoluble; but at the same time, he never forgets to warn party and government officials to be vigilant against the "Tacitus trap".

Xi Jinping noticed the problem of the "Tacitus Trap" in 2014, which may mean that although he knows that the public expects him to go to the disaster-stricken area to stabilize people's hearts during the disaster, his government will be criticized whether he goes or not. . Especially after going there, if there is still insufficient disaster relief, it will be a major stain on Xi Jinping's personal authority. As for the remote control command of disaster relief from other places, there is such an advantage: the leader is responsible for the effective disaster relief, and the officials are responsible for the ineffective disaster relief.

In 2016 and before, the Chinese party media and official media released the news that then Premier Li Keqiang rushed to the disaster area to inspect the disaster situation in time. After 2016, the situation has changed a bit. For example, in 2021, the catastrophic floods in Henan, the news of Li Keqiang’s inspection of the disaster-stricken areas in Henan only appeared on the official website of the Chinese government, but the Chinese official media and party media did not mention it. When Li Keqiang supervised the disaster relief work in Chongqing in 2020, the situation was similar. At that time, only the media directly under the State Council system reposted it, and CCTV, Xinhua News Agency, People's Daily and other central media did not report (or deliberately delayed reporting for a few days), which inevitably aroused the outside world's reverie about the "dispute between government and court". If the Prime Minister was indeed appointed by the General Secretary to inspect the disaster, the Chinese media would definitely not respond in the same way. For example, in the 2015 Tianjin Binhai New Area explosion, People’s Daily Online clearly mentioned that Li Keqiang represented the Party Central Committee, the State Council, and General Secretary Xi Jinping in its report, and the report was released on the day Li Keqiang arrived at the scene (CCTV News also rolled out the report).

This situation cannot be ruled out to be related to the collective turn of the party media and official media on the issue of the "Tacitus Trap" in 2017, nor can it be ruled out that the State Council and the Party Central Committee have had major differences in this turn. Apparently, the State Council still adopted the traditional approach at that time, once a disaster occurred, it rushed to the disaster area as soon as possible. But the Party Central Committee is becoming more and more indifferent to this. After the change of the State Council in 2023, even if the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei catastrophic floods break out, both the Prime Minister and the General Secretary are still invisible, and only a deputy prime minister is appointed. Rushed to Zhuozhou disaster area.

Judging from this situation, in the face of the crisis of credibility, the Party Central Committee represented by Xi Jinping does show signs of "laying flat", at least no longer hopes to restore confidence by putting on a show on the front line of disaster relief. Yaba Akio, director of the Taipei branch of Japan's "Sankei Shimbun", also believes that the phenomenon of "collective lying down" has appeared in both the central and local leaders.

3. Disaster caused by flood discharge

Hebei is relatively close to Beijing. Under normal circumstances, even if the general secretary does not come to inspect the disaster, it is not too difficult to send the prime minister as a representative. However, due to the political task of "protecting Xiong'an" by digging dikes to release floods, it caused floods to the people in Zhuozhou and Bazhou, and the order to dig dikes is unlikely to be the result of the local government's own initiative, but more likely the result of the central government's instruction. Under such circumstances, if the central government sends representatives to the front line to supervise the disaster relief work, it may embarrass the central government.

Due to torrential rains, at least 13 rivers in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei were flooded beyond the warning line. Some local governments had to dig embankments to release the flood. As a result, residents in flood storage and detention areas, including Zhuozhou and Bazhou, were suddenly flooded. For example, the residents of Zhuozhou, the flood-hit area, released the flood in the middle of the night without being notified, making it too late for residents to evacuate. However, the authorities claimed that "many people did not take the flood discharge notice seriously", which aroused public indignation. This shows that the Zhuozhou government recognizes the flood discharge.

Even though the media repeatedly claimed that the flood was caused by torrential rain, other local governments besides Zhuozhou above also indirectly admitted the fact that they dug embankments to release the flood. For example, the Bazhou Municipal Government affirmed the sacrifices made by the villagers who voluntarily evacuated the flood storage and detention area in the "Letter to the Folks" on August 5, and promised compensation, which is an indirect acknowledgment of the dike digging to release the flood. In view of the heavy losses caused by the Zhuozhou government’s unannounced digging of embankments to discharge floodwaters, residents of Gaobeidian found out that the government ordered people to break the embankments to release floodwaters in the early morning of August 6th. Leave angrily.

Flood emergency management is in a mess, and local governments are unethical and dereliction of duty. I am afraid that this is also an important reason why the central government is inconvenient to send representatives to inspect the hardest-hit areas. If the prime minister or deputy prime minister comes to investigate the disaster, in order to protect Xiong'an in an emergency, the emergency measures may not be much better.

Due to the low-key handling of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei flood disaster by the central government, China's major official media and party media have been silent, only reporting the disaster relief situation in every corner, and deliberately avoiding the serious and the possible causes of the loss. About him.

According to the counterfactual hypothesis, if China's major media reported the disaster on a large scale as in previous years, the fermenting effect of public opinion would be immeasurable. In view of the fact that Chinese party media and official media usually have a unified caliber on major events, their propaganda caliber may have the following possibilities: 1. Focus on the disaster relief process and the disaster situation; 2. Focus on investigating the responsibility for flood discharge and questioning the cause of the flood caused by the heavy rain; 3. Shaping disaster narratives (promoting positive energy and shaping sadness); 4. Advocating fundraising. The 1st, 3rd, and 4th types of propaganda may all lead to the second type, and the second type is what the authorities try their best to avoid. Even if they want to be held accountable, local officials can only be used as scapegoats; but in the view of the central government, as long as the will of the central government is not violated and there is no serious dereliction of duty, there is no need to severely punish officials. Furthermore, the central government is not necessarily willing to expose one of Xi Jinping's important political achievements, the "sponge city" stormwater management system-its failure is directly related to the flood caused by Beijing's heavy rain-to the wind of public opinion.

If it involves disaster compensation and disaster relief subsidies, it may be a sensitive topic that the authorities are reluctant to face at the moment when the finances are stretched. During the Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008, the central government allocated approximately RMB 41.794 billion in living relief funds to the disaster-stricken areas, which were used as temporary living allowances for 9.2244 million people in the disaster-stricken areas. As of August 6 this year, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Emergency Management have accumulatively allocated 520 million yuan for flood control and disaster relief to the flood-stricken areas of Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Jilin and other underground areas, which does not include disaster relief living subsidies and does not involve compensation. Not to mention that the appropriation amount is so small that it is far from enough to make up for the disaster losses. Although the responsibility for flood discharge lies with the government, the government does not bear compensation and relief subsidies.

We have seen that in major disasters from 2020 to 2023 at least, the Chinese party media and official media do tend to downgrade their handling (except for Wuhan pneumonia). At the same time, one point that is often ridiculed by Chinese netizens is that the intensity of the Chinese media's rolling reports on the release of dangerous chemicals caused by the train derailment in Ohio, USA, is higher than that of the mine disaster in Inner Mongolia and the explosion of a chemical plant in Jiangxi. No representative was sent to inspect). On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that China's official mouthpiece and propaganda agencies deliberately downplay the frequent disasters and accidents that have occurred in the country in recent years.

4. Stability maintenance logic: continuous loss of popular support

The floods in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, especially in Zhuozhou and Bazhou, have exposed serious flaws in China's disaster emergency management. Wang Weiluo, a water conservancy expert living in Germany, said that Zhuozhou has blocked floods for Beijing and Xiong'an New Area, but the CCP has never planned a flood-fighting drill for Zhuozhou. This is a major flaw in Xi Jinping's governance. In addition, dike patrols should be strengthened during the flood season, which is also missing. Not only that, Zhuozhou, as a flood storage and detention area, lacks experience in fighting floods, and the disorderly evacuation of personnel is directly related to the government's dereliction of duty.

Not only that, the flood in Hebei once again appeared the bizarre scene of the flood in Zhengzhou in 2021. The main leaders of the local government were all in hiding at the most critical moment of the disaster. In contrast, the executive deputy mayor of Shulan City, Jilin Province, two officials and a water conservancy engineer died in the line of duty while supervising the frontline flood fighting and emergency rescue. Therefore, it is not ruled out that the local officials in Hebei may have fled cowardly, but there may be other reasons for not showing up after a few days after the flood broke out.

In addition, it is worth mentioning that Xi Jinping's popularity in Chinese society may not be as high as the propaganda. Especially after comparing Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao's team, the public resentment and anger caused by the disaster victims' ineffective disaster relief and shirking responsibility will also be uncontrollable factors. In addition, the tightening of online public opinion monitoring, strict censorship of speech, and high-intensity maintenance work just show from a certain side that the Xi Jinping era has to face the loss of popular support and the surge of public grievances. Although Xi Jinping also inspected the disaster area afterwards, the security work arranged in advance and the eyeliner installed can do his best to ensure that he will not go through the gang, but in the disaster area facing the emotional victims, the leader's face may not be guaranteed.

Although there is no law that requires leaders to go to the front line to command in person in order to stabilize the people's hearts, the Xi Jinping government has chosen a path of separating the government from the people's hearts. This road is not only caused by the collapse of credibility, but also caused by high-pressure stability maintenance work. As the leader of a totalitarian government, he does not really need the hearts and minds of the people like the leaders of democratic countries. Propaganda machines and stability maintenance machines can help him achieve the same goal, but the cost of governing is too high.

On August 4, people in Bazhou gathered outside the local government building and held up red banners to protest, "Return my home. It was obviously caused by flood discharge, but it was caused by rain." They were beaten by a group of men in black with riot shields. On August 9, villagers from Gaobeidian Xincheng Village went to the government to report their problems, but were also beaten by special police. In the eyes of the Chinese government, the opinions expressed by the disaster victims are of the same nature as the protection of the rights of depositors in rural banks in Henan, and they are both targets of stability maintenance and suppression.

In 2020, China's expenditure on maintaining stability in the name of public security expenditure will reach US$210 billion, which not only doubles in 10 years, but also exceeds military expenditure by 7% in the same year. Concealed under the pressure of huge stability maintenance expenditures is not only the political logic of using violent means to solve public opinion problems, but also the determination of the central government not to please the public opinion. During the Hu Jintao administration, building the legitimacy of governance was one of the most important political issues, and the enthusiasm for its policies was much higher than that since Xi Jinping came to power. Now the legitimacy of governance is no longer a hot topic in government official documents, party media, and official media. To some extent, it just shows that the central government is also showing signs of "laying down." The crisis of ruling legitimacy has reached a serious stage, and political reform has been hindered. The central government has instead sought to strengthen the security of the regime by means of maintaining stability.

In the report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping repeatedly emphasized the promotion of the modernization of the national security system and capabilities, and resolutely safeguarding national security and social stability. From one aspect, it reflects that the current problems faced by the Chinese government have gone beyond the scope of ruling legitimacy, and have been upgraded to issues of national security and social stability.

Under the political logic of the Chinese government, disasters not only threaten the safety of the people, but also endanger the political power and social stability. Under the general situation of maintaining stability, it is no longer a priority to win the hearts of the victims. For the Beijing authorities, not only the hearts of the disaster victims are not that important, but even the general public opinion and public opinion are not that important. During the "anti-extradition movement" in Hong Kong, the public opinion expressed by Hong Kong people was hit by maintaining stability. Hong Kong's superficial social stability can be guaranteed if it does not win the hearts of the people. This is the choice made by the Beijing authorities in a crisis-ridden moment. The logic of maintaining social stability in Mainland China.

It's not that the Beijing authorities don't care about public opinion and support, but that the government, which has fallen into a serious crisis of ruling legitimacy and is powerless, has been unable to give priority to public opinion and support. Between public opinion and public opinion, choosing to monitor public sentiment is also a political logic, because public sentiment can be directly suppressed and attacked. This is an important reason why China has stepped up efforts to monitor public opinion.

5. Summary: High-risk societies and autocratic governments

With the government's credibility collapsing, Chinese society has gradually become a high-risk society, which is also the fundamental reason why stability maintenance expenditures exceed military expenditures. In this environment, the use of stability maintenance measures to solve all problems has become the first priority.

Even if the flood caused the disaster, the government cannot be blamed. To some extent, the Beijing authorities have given up fighting for public opinion and support. From central to local, from party media to official media, there is general indifference to the disaster situation.

The government puts its priority and focus on maintaining stability through violence, and no longer struggles to overcome the crisis of governance legitimacy caused by the "Tacitus Trap": because in this trap, at least in the eyes of the Beijing authorities, no matter how hard you try, you will lose points .