《被统治的艺术》之被统治的艺术：删减部分中英对照

说明：

第一，（*）为中文删减标记，英文黑体为删减内容。

第二，英文页码是我从Library Gensis上下载的PDF版本的页码，并非原书页码，请注意！

第三，个人认为绝大部分内容没有必要删减，有点反应过度了。

1. 中文第234页：“古时候，众人会在游神的前一晚将神像安置于李氏宗祠。如今李氏宗祠早被拆除，改建为小学。于是，只好委屈神像在货仓休息一晚了。（*）”

英文：But the hall was torn down long ago to build a primary school, so the gods spend the night instead in a warehouse owned by the head of the organizing committee for the festival. He also owns a fireworks factory. (184)

2. 中文第329页：“官府不时努力调整（有时是在地方层级），采用正式的管理手段加强对社会的直接控制，而不是以非正式的管理手段间接地控制社会。但是，这些努力未能长期贯彻下去；部分原因是意识形态方面的考量，另一部分原因则是因为如果官府要直接控制社会，就必然要承担更高的成本。（*）然而，我们不应该受到主流观点的蒙蔽，反而应该看到历史发展的其他可能性。”

英文：There were periodic efforts, sometimes at the local level, to shift to direct rather than indirect control, to formal rather than informal management of local society. But such efforts never fully took root, in part because of ideological concerns, in part because there was no way to implement direct control without raising the costs. In some ways, the shift from informal to formal mechanisms of state control is still ongoing in China even today. The widespread notion that the transition to modernity is a linear process of state penetration and the building of uniform control should not blind us to the possibility of other historical trajectories.（258-259）

3. 中文第334—335页：“我们今天依然在中国听到的一句老话‘阳奉阴违’，很好地概括了本书所讨论策略的精髓。无独有偶，这句老话最早的一个出处是明末一封关于徭役的奏疏——尽管今天使用这句话的人大多不知道这一点。（*）”

英文：An old folk saying that one still hears in China today, “to comply overtly but violate covertly” (yangfeng yinwei), captures well the spirit of the strategies discussed in this book. As it happens, one of the early appearances of the phrase is in a late Ming memorial on corvée obligations —though people who use the phrase today are generally not aware of this. Examples of “complying overtly but violating covertly” abound in contemporary China. Many of China’s greatest fortunes were made in the early reform era through regulatory arbitrage, by people purchasing things in the command economy system and selling them at a higher price in the market economy (in this case I do use the term in the narrow sense, with its contemporary negative connotation). Jiang Jishi and his fellow naval officers from Fuquan in the Ming would have been right at home in the PLA Navy of the 1980s and 1990s, in which smuggling and collusion with smugglers was rife.（262-263）

4. 中文第335页：“我在上文的三点观察当中——关于契约、非正式组织以及国家语言的使用——至少第三点似乎在某种程度上适用于当今中国社会——我和中国人谈起这个课题时，他们往往最关注这一点。（*）举例来说，在中国某些地区，我们不难发现近年来重修的一些地方庙宇同时充作‘老人娱乐中心’和‘民俗研究所’。高丙中解释，当百姓重修法律地位模糊的寺庙时，他们会同时把它塑造成为一个绝对合法的社会组织。他把这个现象成为‘双名制’。筹建庙宇的人利用某个管理制度，如负责老人活动或民俗研究的机构，争取获得另一个管理制度——负责民间信仰的机构——的批准。魏乐博进一步阐发了这个观点，提出了‘盲眼治理模式’的概念。（*）同时，它也是明代官府依赖非正式管理手段在当代的写照。”

英文：“Among the three observations I made above—concerning contracts, informal institutions, and the use of state language—the third at least seems to retain a certain validity today—and is certainly the one most noticed when I talk about the subject in front of Chinese audiences. In the Maoist period, people continued to use state vocabulary deliberately to frame their political claims, and they still do so today. For example, in some parts of China one finds newly rebuilt local temples that also house “recreation centers for the elderly” and “folklore research centers.” Gao Bingzhong explains that when organizers rebuild a temple whose legal status is ambiguous, they deliberately create an unambiguously legitimate social organization at the same time. He calls this phenomenon “double-naming.” The temple organizers take advantage of one regulatory regime —that governing activities for the elderly or folklore studies—to secure authorization in another—popular religion. Robert Weller develops this argument further with the notion of blind-eyed governance, a “don’t ask, don’t tell” attitude on the part of the government to social forms and actions that are outside the strict letter of the law but are nonetheless tolerated. He suggests that officials turning a blind eye is actually a fundamental principle of politics in contemporary China. But it is also a modern analogue of the reliance on informal management in the Ming.”（263）

5. 中文第338页：“……并聆听本书提到的明代百姓的子孙讲述祖辈的故事。（*）一种他们与中国过去、现在，可能还包括未来的普通民众共有的‘被统治的艺术’。”

英文：“In Pinghai, the God of the Wall is once again taking his annual tour of the community, as he has done for centuries. The villagers’ ears are ringing from the cannons and their eyes are watery from the firecrackers. The path of the procession has been swept clean to ensure the purity of the ritual; now it is dotted red with the blood of the spirit mediums, who demonstrate their imperviousness to pain by piercing and cutting their bodies. The children of the village scurry around to get the best view of the spectacle; their grandmothers pull them away to shelter them from the baleful influence of the spirits. As the young men of the village carry the god and the various symbols of his authority, they recall the founding of their town by the god in his human form, more than six centuries ago. They commemorate and enact their identity as townsfolk and their distinctiveness from the villages around them. The organizers know that they should call the procession festival “intangible cultural heritage” or “popular culture,” lest the authorities label it instead as “feudal superstition.” Organizers and participants alike subtly commemorate and enact a distinctive mode of everyday politics, an art of being governed that they share with people in China past, present, and perhaps future.”（265-266）