Memoirs of a Loser 166: The Mystery of Dong Xia Zeng Shang

李怡
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IPFS
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Why did Tung Chee-hwa disregard the CCP's suggestion at that time and insist on conducting consultations on the electoral system? In addition to the reasons mentioned above, it was also related to the situation in China and Hong Kong at that time.

Some of the things mentioned in the previous articles, some netizens left messages, here are some supplements.

The first is about Hong Kong's use of foreign exchange reserves to repel international speculators during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Some netizens said that there are rumors on the Internet in mainland China that China stepped in to help Hong Kong save the crisis. And mainlanders also believe it.

A lie told a thousand times becomes an example of the truth. At that time, the CCP’s foreign exchange reserves were only US$140 billion, which was similar to that of Hong Kong. How could China help? The then Financial Secretary, Mr Donald Tsang, said that the whole thing was handled by Hong Kong officials and the CCP was informed afterwards. In 2000, U.S. President Clinton also told that when U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan visited Hong Kong, he wanted to examine the successful example of Hong Kong.

The second is the resignation of the three bureau officials after the 2003 parade. I have not explained the different reasons for the resignation of the three. Among them, only Secretary of Security Yip Lau Suk-yi resigned when she was pushing for the legislation of Article 23 because of lack of rationale and repeatedly showing contempt for opposing opinions. The resignation of the other two was not a big mistake. In 2003, the Financial Secretary, Leung Kam-sung, was accused of buying a motorhome for his own use without declaring it before announcing the increase in motor vehicle tax. The Secretary for Health and Welfare, Yang Wing-keung, did not arouse the public's vigilance because he still publicly stated that "there is no pneumonia outbreak in Hong Kong" when the number of SARS cases in Hong Kong was rising. The faults of the two are nothing compared to the big mistakes and arrogance of some high-ranking officials in the future. They were criticized by public opinion because their faults were magnified under the low popularity of the Dong regime.

I am very familiar with Liang Jinsong. We have known him since he was a student at the University of Hong Kong, and we have been in contact with each other all the time. Before "Apple Daily" revealed that he "sneaked to buy a car", he first notified his press officer, hoping to get his response before making the matter public. But his press officer didn't tell him, and it took "Apple" two days to reveal it as a scandal. He later told me that he gave up his high job in a bank with an annual salary of tens of millions to become a government official. How could he be greedy for a little tax? But he said that the problem is not whether he has such greed, but that the public thinks he has and loses credibility, so he has to resign.

Perhaps the senior officials of that era had a sense of responsibility and shame. After that, it got worse every time. Just as Yan Fu, an Enlightenment thinker in the late Qing Dynasty and the early Republic of China, said: "The disadvantages of the Huafeng, the eight characters, begin with falsification and end with shamelessness." After the transfer of sovereignty, Hong Kong has been hit by the "Huafeng".

The third thing is the real reason why Tung Chee-hwa resigned as I mentioned earlier. Some netizens said, if what I said is true, then he is blaming Lao Dong.

I would like to add that he did not blame Lao Dong at all. What I wrote in my memoirs were all my observations and analysis at that time, and I didn't want to defend anyone. Including Dong, and Liang Jinsong mentioned above. In the following memoirs, when I talk about the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, I will not hide my judgment on their words and deeds at that time because many pro-democracy activists are my friends and because of the misfortunes of their arrest. be right or wrong.

Why did Tung Chee-hwa disregard the CCP's suggestion at that time and insist on conducting consultations on the electoral system? In addition to the reasons mentioned above, it was also related to the situation in China and Hong Kong at that time.

In 2000, the United States abolished the annual review of the most-favored-nation treatment for China, and in 2001, the World Trade Organization accepted China as a member. This creates conditions for China's economic take-off. At this time, China wanted to rely on cheap labor and land resources to attract foreign investment, but lacked international connections. 70% to 80% of foreign investment comes from Hong Kong, and a considerable portion of exports go through Hong Kong businessmen to get tax incentives. High-tech products also depend on Hong Kong to import. It was China's interest at the time to maintain Hong Kong's "One Country, Two Systems" and try not to let Western countries question it. As far as the individual elites in the mainland are concerned, it is also their interests.

Therefore, the CCP is as hoarse as possible to all anti-communist and anti-communist voices in Hong Kong; it tries not to interfere with the Dong regime; it insists on uniting the front with all social strata, especially the business community; If Tung Chee-hwa wanted to use political reform to restore popularity, he should just do so in response to the 500,000-strong march. He never imagined that changes in the electoral system would involve the CCP's unyielding power.

After Dong stepped down, the CCP based on his good impression on the international community in the first few years of 1997, that "one country, two systems" was basically established, so he wanted to continue to "use" him, especially to use his relationship with the US political and business circles to deal with the US. Tung Chee-hwa has participated in or accompanied him when several U.S. presidents visited China, or CCP leaders visited the United States. He has more contacts with the high-level CCP, and I am afraid that he will not be able to avoid the "disadvantage of Huafeng". It is reported that Leung Chun-ying and Carrie Lam were the chief executives, and he recommended them to Xi Jinping. Therefore, even if he stepped down due to political reform, the people of Hong Kong are not wrong to blame him based on his subsequent performance.

Tsang, who succeeded Tung Chee-hwa in power, was an elite trained by Hong Kong British after leaving school. In the eyes of the CCP's concept of enemy sentiment, he is by no means a trustworthy candidate. Replacing Tung Chee-hwa with him is just an expedient measure. According to the provisions of the Basic Law, when the Chief Executive is vacant, a new Chief Executive shall be elected, and the new Chief Executive shall of course serve a five-year term. At that time, both the democrats and the pro-China factions said so at first. However, according to the news released by the CCP, the newly elected chief executive has only completed the unfinished two-year term of Tung Chee-hwa. According to the Basic Law, this is Hong Kong's internal affairs and should be subject to judicial review by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, but the National People's Congress once again violated the interpretation procedure and made a decision that it can only complete the unfinished term.

With a high popularity of 70%, Tsang Yinquan was selected as the next chief executive without any opponents. When he was appointed in Beijing, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao did not treat him with as much respect as Tung Chee-hwa, but were full of lessons. Tsang Yinquan also seemed a little sincere.

No matter which CCP leader is changed, Hong Kong public opinion is worthless in the eyes of the CCP. The CCP will not let Tung Chee-hwa, who has only 16% of the public opinion support, step down for the demonstration of 500,000 people, nor will it respect and trust Tsang Yam-kuen because he has 70% of his popularity, but will only be wary of him. Negotiating prices with the central government.

In the picture, in 2000, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, visited Hong Kong and met with the HKMA Director Yam Zhigang, Financial Secretary Donald Tsang and Tung Chee-hwa, and affirmed Hong Kong's defense in the Asian financial turmoil.

(Original post published on July 1, 2022)

"Memoirs of a Loser" serial catalog (continuously updated)

155. Observations and reflections in the early 1997

156. Tung Chee-hwa's 85,000 "Baby"

157. For the first time, everyone did not think so

158. My Column in The Letter

159. The cornerstone of "unchanged" begins to shake

160. Chen Fang Ansheng resigned, the civil service system collapsed

161. Woohoo! Hong Kong people are proud of the ICAC!

162. Seeing him rise from Zhulou, seeing his building collapse

163. What is the difference between the Governor of Hong Kong and the Chief Executive?

164. The Mystery of Tung Chee-hwa's Resignation (Part 1)

165. The Mystery of Tung Chee-hwa's Resignation (Part 2)

166. The mystery of Dong Xia Zeng Shang

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李怡李怡,1936年生,香港知名時事評論家、作家。1970年曾創辦雜誌《七十年代》,1984年更名《九十年代》,直至1998年停刊。後在《蘋果日報》撰寫專欄,筆耕不輟半世紀。著有文集《放逐》、《思緒》、《對應》等十數本。 正在Matters連載首部自傳《失敗者回憶錄》:「我一生所主張所推動的事情,社會總是向相反趨向發展,無論是閱讀,獨立思考或民主自由都如是。這就是我所指的失敗的人生。」
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