Chinese Order, Great Unification and International Democracy

Wang Feiling/Teng Biao

Teng Biao (hereinafter referred to as Teng): You once mentioned that the Qin-Han system, the Chinese order and Lenin-Stalinism have some coincidences. Can you explain it in detail? We know that Mao Zedong said that he was Marx plus Qin Shihuang. Maybe the Qin system has similarities with the modern communist totalitarian system, but communism, the great harmony of the world, and the world order of the "discrimination between Hua and Barbarians" seem to be very different.

Wang Feiling (hereinafter referred to as Wang): My answer is divided into two layers. On the first level, the Qin-Han regime is very consistent with the so-called Stalinist socialism and the one-party rule of the Communist Party. The so-called modern political system is highly consistent with a pre-modern thing, which just shows that the Stalinist dictatorship of the proletariat or one-party dictatorship is actually a very pre-modern (before the Enlightenment) old political system. It's just that the defense has changed from Mandate of Heaven to Mandate of the People, that is to say, whether it represents God's will or serves the people is different. Mao Zedong found that the distorted Stalinist Marxism was quite consistent with China's Qin and Han regimes and the so-called Confucianized Legalism. He took advantage of this very cleverly, claiming that he was Marx plus Qin Shihuang.

On the second level, Stalinism, Leninism and the original Marxism are also completely different things. The original Marxism was not like this, and it was different from China's unification of the world and the distinction between Hua and Barbarians. The young Marx still emphasized personal liberation, personal freedom, and the combination of free bodies. It was not at all the one-party dictatorship that Stalin implemented later, governing by means of suppression and control. Unfortunately, what China imported was Stalinism, not the so-called social democracy or democratic socialism that is still practiced in the West.

Teng: The Chinese order and the thought of great unification that you mentioned are basically synonymous. This kind of thought of great unification has an extremely profound impact on China's politics, history, and society. How exactly did it form? What is its connection with nationalism (in the current context, imperialism, Han chauvinism)?

Wang: To put it simply, the concept of grand unification, the Chinese order, or the World Empire (world empire) regime was formed gradually. It was first built in the Qin Dynasty, stabilized in the later Han Dynasty, stabilized by introducing Confucianism as a package, passed the imperial examinations in the Sui and Tang Dynasties and other systems, and went to extremes in the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties. It is a process of continuous improvement and change. . In the process, it was highly internalized and became a core concept of the so-called Chinese political culture. Chinese literati, intellectuals, and even ordinary people take the unification of the world as a matter of course and a normal state; while the division of the world, like the Westphalian system, is the current international system in the West, which is an abnormal state. This concept was originally formed due to the ecological and geographical environment. After long-term political influence, it was later used by the rulers to internalize it into a cultural concept and a deeply rooted value by means of political propaganda and suppression.

So what does it have to do with Han nationalism? Han nationalism is just a discovery and invention of modern people. In the past, there was no such thing as Han nationalism. There were only emperors who were obedient and rebellious.

Everyone will say that I am from Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing. No one will say that I am Han or Chinese. These are later inventions and creations. In my opinion, Han nationalism was used by the rulers after modern times to create a new ideology to compete with other countries and consolidate their own power.

Teng: Now the CCP uses cosmopolitanism, communism, and a community with a shared future for mankind at the same time, and it also advocates and promotes Han nationalism centered on the Han nationality, a kind of racism. For them, the two can be seamlessly connected, but the goal is actually one: I have to stay in power forever, and the doctrine is not too important to it. ——A term often used by nationalists is the Chinese nation, which was actually invented by Liang Qichao. Does it have anything to do with the Chinese order?

Wang: At that time, some intellectuals and political elites in China wanted to accomplish two things. One was to separate themselves from the Manchu rulers and at the same time separate themselves from the Western countries; The integrity of the territory under the occupation of the great national empire. In order to achieve these two goals, it is necessary to reinvent a concept, so there is the so-called "Chinese nation". "Chinese nation" does not exist in anthropology, it is a political concept. Later, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party made great use of this concept, that is to say, we are one nation just like the Western powers, and we are also a nation state with a single nation, so that there will be no various problems in multi-ethnic countries. Keep every piece of territory of the Manchu Empire, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Northeast China, etc. The political concept of "Chinese nation" has become a concept accepted by everyone in China due to the vigorous promotion of politics and the indoctrination of education.

Teng: You mentioned that the Chanyuan Alliance is "a peace treaty of Westphalia 643 years ahead of schedule". The Song Dynasty deviated from the tradition of the Chinese order for three centuries. How did this come about?

Wang: Thank you for mentioning this point. It is my own experience in reinterpreting Chinese history. Now I find that there are not many people who have this view. In the discussion of Chinese history, the Song Dynasty has long been regarded as a weak and unenviable dynasty. But in fact, the Song Dynasty was a peak of Chinese civilization. The rulers of the Song Dynasty gave up their ambition to unify the known world by force, and gradually became familiar with and accepted the situation that several emperors coexisted in a known world. There are natural factors, historical path-dependent factors, man-made and some accidental factors. But they have never been satisfied, because they are still deeply rooted in the implementation of the Qin and Han systems, and they still want to try to unify the world from time to time, and it is difficult to curb their desire to become the real emperor and the real son of heaven. In the end, it led to a big mistake, which caused the collapse of the Song Dynasty and the collapse of China's golden age. In Chinese history, the Song Dynasty was the only major dynasty that was not overthrown by internal rebellion, but was wiped out by external enemies. The fault is that it has not been consistent in its foreign policy, but is tempted by the devil in its own heart from time to time to build a world empire.

The Chanyuan system is an invention that the Chinese are far ahead of the Europeans, and it is unfortunate that they cannot persist. One of the reasons is that the Chanyuan system is different from the Westfalia system, and has inherent shortcomings from the beginning. Both the emperors of the Liao and Song dynasties swore that whoever violated this treaty would suffer a terrible death, and it turned out to be the case. Song Huizong and Song Qinzong were captured and taken to the north by the Jin people, which was quite miserable. This also shows that the eastern part of the Eurasian continent, like people of all ethnic groups in Europe and the Mediterranean, has the ability to innovate an international system.

Teng: How did the Yuan and Qing dynasties, as alien rule, unite with the "Chinese" order? In the history of the world outside of China, are there any ideological traditions and imperial practices similar to the Chinese order?

Wang: The Chinese order, like the Qin and Han regimes, is highly attractive to all authoritarian rulers or emperors. This attraction is beyond the limitations of nationality, culture, and language. Especially when the system is more refined and works effectively, autocrats will like it. Therefore, the Mongols and the Manchus of the Qing Dynasty later accepted this system and made it more solidified and violent.

The emperor of the Qing Dynasty was very diligent and the bureaucracy was quite effective. Therefore, although it is ruled by foreign races, the Han scholar-bureaucrats found that there is no problem, we can accept it and fight for it. People like Zeng Guofan and Nian Gengyao could fight for the rule of the Qing Dynasty all their lives. In their view, the so-called differences in national culture are not as important as we think today, as long as there is a good emperor. The so-called Hua-Yi debate, if the foreign barbarians accept our way, they will become us, and if we don’t accept this way, we will become foreign barbarians. Emperor Yongzheng also specially wrote an article to illustrate this problem. This shows that the Chinese order and the Qin and Han regimes have a universal appeal.

Are there such systems in other parts of the world? have. For example, the Inca Empire in South America, the Aztecs and Maya in Central America, in Africa, and in the Mediterranean region, some rulers continue to hope to establish a world empire. But most of them failed. In China, many of them have succeeded, and they have been maintained for a long time; this is also related to China's ecological and geographical environment, and has something to do with the conscious indoctrination of Chinese emperors.

Teng: Professor Ge Zhaoguang said that China missed four historical opportunities to change its worldview, namely the period when Buddhism was introduced to China, the Song Dynasty, the Yuan Dynasty and the late Ming Dynasty. It was extremely difficult to change the concept of the world, and it was not until the late Qing Dynasty encountered the great powers that it had to accept a new world view. One of the main reasons is that China's traditional civilization and ideological system are too familiar, so they are extremely stubborn. Do you agree with this statement?

Wang: What Mr. Ge said makes sense. But I don't completely agree with some of his specific analysis. I think there are only two historical opportunities, one after the Han Dynasty, the Wei, Jin, Southern and Northern Dynasties and the Three Kingdoms period. The long period of division in the Wei, Jin, Southern and Northern Dynasties failed to be perfected and institutionalized. Another time was the Song Dynasty. The emperor's rule in the Song Dynasty was a little more relaxed, more benevolent, and rarely killed ministers and so on. Some Western scholars believe that in the Song Dynasty, China was actually ahead of the Europeans and was at the gate of modernization, but it did not enter. I don't think the Ming and Yuan dynasties were major changes, on the contrary they re-consolidated the Chinese order. Although there were people like Gu Yanwu in the late Ming Dynasty, it did not mean that it was a real opportunity at that time.

As for China's traditional civilized ideology, which matures prematurely and is relatively stubborn, I think that the reform is not due to early maturity or solidification, but because of a unified view of power or internalized cultural view, as well as the constraints of the ecological and geographical environment. There must be a political system with external pressure and internal competition, which only existed during the Song Dynasty or the Three Kingdoms, Southern and Northern Dynasties. Because of climate change that year, the Mongols went south, which made the Song Dynasty system unsuccessful.

The Qin and Han regimes and the Chinese order have been maintained for a long time. In this sense, it is a peak of human political governance, but compared with the peak after modernity, this peak is just a small hill.

The evolution of human political governance systems should be endless. Many friends think that Chinese people mature earlier than Europeans, but that may not be the case. The Chinese just reached a peak and stopped going forward due to various reasons; while in Europe, they kept moving forward due to the trend of international competition. The Chinese order solidified and stagnated a long time ago. This is hardly a kind of maturity. Maybe it should be called premature aging.

Teng: From the time of Confucius, many Chinese felt that the most ideal China was in the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties. Some people feel that Confucianism is more like Western conservatism.

The well-known sinologist Konan Naito once wrote: "As long as (China) is defeated in wars with foreign countries, the concept of race will always arise from time to time, and when it becomes strong, it will immediately return to the thinking mode that China represents the world." You It is written in the book, "The Chinese order has been deeply internalized into the only and proper world order in people's hearts after thousands of years of practice." Do you think there is a constant transformation between tianxia and racism, universalism and particularism? ? How to understand the tension between the two?

Wang: Mr. Naito's research and elaboration on Chinese history is very interesting. I appreciate his high evaluation of the history of the Song Dynasty. He said that when China's rulers failed in foreign wars, they began to instigate nationalist thoughts. The rulers always say that foreigners have bullied and humiliated us, but in fact it is the rulers who have failed. The so-called "century-old national humiliation" shames the rulers, not the common people. The progress that the Chinese people have made in those one hundred years is rare in history, including science, medicine, social facilities, and people's living standards. These are all huge qualitative leaps, and there is no shame at all.

Foreign invaders in the past were sometimes relatively backward and cruel, but since the mid-19th century, those who invaded China or influenced China represented more advanced science and technology, organizational methods and ideas. Of course they have brought many disasters to China, but they have brought more benefits. Moreover, some disasters are the result of ordinary people being incited to xenophobia. For example, the United States, which is most beneficial to China, and the West have become enemies, while Russia and North Korea, which often bully China, have become good friends. This shows that the interests of the rulers and the interests of the people are inconsistent.

Teng: How does racism/nationalism harm China's domestic politics and international order? We know that there are many dissidents who pursue democracy, Chinese who call themselves liberals, but also have a deep-rooted idea of unity and discrimination against blacks, Muslims and ethnic minorities.

Wang: I completely agree with your analysis. The so-called nationalism and even racism in China are largely man-made and instigated. Today's Chinese people actually have no fundamental hatred, let alone any fundamental fear, with other countries in the world and the West. The so-called "death to the heart will never die", who is the "I"? In fact, he is the ruler and has nothing to do with the people.

Incited nationalism is a threat to world peace, neighboring countries, and a huge threat to the Chinese people. Militarism has been instigated in history, how many ordinary people are lucky? The Qin Dynasty conquered the six countries, but the disasters of the people of the Qin Dynasty are too numerous to describe. The rulers of the Qin Dynasty themselves did not end well. The Ying family ruled the Qin State for hundreds of years. A huge royal family with a population of more than 100,000 was wiped out after the collapse. Today, there are no people with the surname Ying in China. Who sings the praises of Qin Shihuang? Only people like Zhang Yimou who have a messy view of history.

Teng: Do these concepts and traditions, such as the Chinese order and world view, have some secret relationship with the Chinese dream, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and the community of shared future for mankind proposed by the Communist Party?

Wang: Of course. That is why today we have to reinterpret Chinese history, reorganize these concepts, allow Chinese people, especially Chinese elites, to freely read and interpret history, and discuss what is best for China. Whether it is the so-called Chinese dream, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, or the establishment of a community with a shared future for mankind, in my opinion, it is actually just a packaging of the Chinese order to varying degrees. Not to mention that there are problems with the logic of these formulations, the consequences of their actual operation will be very worrying. Ordinary people will become victims of militarism and cannon fodder for rulers. The so-called Emperor Qin, Han Wu, Genghis Khan, and the so-called prosperity of Kangxi and Qianlong are all the vanity and authority of the rulers, and have nothing to do with the real well-being of the people. The common people are in great pain. Precisely because of the establishment of the world empire, China's economic, cultural and technological development and people's living standards have been stagnant for a long time.

Teng: Considering the history and reality of Tibet (Tibet) and Xinjiang (East Turkestan), as well as the development trend of identity politics and national independence movements, do you have any predictions for the prospects of Tibet and Xinjiang striving for independence?

Wang: It is difficult to make specific predictions. But if we have a deep grasp of history and sufficient possession of real data, we can make some less stupid reasoning.

Tibet and Xinjiang are, of course, problems left over from history, problems left over from the multi-ethnic world empire of the Manchu and Qing Dynasties. The original Han Dynasty basically never ruled Tibet, and occasionally entered part of Xinjiang, but never completely ruled Xinjiang. These two places have long been considered marginal areas with little value. Xinjiang has become more important today because it has resources; from an economic point of view, Tibet is actually a money-losing business for the People’s Republic of China: the money invested by the central government in Tibet is far higher than the benefits Tibet can provide. For the Han people, the existence of Tibet and Xinjiang is actually a political decision, not our divine natural rights. You can make a bold guess that if Tibet and Xinjiang are really independent one day, it may not be a bad thing for the Han people, or even for the Han people living in these two regions. The history of the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period and the Song Dynasty shows that during the split period, the Han nationality and some other surrounding ethnic groups may have lived better. It may be difficult for Chinese people who have not reflected on history to accept it, and may call this statement a traitor to the country. In fact, Tibet and Xinjiang do not belong to me, nor does China belong to me, so I cannot betray my country.

Tibet and Xinjiang have never belonged to the Han people, but the Manchus brought them in. To say that Tibet, Xinjiang, and Outer Mongolia are all ours is like today's Indians saying that Canada and Australia are ours, because we were all ruled by the same ruler at one time, which is illogical.

Teng: The Dalai Lama proposed a middle way instead of independence. Of course, it is a very wise and benevolent proposition, but I think the root cause is the powerful autocratic power of the CCP; if China is a democratic system and it is not so powerful, the majority Tibetans, especially young Tibetans, want independence. I also think that whether it is the Tibet issue or the Xinjiang issue, it is a very worrying issue for China's future democratic transition. What is your opinion on the prospect of China's democratic transition?

Wang: I agree with your analysis. Tibet and Xinjiang issues may become a less favorable factor in the process of China's political transformation, because nationalism will be incited. Territorial issues cause a lot of people to get too excited and then forget what is best for China.

Unfortunately, the possibility of China moving in the direction of liberalization and democratization is not very high; especially, the possibility of internal transformation is even lower, that is to say, it is unlikely that the rulers will change by their own conscience. . But if China's rulers are facing domestic and foreign difficulties and are desperate, they may make some concessions, and these concessions may suddenly get out of control and cause real changes. After all, after decades of Westernization and opening up to the outside world, China has undergone many changes in people's ideas. But the Chinese system has a super self-reinforcing ability and controls a lot of resources. For example, the ideological and political work of the CCP can be said to be unparalleled in the world and extremely effective.

The price of democratization may be that Xinjiang and Tibet will leave, and some people's lives and properties may be lost. But in the history of human progress, there is no progress without cost, but we are obliged to minimize this cost.

Teng: Can you explain the effects of CCP optimization and China suboptimization? How did this come about? How does this affect China's political transition? While the Chinese Communist Party has accumulated enormous economic and military resources, it has also accumulated extremely rich experience in governance. Stein Reign called it "sophisticated totalitarianism" (sophisticated totalitarianism), which is cruel and vicious, but also has a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability, and has a strong learning ability. I use "high-tech totalitarian system" to emphasize its ubiquitous and efficient monitoring.

Wang: I mentioned the CCP’s optimization and China’s sub-optimization in “China Record: Assessing the People’s Republic of China”. This system can provide autocratic rulers with a fairly powerful and resilient mechanism, but the other side of this system is its sub-optimal rule and sub-optimal governance. China's economy, social development, people's lives, culture and technology, environmental protection, and disaster control are all mediocre, often catastrophic, and tragic. Like the Mao era. Today's China's economic development has attracted worldwide attention, but the vast majority of ordinary people are still very difficult and can only survive in a sub-optimal state. And rulers have enormous power and resources. This is also in line with a conclusion of Western political science. A bad government does not necessarily collapse immediately. Before the Enlightenment Movement, a large number of backward regimes were able to govern for a long time. As long as the rulers had enough ability to optimize their rule and had enough resources, they could still rule even though the governance of the country was a mess.

Teng: If China maintains its current authoritarian system, is it possible for it to coexist peacefully with other countries, especially liberal democracies? Is it because they "hide their strengths and bide their time" when they are not strong enough, and once they think they are strong, they should "make a difference", "rise peacefully", or even engage in wolf-war diplomacy and promote the "China plan" everywhere? Some people say that the CCP only wants to maintain its monopoly position and dictatorship in China, but does not want to export revolution, export the "Chinese model" and dominate the world. In your opinion, does the CCP have expansion ambitions and is it trying to use the Chinese order to create Alternative to the Westphalian sovereign order as dominated by the West? Is there any possibility of re-establishing the tributary system of Sino-centrism?

Wang: A Chinese order based on the Qin-Han regime is the dream of all Qin-Han regime rulers, and it is also their ultimate mission and curse. They don't feel safe if they don't. The rulers of the Song Dynasty obviously lived a good life, but they insisted on destroying the system because they felt at ease in this way. The same is true in today's China. When you are weak, you keep a low profile. Once you feel strong, or feel that the rest of the world is bad, you have to "do something". It seems to me that this is predestined, determined by the red gene. This is very unfortunate, and it is even more unfortunate for the Chinese people. Let them suffer every day, and spend countless money to build islands, build aircraft carriers, and distribute money to Africa. There is only one possibility for China to coexist peacefully with other countries in the world, and that is to abandon the Chinese order, reform politics, and implement democracy.

Teng: The very well-known democratic peace theory in international politics: wars and military conflicts are basically between autocratic countries, or between democratic countries and autocratic countries, and there are very few or almost no wars between democratic countries. Is it true that after China realizes democracy, the threat to the international order ceases to exist? After learning history and discussing issues freely as you emphasized, will this kind of unification of the Qin and Han systems gradually fade away?

Wang: Indeed. The China threat theory is sometimes accurate. For example, China's power under the leadership of the CCP is a threat. But it is not necessarily true that the Chinese as a nation must conquer other nations. Of course, Xi Jinping claimed that the Chinese nation has been peace-loving since ancient times, and that peace is in our genes, which is completely inconsistent with the facts. The Chinese nation or the Han nation often conquered other countries and massacred others in history, and even carried out genocide against the Junggar tribe in the late Qing Dynasty. But if the system is right, the Chinese can coexist peacefully like everyone else. If China's system and concepts do not change, then the rising power of China will not be a good thing for the world.

Teng: As soon as Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations was put forward, it immediately aroused huge repercussions, and also aroused widespread doubts and criticisms. What is your position? Is your own statement taken as an example of a clash of civilizations theory? The "China Threat Theory" has been very active, and a lot of discussions have emerged. People have observed that China's threat to the international order does exist. Then, when acknowledging and responding to China's threat, how do we not essentialize a country or civilization? Do not go towards hostility and depreciation of non-Christian and non-Western civilizations?

Wang: This question is very good and forward-looking. This is what I want to explore in the final volume of my trilogy series on China. Huntington's theory was an objection to Fukuyama's end-of-history conclusion that conflict would continue. I think Huntington's judgment is still correct so far. Of course, I don't quite agree with his division of civilizations. The classification of Christian civilization, Buddhist civilization, and Confucian civilization is far-fetched and inaccurate.

Without sufficient socio-political change, the rise of China's power will harm others as well as itself. But I tend to use "CCP threat theory" or "People's Republic of China threat theory" instead of "China threat theory". The "China threat theory" is literally racist. Chinese people have no reason to conquer the world, to use force to massacre others, they will only do so under the instigation and drive of the government. For example, supporting Russia, etc., is not the choice of ordinary people, but the leader's decision there.

We need to take this threat of Chinese power under the leadership of the CCP seriously, without turning the Chinese threat into a racist clamor. Like my friend said "you can chew gum while walking".

Teng: The Chinese government and the Communist Party do not represent China or the Chinese people. This is common sense. It is a pity that many scholars and politicians have forgotten this point. And the Chinese Communist Party also takes advantage of this, saying that you are engaging in Asian discrimination, racism, and so on.

Wang: Yes. Wrong concepts have been used for a long time, and if you get used to them, they will have an impact on actual actions.

Teng: With the spread of human rights ideas, the success of liberal democracy, the progress of the international rule of law, and the development of globalization, the principle of non-interference in sovereignty is being challenged. Will human rights over sovereignty become an international consensus? From a more macro and long-term perspective, will freedom and democracy, as predicted by Fukuyama, become the end of history and the only system choice for all countries in the world, will it become a reality?

Wang: Human rights instead of sovereignty represent some idealistic ideas. But in the entire history of human civilization, the most beautiful ideas often lead to counterproductive results. That is to say, between human rights and sovereignty, between universal equality and freedom and the juxtaposition and competition of all countries, a balance should be established rather than a substitute relationship. In other words, maintain the Westphalian system rather than abolish it. Canceling the Westphalian system in the name of human rights is precisely the realization of the Chinese order from the back door.

Teng: In my opinion, the trend of human history is probably towards freedom and democracy, towards the direction of human rights over sovereignty. Of course, it is still far away to achieve this goal.

Thank you very much for accepting our interview and congratulations on the publication of your three books.

[This interview was published in the second issue of the just-published "China Democracy Quarterly". https://chinademocrats.org/?cat=8 Please download, subscribe, and disseminate "China Democracy Quarterly", and please contribute to the masterpiece. 】