"The Art of the Ruled": The Art of the Ruled: Abridged Chinese and English

illustrate:

First, (*) is the mark of deletion in Chinese, and the boldface in English is the content of deletion.

Second, the English page numbers are the page numbers of the PDF version I downloaded from Library Gensis, not the original book page numbers, please note!

Third, I personally think that most of the content does not need to be deleted, which is a bit overreacted.

1. Chinese page 234: "In ancient times, people would place the statue in the Li's ancestral hall the night before the wandering gods. Now the Li's ancestral hall has been demolished and converted into a primary school. Therefore, the aggrieved statue has to rest in the warehouse for a while. late.(*)"

English: But the hall was torn down long ago to build a primary school, so the gods spend the night instead in a warehouse owned by the head of the organizing committee for the festival . He also owns a fireworks factory . (184)

2. Chinese, p. 329: “The government has made efforts from time to time to adjust (sometimes at the local level) to increase direct control over society through formal management rather than indirect control through informal management. However, these efforts have not It can be implemented in the long run; partly because of ideological considerations, and partly because if the government wants to directly control society, it will inevitably bear higher costs. (*) However, we should not be blinded by mainstream views, Instead, we should see other possibilities for historical development.”

English: There were periodic efforts, sometimes at the local level, to shift to direct rather than indirect control, to formal rather than informal management of local society. But such efforts never fully took root, in part because of ideological concerns, in part because there was no way to implement direct control without raising the costs. In some ways, the shift from informal to formal mechanisms of state control is still ongoing in China even today. The widespread notion that the transition to modernity is a linear process of state penetration and the building of uniform control should not blind us to the possibility of other historical trajectories. (258-259)

3. Chinese pp. 334-335: "An old saying that we still hear in China today, 'Yang follows yin and violates', sums up the essence of the strategies discussed in this book. Coincidentally, one of the earliest sources of this old saying is in the late Ming Dynasty. A stipulation on corvée - although most people who use the phrase today don't know it. (*)"

English: An old folk saying that one still hears in China today, “to comply overtly but violate covertly” ( yangfeng yinwei ), captures well the spirit of the strategies discussed in this book. As it happens, one of the early appearances of the phrase is in a late Ming memorial on corvée obligations —though people who use the phrase today are generally not aware of this. Examples of “complying overtly but violating covertly” abound in contemporary China. Many of China's greatest fortunes were made in the early reform era through regulatory arbitrage, by people purchasing things in the command economy system and selling them at a higher price in the market economy (in this case I do use the term in the narrow sense, with its contemporary negative connotation). Jiang Jishi and his fellow naval officers from Fuquan in the Ming would have been right at home in the PLA Navy of the 1980s and 1990s, in which smuggling and collusion with smugglers was rife. (262-263)

4. Chinese p. 335: “Among my three observations above—about contracts, informal organizations, and the use of state language—at least the third seems to apply to some extent in Chinese society today—I When discussing this topic with the Chinese, they tend to focus on this point the most.(*) For example, in some areas of China, it is not difficult to find that some local temples that have been rebuilt in recent years serve as both 'entertainment centers for the elderly' and ' Folklore Research Institute'. Gao Bingzhong explained that when the people rebuilt a temple with an ambiguous legal status, they would also shape it into an absolutely legal social organization. He called this phenomenon a 'two-name system'. Those who planned to build temples used a certain Management systems, such as agencies responsible for elderly activities or folklore research, seek approval of another management system—the agency responsible for folk beliefs. Wilebo further elaborates on this point of view, and proposes the concept of a 'blind governance model'.( *) At the same time, it is also a contemporary portrayal of the Ming government’s reliance on informal management methods.”

English: "Among the three observations I made above—concerning contracts, informal institutions, and the use of state language—the third at least seems to retain a certain validity today—and is certainly the one most noticed when I talk about the subject in front of Chinese audiences. In the Maoist period, people continued to use state vocabulary deliberately to frame their political claims, and they still do so today. For example, in some parts of China one finds newly rebuilt local temples that also house “recreation centers for the elderly” and “folklore research centers.” Gao Bingzhong explains that when organizers rebuild a temple whose legal status is ambiguous, they deliberately create an unambiguously legitimate social organization at the same time. He calls this phenomenon “double-naming.” The temple organizers take advantage of one regulatory regime —that governing activities for the elderly or folklore studies—to secure authorization in another—popular religion. Robert Weller deve lops this argument further with the notion of blind-eyed governance, a “don't ask, don't tell” attitude on the part of the government to social forms and actions that are outside the strict letter of the law but are nonetheless tolerated . He suggests that officials turning a blind eye is actually a fundamental principle of politics in contemporary China. But it is also a modern analogue of the reliance on informal management in the Ming.” (263)

5. Chinese p. 338: "...and listen to the descendants of the Ming people mentioned in this book tell the stories of their ancestors. (*) A 'ruled' they share with the common people of China past, present, and possibly the future. the art of'."

English: " In Pinghai, the God of the Wall is once again taking his annual tour of the community, as he has done for centuries. The villagers' ears are ringing from the cannons and their eyes are watery from the firecrackers. The path of the procession has been swept clean to ensure the purity of the ritual; now it is dotted red with the blood of the spirit mediums, who demonstrate their imperviousness to pain by piercing and cutting their bodies. The children of the village scurry around to get the best view of the spectacle; their grandmothers pull them away to shelter them from the baleful influence of the spirits. As the young men of the village carry the god and the various symbols of his authority, they recall the founding of their town by the god in his human form, more than six centuries ago. They commemorate and enact their identity as townsfolk and their distinctiveness from the villages around them. The organizers know that they should call the procession festival “intangible cult ural heritage” or “popular culture,” lest the authorities label it instead as “feudal superstition.” Organizers and participants alike subtly commemorate and enact a distinctive mode of everyday politics, an art of being governed that they share with people in China past, present, and perhaps future.” (265-266)