Chapter 7, Appendix: Study on the Dalonghua Battle of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Sub-district (2)

7.6. Battle near Xiling

May 20th was the day when Yang Chengwu's troops successfully encircled and annihilated the Japanese army near Dalonghua. But the battle was not over yet. From May 21st to 25th, it was the final stage of the battle, mainly the retaliatory counterattack and mopping-up organized by the Japanese army.

The following is a record of the Dalonghua battle from the headquarters of the 140th Regiment in Zhuo County. The regiment history is called "Detailed Battle Report", but judging from the content, it is "Diary in the Battlefield". It mainly records various contact matters with the front-line troops in chronological order. Including status reports of the front-line troops, and the deployment and orders of the regiment. The content is not just the Dalonghua battle, but the process of the regiment organizing the rescue of the Lianggezhuang Third Battalion in the afternoon of the 20th, and the content of the revenge and mopping-up operations of the main force of the regiment against Yang Chengwu's troops from the 21st to the 25th (the battle near Xiling). The report on the battle situation in Dalonghua is of reference value in the strategic understanding of the battle process near Dalonghua. The following is the specific content:

Regarding the daytime battle on the 20th, "the enemy was the 1st Independent Division led by Yang Chengwu and Zhao Yukun, about 3,000 men, and the 6th Independent Division led by Deng Hua, about 1,000 men. In the early morning of the 20th, one part of the troops attacked Dalonghua Village, while another part entered the Xiling area and clashed with our road fortification protection team." At 15:00 on the 20th, the Zhuo County Joint Corps Headquarters received the following report from the Lianggezhuang Third Battalion Headquarters.

First report: The Dalonghua Guard was attacked by a superior enemy at 1:00 a.m. today and has repelled them. The Guard is currently sending out a part of the counterattack, and the details are currently unknown. The Fujita Team (a small team of the 10th Squadron, equipped with 2 machine guns and 1 cannon) that is protecting the road fortifications is fighting with the enemy near Daling.

Second report: The battalion sent Lieutenant Xin Tian to command part of the squadron to reinforce and attempt to enter Dalonghua Village.

The third report: The Xintian reinforcement team was blocked by the enemy in the front and was in a tough battle. (The reinforcement team was blocked at the blue flag in the east of Xiaolonghua)

The above is the report record of the Third Battalion to the Wing Headquarters. Judging from the time sequence of the reports, the first and second reports should be at 9:00 on the 20th, after the main force of the Kiso Squadron attacked Hill 315. The third report was before 15:00 in the afternoon. It can be seen that after the battle began until 15:30 on the 20th, the Wing Headquarters and the Lianggezhuang Inland Sea Battalion Headquarters, 20 kilometers away, did not realize the seriousness of the Eighth Route Army's main force attacking Dalonghua. The Wing Headquarters only collected intelligence and did not take any active action.

Facing thousands of enemies, the reinforcements sent by Captain Utsumi were only about two squads (dozens of people) of the Xintian Squadron. In response, the troops that attempted to stop the Japanese reinforcements near Dahongmen on the way were the main force of Yang Chengwu's First Regiment (Chen Zhengxiang), etc., with at least a thousand people deployed. The Xintian Team was the 10th Squadron of the 3rd Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Nitta Jisaburo. A squad had already covered the road fortifications in Xiling, called the Fujita Squad (Second Lieutenant Fujita Akizo). After the merger, there were less than 100 people in this unit, and of course it was impossible to cross the Dahongmen (Xianglanqi) blocking line of the Eighth Route Army. Captain Utsumi received the news that the Xintian Team had entered a hard battle on the way to rescue at 15:00, and then he asked for help from the Zhuo County headquarters. Because except for the 9th Squadron of the Reserve Guard Lianggezhuang, Captain Utsumi had no other troops to call.

Regarding the Dalonghua crisis, the handling of the Dalonghua crisis by the commander of the regiment, Kobayashi Choji, was also very slow. The Kiso unit on the front line near Dalonghua was divided into three parts, and the overall crisis occurred between 13:00 and 15:00 on the 20th. On the one hand, the Zhuoxian regiment headquarters did not respond until 17:00, and issued "Changzuo Order No. 114", formulating a plan for the main force of the regiment to reinforce. However, the only force that could be urgently mobilized at this time was a small infantry squad of the second battalion stationed in Baoding (about 90 kilometers southeast of Lianggezhuang). This team was ordered to "immediately take a car to Lianggezhuang and enter the command of the third battalion commander." At 19:00, when the commander of the regiment organized the rest of the troops to attempt to reinforce, he received the fourth report from the commander of the third battalion of Utsumi:

1. The enemy forces in front of the Blue Banner Xintian Team gradually increased to 2,000, and the battle became increasingly fierce. Part of the enemy was advancing northwards from Xiling to Lianggezhuang. 2. The brigade attempted to occupy the 250-meter high ground west of Lianggezhuang to stop the enemy from advancing.

It can be seen that before and after the Eighth Route Army won the victory near Dalonghua, there was an attempt to use the remaining heavy troops to march to Lianggezhuang. Captain Uchiha's countermeasures were no longer to rescue Dalonghua, but to defend Lianggezhuang, that is, to use the last troops at hand (the 9th Squadron) to try to stop the enemy's attack on Lianggezhuang and prevent the Lianggezhuang Battalion headquarters, which was empty of troops in the rear, from falling. It can be seen that at this moment, the Third Battalion in the Lianggezhuang area had reached the end of its rope. However, Captain Kobayashi denied this plan and ordered the Third Battalion to continue to attack and rescue Dalonghua.

The content of "Changzuo Order No. 115" issued by Zhuo County Headquarters at 20:00 on the 20th is as follows:

1. The number of enemies in the Xiling area is gradually increasing. 2. The regiment intends to annihilate this enemy. 3. The Third Battalion should continue to make efforts to launch the attack. 4. The captain of the First Battalion will gather the troops of Xincheng (about 70 kilometers east of Lianggezhuang) to quickly support Lianggezhuang and assist the Third Battalion in the battle. 5. The captain of the Second Battalion will organize a punitive team based on the First Infantry Company, and set out from Lao Village in the morning of the 21st to attack the enemy on the south side of Xiling and near Beishilou. 6. Lieutenant Kimura will command the flag squad, the communications squad, the armored vehicle squad, and the automatic vehicle of the military station to strive to set off from Zhuo County at 07:30 on the 21st. The rest of us will travel with this team by car and advance towards Lianggezhuang.

In this way, the commander of the regiment, Kobayashi, organized a punitive team overnight, and assembled all the troops of the regiment scattered in Zhuo County, Xincheng, and Baoding. "The total number was five infantry squadrons, one and a half machine gun squadrons, one regiment artillery squadron, one field artillery squadron, and three wireless squadrons." They went to Lianggezhuang overnight or the next day in an attempt to defeat the main force of Yang Chengwu's troops. The reinforcements arrived at Lianggezhuang one after another during the day on the 21st, and the Dalonghua annihilation battle had already ended on the evening of the 20th. Before the arrival of the Japanese army, Yang Chengwu's troops had cleaned up the battlefield and all withdrew from the Dalonghua area.

7.7. Investigation report on the missing luggage

In the archives of the War History Office of the Japanese Ministry of Defense, there is also a "Report on the Burning Accident of Jindujin" from the commander of the 100th Division, Kuwaki Takaaki, to the Minister of the Army, Itagaki Seishirō, on June 24. In fact, the content of the record is the case of "important documents seized from the Japanese army" mentioned by Yang Chengwu and Nie Rongzhen. However, the Japanese army did not treat this as a military intelligence leak, but as an accounting management error, and submitted the responsibility of "lost cash and receipts" to the accounting supervision department for disposal.

This article not only records the details of the loss of the suitcase, but also records in detail the unknown details of the battle (fall) of Dalonghua in the afternoon of the 20th. It is a very important internal document. Let's take a look at the historical materials first:

"Report on the Loss of Military Funds at Jindu"

1. Date and location of the murder. Time: 20:30 on May 20, 1939; Location: Dalonghua Guard Station, Yi County, Hebei Province

2. Cause and situation of the casualties: At 1:20 on May 20, 1945, about 600 soldiers of the Eighth Route Army attacked the Dalonghua Guard. All the soldiers including the squadron leader responded to the attack and repelled the enemy to the mountainous area south of Dalonghua about six hours later. In order to annihilate the retreating enemy, the squadron leader led two squads and all heavy weapons to attack the mountainous area south of Dalonghua at 9:00, leaving Lieutenant Kawaguchi to command the remaining personnel to wait in Dalonghua Village.

At 13:20, once the retreating enemy was reinforced by a strong force, more than 900 people were dispatched to attack the Dalonghua Guard again. The remaining garrison personnel were caught in a bitter battle, and the casualties continued to increase. Finally, they had to retreat. Earlier at 16:00, the first sub-post set up by the guard on the northern high ground was in danger of being shot by the enemy's concentrated firepower. Lieutenant Kawaguchi then ordered Sergeant Hatanaka, who was temporarily in the team as a liaison, to lead a squad (about 10 people) to urgently support the sub-post. After arriving at the first sub-post, Sergeant Hatanaka commanded the squad to fight the attacking enemy for about 4 hours. At 20:40, the ammunition was exhausted. When he wanted to lead his men back to the guard for replenishment, he found that the guard in Dalonghua Village had burned important documents and broke through. At this time, it could be seen from the mountain that the attacking enemy had occupied the nearby rooftops. In order to inform the Lianggezhuang Battalion Headquarters of the situation, Sergeant Hatanaka and others had to avoid moving forward and finally returned to the Lianggezhuang Battalion Headquarters at 17:00 on the 21st.

3. Amount of damage: 150 yuan 79 cents in cash. 5 receipts, with a total face value of 736 yuan 47 cents.

4. Moment of discovery of the victim: At 20:40 on the 20th, Sergeant Hatanaka, who was fighting in the northern highlands of the garrison, saw from the mountain that the garrison house was on fire and the nearby roofs were occupied by the enemy. He predicted that the cash and receipts he was responsible for keeping would be burned. When he arrived at the Lianggezhuang headquarters, he learned that important documents and some luggage that could not be carried were burned by themselves under the order of Captain Kawaguchi. On the 22nd, Hatanaka asked the Utsumi Unit's body collection team that went to Dalonghua Village to clean up the battlefield to find the metal luggage of officers and officers owned by Lieutenant Kiso, the squadron leader, who kept the cash and receipts, but failed to find it. On the 25th, Hatanaka personally went to Dalonghua Village with the collection team to investigate, but did not find the suitcase, so he determined that it was lost.

5. Result of the handling of the incident: …According to Article 135 of the Accounting Rules, the Accounting Inspection Office was requested to be exempted from liability. Taking into account the circumstances at the time, it was determined that the method of keeping cash receipts and other certificates during the term of office was appropriate, so the punishment was exempted [1].

This investigation report not only clarifies the process and latitude of the loss of the officers' luggage, but also accurately reproduces the course of the battle through the recorded time. It proves that the Dalonghua battle was divided into two times. The first was the night attack of the Eighth Route Army that began at 1:20 a.m. on the 20th. After six hours of fighting, 600 night attackers (including the first battalion of the first regiment of Yang Chengwu's independent division) were "repelled in the southern mountains" (315 high ground). The second attack of the Eighth Route Army on Dalonghua Village began at 1:20 p.m. on the same day. After about 7 hours of resistance, the small team of soldiers who were ordered to stay behind ran out of ammunition and reinforcements. Captain Hekou ordered the burning of important documents and the destruction of the radio station to break out and retreat (Yang Chengwu's Dalonghua battle detailed report recorded the captured and destroyed radio station). The Dalonghua stronghold fell around 20:30.

The Japanese army was able to calmly destroy the radio station and burn important documents before retreating, indicating that it was an organized breakout and retreat, but why was the important luggage of officers and officers seized by the Eighth Route Army? Because it was a large item that could not be taken away during a light breakout (it needed to be loaded in a baggage wagon), and it was also an iron box that could not be easily set on fire. If Captain Hekou could unlock it and burn its contents, or take out cash, it is not impossible. However, from the perspective of accounting and confidentiality, destroying a confidential luggage box is absolutely not allowed. It is estimated that before the retreat, Captain Hekou had burned the telegraph code book, radio station, and the most important documents related to combat (commands and deployments, etc.), and finally burned the house in the hope that this bulky iron box would perish with the fire, but in the end the iron box defeated the fire and became a trophy of Yang Chengwu's troops.

After the case was handled, on August 11, 1939, the commander of the North China Front Army, Sugiyama Hajime, once again reported the results of the investigation by the Front Army Management and Supervision Department to the Minister of the Army, Itagaki Seishirō ("Front Army Management and Supervision No. 262/Report on the Loss of Cash Custody Officials"), and approved the handling method of the division commander Kuwaki. The handling of the cash loss incident ended here. [2]

Why didn't the Japanese army hold Nie Rongzhen responsible for the loss of the so-called "important documents"? Considering that such documents distributed to the squadrons were not special combat secrets. From the list of seized documents listed in Yang Chengwu's memoirs,

There were the "Guidelines on Suppressing Bandits and Guarding" and "References on the Use of Special Equipment (Poison Gas)" issued by the North China Front Army Headquarters, and the "Summary of the First, Second, and Third Phases of the 1939 Operation against our Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Base Area", which included guiding clauses for invading our country in the economic and cultural fields, as well as intelligence work, the construction and use of puppet regimes, and the "Blockade Plan for Bandit Groups in the Mountain Area" issued by the Japanese 110th Division Headquarters, etc. [3]

Most of them are general combat instruction manuals, rules, and strategic security concepts. Although they are confidential documents, they are not directly confidential like passwords, combat plans, and troop deployments. This is also the reason why such documents are packed and kept, and they are not commonly used documents.

According to the biography of Nie Rongzhen, he later asked someone to translate and carefully studied the captured documents, and reported the results to the central government. The aforementioned Eighth Route Army Chief of Staff Zuo Quan said that the enemy's "mixed brigades" that fought against the Eighth Route Army in the Taihang Mountain base were all "elite brigades" in the Japanese army, and the commander Abe Nobuhide (Major General) was a "mountain warfare expert" proficient in tactics. These comments were self-speculated after studying the documents captured in the Dalonghua battle.

In the “Indicators on Eliminating Bandits and Guarding” issued by the enemy’s North China Front Command and seized in the Dalonghua battle, it is stated that “the success or failure of bandit suppression has a great deal to do with the commander. … Abe Nobuhide was appointed as the brigade commander with the rank of lieutenant general (the enemy’s brigade commanders were generally major generals…) and was the commander-in-chief of the attack on the border areas from the north. In the eyes of the enemy chieftain, he was naturally the most capable and (met) the highest requirements… and was the most active, courageous, and independent “talent” [4] (page 10).

Funny thing is, the Dalonghua battle (May 20) took place half a year before the Huangtuling battle (November 7) that killed Abe Nobuhide. And the Japanese troops fighting with Yang Chengwu's left column near Dalonghua were not the mixed brigade of the Mongolian Army and Abe Nobuhide (Major General Abe Nobuhide took office six months after the battle), but the infantry regiment of the 100th Division of the North China Front Army. The so-called confidential documents were also the documents of the 100th Division of the North China Front Army, which had nothing to do with Abe Nobuhide's Mongolian Army. How did Zuo Quan infer the command quality of Abe Nobuhide of the Mongolian Army from the old documents of the previous system?

7.8. Analysis of the Dalonghua Battle

Judging from the above records, the night attack by Yang Chengwu's Eighth Route Army took place at 1:20 a.m. on the 20th. At the beginning, the attack was unexpected and went smoothly. They were able to climb onto the roof of the enemy's stronghold near Dalonghua and block the enemy's movement. But soon the situation reversed. Under the counterattack of the Japanese troops of the First Squadron and heavy machine guns, regiment artillery and other heavy weapons, the night attack finally failed. After dawn, the night attack team had no choice but to abandon dozens of corpses and retreat to the 315 high ground in the south. In response to this failure, Yang Chengwu said that "in the morning, the first battalion troops withdrew to rest" [5] , which was actually a disguised admission of defeat in this battle. If Yang Chengwu's "withdrawal to rest" is included, there are now at least four documents from both Japan and China [6] that can interweave and confirm the fact that the first night attack on Dalonghua in the early morning of the 20th failed. It was not Yang Chengwu's troops but the Japanese Dalonghua garrison that cleaned up the battlefield after daybreak and confirmed that "more than 80 enemy corpses, 20 rifles, 50 grenades, 550 rifle bullets, and our casualties were 8 non-commissioned officers and below."

At 9:00 a.m., Captain Kiso led two squads of infantry and all heavy weapons (one cannon and one heavy machine gun) to attack the enemy who retreated to Hill 315 in the south. This was not "the enemy took the opportunity to break through" or "escape" as Yang Chengwu claimed, but a pursuit. It is speculated that the Kiso squadron's attack was decided after receiving the news that the Lianggezhuang Battalion Headquarters would send two squads of the 10th Squadron (Xintian Squadron) to support, intending to join forces with the reinforcements to annihilate the remaining enemies in the mountains.

From this point on, the situation of the war took a dramatic turn. The humiliation of a small defeat in the first battle made Yang Chengwu make a desperate move and make the decision to mobilize all the main forces of the surrounding military divisions to fight the enemy. After receiving the order, the various troops continued to gather on the battlefield, and finally turned the situation around noon on the 21st. At this time, Captain Kiso also misjudged the situation, thinking that the attacking enemy only had more than 600 night raiders and had been completely repelled, and the enemy's offensive plan had been completely thwarted. In fact, on the contrary, Yang Chengwu's troops were increasing their troops as planned. While fighting on Hill 315, more than 3,000 heavy troops had been deployed in Dalonghua, Xiaolonghua, and Dahongmen. Yang Chengwu not only had enough troops to attack the Dalonghua stronghold and annihilate the Kiso squadron that went out to fight, but it was also not difficult to stop the reinforcements of the Inland Sea Brigade that might arrive from Lianggezhuang.

Captain Utsumi also underestimated the enemy's strength. After receiving the early morning pursuit report from the Kiso Squadron, he thought that the attacking enemy had been completely defeated and retreated, so he did not pay attention to the development of the situation in Dalonghua, and only sent about two infantry squads to reinforce (nearly 100 people in the Nitta Squadron) to help clear out the remaining enemies. The Kiso Squadron's attack (pursuit) and the order to the Inaba Squadron to go to Xiaolonghua to meet the reinforcements during the battle were, in my opinion, the biggest mistakes in Captain Kiso's combat command. The squadron, which originally had only about 150 soldiers, was divided into three groups, and two of them were isolated in the dangerous field battlefield.

From the analysis of various Japanese military battles, no matter how many people the Eighth Route Army had, it was difficult to win when fighting against the regular Japanese army with a squadron or above (more than 100 people), and there were almost no examples of annihilation battles. However, if the Japanese army was divided into small units and then surrounded by more than ten times the number of troops, an annihilation battle could be formed. From the famous battles of Pingxingguan, Guangyang, Chenzhuang, Yansuya, etc., the Eighth Route Army's winning method was the same, that is, the "protracted encirclement battle" with absolute superior forces and firepower. In the battle, close combat was not easily carried out. After several hours of confrontation and gun battles, the ammunition of the surrounded Japanese army was exhausted, and then more than ten times the number of troops were used to attack and annihilate the enemy. The tactical feature is a long-term confrontation and gun battle after the encirclement is formed. The battle with more than ten times the number of enemies, such as the ambush in Xiaozhai Village (Pingxingguan), lasted for more than 4 hours. The battle of Guangyang lasted about 8 hours and was resolved at night. The battle of Yansuya lasted longer, about 20 hours. In the Battle of Huangtuling, the Eighth Route Army had a troop advantage of only 4 times. Although they formed an encirclement, they were unable to win. As a result, the enemy broke through the encirclement and the Eighth Route Army withdrew on its own.

The battle of Dalonghua was no exception. On the 20th, the Kiso Corps headquarters near Hill 315, the artillery corps, the Inaba Corps sent to the northwest of Xiaolonghua, and the Hekou Corps stationed in Dalonghua Village were surrounded by the main force of the Eighth Route Army, which was more than ten times larger than the main force of the Eighth Route Army. Judging from the time reported by the Japanese army, the main force of the Eighth Route Army had assembled and began to surround and attack (counterattack) the Japanese army at 1:00 p.m. The three divisions surrounded three Japanese squads (a total of about 150 people in one squadron). Under this situation, the war of attrition continued until the evening, and finally the isolated Japanese troops ran out of ammunition and faced a crisis. It took more than 8 hours from the start of the general offensive to finally resolve the battle, and as a result, the Japanese troops in each of the three divisions were able to break through. The Xintian Team, which came to support from Lianggezhuang with about a hundred people, was completely blocked by the main force of the Eighth Route Army of more than a thousand people to the east of Xianglanqi (recorded as Dahongmen by the Eighth Route Army), but no encirclement or annihilation battle was formed here, so the Japanese army suffered almost no losses (no record of death in battle, and the number of injuries is unknown. Yang Chengwu claimed that 170 enemies were killed).

At 17:00 in the afternoon, when the situation became critical, the Zhuo County Brigade Headquarters began to realize the seriousness of the incident, but there were no available troops near Yi County. In a state of anxiety, Lieutenant Colonel Xiao Lin first issued "Changzuo Order No. 114" to order the Second Battalion of Baoding to send a small infantry squad to Lianggezhuang for emergency assistance (the road is about 90 kilometers). After 20:00 at night, "Changzuo Order No. 115" was issued to gather five infantry squadrons, one and a half machine gun squadrons, and three artillery pieces from various places to reinforce the Lianggezhuang battlefield overnight. However, distant water cannot quench a nearby fire. These troops gathered in Lianggezhuang from hundreds of miles away during the day on the 21st, after the Dalonghua annihilation battle had already ended. Yang Chengwu recorded that "the battle ended at 20:00, the battlefield was cleaned up on the evening of the 20th and the morning of the 21st, and the various troops began to move at 12:00 on the 21st." [7] The following photo was taken by Luo Guangda, a photographer of the Eighth Route Army, when the Eighth Route Army entered the Dalonghua Garrison Headquarters. It should have been taken on the morning of May 21 when the battlefield was being cleaned up.

The time when the remnants of the Kiso team were "taken in" by the rescue team after breaking out was recorded as 3 a.m. on the 21st. It is speculated that the troops that came to join at this time were the Xintian team that was blocked near Xianglanqi during the day, or part of the 9th squadron sent by Lianggezhuang after 17:00. The remnants of the Hekou team that successfully broke out from Dalonghua arrived at the Lianggezhuang headquarters at 14:00 on the 21st, and it took 18 hours to travel 16 kilometers. The time when the military sergeant Hatanaka (a secondary officer) who withdrew after failing to enter Dalonghua Village and led his subordinates to return to the Lianggezhuang headquarters was recorded as 17:00 on the 21st, which took more than 20 hours. This shows that throughout the day on the 21st, Yang Chengwu's troops were still in the mountains near Lianggezhuang and Dalonghua, dealing with the retreating enemy or the enemy reinforcements. The mountain battlefield area between Dalonghua and Lianggezhuang was also full of the Eighth Route Army, making it difficult for the remnants of the Kiso team of Dalonghua who were dispersed or broke through to return to the team. The Eighth Route Army cleaned up the battlefield from 8pm on the 20th to noon the next day. They cleaned up very thoroughly and had enough space for photographers. The Japanese army recorded that they cleaned up the Dalonghua Village battlefield on the 22nd, which was 36 hours after the fall of Dalonghua Village. Of course, there would be no remnants left on the battlefield at this time except for the bodies of the Japanese soldiers.

From the above analysis, we can know that this battle was not as spectacular and thorough as described by Yang Chengwu of the Eighth Route Army. The basic fact that the Kiso Squadron was severely damaged in the end is true (when the Japanese army reports half of the losses, they generally use the term "complete destruction"), but the number of Japanese casualties in the report is "more than 400" is not true. The total number of troops of the Third Battalion was only 700, and this number was also the result of Yang Chengwu's verification from the captured Japanese documents ("Selected Military Writings of Yang Chengwu" page 45). On the 20th, only two squadrons, Kiso (the 12th) and Nitta (the 10th, missing a squadron), actually entered the battle. Only about 150 members of the Kiso Squadron that were divided and surrounded were annihilated (in addition, there were about 20 puppet troops and some road construction workers), and the exact number of Japanese deaths was 51. It can also be confirmed that more than half of the survivors of the three squadrons of the Kiso Squadron that were divided and surrounded successfully broke through. Among the squad leaders, only one, Miki Iwao (second lieutenant), died. Of the four officers and soldiers in the squadron, squadron leader Kiso Kyouhei, squad leader Inaba Minoru [8] , and Kawaguchi Kamenosuke were all safe after the battle. Sergeant Hajiri and Corporal Kobayashi, who were ordered to lead the Nishimura Construction Team's trucks to break out of Dalonghua Village, did not appear on the list of the dead, so the truck breakout group of the construction team was also successful. This kind of incomplete annihilation battle can be seen in Pingxingguan Laoye Temple (automobile squadron) and Yansuya battlefield. It shows that the Eighth Route Army's attack and blocking capabilities were not strong in the frontal battle with the enemy.

The captured person "Japanese Army Instructor Anada" in Yang Chengwu's record was not included in the list of officers and soldiers of the 140th Regiment. According to Yang Chengwu, he was the "commander" (advisor?) of the 20-member road guard team (Manchukuo Mausoleum Guard Team). It is unclear whether he was a soldier. If there were other captured people, it is possible that they were civilians from the Construction Bureau (related to the Nishimatsu Group of the Construction Company) who were in charge of road construction.

Among the heavy weapons seized by the Eighth Route Army, only the 1st Division of the Regimental Artillery (a Type 31 mountain gun) and the 1st Division of the Heavy Machine Gun (a Type 3 heavy machine gun) attached to the Kiso Division can be confirmed. It is estimated that the total number of casualties on the Japanese side, mainly from the Kiso Division, is likely to exceed 100. Although the two squads of the Nitta Division, which served as the rescue team, were blocked, it was just a confrontation battle and there was almost no loss. If there were any losses, the number would also be included in the 51 deaths of the entire regiment on May 20. In the records of battles after May 21 in the regiment history, such as the punitive battle near Xiling after the 21st (-25th), and the sweeps of Tanghu Town and Jinpo Town after the 25th, the 12th Squadron (Kiso Division) that was severely damaged did not appear, while the 10th Squadron (Nitta Division) that was blocked at Dahongmen appeared in the battle sequence every time ("Tottori General Regiment History" pages 472-3), which also shows that its losses were minor.

The captured items recorded in Yang Chengwu's "Dalonghua Battle Detailed Report" include, in addition to the four suspicious cannons [9] , one mountain cannon, five light machine guns, one heavy machine gun, a radio (already damaged), more than 80 rifles, dozens of important documents, etc., which can be considered to be close to the actual situation and not very different. Yang Chengwu's battle detailed report recorded a total of 349 casualties on the Eighth Route Army side (including 13 members of Zhao's detachment), which is also a credible data based on the principle of self-reporting of combat casualties [10] .

Because of the written evidence of Yang Chengwu's "Detailed Report on the Battle of Dalonghua" (actually a report summarizing experience), the record of the battle of Dalonghua is not as bizarre as the memoirs of the "Pingxingguan Victory" where even the battle time and the direction of the Japanese troops' march are unclear. The basic intelligence records are relatively accurate. The intelligence on the number of Japanese troops is very close, and the battle results report on the number of enemies killed and weapons seized is only about three times different from the actual numbers. It is the most honest record of the Eighth Route Army's battle results that the author has seen. Unfortunately, there are only a few historical materials that are more authentic, and no one has studied them seriously. Most people are more interested in the more popular story in Yang Chengwu's "Blood Battle of Dalonghua". But who has ever noticed that when the results recorded by Yang in the "Combat Detail Report" were officially included in the "Victory News Report" (Eighth Route Army Battle Results Statistics) of the "Eighth Route Army Military and Political Magazine" (June 25th issue), the number of enemies killed had increased to "more than 500", the number of rifles seized had increased from 80 to "more than 130", the number of light and heavy machine guns had doubled, and the number of Japanese prisoners had increased from 11 to "seventeen squadron leaders and squad leaders" [11] . From this kind of propaganda method that has risen with the tide, we can also see the importance of mastering and analyzing the earliest original data in research.

Finally, let me provide some data on the 100th Division that fought against the Eighth Route Army in North China. The 100th Division (Lieutenant General Kuwagi Chongming - September 1939, about 21,000 men), including the Kobayashi Regiment (140th Infantry Regiment) and four other infantry regiments, suffered a total of "533 deaths (including 32 officers and officers) and 1,327 wounded (including 60 officers and officers)" in "2,250 battles" over a period of about 15 months from July 1938 to October 14, 1939. [12] In comparison, Yang Chengwu's troops killed 51 enemies in one battle at Dalonghua, which is not an insignificant number. This is what the Eighth Route Army meant by the so-called "Dalonghua Victory".

[1] "Report on the Accident of Sentō Kinyaki", Ministry of the Army-Roku Chipu Diary-S15-12-233, Defense Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense.

[2] "The case of the loss of gold in the custody of the cashier and official of the North China Front Army Commander" Ministry of the Army-Rokuchipu Diary-S14-11-201, Defense Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense.

[3] Memoirs of Yang Chengwu, PLA Publishing House, 1987, p. 517.

[4] Originally published in the New China Daily/North China Edition. This article is quoted from the Eighth Route Army Military and Political Magazine, Issue 3, 1940, p. 9. The original content should be from Yang Chengwu’s contribution.

[5] Selected Military Writings of Yang Chengwu, PLA Press, 1997, p. 50.

[6] The three records from the Japanese side are the “140th Infantry Regiment’s Battle Report”, the division’s report on the loss of luggage (“Report on the Loss of Baggage at Qiandu Jinyan”), and the “Xingya Military Record” by the person involved, Sergeant Saito of the 3rd Machine Gun Squadron (which states that “On May 19, the Eighth Route Army… launched a night attack. The battle lasted until dawn and the enemy was finally repelled.”). The Chinese side has Hu Zhuoran’s “Legends Behind Enemy Lines: Red Anti-Japanese Legends with Comparison of Rare Chinese and Japanese Historical Materials” (Beijing: Xiyuan Publishing House, September 2012, p. 133).

[7] Selected Military Writings of Yang Chengwu, PLA Press, 1997, p. 51.

[8] Captain Inaba Minoru died shortly afterwards on September 15 in the battle of Xiliutun in southern Hebei (cited in History of the Tottori General Army, p. 484).

[9] Said "two Type 25 mortars and two small submachine guns". None of them were weapons equipped by the Japanese army. Moreover, Yang Chengwu's memoir "The Bloody Battle of Dalonghua" only described the scene of capturing one gun.

[10] Yang Chengwu, “Detailed Report of the Battles of Yansuya and Huangtuling” (Selected Military Writings of Yang Chengwu, People’s Liberation Army Press, 1997), pp. 51-52.

[11] “Report on the Victory of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in May”, Eighth Route Army Military and Political Magazine, June 1939.

[12] "110th Division Situation Report" JACAR (アジア歴史记センター) Ref.C13070382700, 110th Division Situation Report (Ministry of Defense Defense Research Institute) 13/26, pages 3206-3207.