[Reading] Jigsaw Puzzles with Archives: Reading "The Future of Hong Kong in British Archives"

1/ It is said that the appropriate distance to read history is thirty years, because this is the time limit for the declassification of many national archives. In 2010, the British government amended the law to reduce the release period of government archives from 30 years to 20 years. This is a good thing, but it is a pity that many files related to the Hong Kong issue will not be declassified until 2049. In other words, the best distance to read the history of Hong Kong's return is about sixty years. But it's really not that long. Even if only an incomplete picture can be assembled from the declassified small part, it is better than looking at the official jigsaw puzzle; so reading Zhang Jiawei's "The Future of Hong Kong in the British Archives" can still discover a lot of new things.

It is now known that China and the UK first discussed the future of Hong Kong in 1979. In March of that year, Hong Kong Governor MacLehose visited Beijing and "found out" Deng Xiaoping by the way to find out China's intentions on the issue of the expiration of the New Territories land lease in 1997. After MacLehose returned to Hong Kong, he was asked by a reporter what he discussed with Deng. He only said "Deng reassures Hong Kong investors" (which became an explosive newspaper headline at the time), but concealed Deng Xiaoping's statement that "Hong Kong's sovereignty belongs to China" and Important message for "possible take back Hong Kong". At that time, Hong Kong people were all kept in the dark, and continued to live in the luxury of money.

In 1979, I was just a toddler. It happens that those of us who were children and countless people who have not yet been born need to bear the great changes brought about by "possible withdrawal". The days are flying fast, and Hong Kong is riddled with holes in 2023, and half of the 50-year promise in 2047 has passed, but what is strange is that what Deng Xiaoping answered MacLehose that day is still a Rashomon. The three "versions" I have on hand look like this:

(1) Xu Jiatun recorded in his memoirs the version he heard from officials in the 1980s: Deng Xiaoping clearly told MacLehose that China must take back Hong Kong's sovereignty by then, but Hong Kong investors should rest assured.

(2) Lu Ping's oral history version (which can be regarded as the official Chinese version): Deng told Mai that we consider Hong Kong as a special region. For a long period of time, Hong Kong can practice its capitalism, and we can practice our socialism. Investors should rest assured.

(3) The version of the British declassified files: In addition to the content of (2) above, Deng Xiaoping also said: "(By 1997,) there are two solutions to the Hong Kong issue, one is to take back Hong Kong, and the other is to maintain the status quo" (There were two solutions by 1997, to take Hong Kong over, or to allow present realities to remain.)

As Zhang Jiawei pointed out in the book, "(Lu Ping's) Chinese version does not mention that in the minutes of the British meeting, Deng Xiaoping mentioned that there are two solutions to the Hong Kong issue, one is to withdraw and the other is to maintain the status quo." (20 pages) In the end, which one is "real"? Perhaps Deng Xiaoping really said "two ways, take back or maintain the status quo", but since Beijing later decided to "take back Hong Kong in 1997", this sentence that does not conform to the "development of the situation" should be removed from the official version? (Qin Jiacong wrote an article in 2010 to disclose that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee decided to take back Hong Kong only in December 1981.) Or are the "two solutions" purely lost in translation by the British side, "created out of nothing" in the process of translation and paraphrasing? The above are just wild guesses. This irrelevant Rashomon issue should be left to future historians to study.

2/ Before the Sino-British negotiations broke down in September 1983 and the Hong Kong dollar plummeted, Mrs. Thatcher conceived various "novel" solutions to the Hong Kong problem. Looking back at Iron Maiden's "think out of the box" today, it really makes me smile (or wryly). What Thatcher was thinking about at the time was that Britain would continue to rule Hong Kong after 1997. From the very beginning, she didn't want to let go, so she advocated "sovereignty for governance"; nominally, sovereignty returned to China, but in reality, Hong Kong continued to be governed by the British side after 1997, and it was not withdrawn until a certain period of time. This idea actually borrowed information from Portugal to the United Kingdom: as early as 1974, China had rejected Portugal’s request to return Macau, and asked Portugal to continue to govern Macau on the condition that it recognized China’s sovereignty over Macau.

After 1997, the British side will continue to rule Hong Kong. Such a "rebellious" and "perpetuating colonial shame" plan makes cold sweat even thinking about it today, but it was the popular will (because Hong Kong people generally wanted to maintain the status quo). The non-official members of the Executive Council headed by Zhong Shiyuan have been urging the British side not to make concessions. But "sovereignty for governance" is not the most exciting proposal yet.

The book reveals that in early 1983, Thatcher proposed a "co-management plan" in a letter to the Foreign Minister: Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula would be administered by the UK, the New Territories would be administered by China, and the entire greater Hong Kong would be jointly administered by China and the UK. But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs firmly believes that it is not feasible. In addition, in March 1983, when China and Britain were deadlocked on the Hong Kong issue, Thatcher once raised the idea of "promoting a referendum" at a high-level meeting. According to the "TNA, PREM 19/1054" archive document cited in the book, she thinks it may be possible to try to hold a referendum in Hong Kong by the United Nations: a number of alternatives could be put to the Hong Kong people in a referendum — they could be offered a choice between Chinese sovereignty plus Chinese administration, Chinese sovereignty plus British administration or other formulae. De also believes that Hong Kong people "were prepared to distinguish between sovereignty and administration", but this senior diplomat understands the CCP better than Thatcher, and believes that it is more practical to facilitate the negotiation first.

Thatcher's idea of a "United Nations referendum" was quickly banned by high-ranking officials in the United Kingdom, but it was no coincidence that in 1984, before China and Britain were about to sign the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Zhong Shiyuan also strongly advocated a referendum to evaluate Hong Kong people's views on the statement; According to declassified files, in a meeting in July 1984, Chung told the visiting British foreign minister Richard Luce that if the British government refused to accept his opinion (to hold a referendum), he "may publicly advocate a referendum" (99 Page).

Zhong Shiyuan is a die-hard supporter of sovereignty-for-governance, and he doesn't trust China's promises, but being pro-British doesn't necessarily win him. At the end of 1983, the British side was ready to make concessions in the face of reality, but Zhong still advised the British side to be tough on China and dare to take risks; when Zhang Jiawei combed through the British files, he found that this kind of non-committal and untactful attitude made some senior British officials object to He resents it. But this matter shows the character of the clock. Compared with Luo Luocheng, who suddenly turned around and changed from pro-British to pro-Chinese, Zhong Shiyuan is the real son of Hong Kong.

3/ Zhang Jiawei's book also solved the mystery of the "88 direct election" being killed.

During the colonial era, the British did not give Hong Kong people any democracy for a long time, because they were afraid of angering China. This view is corroborated by Youde's letter to the British Foreign Office in 1983:

Normally in a British dependent territory, the next step would be to create a directly elected legal council. In Hong Kong because of the Chinese attitude, it has always been considered too risky to have a directly elected council.

Note that Yoder said "has always been considered". That is to say, Britain has always tabooed China, so it dares and is unwilling to promote democracy in Hong Kong (but Zhang's Chinese translation misses the important meaning of "always"). When did you change your mind? In October 1983, the Thatcher government clearly knew that after 1997 it would not be able to continue to govern Hong Kong, so it began to study and promote the development of Hong Kong’s representative government system. Beijing's intervention". This may have a self-interested calculation, but it should also feel ashamed of the colony and want to try its best to make up for it? Although it is too late.

In 1985, the British Hong Kong government introduced indirect elections to the Hong Kong Legislative Council for the first time. In 1987, the British Hong Kong government conducted a review and consultation on the representative government system, and proposed possible options such as "direct election of the Legislative Council". At that time, public opinion favored the introduction of direct elections to the Legislative Council in 1988. However, after the four-month consultation period ended, the British side gave distorted interpretations of the collected public opinions, and finally rejected the "88 direct elections" on the grounds of "divided public opinion". . For a long time, some people have pointed out that the government at that time was "playing with public opinion and distorting survey data" or "to curry favor with China" (Note), but the reason behind it is unknown. Zhang Jiawei learned from the declassified files that two years before the review and consultation, the Chinese side had repeatedly pressured the British side not to mention direct elections in the consultation document; although the British side finally mentioned direct elections in the document, there were different opinions within the government (among them Hong Kong Governor Youde was the most enlightened, and he was in favor of introducing ten directly elected seats in 1988, but he died in Beijing in 1986). In October 1987, five months after the review and consultation document was published, Foreign Minister Howe revealed in a letter: In September, the British side saw a trend of public opinion not agreeing with the direct election in August 8th, so it had reached a private agreement with the Chinese side. In 1990, direct elections to the Legislative Council were not implemented, in exchange for China's agreement to implement direct elections in Hong Kong after the promulgation of the Basic Law in 1990.

Howe's so-called "disapproval of the trend of direct elections in 1988" actually came from more than 70,000 preprinted letters with the same content. It is not difficult to guess who came up with these "public opinions", but why is the British Hong Kong government so stupid to believe in these "public opinions", and is willing to bear the ensuing civil criticism and distrust? After reading this book, the truth is finally revealed. The cause of death of the "88 Direct Election" is basically the same as many other things.

Note: The criticism of "playing with public opinion and distorting survey data" comes from Zhong Tingyao ( https://web.archive.org/web/208033938/http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/columns/columns34.html ), "to please "China" is the word used by Margaret Ng in "Under the Keystone: Eighteen Years in Politics".