The CCP's current path of "maintaining the regime" and the future of the new Sino-US Cold War

Let me start with the conclusion. In fact, this year's two sessions have only one main theme, and that is "protecting the political power." And the object of this protection of the regime, which is ultimately targeted, either overtly or secretly, is actually only one, and that is the United States.

Many people in Hong Kong and Taiwan are not quite aware of a problem, that is, the problem with the essence of the CCP regime has always been political rather than economic.

That is to say, we need to understand what the core political content of the CCP's regime is when it "protects the regime".

Here, we must praise Xi’s contribution as the chief accelerator. Originally, the CCP took advantage of the cheap labor force in China to make a fortune without provoking the West. No matter how authoritarian it is in China, the West can At best, people are only superficially condemning. In Hong Kong, under the mask of "one country, two systems", they continue to use economic penetration and brainwashing education to boil frogs in warm water, so that Hong Kong can truly "return people's hearts".

However, the Xi regime has brought an unprecedented new element to the CCP: nationalism in practice. In the previous discussion of the CCP, despite the ambitions of the imperialists, there is basically a CCP, and there is absolutely no need to worry about imperialism invading. including leeks) to make some money.

But the essence of Xi is neither Mao nor Deng.

I don't need to say too much to believe that Xi's idol is not Deng, why not Mao? Because in essence, in Xi's thinking, he has no interest in the masses. We need to make it clear that Xi and other leaders of the CCP are different. Mao and Deng were born as revolutionaries. Before Jiang and Hu became leaders, they also gradually worked their way up from grassroots cadres. However, Xi himself was an aristocrat from birth. When his father was defeated, he became a "class enemy". After the reform and opening up, he became a "second generation of red", a leading party cadre.

This element determines that Xi is not very interested in introducing mass movements into Chinese politics. He had neither Mao's writing, nor Hitler's eloquence, in other words, the masses only played the role of a set board in his political game. For example, after he did something great, the crowd thanked him. As for using the masses to hit political enemies, this is not his style. I dare not say that he has not read Marxism-Leninism, but he is definitely not a true believer of Marxism-Leninism.

So what was that great thing deep inside him that he wanted to do? Four words: national rejuvenation

His national rejuvenation is different from the national interests we understand. His revival was a very simple value from the peasantry. In fact, in essence, it is necessary for foreigners, especially Americans, to look down on China, and even be willing to make China equal to the United States in Asia.

We can understand it as the show-off mentality of the nouveau riche, thinking that they are obviously rich now, why do the nobles still look down on themselves. And this mentality of wanting to be looked up to has fundamentally determined that he wants to change the line of reform and opening up that Deng had taken before, that is, the line of making a fortune in silence. Whether it is one country, two systems or keeping a low profile, they all serve the reform and opening-up route.

This has fallen into a three-ring paradox of economic development, national rejuvenation, and Sino-foreign relations. The achievements of economic development support the ideology that he believes can engage in nationalism. The implementation of extreme nationalism policies will destroy China and the United States. The Western world, including the relationship between Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the deterioration of Sino-foreign relations will inevitably drag down economic development.

Nationalism supported by economic development is something he insists on, and it will not change at all. The deterioration of Sino-foreign relations brought about by nationalism, especially the deterioration of Sino-US relations, is caused by foreign countries, not him. Obviously It can't be changed either. So the only thing he can change is the third ring, how to keep the economy running and growing under the deterioration of Sino-foreign relations.

——This is the general background of the entire "protection regime": the new Cold War between China and the United States

1. United States

It must be said that the pneumonia has indeed accelerated this process. On the one hand, the United States will speed up its decoupling from China. From the perspective of the CCP, China will speed up its "closure of the country". Just two sides of a coin. Before the outbreak of the epidemic, the new Cold War was actually the will of the Trump administration in the United States, which was far greater than that of China. After all, China's dependence on the United States in trade, technology, and finance is greater than the United States' dependence on China. From the perspective of the CCP, it is their main thinking to deal with the first phase of the trade war negotiation to be able to avoid the United States’ demands for greater reforms in the system by paying more to buy American goods.

However, after the outbreak of the epidemic, there has been an overwhelming wave of global accountability, and the pressure is so great that it is believed to be unprecedented since 1989. What is more serious is that the people who died in 1989 were Chinese after all, and this time it was the people of the West. Therefore, the improvement of Sino-US relations in the foreseeable future can be said to be very difficult. As for the first phase of the trade agreement, it is obvious that due to the "force majeure" factor of the epidemic, there is no way to fully implement it. In this way, the last chance to prevent the decoupling of China and the United States has been missed. After the epidemic, it is obvious that the industrial chain will move out, and technological sanctions and financial decoupling will follow one after another. And this will only accelerate the CCP's determination to push forward the "closed country".

It should be said that the United States has given the CCP enough opportunities to turn back its prodigal sons.

2. Hong Kong and Taiwan

Sino-US relations are definitely the top policy of the CCP's policy towards Hong Kong and Taiwan. To put it simply, if Sino-US relations are good, cross-strait relations will be stable, and one country, two systems will function well, and if Sino-US relations are poor, the opposite will be true.

Economically, when China has decided to follow the road of closing the country, basically it is no longer important to allow Hong Kong to retain the free economy and way of life of capitalism under one country, two systems. As for economic interests, as I said at the beginning, in the world of the CCP, the economy has always served politics. As for politics, Hong Kong under "one country, two systems" is obviously a model for Taiwan. The so-called "horse running" and "dancing" are taught to both Hong Kong people and Taiwanese.

This leads to the question of Taiwan. In Xi's great cause of national rejuvenation, the reunification of Taiwan must be a piece of the puzzle of national rejuvenation. If "national reunification" has not been completed, how can the so-called rejuvenation theory come about? The CCP's united front against Taiwan in the past few decades has used economic infiltration to influence its internal politics, and then manipulated specific political and economic forces within Taiwan to influence Taiwan's cross-strait policy. However, in 2018, the hasty and rough introduction of a pro-China populist leader like Han Guoyu suddenly awakened the Taiwanese, and the enemy had already invaded the country. When Taiwan was seriously infiltrated by the CCP, it has attracted great attention from the government and the people. It is basically impossible to unify Taiwan by non-military means.

What about military means? It should be said that the CCP does not want to fight at this stage, because the possibility of winning is not high, and the consequences will be unimaginable if it loses. The timing of the CCP's action should be when the internal conflicts and crises are too deep to be resolved. Just imagine, a person has already lost all the money in the casino. At this time, someone lends him a sum of money. If he loses, it will only add another debt Account, if you win, you may bet all your previous capital back, why not do this deal? Before that, the CCP should be in constant trouble in Taiwan, with military aircraft and warships circling Taiwan, and even creating some local conflicts in the South China Sea and Jinma. Let's see if we can take an island or two over there.

But behind Taiwan is always the United States. In Hong Kong, after the passage of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights last year, it is also believed that the United States rightly believes that the freedom of Hong Kong has something to do with me. Behind every push against Hong Kong and Taiwan is another provocation by the CCP against the United States.

3. Economy

In the new Cold War between China and the United States, the biggest threat to the Chinese economy is not the market itself, nor employment. It's his own bureaucracy. Just imagine, in peacetime, the weapons and equipment of the troops may not be so important. But about to go to the battlefield, a commander must be very aware of how many guns and how many bullets are in his ammunition depot.

However, the downward pressure on the CCP's economy is so obvious, but can it be truly reflected by the grassroots or even the middle management to the upper management? Judging from the effectiveness of Wuhan pneumonia and targeted poverty alleviation, the gap in information uploaded and released within this regime is indeed very large. Once the economic downturn begins to accelerate, the first reaction of local bureaucrats may not be to report it up, but how to falsify the truth. And when the economy is unstable, the CCP must look for financial resources to maintain its huge state apparatus. After all, as I said before, Xi is not Mao, and has no interest in mass movements, while the military, police and civil servants all need money to finance everything. maintain. How can a state machine without financial resources to maintain the security of the regime in the new Cold War? As for the new financial resources, there is a high probability that they will be robbed of the rich and private entrepreneurs. As for the middle class, it is true that many people are worried about the property tax, but many people in the middle class are themselves part of the CCP's state apparatus, and the CCP should not offend these people first.

Another possibility is that the CCP removes the “economic development” link in the three-ring paradox. Only Sino-foreign relations and nationalism. In other words, nationalism deteriorates Sino-foreign relations, which in turn promotes nationalist hatred, and the CCP has become the only regime that can defend national interests. However, given the size of China, without "economic development", it is necessary to prepare mentally to maintain the regime while tens of millions of people starve to death.

The conclusion is that the next 10 years will be a difficult march for both China and Hong Kong, while Taiwan must be very careful at all times, not only to prevent the CCP's invasion, but also not to overheat and intensify the tension between the two sides of the strait. possibility of military conflict.

Based on the above, in the 2020s, the pattern of a new Cold War will be formally formed, and the comprehensive decoupling of the United States from China will be completed. The CCP will fall because of a fuse that no one expected at a time when no one expected it.

As for the United States, after winning Big Brother in the last Cold War, can't it win this time? The instructor is in the bookcase. It's just that American society needs a period of time to slowly build consensus. This is the advantage of a democratic country. In the process of forming a decision, consensus needs to be built, but once a consensus is formed, it is difficult to break.