The emergence of public culture through three waves of criticism of #MeToo

First published in the 37th issue of "Thinking"

In October 2017, dozens of Hollywood actresses accused well-known producer Harvey Weinstein of sexually assaulting them, followed by actress Alyssa Weinstein, who was also sexually assaulted by Weinstein. On Twitter, Alyssa Milano called on women who have been sexually harassed to speak out about their experiences with the hashtag #MeToo. That's where the global #MeToo movement came from. At the end of 2017, Zhou Bin, the former deputy dean of Nanchang University's School of Chinese Studies, was accused of sexual assault by students in what was the first #MeToo case in mainland China. Over the next year, countless Chinese women came forward under the #MeToo banner to tell their stories of sexual harassment.

#MeToo has been controversial since its appearance. Some people who support this movement believe that the skeptics are from supporters of the patriarchy, or from conservative forces, but in Europe and the United States, judging from the more influential criticisms, the critics themselves belong to Feminist camp. In China, the situation is more dramatic. With three waves of criticism against #MeToo, critics are all getting closer to the heart of the movement. This forces us to abandon the "progressive/conservative" dichotomy and confront the complexities within #MeToo. This article attempts to reconstruct the narrative of #MeToo by analyzing domestic and international criticism of #MeToo and the logic behind it, and to clarify the interaction between "public culture" and social movements. Unlike some supporters, we believe that these criticisms are rooted in the original public culture of the society, so their emergence has a certain inevitability. If the #MeToo movement really wants to change the gender concept of society and improve the living environment of women, it will These criticisms and the public culture behind them cannot and should not be skipped.

Public Culture and Criticism of #MeToo Abroad

As early as the beginning of this year, when the case of Beihang professor Chen Xiaowu's sexual harassment of several female students had just been reported in China, Le Monde, a mainstream French newspaper, published an article jointly signed by a hundred writers, actors, scholars and business elites. Open letter slamming "#MeToo" or "#BalanceTornPorc", saying it's a new "puritanical" movement. The signatories of this open letter are all women, who believe: "Men's flirting with women is indispensable to sexual freedom." "Rape is a crime, but whether it is clumsy or not, whether it is pursued or not, Pursuit is not an offense, much less a macho aggression.” Not only did they view some of the allegations as false and fussy, but they also argued that such a movement had already had a negative impact on the relationship between men and women: It discourages men from pursuing women and even encourages "religious extremism."

Here, a hundred French women and supporters of the #MeToo movement are divided over "sexual freedom" in Western "public culture". Both agree that sexual harassment hurts women's sexual freedom, but the former believes that men should be allowed to have more freedom. There is a large space for temptation, so that women can enjoy the fun brought by the relationship between the sexes, and the latter men should wait for the women to express their consent before flirting and pursuing. The "public culture" we are talking about here does not refer to simple "pop culture", but to the deep-seated ideas, values, principles, memories, imaginations, and ideological structures of a society, somewhat similar to the American philosopher John Rolle John Rawls called it "public reason" and Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor called it "social imaginary." Ideas, values, principles, memories, imaginations, and structures of thought in public culture are not necessarily acceptable to all in society, but when one person raises these ideas in public discussion, another person can (under the same conditions) conform to Reasonably "understands" and can express approval or dissent, common dissents include interpreting the concept differently, questioning its scope, or resorting to other concepts. Not everyone's ideas are all derived from "public culture", but very few people's ideas have no overlap with public culture. The existence of public culture makes it possible to achieve a certain level of social consensus, rather than appearing as an eternal ideological scuffle.

The situation in the Western world can be more complicated about the public perceptions involved in sexual harassment. The New York Times published an article in August titled “What Happens When Feminists Are Accused of Sexual Harassment,” which mentioned that New York University professor of German and comparative literature and renowned women scholar Evito Ronell ( Avital Ronell was accused of sexual harassment by her one-time doctoral student, Nimrod Reitman, and Ronell maintains that the relationship between her and Reitman was entirely consensual. After an 11-month investigation, New York University determined that Ronell's sexual harassment was sufficient to "impact Reitman's learning environment," but denied Reitman's allegations of "sexual assault, stalking, and retaliation." This spring, more than fifty academics from around the world wrote a joint letter to NYU protesting NYU's handling of Ronell, the first of which was the feminist theorist Judith R. Butler (Judith Bulter). The letter reads as follows:

"Although we have not seen the confidential case file, we have all worked with Professor Ronell for many years and have all witnessed her relationships with students, and some of us also know the person who launched the malicious attack on her. ...we can attest to Professor Ronell's grace, sharp intelligence and passionate commitment to scholarship, and ask for the decency and dignity that anyone of her international standing and prestige deserves ."

The letter caused an uproar after it was made public online, with many accusing feminist academics, led by Butler, of using an unseemly "double standard" when the victim was male and the accused was a feminist . On August 20, Butler issued an open letter via email, apologizing for his previous "endorsement", acknowledging that the co-signers should not "blame the complainant's motives" or "suggest Ronell's status and reputation." Any form of differential treatment can be obtained.” It is worth mentioning that Slavoj Zizek, another left-wing philosopher who endorsed Ronell but has always had reservations about #MeToo, still insisted on the day before Butler issued an open letter. There was nothing wrong with Ronell's actions, and said the victim "has now got his wish, enjoying the media attention given to a copycat victim, a position that gave him (and his supporters) all real social power, putting Aveto This 'powerful' figure is pushed to the brink of social incapacity and exclusion." This rhetoric, commonly known as "blame the victim," because Zizek is speaking for a feminist, queer theorist, seems to be Criticism was less severe. Lisa Duggan also defended Ronell with "queer theory," arguing that queer intimacy cannot be viewed through the lens of traditional heterosexual intimacy, "that queerness does not clearly define friendship. Separate from love, not partnership from romantic friendship."

In connection with the earliest voice of #MeToo, Italian actress Asia Argento was accused of sexual assault by Jimmy Bennett, a young actor and musician 22 years her junior, #MeToo in The values and principles involved in public discourse in the West have become extremely complex: Is "sexual freedom" understood as an opportunity to have a richer sexual experience, or as the right to inviolate one's body? Do feminists defer to the "right thing to the wrong person" when the identity of the victim and the accuser don't fit the stereotype of "men in power sexually assault vulnerable women"? Where is the line between queer practice and sexual harassment? While we don't doubt that there will be feminists who can give a coherent account of the events above, to do so in a way that is consistent in principle, does not distort the facts, and does not damage the reputation of the #MeToo movement and feminism, I am afraid Difficulty is not small. Although European and American societies have not yet fully assimilated these events into their public culture, one thing is certain: even if they happened in China, they would not have caused the same controversy. Not that there are no women in China who think the #MeToo movement hinders their sexual freedom, nor that the victims and feminists who have come forward in China's #MeToo movement can't be accused, but it's hard to imagine that in the Chinese language Under this circumstance, there will be so many women who will take the initiative to stand up for the freedom of men to flirt without being maliciously interpreted by public opinion, and it is even more impossible for Chinese people to accept "queer theory" as a public reason for any unconventional intimate practice and Sexual Practice Defense. This fully shows that China and the West have completely different public cultural backgrounds when it comes to #MeToo.

first wave of criticism

If it is said that feminism is a basic consensus in the above three events, but the interpretation is different, then in China, the discussion on #MeToo does not have a feminist consensus background, and some people even think that China does not exist at all. "Public culture", only the "war of the gods" of values.

There are two reasons for saying that there is no "public culture" in China: there is no real freedom of speech in China, and the formation of a public culture needs to ensure that every citizen can honestly and fully discuss their own views without being influenced by public power. Otherwise, these expressed views are likely to be manipulated; China has only a variety of ideologies and values, and there is no "consensus" in any broad sense, so the communication between people presents a "sympathetic warmth" "Layer effect", different stratospheres can only have functional communication, but cannot carry out deep dialogue.

Both of these reasons have certain truths. For the first reason, we can respond as follows: Although China does not have freedom of speech as a "right", it does have speech in a "de facto" and quantitative sense. Freedom, this does not mean that although the Chinese government does not respect the "freedom of speech" clause in the constitution, Chinese citizens can speak freely without being punished by public power. Of course, there are cases of "criminal punishment for speech", but due to the limitations of control technology and the cost of control, it is impossible for the Chinese government to control all public speeches. Even if there is control, most of them are deleted. Taking a step back, many Chinese are willing to express their views sincerely in public discussions, even with the possibility of being convicted of their speech, and many public speeches do not themselves involve what the Chinese government considers "sensitive content," which may themselves be "sensitive." politically neutral". As far as these aspects are concerned, although the publicity of China's "public culture" is limited, it is not completely absent.

The second reason misunderstands "public culture" and "social consensus." In China, the split state of social concepts is indeed remarkable, but this has nothing to do with the existence of "public culture", because many concepts in public culture do not necessarily have to be accepted by all people in society, and a person may only accept public culture. part of the concept, and not accept the other part of the concept. If an idea appears frequently in public discourse, there are many different interpretations of it, and it is often cited as an explanation for the behavior of oneself and others, then we can say that such an idea is in the deep structure of social consciousness and also That is, it is part of public culture. Public culture is not a coherent whole, and there may be conflicting public concepts in it. So we can say that public culture is only the material of social consensus, but not social consensus itself.

Just as we examine criticism of #MeToo abroad, we can see how Western public culture responds to the movement, we can also examine the criticism of #MeToo in China to observe how some public ideas emerge from public discussions and embrace #MeToo The shock of #MeToo. One of the most prominent public concepts in China is probably "nationalism". China's "nationalism" is not simply "nationalism", but also includes a little "statism". This is not to say that there is no pure "nationalism" in China, but due to the ambiguity of China's national construction since modern times, and the indistinguishability of "national interests" and "national interests" in public discourse, most Chinese show "Nationalism" contains some "nationalism" more or less, so we use "nationalism" instead to distinguish "nationalism" in the Western sense.

The first wave of criticism against the #MeToo movement came precisely from nationalism. Since Luo Qianqian reported Chen Xiaowu, there have been voices from inside and outside the system that there must be "foreign forces" making waves behind this. In March of this year, the WeChat public account "Cold Play Lab" published an article "Charging foreign men's money and cheating Chinese girls? There is such a group of "feminist organizations" in China", which slandered the feminist organization "Feminist Voices" and young feminist activist Zheng Churan, and was also charged with "colluding with foreign forces".

The article stated that "Feminist Voices" received sponsorship from the Ford Foundation, an overseas organization, and Zheng Churan had close contacts with Leta Hong Fincher, an overseas scholar who supports Hong Kong independence. of. They crusade against Chinese men, the purpose is to sell Chinese women to white men. Although this topsy-turvy article did not directly name #MeToo, the time it was published, the target (during the #MeToo movement, Feminist Voices and Zheng Churan’s social platform accounts both posted a lot of relevant content) and the charges detained Look, it can be said that it is directed at #MeToo.

In April, under the indictment of Wang Ao, an assistant professor of East Asian Studies at Wesleyan University, and other classmates in the Chinese Department of Peking University, the director of the Linguistics Department of the School of Literature at Nanjing University and a Changjiang scholar Shenyang sexually assaulted a female student at Peking University. Gao Yan was exposed. . Some students from Peking University applied to Peking University to disclose relevant information of the year. Yue Xin, a fourth-year student at Peking University's School of Foreign Languages, was repeatedly coerced by the school, and was suspected of being instigated by "foreign forces" because of her own experience of going abroad.

When these incidents happened, some nationalist-inclined public opinions on social platforms have been rendering #MeToo a movement dominated by foreign forces with ulterior motives, aiming to crack down on Chinese male elites from all walks of life. Soon, #MeToo became a sensitive word on Sina Weibo, and it was impossible to initiate a topic with this hashtag, and it was impossible to search.

Strictly speaking, this wave of "criticism" of the #MeToo movement and feminism might be more appropriately called "attack" or "stigmatization." It epitomizes the claim that "the #MeToo movement is being manipulated by foreign forces". It mainly comes from: 1) units or personnel within the system; 2) anti-Westernists who regard the West led by the United States as an imaginary enemy; 3) conspiracy theorists in international relations. Logically, its absurdities are obvious, such as ignoring the origins of the #MeToo movement in the West, such as being based on some unfounded speculation, but it still attracts a large number of believers. For the units or personnel within the system, accepting the term "manipulation by foreign forces" provides many conveniences for them to crack down on the parties and shirk their responsibilities; for anti-Westernists, "manipulation by foreign forces" is undoubtedly a battle horn , they can vent their invisible hatred on the visible campaigners; for conspiracy theorists, this best explains the coincidence of multiple cases being exposed at the same time. The above three positions all belong to a certain sense of nationalism. In addition, considering that "imperialism's heart will not die" has been talked about by the Chinese since 49 years, the nationalist expression "#MeToo movement is the manipulation of foreign forces" is the country's target for #MeToo MeToo's most natural and native response.

However, this wave of "criticism" or "attacks" on #MeToo has done little to damage the movement, other than turning #MeToo into a sensitive term and attracting hostility from the system. After May, although the term "manipulation by foreign forces" appeared less in public discussions, it did not disappear completely. Rather, because nationalists lack the patience to observe and analyze the #MeToo movement, nationalism itself is also at odds with the logic of the #MeToo movement. Liberals”), so nationalism can no longer play a significant role in public discussions related to #MeToo. In addition, since #MeToo targets mainly people within the system (college teachers), and #MeToo supporters have had a fierce confrontation with the system (the Yue Xin incident), the term "manipulation by foreign forces" is not conducive to solidarity. All the disgruntled people have played a part, and #MeToo's support has grown even wider.

Second wave of criticism

From the end of 2017 to the beginning of July 2018, the exposure of #MeToo in China was mainly by university professors, besides Chen Xiaowu (January) and Shenyang (April), Gu Haibing (April) and Renmin University’s Gu Haibing (April) and Zhang Peng of Sun Yat-Sen University (July), which also attracted criticism mainly from Chinese within the system and hostile to Western ideas. On July 23, Lei Chuang, the founder of Yiyou Public Welfare, was accused of sexually assaulting volunteers. #MeToo began to enter the public welfare circle. Feng Yongfeng, an environmental public welfare person, and Deng Fei, the founder of Free Lunch, were exposed. On July 25th, veteran media personality Zhang Wen was accused of sexual assault and harassment by several women (including young female writer Jiang Fangzhou), #MeToo officially entered the so-called "public circle", because Zhang Wen was not only a "China hundred" Great public intellectual”, and also has a deep relationship with famous public intellectuals such as He Weifang. At this time, although some non-system public figures such as Xin Lijian and Yan Lieshan came out to speak to Zhang Wen, and suspected that there might be an official or other political faction behind this, they wanted to take the opportunity to damage the reputation of the public, but due to the large number of accusers , Zhang Wen's response was also extremely rude and savage, and bystanders who followed #MeToo were generally more inclined to believe the accusers. The turning point was Xiong Peiyun’s incident. Not long after Yan Lieshan’s defense of Zhang Wen’s statement came out, Zhao Sile, a well-known protest reporter, accused Xiong Peiyun, an associate professor of Nankai University and a well-known public intellectual, of sexual harassment against her, triggering the biggest incident since the mainland #MeToo movement.” earthquake".

The complexity of the Xiong Peiyun incident is not only that Xiong Peiyun's reputation is much better than Zhang Wen's, but also that Zhao Sile's accusation lacks further relevant evidence to support. In the end, it is difficult for bystanders to draw a more certain conclusion from it, and ultimately they can only resort to personal trust. On July 27th, Liu Yu, an associate professor at Tsinghua University and another well-known public intellectual, posted a long article on her Moments about her views on #MeToo.

Liu Yu's article, as she said at the end, if the author is a male, he will definitely be identified as himtoo. She criticized #MeToo from the perspective of a woman. From this point of view, the nature of the article is somewhat similar to the open letter in the French "Le Monde", but since there are no other women's signatures behind the article, she can only represent herself, Not representative of other women. In fact, judging from the subsequent reactions, Liu Yu's female identity did not give her much immunity, and her critics believed that her views represented more of her "publicly known" status rather than from her female identity. The article is divided into seventeen subsections, and almost every subsection is full of controversy. Even the second subsection, which generally affirms #MeToo and is considered "politically correct" by the author, makes it difficult for feminists to mention women's self-protection. accept. Zhao Dan, who graduated with a doctorate in law from Yale University, responded to Liu Yu in "China's "Mitu" is very precious, please don't destroy it easily", saying: "#MeToo does not need to educate women and gay men to protect themselves, but should let the disadvantaged The community recognizes that there are a lot of people just like you here, you are right, it's the people who abused you, and it's about educating these people about gender boundaries, women's rights, and encouraging her/them to take action , forming an effective force to promote change.”

The other subsections, in the view of feminists, are more problematic: From subsections 4 to 8, Liu Yu tries to demonstrate why judicial access is preferred to online exposure, and the reasons she lists are indeed consistent with liberal public knowledge Molecular style: the spirit of the rule of law, individualism, the presumption of innocence, the principle of proportionality, not asking the accused to prove their innocence... In this regard, Zhao Dan's response is also representative: "#MeToo does not convict people, it does not exist "Punishment" (by definition, "penalty" must involve the intervention of public power), how about proportional sentencing? #MeToo is a cultural movement that exposes the reality and makes people realize that "there is a problem here", of course, it cannot be applied in the legal system the principle of proportionality.”

In Section 10, Liu Yu believes that women should not always be assumed to be "innocent and weak women", because this is inconsistent with the "strength, autonomy, and courage" advocated by feminism. There should be equal rights and responsibilities between the two sexes. The response is that this is the difference between what is and what should be. Sections 12 and 13 say that the reason why some men have sexually assaulted women, the concept of "easy sex" in popular culture and the self-objectification of some women also need to take some responsibility. Zhao Dan admits that changing popular culture and The importance of women's self-objectification, but it's not contradictory to point out that men are wrong. Intimacy in the relationship between men and women often requires consideration of when a woman must give a clear "consent" and when it can be carried out by capturing "signals". Liu Yu is undoubtedly more inclined to agree with the role of "signals", while Zhao Dan is the opposite. .

After Liu Yu's article came out, there were some dramatic reactions: the article was posted late at night, but liberal intellectuals reposted it in the circle of friends one after another. But it gradually became mainstream. Zhao Dan was the first to respond. Although it was mainly disapproval, the language was still mild, and it was a discussion rather than a criticism. Some criticisms that appeared later were quite rude, and even regarded Liu Yu as #MeToo and feminism. the enemy of ism. Liberal intellectuals were appalled by the vehement criticism of Liu Yu, with some seeing it as a sign that the #MeToo movement was out of control and needed to be curbed, or at least less supportive. Feminists and younger generations are also puzzled by this reaction from liberal intellectuals, seeing it as a "generation gap," or, in other words, liberal intellectuals being "too conservative" and "not keeping up with the times." Ji Xiaocheng, a media person, wrote in the article "China's #MeToo Debate: It's not Liu Yu that caused the tear, the crack has always been there": "I have to admit that many former 'liberal' enlighteners are in the knowledge structure, action force And empathy for disadvantaged groups is far behind the younger generation of social activists... The next leaders in the Chinese social movement may be feminists, left-wing youth, and activists in the labor movement."   If history is going so smoothly, then perhaps we should be optimistic about China's progress. In fact, #MeToo went into a defensive phase after August and was brought into the judicial process as the accused sued multiple accusers and whistleblowers for "reputation infringement".

In fact, the point of the debate between Liu Yu and Zhao Dan is not to stage a life-and-death struggle between "progressives" and "conservatives", but to fully demonstrate how "public culture" is impacted by social movements and response, and how the movement’s supporters responded to that response. Let's go back and look at all the reasons why Liu Yu questioned #MeToo: individualism, presumption of innocence, proportionality, equality of power and responsibility, signals in the relationship between men and women... these are of course liberal intellectual ideas, but from another level In other words, they are also the "water level of ideas" in China at this stage. Liu Yu is not ahead, but not behind. It is not easy for them to become a part of China's conceptual reality. There are reasons for the overall changes in the Chinese social structure, as well as the credit of liberal intellectuals. Without the 30 to 40 years they spend repeatedly preaching "common sense" in spaces of speech that periodically expand and contract, these ideas would not have become part of Chinese public culture. A person who has been educated in mainland China since childhood, often reads mainland Chinese publications, and has been immersed in simplified Chinese Internet for a long time, even if it is a woman, her views on sexual harassment are more likely to be close to Liu Yuna kind, not the feminist kind. This is not to say that Liu Yu is right on this issue, and feminists are wrong. It should be said that this shows that there were not many "feminist" elements in Chinese public culture before, although after 1949, the country had Massive official propaganda that "women hold up half the sky".

Zhao Dan's criticism of Liu Yu is not by completely denying these pre-existing public concepts, but by questioning its scope of application, or by limiting its context. For example, Liu Yu believes that a "presumption of innocence" should be made on the accused until there is definite evidence, while Zhao Dan believes that this only applies to criminal charges, not to social public opinion; Big-character posters,” and should be resolved by judicial procedures, and Zhao Dan, by comparing the differences between China and the United States in the anti-sexual harassment mechanism, the way public opinion changes legislation, and the role of the Supreme Court, believes that Liu Yu’s suggestion Feasibility is too low; Liu Yu is worried that #MeToo will cause the relationship between men and women to lose warmth, leaving only vigilance, and Zhao Dan thinks this concern is understandable in Europe and the United States, but in China, it is too early to consider this . Zhao Dan's criticism of Liu Yu is reasonable, because these public concepts are indeed not applicable in any field, and when resorting to them, it is also necessary to consider the degree of realization of some supporting systems in different countries.

The reason why it is appropriate to understand the debate between Liu Yu and Zhao Dan through "public culture" is that they themselves have more or less related discussions. Liu Yu said: "The principle of 'presumption of innocence' is first of all a kind of culture, and it is only possible to generate a specific system in a specific culture. I don't believe that a society in which the 'presumption of guilt' is universally applied in public opinion will be true. Suddenly, the principle of 'presumption of innocence' was effectively implemented in the court." Zhao Dan responded: "Public power trials require the cultural basis of 'presumption of innocence', but social movements based on popular culture, 'presumption of innocence' The spirit does not apply.” This fully shows that they are fully aware of the interaction between social movements and public culture, but they do not discuss this interaction.

In her article, Liu Yu compared #MeToo to a "big big-character poster", which was angrily ridiculed by countless feminists. In "Problems of Knowledge Structure of Chinese Middle-aged Liberal Intellectuals", Peking University believes that liberal intellectuals represented by Liu Yu suffer from severe "Cultural Revolution phobia": "The symptoms are: no matter what aspects of social justice they see. If you see people or groups that hold leftist theories, you will automatically scare yourself, whether these people are very hairy, and whether what they do will eventually lead to another Cultural Revolution. This ridicule misses the point that the memory and imagination of the "Cultural Revolution" are indeed deeply ingrained in contemporary Chinese public culture. Section 2 questioned the first reason for the existence of public culture in China. Its rationality lies in the fact that contemporary public culture in China is not only caused by social structural changes and the “enlightenment” of intellectuals, but also related to official propaganda and education. Both liberal intellectuals and the CCP during the Deng era (1978-2012) participated in the shaping of contemporary Chinese public culture, and in terms of “cultural revolution phobia”, these two groups are highly similar. If in the West, linking an event with the Nazis means that it is an irrefutable evil, then in China, the same is true of linking an event with the Cultural Revolution, which reflects the relationship between China's "public culture" and China's There is nothing to ridicule about the special relationship of a certain period of history. From another point of view, feminists’ violent reaction to the “big-character posters” and their eagerness to distance themselves from the relationship precisely show what kind of situation the “Cultural Revolution” is in in contemporary Chinese public culture. unique position.

Third wave of criticism

The impact of Liu Yu's criticism on #MeToo is far-reaching. It alienates quite a few liberal intellectuals from the movement, but it has not had a huge shaking effect on #MeToo and feminism. It's a pity that the discussion has since become a bit of a battle of emotions, and some of the issues raised by Liu Yu have not been taken seriously enough, such as how #MeToo avoids wrongful convictions, how to distinguish different degrees of sexual harassment, How to tell the difference between silly sexual temptation and sexual harassment. They did get a certain degree of response, but compared to their importance, this response is still not enough. The solution proposed by Liu Yu (recourse to justice) is certainly unconvincing, but if it is completely like Zhao Dan's Said, according to the popular culture "suspicious crime always exists", of course it sounds like a solution to hatred, but after all, it is not a proper solution. Progressives in China will have to go back and make up for this lesson in the future.

When He Weifang reposted Liu Yu's article, he mentioned that "such articles reflect the advantages of female authors". Being a woman alone isn't enough to make feminists hold their ground, but feminists feel a little swayed when their critics are not just women, but victims, and activists on the front lines of #MeToo Difficult. At this year's Golden Horse Awards ceremony, Taiwanese young director Fu Yu delivered an acceptance speech, in which he said: "I hope our country can be treated as an independent individual." The embarrassment of Ang Lee and the mainland actors can be imagined. I know, but what people didn't expect was that the remarks also sparked a civil war in #MeToo. Film practitioner Xianzi made a comment on his Weibo, disapproving of Fu Yu's remarks: "I support freedom of speech, but I really think that young people who do not recognize that Taiwan and the mainland are one country are being fooled by politicians. Stupid." She also believes that "Taiwan's development is far behind that of the mainland", and Taiwan's practice of alienating the mainland will only make her situation more embarrassing.

Another identity of Xianzi is that she is a client of Zhu Jun's case. She was sexually harassed by Zhu Jun during her internship in "Art Column" four years ago, and she reported the case afterwards. This year #MeToo is on the rise in China. She posted her experience on the Moments in the early morning of July 27th (just a dozen hours earlier than Liu Yu’s long post), and her friends reposted it with her permission. My friend Mai Shao posted this self-report on Sina Weibo and received a lot of retweets. On August 15th, Zhu Jun's law firm "Beijing Xingquan" sued Xianzi Mai Shao and forwarding users to the People's Court of Haidian District, Beijing, claiming 655,000 yuan. After receiving the court's notice, Xianzi also formally sued Zhu Jun. This shows that #MeToo has to resort to justice as Liu Yu said, and this solution has been approved by Xianzi Maiyao from the very beginning.

Xianzi's remarks about Taiwan surprised some people who have been following and supporting #MeToo, not only because #MeToo activists rarely get involved in other too controversial topics, but also because #MeToo has been receiving official scrutiny since its inception. Suppression, its supporters are mainly people who have a critical attitude towards the system. They believe that after Taiwan's return, the living environment for women may become as bad as the mainland. Plus many people who support #MeToo also support LGBT rights, and Taiwan is the most progressive region in Asia in this regard, so they feel completely incomprehensible to Xianzi that Taiwan's development is far behind the mainland. Of course, some people who follow Xianzi are indeed outright dissidents, and they pay attention to the two because Xianzi Maiyao directly confronts representatives from the system like Zhu Jun. It is difficult for us to clarify the motives of all those involved in this matter. From the facts, Xianzi got into a fight with some netizens because of the above remarks.

Soon someone connected Taiwan's autonomy with her autonomy over her own body. These remarks completely angered Xianzi. She believed that these people who mocked her came from the feminist camp, and she came forward with some feminists. The activist did have unpleasant communication on some issues, so she took aim at feminism. She posted a Weibo on November 18, expressing several meanings: She doesn't think women's rights are more important than other public issues (such as environmental protection, because Maijou is doing environmental protection public welfare), and she doesn't believe in any "ism" , she doesn't think #MeToo is about politics, much less that #MeToo is a "movement". Many followers are anxious, some explain to her why #MeToo is related to politics, some give her knowledge of "social movements", but more express disappointment, thinking that Xianzi is trying to draw a line from feminism , to avoid unfavorable lawsuits, and there is suspicion of crossing the river and demolishing the bridge.

On the evening of the 19th, Xianzi posted another long article on Weibo called "About Labels, a Discussion", explaining why he rejected the label of "feminist". Earlier in the article she quoted Foucault's passage on "power", and then said: "Our vision from the ID behind each other has become a kind of power over spirit, and in Foucault's view, this power The purpose is to make the object useful and effective.” Quoting Foucault makes Xianzi’s article incomprehensible to some, but combined with her role in the #MeToo incident, what she wants to say is that she refuses all attention and Labels, because these gazes and labels will hurt her own "subjectivity" and make herself a tool for others; she worries that once she devotes herself to a certain ism or identity, she will inevitably sacrifice other values and harm for that ism or identity other people:

"Mei Yao and I refuse not only a label of feminist protection, but all labels: victims, whistleblowers, opinion leaders, dissidents, we refuse to be watched and disciplined, and we refuse to be absolute feminists. To be noticed as a doctrinal (or) or other identity, refusing to be noticed by this kind of gaze becomes valid and useful. Because first, we question this validity. We want to be ourselves with our own perception of the world - Foucault said People are produced by power, and we don’t want to suddenly discover that one day we cannot be pure ourselves.”

On the other hand, she also explained why she is reluctant to understand #MeToo as a politics and a movement. She believes that in China, victims and whistleblowers stand up to promote the progress of women's rights and interests in society as a whole, but they can get very little legal aid, financial aid, psychological aid and media aid, "if you want to say # MeToo, the essence of this wave is to encourage victims to speak out about their experiences, but when all subsequent protection measures have not been done well, to blindly impose the detached political meaning of this wave is to push people who are weaker than themselves People are rushing to the line of fire." Not only did she think that there was no need to impose a political meaning on #MeToo from a prudent point of view, but also from the motive of the victims to speak out, she also did not feel that there was a political meaning in it, just "because they were suffering, not It's more painful to say it."

Judging from the seriousness of her writing, Xianzi is sincere in explaining her thoughts to followers, although her explanation is not necessarily convincing in the eyes of some people. Wu Huaiyu, a young scholar whose Weibo ID is "I talk about old common sense", believes that a person can reject a certain label, but it is impossible to reject all labels: "If a person has done everything in the past, and her most representative identity, They are all closely related to women's rights and interests, and her rejection of the feminist label will bring confusion to others about who she is." Xianzi also doesn't know much about the efforts made by domestic feminists and the suppression they receive. That's why there are complaints that "feminists don't do anything but like and retweet". Despite this, many well-known feminists still understand Xianzi's attitude of "rejecting the label", and some even come out to criticize those "feminists" who attack Xianzi. However, the misunderstanding continued to escalate until Xianzi said, "Don't do it with the facts, use the doctrine to engage in the Cultural Revolution on the Internet, and stigmatize women's rights." Think of Liu Yu's famous criticism.

Leaving aside the Foucault theory that is the background of Xianzi's argument and the right and wrong of her views, we can still find some of the underpinnings of public culture in her speech: depoliticization, skepticism of all "movements", individualism , a critique of moral idealism, and, most importantly, the use of the "Cultural Revolution" to bring down the opponent's army. Xianzi's "individualism" is reflected in her assertion of personal subjectivity, refusing to be labelled, refusing to be used as a tool for some kind of grand goal, and when she believes that she is dedicated to a certain "ism", she will not hesitate to sacrifice other values, harm Among others, she does share contemporary liberal intellectual critiques of moral idealism. There are many complicated factors in Xianzi's "depoliticized" stance. Personally, he may have a bit of Milan Kundera's connotation. He refuses to express his support for the Communist Party, but also refuses to express his anti-Communist position. The more important point is that she was the first to stand up to participate in #MeToo, more consideration is "injustice of justice" rather than "feminist rights", she is more willing to resort to the law, rather than resorting to politics or sports, she is like Liu Yu , sincerely believe that the problem of sexual harassment can be solved through justice, even if he loses the case, that is a warning. Whether feminists agree or not, Xianzi doesn't understand herself wrong, even though she is a victim of #MeToo, she is in court with the accused, even though what she is doing is closely related to women's rights, she Many of the core concepts of feminism really have nothing to do with "feminism". If you want to say, her part of the concept is closer to conservative liberalism (she personally may not like such a "label").

Although some people hope to rearrange the debate caused by the strings from the perspective of feminism, the part that is difficult to restore still shows that the right to interpret #MeToo cannot be monopolized by a certain ideology (neutral). If Liu Yu and Zhao Dan's defenses are not enough to convince some that there is a part of plain liberal ideas in Chinese public culture, then Xianzi's remarks should prove it better than Liu Yu's. She is a core participant in #MeToo, not an intellectual like Liu Yu who originally identifies with liberalism. From her attitude towards the Golden Horse Awards, she does not have a thorough critical stance on the system, and the philosophers she cites also Not a liberal philosopher. If we can find a lot of liberal public concepts (and some nationalistic elements) in such an actor without liberal "personality", then feminism's criticism of liberalism , it may be necessary to take into account more complex situations. For those #MeToo participants and supporters, if they want the movement to "change the way society treats women," or inject more feminist elements into China's public culture, they need to have more mental preparation and patience to deal with these pre-existing public concepts.

Epilogue

At this point, we may still be unable to convince some people that it is the narcissism of liberals to say that there are some elements of liberalism in China's public culture. Some of those who hold this position are cultural conservatives. They believe that the foundation of China's public culture is still traditional ideology such as Confucianism. Even after the Mao era and the reform and opening up, this foundation has not changed. , they are all just duckweed; the other part is radicals who completely deny the "enlightenment" since the 1980s. They believe that only by completely overthrowing the current regime can various Western advanced concepts truly take root in China. All duckweed.

For the first type, we cannot fully convince them, because their position is close to "cultural ontology", they believe that the deep cultural structure of Chinese society can only be Confucian, and ignore all evidence that contradicts this point. But we admit this: Confucianism and other traditional concepts have not died out in contemporary Chinese public culture, especially in recent years, with the prosperity of Sinology education and classics reading education inside and outside the system, and the concept of "female Durban" in some places. "For example, men are the sky and women are the earth", which is directly opposed to liberalism and feminism. Although in the view of some feminists, liberalism that does not accept feminism, like Confucianism, is "patriarchal" and must be eliminated, but compared with liberalism, Confucianism is not only farther away from the goal of women's liberation, It is also a greater threat because it is closer to the center of power.

For the radicals who deny the contribution of "Enlightenment", they essentially believe that in an autocratic society there cannot be any public concept other than the concept approved by the ruler, they deny the possibility of public concept being independent of politics, and believe in "political determinism" . As we acknowledged in Section 3, some of the contemporary public concepts in China are also shaped by the Communist Party of China, and this part of the officially recognized concepts are passed through official newspapers, central news, leaders’ speeches, history textbooks, ideological and political concepts. Teaching materials and authorized film and television works were disseminated. In addition, power also has a more detailed concept reproduction system, such as "The Rabbit That Year", the fifty cents party on social platforms, and the official WeChat account. Beyond these, however, ideas are not without room for growth, such as independent media, unofficial publications, university humanities classes, art exhibitions, foreign websites, and various Weibo and WeChat official accounts that have not been manipulated by the authorities. Ideas that grow in these spaces are not rootless duckweed.

Their roots lie precisely in the overall changes in China's social structure over the past forty years. Since 1978, the market economy has been gradually recognized and the status of the non-public economy has risen; large-scale urbanization has occurred in Chinese society, a large number of farmers have migrated to cities to work, and a large number of individuals outside the system have emerged; China's accession to the WTO encourages Chinese enterprises to participate in foreign trade and share the benefits of globalization. Dividends; China’s family planning policy has made one-child families mainstream within one or two generations; China’s university enrollment has expanded, and the proportion of the Chinese population with a college education has risen sharply; the Chinese government has improved civil rights at the institutional level, such as the abolition of detention The deportation system, the introduction of the "Property Law", etc.; the rapid development of information technology, such as the Internet and electronic communications, has also greatly changed the way people obtain information and perceive reality. A fact that is easily overlooked is that China has gone through two or three hundred years of experience in the West in the past 40 years, and the existence of multiple conflicting concepts in China is a consequence of this "hurricane advance". Although political power can manipulate social concepts, it cannot change a reality: some concepts will appear with the overall change of the social structure, while the existence of other concepts only reflects the lag of social consciousness.

This does not mean that we have to wait for a fundamental change in the social structure itself before we change the society's attitude towards women and promote the progress of gender equality. Moreover, some social structures themselves should be changed. Public events and social movements have positive meanings: some public events and social movements can have a mobilizing effect on those who share a certain public concept, and the mobilized groups can work together to accomplish more ambitious and further Goals; at other times, events and sports will have an impact on the existing public culture and contribute to the formation of a new public culture. It can be said that without movements and events, there would be no drive to generate new public ideas.

Yet public events and social movements cannot themselves become new public ideas without criticism from public culture. Many of the ideas contained in #MeToo cannot go directly into public culture without being enforced by state power and must go through some debate. For example, while sexual harassment is a common female experience, exposing and punishing public opinion through #MeToo is not a “universal” practice. So during the campaign, someone would criticize the specifics, and campaigners and supporters would respond, and so on and so forth. There is a fact that the views of Liu Yu and Xianzi were not raised before they were raised, so in the absence of external intervention, the debate between Liu Yu and Zhao Dan, the debate between Xianzi and feminists, they The occurrence of is a high probability event. After the movement has come to an end, there will be debates over the overall narrative and comprehensive significance of the movement. After the debate, some of the recurring concepts in the movement will gradually become part of the public culture.

Focusing on the benign evolution of public culture, critics may not regard activists as monstrous beasts, and activists may not regard critics as ignorant of the past. But it must be said that this benign evolution does not necessarily occur between all movements and criticisms. Some movements, with the manipulation of political power behind them, do not aim to change public culture, but to "pure people". Some criticism is neither out of concern for public affairs nor out of concern for fellow citizens living together in a society, but out of prejudice against a certain group, or refusal to reflect on one's own inherent position. Such movements and criticism will only make a society forever trapped in a vicious political cycle.