Why did de Gaulle abandon Algeria?

Press: There is a TELL+ historical event in Shanghai, which aims to tell a little historical story to the general public. When I found me in the spring of 2018, I stuffed some private goods and told this story. ps, the audience off the field did not respond well.

one

Do you still remember a movie called "The Day of the Jackal", which is based on the novel of the same name by the British writer Forsyth. It tells that in 1963, a killer nicknamed Jackal was hired The assassination of French President Charles de Gaulle. The description of this novel is so wonderful that this work has since been regarded as a blueprint for action and a training material by intelligence agencies and terrorist organizations of various countries. Fiction is fiction, of course, but the assassination of de Gaulle is a real thing (Forsyth usually plays on the real thing). If you have read the movies and novels carefully, you should know that the organization that hired this killer is called the "Secret Army".

Who is the secret army? They were both officers of the French army and had organized numerous assassinations of de Gaulle in the sixties (at least four such assassinations: September 1961, May, June and August 1962) . Then comes the problem. We all know that Charles de Gaulle was a hero of France, who made outstanding contributions during World War II and enjoyed a high prestige in the French army. Then why did these French soldiers assassinate him? This starts with Algeria and the Algerian War.

two

A strong, secular state with a long civilization and a large population has a largely Muslim frontier. This side has a vast territory and many resources. Over the past century, a large number of immigrants from the mainland have moved in. These immigrants are superior and self-contained in terms of work, status, economic conditions and living area, and they regard themselves as the pioneers of "civilization". The state has invested heavily in this frontier, but the main beneficiaries of this investment are outsiders. Although it has been established here for more than a hundred years, the government is still worried about the centrifugal tendency of the local people. The army deployed there mainly performs civilian surveillance tasks. The local government holds a certain discriminatory attitude towards the religion and culture of Muslim residents, and believes that the best way to consolidate unity is to make local residents align with the country's mainstream culture as soon as possible. But to be fair, the state still provides local people with basic legal order, medical and educational services, and more or less avenues for political participation. Although the situation of foreign immigrants is better, they are still self-sufficient. Although the locals are dissatisfied, life is generally decent compared to the surrounding areas. A large number of local people joined the army and local government to work, and a group of people became intellectuals who accepted mainstream culture. On the one hand, they were dissatisfied with social discrimination, on the other hand, they were still willing to live in this country.

The above is about Algeria around 1950. At that time, Algeria was a province of France, and the general perception in the world still regarded Algeria as a special part of France, rather than an ordinary imperial colony (in this kind of territory, a small number of imperial bureaucrats ruled the vast number of foreign ruled, such as French Morocco). The relationship between Algeria and France at that time was like that of Ireland in the nineteenth century to Britain, modern Quebec to Canada, and the Basque to Spain. After World War II, the native population of Algeria began to demand some kind of political reform in order to have more rights. This call for reform later slowly morphed into some kind of armed resistance.

For the French politicians and people at that time, the consciousness of l'Algérie, c'est la France ("Algeria is France") was very strong, and this probably cannot be dismissed as a colonial mentality. The famous French writer Camus was born in Algeria. For people like him, Algeria is also his hometown, so he called for reconciliation and consensus many times. In 1954, when the FLN (Algerian National Liberation Front) began to pursue independence through violent terror (the outbreak of the Algerian War), all parts of the French political spectrum were firmly opposed. At that time, although France was governed by leftists and advocated improving people's livelihood, on the issue of Algeria, there was no difference of opinion between the left and the right. Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-Frans (an anti-colonial man who presided over the withdrawal of France from Vietnam, Tunisia, etc.) addressed the National Assembly:

"There is no compromise when the internal peace, unity and integrity of the French Republic are threatened...Algeria is part of the French Republic."

In 1956, the centre-left coalition Republican Front won the election, and Prime Minister Guy Mollet (who was also General Secretary of the Socialist Party) had intended to restore peace in Algeria by undertaking political reforms. But in the face of Algeria, which was already extremely divided at the time, Moller quickly made a choice to implement military control in Algeria.

The French left is still like this, not to mention other political forces - some people want to keep the honor of the empire, some people want to save the humiliation suffered in World War II and the Vietnam War, some people want to protect more than one million immigrants, some people like it Algeria's resources and geographic importance, and it was also argued that French Algeria was a reality, and that forcing it to modify it would bring greater misfortune.

Therefore, basically all French parties have a common view on maintaining French sovereignty in Algeria.

Economically, repressing Algeria is not difficult either. Of course, the Algerian war was a huge expense, costing between 50 billion and 55 billion francs, or between 24 percent and 32 percent of the government's total budget spending each year. In 1958 (the end of the Fourth Republic), a financial crisis also broke out, and the French economy stagnated. But this is probably because the center-left government at the time carried out many ambitious social projects while suppressing the uprising. After the de Gaulle government came to power in 1958, these constructions were drastically reduced, and France immediately regained its financial health and economic vitality. In the second half of the war (1958-1962), France was always in a state of economic growth (annual growth rate of more than 5%), and has made rapid progress in the energy, machinery, and electronics industries. From the perspective of the entire war span, the peak of French spending in Algeria (including military and civilian spending) was in 1959, accounting for 2.8% of GDP, but this is not a very large number. In fact, the period from 1945 to 1975, from the point of view of economic history, has been called France's "Golden Thirty Years" (an average annual growth rate of 5.7%). From this point of view, France has the economic strength to conduct long-term operations.

So, is it the French army's unsatisfactory operation in Algeria?

Simple answer: no. The French army has been conducting research on guerrilla warfare and revolutionary warfare since its return from Vietnam, and deployed a large number of officers in Algeria with rich experience in combating riots. From a military point of view, the Arab Liberation Organization has been suppressed and beaten by the French army. For example, one of the focal points of ALO's activities is to attack and assassinate police officers and bomb civilians in big cities like Algiers. The reason is very simple. The outbreak of violent terrorist activities in big cities can best strike the order maintained by France. sense, highlighting the strength of the resisters. But the French army dispatched war hero General Matthew, with his paratrooper brigade, to carry out a ruthless sweep of the ALO's network of urban organizations starting in January 1957. After nine months of brutal fighting, the ALO leaders , combatants, and logisticians were killed or captured almost without exception. Algiers' activities in Algiers were completely terminated.

In rural areas, the Arab Liberation Organization can maintain a certain presence. Until March '58, the AL Group had recruited more people than it had lost, but after April the situation reversed. The French army moved 2 million people out of the mountains, depriving the ALO of its social soil. By 1958, it had successfully blocked the borders between Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, and cut off the ALO's access to external aid. channel. The intelligence work of the French army was effective, well-equipped, mobile, and able to obtain the cooperation of some locals (albeit with varying motives, 200,000 locals fought for the French at its peak), slowly but gradually in rural areas. Kill the Arab League. In the face of French offensives, the local Algerian community usually refuses to associate with the ALO to avoid reprisals. By the summer of 1960, the crisis in the Algerian resistance movement had reached its peak, and key regional commanders had begun to try to negotiate with the French aside from the leadership. A regional leader at the time wrote to the Algerian government-in-exile reporting that "organizational structures have disintegrated in urban centers and are increasingly impossible to maintain in the countryside." Due to the French repression, ALM was never able to organize A strike, demonstration or uprising throughout Algeria.

From the international environment, it seems that there are not too many obstacles to France. Despite America's post-war anti-colonial stance, it wasn't too happy about France's actions in Algeria. But Algeria is a special case, and they know it. It never took the drastic ultimatum attitude of the "Suez Crisis". In the case of the Soviet Union, although it verbally expressed its support for the Algerian resistance organization, the Soviet Union had limited overseas delivery capabilities at that time, and in many cases it could only be rhetorical.

So, since France faces no obvious obstacles in terms of politics, economy, military and external environment, why did France still lose Algeria?

There are several answers to this question, for example, the growing anti-war opinion within French society. Although everyone thinks that Algeria is part of France, everyone also admits that Algeria is not the same as the French mainland after all. As the war has been prolonged and brutal (though successful), there has been a growing awareness that rebuilding Algeria in the future and restoring the morale of the people will be costly. Perhaps the transfer of a large amount of resources from mainland France may bring down the standard of living in mainland France. In other words, the war itself reduced the value of Algeria to France. Moreover, the Vietnam War in the East was still in the ascendant at that time. With this example, it is difficult for the French to have excessive optimism about Algeria. This gap between reality and perception, this anxiety about the future, may explain de Gaulle's final reason for granting Algeria independence.

However, for France, the most dangerous enemy may not be Ah Jie, but Xiao Qiang. Many within France began to notice with increasing unease the deadly union of the Blackfoot with the army, and the deadly consequences of it.

three

After the French invasion of Algeria in the 1830s, large numbers of immigrants were sent to Algeria as minions. After the French political tides, revolutions, and people who were frustrated with politics also flocked to Algeria to open up a new life, these immigrants gained a nickname - "Pieds-Noirs". By the 1950s, their number had reached As many as a million, and it has been through generations locally. For these black feet, they have a greater sense of self-esteem and a deeper sense of intimidation due to their location on the fringes of the empire and in the multi-ethnic environment. "Crazy" and "fearful" are the mentality of many people. They oppose all reforms that give locals more political power on the grounds that they are unnecessary or too dangerous. A large number of members of the French parliament sympathize with the Blackfoot, believing that proposing political reforms is to encourage separatist forces, and to be weak and incompetent.

Here's an example: In January 1955, the French Prime Minister appointed Jacques Soussdale as governor-general in Algeria to resolve the Algerian problem. He advocated the expansion of Algeria's financial and administrative autonomy (closer to the direction of self-government) and the abolition of the current "dual electoral college" system (three-fifths of the seats in the Algerian parliament were elected by the European population, and the remaining of Muslims), so that Muslims and immigrants have equal voting rights. He wanted to win the support of moderate Muslims and disintegrate the resistance. The move was firmly opposed by the black feet, who believed that it was bowing to the terrorists. They used their supporters in the French parliament to pressure Soussdale to suspend the plan.

Facing the independence movement, many (if not most) Blackfoot supported unscrupulous repression, and they found an ally in the military.

The French army in Algeria at the time, when reflecting on the defeat in Vietnam, especially studied Mao Zedong's theory of "people's war". Generally speaking, there are three approaches to destroying an insurgency. The first method is to indiscriminate, without distinguishing between the rebels and the groups where the rebels are located, and they will all be eliminated or expelled; the second method is to draw in and intimidate, and isolate the masses from the rebels; the third method is to strike Judging the head of the organization, personnel and logistics, this is a purely military style of play. In Algeria, the French army believes that in the face of such a war, relying solely on military means is not enough. It suffered from this loss in Vietnam in the past. Now facing the Arab Liberation Army, in addition to combating the Arab Liberation Organization militarily, it is also necessary to control the "water" in "fish and water". Therefore, the military specially set up a psychological warfare department to directly face the Algerian people, and this psychological warfare gradually turned into a full range of control and coercion. The French government at that time, in fact, more or less supported the decision of the military, and decided to let the military do the work, and gradually transferred the governance of Algeria to the military. In March 1955, the French government declared a state of emergency in Algeria, and in 1957, the military had all real power in Algeria. The military at that time, in the face of the terrorist attacks and guerrilla warfare of the Ajie, deeply felt the inadequacy of ordinary criminal procedures and methods. "We must not hesitate to find effective means - even though they may be out of the norm - and to enforce them without mercy." This generally refers to torture and unlawful detention. The military at the time saw every Algerian and sympathetic French as a potential criminal and decided to rule by violence and fear. This practice was not only used in Algeria, but also spread to the French mainland. At that time, there were many Algerians who came to France to work and live, and there were many supporters of the Arab Liberation Army. What the military and police did to them on many occasions was also illegal.

In doing so, the military grew increasingly impatient with the republican government in Paris. Although successive governments have been quite supportive of the military, there are more or less criticisms and restraints in the country. In a democratic system, such voices are difficult to completely disappear. Many soldiers began to question the reliability of democratic government. They thought of the government's "betrayal" of the military during World War II and the "weakness" of the government in the Vietnam War. They believed that the democratic system was simply unable to cope with such extraordinary events as the "Revolutionary War". Some officers began to claim that "we have to realize that in the contemporary world, democratic ideology is very powerless."

Some French soldiers in Algeria admitted: "What we have to do [in Algeria] is organize the masses from top to bottom. You can call me a fascist, but we have to make the masses obey and let everyone behave Control.” France’s intellectual elite began to worry about the spread of this phenomenon. Jean-Marie Domenach, a prominent French left-wing intellectual, wrote at the time: "Fascist tendencies in Algeria cannot coexist with democratic practices in France. . . . I believe that Algeria The fascism of ... will turn against the central government. ... As long as France continues to reject the wishes of the Algerian people, the Algerian war will continue. And as long as the war continues, the situation in Algeria will continue to breed fascism . . . fascism will inevitably spread throughout the army. We are racing against time." In a 1959 French poll, 65 percent of highly educated respondents believed the military could be deviating from its tracks. .

Four

Things happened as expected. On May 13, 1958, a coup took place. In Algiers, a student leader named Pierre Lagayard led a crowd to storm the Governor's Palace building, and the French army in Algeria sat idly by and joined later. General Matthew, the war hero we mentioned earlier, came forward and organized a public security committee.

The danger continued to spread to the French mainland. Native French nationalists began to demonstrate in Paris, and the heads of the republic government sadly found themselves unable to command the army and the police. On May 24, paratroopers from Corsica were dispatched to seize power and established a local public security committee. The French interior minister has warned the cabinet that the insurgency in Corsica could be repeated in the French mainland provinces on May 27 and 28. This is not a lie. General Sarang, commander-in-chief of the French army in Algeria at the time, and General Matthew had drawn up a "resurrection operation plan", specifically, the paratroopers taking off from Algiers and Toulouse, in cooperation with the armored forces stationed outside Paris, entered together Paris, occupy the National Assembly and overthrow the government of the Republic.

The republic government had no choice but to invite Charles de Gaulle, who was living in hibernation in the countryside at that time, and asked him to come back to power to clean up the mess. In this way, not only did successive French cabinets fall because of the Algerian issue, but also the overall military coup was on the verge of breaking out. In modern French history, the danger of "Francoization" of military dictatorship once again emerged. These events are exactly what Burke, the British statesman, said when he opposed the sending of troops to the North American colonies during the American Revolution: "An army that replaces them and governs America will be more costly and less effective; in the end, the army will become like They are just as difficult to control, and it is impossible to know.”

De Gaulle himself was not entirely innocent of the coup. The coup d’étatists had spoken to de Gaulle in advance and asked him for his views on the future of Algeria, and de Gaulle was in vain with him. And some of de Gaulle's men also fought the idea of inciting unrest and taking advantage of the chaos (De Gaulle's Delbec and Soussdale actually participated in the coup d'état). The generals of the coup believed that de Gaulle would be on his side and keep Algeria within the French territory. At the time of the coup, chanted "Long live de Gaulle". De Gaulle also threatened the coup d'état army with self-respect, in order to coerce the government of the republic to grant him full power.

It should be said that de Gaulle's own ideas are actually not much different from those of the military. He also wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of France. His idea was to invest in Algeria on the one hand, and give the locals economic and educational benefits, and on the other hand, to deal with Algeria heavily, to force or persuade the other party to lay down their weapons, and then he would magnanimously incorporate the other party into the local government. , together to achieve a policy (probably some kind of federal system) that will permanently unite Algeria and France. Therefore, after de Gaulle came to power, the military operations in Algeria did not stop and relax, but further attacked, almost forcing Ajie to a dead end. But De Gaulle is De Gaulle after all, and he is different from the general military strongman. He felt that assimilation of the Algerians was impossible (perhaps a hundred years ago), and he knew that even if the rebellion appeared to be suppressed, nothing could stop it in five to ten years After a comeback, it is impossible for France to invest in continuous repression again and again. The French army saw this war as a crusade to restore the honor of the army, preserve French territory and fight against communism, but de Gaulle was very worried that this "crusade" would divide the army and the French nation, and tempt senior officers. The danger of engaging in risky activities. Moreover, de Gaulle's desire for power did not allow him to be held hostage. The army could overthrow the government of the Fourth Republic, and naturally it could overthrow him (when he visited Algiers, the crowd shouted "all power belongs to the army". slogan, he was very angry). Once it became clear that Algeria could not be pacified in a short period of time, he argued otherwise. To the French army and public security committee in Algeria, he kept quiet, and transferred the rebellious high-ranking officers to the center to hang high in the center, and then transferred about 1,500 officers from Algeria to or from Algeria. forced retirement. He is also idle all the time to help his superiors.

The military was of course very dissatisfied with Charles de Gaulle crossing the river and demolishing the bridge. On January 18, 1960, Süddeutsche Zeitung published an interview with General Matthew. General Matthew said the army no longer understood de Gaulle's policies and that it might have been a mistake to help him get back into power. He also said that he and most officers in command "will not unconditionally carry out the orders of the head of state." De Gaulle immediately dismissed him. This immediately triggered a chain reaction. A week later, La Gaillard stormed the streets of Algiers again, setting up barricades. They had a semi-secret armed group called the French National Front. They chanted "hang de Gaulle". The French army has a Marshal Juan, who was a senior of Charles de Gaulle when he was at the Saint-Cyr military academy. He rushed to the Elysee Palace and was furious at de Gaulle: "If you give an order to fire, I will openly oppose you." De Gaulle resisted the pressure and suppressed the rebellion.

A year later, on April 18, 1961, senior French generals in Algeria (including former and current French commanders-in-chief) once again raised the flag of rebellion. The situation was extremely dangerous, because the essence of the French army was in Algeria, which even alerted the British cabinet, who held an emergency meeting to discuss whether to send troops to aid the French government. De Gaulle himself made a radio speech, imploring: "Women and men of France, please help me." As a result, on April 27, due to the common officers and soldiers in the French army responding to de Gaulle's call, but also due to the lack of response by the rebels determination, the mutiny failed.

But that was not the end of the event. The renegade officers who were not caught went underground and cooperated with former civilian insurgents to establish the "Secret Army" organization - an underground military organization composed of ex-officers, extremists in the black feet, and others. Made up of native French sympathizers. Ironically, their strategy of action is similar to that of their old rival Ajie, trying to fight a "people's war". They killed the moderates in the French government and society, and denounced them as "traitors"; they persecuted the native Muslims in Algeria in order to trigger riots and revenge by the local people, thus forcing the army to come forward to suppress them, thus sabotaging any negotiations between the French government and the Algerian Liberation ; and the assassination of General de Gaulle himself. According to the "Le Monde" statistics, from May 1961 to January 1962, secret army organizations carried out a total of 5,862 attacks in Algeria, resulting in 269 deaths.

After suppressing the rebellion, on March 18, 1962, the French government reached a ceasefire with the Arab Liberation Army. De Gaulle had previously appealed to Algerian Muslims, giving three options: independence, merger with France (giving all Muslims French citizenship), and union (self-government of Algeria). But at this time, not many Muslims are still willing to stand on the side of France, and all the moderates have disappeared (either by the Arab Liberation Army, or by the military, the black feet and the secret army). In this way, either a full-scale military conquest or a shameful retreat, there is no third option. The historical choice is the latter. On July 1, 1962, Muslim voters in Algeria voted almost unanimously in favor of independence, while a million black feet embarked on a poignant flight, and hundreds of thousands of Algerians followed them to France.

That's the whole point of today's story.

five

The Algerian War was the bloodiest and most turbulent episode of the post-World War II wave of decolonization. Elsewhere, the withdrawal of former colonists was relatively quick and cost-free, but Algeria was a special case. In this land of 9 million people, France sent 500,000 troops to suppress 35,000 rebel guerrillas, and 400,000 to 1.5 million people died in the war. By many standards, it was a civil war for the following reasons: 1. A large number of deaths occurred outside the regular battlefield, and various terrorist attacks, torture, and slaughter made it famous, and private armed forces retaliated against each other; 2. , the boundaries of combat opponents are blurred. In addition to foreigners, the main targets of the Algerian National Liberation Front are the moderates among the Muslims, and the French residents themselves have organized underground armed forces to attack some French government officials and police; third, the political shock is serious. Not only did several successive French cabinets fall because of the Algeria issue, but the system of the Fourth French Republic also collapsed as a result, and a military dictatorship almost appeared. De Gaulle, who turned the tide, was repeatedly assassinated by French radicals. If the Algerian war was just an ordinary colonial war, it would be hard to imagine that the political situation in France would turn out to be this way.

What can this war tell us?

Looking back on it in hindsight, an obvious lesson is that in such an event, even if you have all political, economic, military, and diplomatic advantages, do not think that violence and coercion can be the only effective means of resolving conflicts. It is probably not enough to deal with ethnic conflicts and national divisions only with the thinking of law and order. It is difficult for us to say that de Gaulle was not a patriot, or that he was a weak and incompetent person. In that scene at that time, he chose a strong man to break his wrist, there must be his reasons.

Another obvious lesson is that in a near-civil war, it is impossible to brandish a broadsword of repression without in turn having a huge political impact on the homeland. A colonial war in the nineteenth century will only involve a small number of elite soldiers. As long as the government has financial support, it can be fought for a long time. It is very simple to end the war, so only the military and economic aspects need to be considered. That's it. But in a civil war, that's not the case. In the case of Algeria, there are a large number of immigrants in the border areas, and to cater to their requirements, it is easy to turn a security operation into an ethnic conflict. In such an ethnic conflict, limited police means will not be able to meet the needs of the immigrant masses. demand, and can easily rise to a full range of social control and confrontation. This will inevitably involve the local society. The first is that the military may find a political base among these immigrants and their supporters, which will lead to the trouble of feudal towns. The second is the formation of an impact on the original political order. A civil war (although only in the border areas) will require more effective, stricter and more coordinated political and social control, and the risk of political strongmen rising in response will increase. , the division of society can also be imagined.

Soldiers are weapons, and saints use them as a last resort. Sun Wu's words are not only applicable to the external battlefield.

Note: Published in The Paper.