祁賓鴻
祁賓鴻

香港01,國際分析與政治評論

Giving charcoal in the snow or taking advantage of the fire? Poland's Two Strategies for the Russian-Ukrainian War

As a neighbor of Ukraine, Poland has been paying close attention to the evolution of the crisis since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and has adopted different coping strategies as the situation changes.

Looking back at the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, at that time Poland highly supported Ukraine's "pro-European" street forces and called for a "peaceful resolution of the conflict"; after the riots led to the change of the Ukrainian government, Poland immediately recognized the new power President Viktor Yushchenko. In the past 10 years, the situation has further deteriorated. Ukraine first broke out in the Crimea crisis in 2014, and in the same year began the armed independence conflict in the east of Ukraine. Poland’s explicit position has gradually escalated since then. It strongly condemned Russia’s interference in Ukraine’s sovereignty. In the next 8 years of Ukrainian conflict, NATO called on NATO to strengthen its military deployment on the east flank to deal with Russia's looming geopolitical threat.

After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, Poland has played a significant role in the issue of military aid and refugees. First of all, as a neighboring country that shares a 535-kilometer border with Ukraine, Poland has opened up airports for the distribution of military aid from outside the region, and continued to import a large amount of arms to Ukraine by railway. On the issue of refugees, according to data from the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) on May 22, Poland has hosted more than 3.5 million Ukrainian refugees, far exceeding Romania, which ranks second with 960,000 refugees.

From a practical point of view, the deepening of Poland-Ukraine relations under the war, in addition to the resonance of anti-Russian historical consciousness, Poland's geographical considerations and political needs may be more critical. The recent visit of Polish President Andrzej Duda exemplifies this trend.

What are Poland and Ukraine negotiating?

On May 22, Duda went to speak at the Verkhovna Rada (national parliament) of Ukraine, the first foreign head of state to speak in the Verkhovna Rada since the outbreak of the war. In addition to encouraging the audience that "Ukraine has the right to decide its own future", Duda also discussed practical cooperation between the two countries with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

According to the Ukrinform report, Duda’s visit to Ukraine involved the following major foreign affairs consultations: the signing of the “Neighborhood Agreement” between Poland and Ukraine, the establishment of joint border customs controls between Poland and Ukraine control), Ukraine granted "special legal status" to Polish citizens in Ukraine.

Regarding the issue of the "good-neighborly friendship agreement", Duda said that in view of the warming relations between Warsaw and Kyiv, the two sides should sign a new bilateral agreement to incorporate the cooperation mechanism created during the war. In response, Zelensky said, "Managing relations with Poland is one of the top priorities in Ukraine today." He then added that Polish-Ukrainian experts will start to study relevant documents and then transfer them to the political departments of the two countries for consultation. Duda pointed out that if the two sides can complete the signing before January 2023, the agreement will be of historical significance. After all, this time is the 160th anniversary of the "January Uprising". "In January 1863, the Poles and Ukrainians also They fought together against Russia."

Compared with the vague brewing of the "Good Neighborhood and Friendship Agreement", the negotiation of the other two matters is relatively specific. On the issue of the establishment of joint border customs control between Poland and Ukraine, Zelensky said as early as March that "we no longer have a border with friendly Poland", and Duda also mentioned in early May that "I hope there will be no border with Ukraine in the future." ". A careful study of the above-mentioned contexts of the two should start with the issue of refugee reception and then deepen to the joint customs and border control in preparation for "joining the European Union".

Zelensky said in his talks with Duda that Pou-Ukraine would sign an agreement in the near future to create joint border and customs controls, "When Ukraine becomes a member of the European Union, Pou-Ukraine will sign a single conditional border agreement. ” Zelensky stressed that all necessary decisions will first serve "Ukraine's EU candidacy" and thanked Poland for "protecting Ukraine's interests on the European continent" for many years. Duda also proposed that the two countries could study the construction of a high-speed railway linking Kyiv and Warsaw.

Regarding the "special legal status granted to citizens of Poland in Ukraine", Zelensky said the arrangement was a "mirror response" to Poland. It pointed out that the Polish parliament passed a new law to treat Ukrainian refugees. "This is an unprecedented decision. Ukrainian citizens who were forced to emigrate to Poland due to the war will receive almost the same rights and opportunities as Polish citizens, and have legal residence and employment. , education, health care and social security. Such a big step that only good friends of Ukraine can do.”

Recalling that on March 9, when the war began, the Polish parliament passed the new law described by Zelensky and signed by President Duda. Its content contains the legality of stay in Poland granted to Ukrainian citizens and their family members without citizenship. Under the law, Ukrainian citizens will be able to legally stay in Poland for 18 months and can apply for temporary 3-year refugee residence after staying in the country for 9 months. In addition, the bill also guarantees work permits and medical services for Ukrainian refugees.

The Russian-Ukrainian War Brings Double Opportunities to Poland

Based on the above-mentioned three major affairs consultations, it can be seen that Poland is actively using the political and geographical window brought about by the Russian-Ukrainian war to maximize its own national interests. Excluding the yet-to-be-formed "good-neighborly friendship agreement", relatively specific "creation of joint border customs control", granting "special legal status" to citizens of Poland in Ukraine, etc., all help to improve the flow of talents and goods between the two countries, the latter in particular has caused A series of conspiracy theories.

On May 22, Zelensky announced that he was planning to submit a related bill to the Verkhovna Rada to "grant special legal status to citizens of Poland in Ukraine." The "draft details" subsequently leaked online. The contents are roughly as follows: First, in the Ukraine Poles can be elected to Ukrainian elected positions and can be appointed to Ukrainian state and local government officials; secondly, Poles have full access to the confidential information of Ukrainian strategically related enterprises; thirdly, Poles have the ability to be appointed as Ukrainian judges. rights; Fourth, the law enforcement agencies, intelligence organizations, armed forces and other agencies authorized by the state to use force in both countries will be integrated.

Such an unequal content similar to "Twenty-One" has sparked a public opinion controversy of "Poland taking advantage of the fire" and strengthened the credibility of the online rumor that "Poland is about to annex Western Ukraine". But in fact, the above-mentioned "draft content" originated from the online self-media, not only has not been confirmed by the official institutions of Poland and Ukraine, but also has not been endorsed by any Western media or relevant powers, such as the United States, the European Union and Russia.

In all fairness, although there are historical problems between Poland and Ukraine, and the far-right in Poland also advocates "taking back Lviv in Poland" and "Western Ukraine belongs to Poland", it is too flat to explain what Poland is doing with whimsical territorial ambitions alone.

First of all, from a political point of view, massive aid to Ukraine and hosting Ukrainian refugees will create a certain moral high ground for Poland and repair its image disadvantage of "low human rights" within the EU. In October 2015, the right-wing Law and Justice Party won the Polish general election, and the conservative political forces made a big resurgence. Duda himself made more than one controversial remarks that did not meet the EU's "political correctness" standards, such as saying that "the government has the responsibility to protect Poland." People are protected from epidemics that refugees may bring”, “LGBTQ is the ideology of foreign forces infiltrating Poland, which is more destructive to human beings than communism.”

In January 2021, Poland introduced the strictest abortion law in Europe, stipulating that women are only allowed to have abortions in extreme cases such as sexual assault and life-threatening situations. Although this bill is inhumane, it is in line with the views of the Polish conservative community with a strong Catholic awareness, and also responds to some Polish people's concerns about the continued decline in the country's birth rate. But it is conceivable that the EU will respond, and words such as "violation of human rights" and "democratic regression" became the keywords of Poland at that time.

However, after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Poland used practical actions to build a moral fortress of "anti-Russian protection", and the EU and the West could no longer criticize "the past". In the long run, Duda's move will reduce external pressure on conservative ruling power and help reduce the probability of being constrained by the EU in the future.

Second, Poland's active actions in the Ukrainian crisis, including the recent series of diplomatic negotiations to deepen Poland-Ukraine exchanges, are intended to shape external conditions that "meet its own geo-security needs." Since Ukraine's first color revolution in 2004, Poland's Ukrainian policy has revolved around a major theme: "Without a free Ukraine, there will be no free Poland". "Freedom" here does not mean liberalism, but focuses on "pro-American and anti-Russian" ideology. Poland believes that a Ukraine that is "not pro-Russian" can better serve as an anti-Russian front in Eastern Europe, bringing benefits to Poland, including Poland. regional countries, more geo-security guarantees.

Now that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has reached a state of war, Poland naturally does not imagine that the "siege of Moscow" may occur, but it cannot sit idly by and watch Ukraine quickly become the "next Finland", which leads to its direct border with pro-Russian forces. Therefore, after the war began, Poland continued to act as a hub for aid to Ukraine, hoping to at least prolong Ukraine’s resistance, so as to spawn other variables outside the battlefield, such as the collapse of Vladimir Putin’s regime, the collapse of Russia’s economy and the forced withdrawal of its troops.

However, the reality obviously does not develop according to the above-mentioned assumptions. Even if Ukraine has a strong will to resist, it is still cannibalized by the Russian army. Russia has successfully survived Western sanctions. It is difficult to see any signs of regime change in the short term. Seeing this, Poland started its second plan: to ensure that at least "pro-Polish forces" exist in Ukraine. Observing the trend of the battlefield, Ukraine has no hope of expelling the Russian army, but the Russian army is also unable to take the whole territory of Ukraine. No matter what the outcome of the war, the divided Ukraine is a foregone conclusion. Kharkiv, Kherson ) and other places, even if they do not join Russia, they must be Moscow's established sphere of influence in the future.

Under this circumstance, Poland must at least establish in advance that it has a non-hostile "special relationship" with Ukraine. As for the so-called "attachment of Western Ukraine" on the Internet, not only Poland's own political, economic and military capabilities are difficult to support. If a strategy is aggressive, the result is more likely to lose the relationship between Poland and the EU. In short, for Poland today, it is a relatively realistic and rational decision to start from the negotiation of foreign affairs to promote Poland-Ukraine relations.

After the Cold War, geo-security has always been a key regional issue in Central and Eastern Europe. There are many small countries here, but none of them can exert absolute influence on regional stability. To this day, the game of foreign powers is still the key force to dominate here. If the external environment is relatively friendly, Central and Eastern Europe can maintain a certain degree of security atmosphere; however, with the continuous escalation of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in recent years, NATO, the United States and Russia With the ever-increasing military presence around it, the security landscape in Central and Eastern Europe has changed from the past. Under this circumstance, Poland's series of responses to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, despite the consideration of national interests, also reflected the torn and turbulent changes of the times.

Original URL:

2022.5.29

Giving charcoal in the snow or taking advantage of the fire? Poland's Two Plans for the Russian-Ukrainian War | Hong Kong 01 https://www.hk01.com/sns/article/774386

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