Exclusive Interview with Qiu Shiqing｜Russia-Ukraine "Decisive Battle of Donbass" can only be negotiated when the outcome is imminent

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been developing for more than a month. This war was originally thought to have a high probability of ending in a "blitzkrieg", but due to changes in the battlefield and political situation, it has progressed all the way to the present day. Now that the Russian army has withdrawn from the Kyiv encirclement and moved to the Donbas region, Russia and Ukraine seem to have a decisive battle. In response to this development, Duowei News interviewed military commentator Qiu Shiqing to discuss the military reality of the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield.

Duowei: On February 24, Putin announced the launch of a "special military operation" against Ukraine, and the conflict has continued for more than a month. Could you tell us a little bit about the current situation? Has the Russian army captured Mariupol?

Qiu Shiqing: According to the official statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense, on April 12 in the area of the Ilyich steel plant in the city of Mariupol, Ukraine, due to the successful offensive operations of the Russian Armed Forces and the Donetsk People's Republic Police Force, the No. 1,026 Ukrainian service members of the 36 Marine Corps voluntarily laid down their arms and surrendered. Among the surrendered soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, there were 162 officers and 47 female soldiers. Among them, 151 wounded Ukrainian soldiers received primary medical treatment on the spot, and then all were transferred to Mariupol City Hospital for treatment.

If the Russian Ministry of Defense's statement is true, Ukraine has effectively lost control of the city of Mariupol, and the only defense area left is a small area near the railway station in the terminal area, and the Azovstal iron and steel plant. works) only. Although not all, the urban area of Mariupol has largely been captured by Russian forces.

Duowei: The outside world is very concerned about the goal of the Russian army's actions this time. After the start of the operation on February 24, the results of the outside world's predictions were roughly between two extremes. One was to capture Kyiv and destroy Ukraine, and the other was to stabilize the situation in eastern Ukraine. After all, it was being shelled continuously at that time. On March 26, the Russian army announced that "the first stage of military operations in Ukraine" has been roughly completed, and the focus will be on the "full liberation" of the Donbas region in the future. . What is your opinion on this development? What kind of military goals do you think the Russian army wants to achieve in Ukraine?

Qiu Shiqing: As far as I know, the objectives set by the Russian General Staff for the first phase of the "special military operation" are mainly to weaken Ukraine's national military and combat potential, and secondly, to target Ukraine's heavy military group in the Donbas region. .

From my perspective, Russia made a bold push in the first phase. When the Russian Airborne Forces successfully seized Hostomel Airport and the 36th Army besieged Kyiv from Belarus, Russia should be expected to achieve two major achievements: first, to contain the Ukrainian army west of Kyiv, making it impossible to attack Kiev. Reinforce the heavily armed group in the east; second, test whether there is an opportunity to use this military deterrence to force Kyiv to negotiate or surrender.

Judging from the current time point, it is obvious that the second effect has not been achieved, and only relying on the 36th Army, and later the Russian First Guards Armored Army from the Sumy area to the west, a total of more than 40,000 people, and no The power to capture Kyiv. Therefore, after successfully containing and weakening 80% of Ukraine's fighter aircraft and 81% of its air defense capabilities, it is a wise decision to decisively remove the Kyiv encirclement. In addition to recovering more than 40,000 troops in the Kyiv area, this decision can also focus these troops on the Donbass area to prepare for the second phase of the goal.

I believe that the strategic goal of this Russian "special military operation" is to first use military means to disarm Ukraine's military capabilities, thereby forcing Ukraine to accept Russia's political conditions and achieve the goal of de-Nazification. For this reason, Russia's strategic goals in the second phase are very important.

If Russia can annihilate Ukraine's heavily armed group in the Donbas region, it means Ukraine will lose 70% to 75% of the country's military strength, and unless Ukraine mobilizes the militia, it will be difficult for the remaining Ukrainian armed forces to defend central Ukraine again. With such a long line of defense in Kyiv, Russia can choose to negotiate or continue to attack, creating a favorable situation for Russia to end the war.

Duowei: After the outbreak of the conflict, Ukraine was considered to be difficult to resist for a long time, but the war has continued to this day. Some commentators believe that the Russian army underestimated the enemy, so that the "Blitzkrieg" failed to succeed. I wonder what you think of this statement? How did the Russian army perform this time, is it really underestimating the enemy?

Qiu Shiqing: My personal opinion on this issue is that Ukraine has a standing force of 250,000 people. Whether it is the number of equipment or the will of the people, it cannot be underestimated. Especially since the Ukrainian defense line has been in operation since 2014, its fortifications have been operated. For 8 years, foreign media even used the "Maginot Line" to describe its strength. No matter how optimistic, it is difficult to use the "blitzkrieg" to predict that Russia's "special military operation" will end soon.

The Russian armed forces did not perform as well as expected in the early days of the war. In addition to the shortcoming of weak supplies due to the adoption of the Battalion tactical group (BTG) in the military reform in 2008, the hasty war and the lack of an effective battlefield management system are also a major reason.

In the first stage, the manpower invested by the Russian army was roughly equal to that of the Ukrainian side, which was about 100,000 people; after the first week, the volunteers mobilized from Chechnya, South Ossetia and other places slowly joined the battlefield to supplement the shortage in Russia. troops. So I don't think Russia underestimated the enemy, but only had so many resources at the time.

Duowei: On March 19, the Russian army used the hypersonic missile "Dagger" for the first time to strike the underground arsenal in southwestern Ukraine and destroy the supply line. What do you think of this action? Why is Russia deploying hypersonic weapons? What kind of war trend does the "dagger" reflect?

Qiu Shiqing: The huge kinetic energy of the hypersonic missile, coupled with its own explosive power, is very suitable for dealing with the enemy's deep underground or fortifications reinforced with reinforced concrete. Because of the huge penetrating power and explosive power, It can destroy targets that ordinary artillery shells and even missiles cannot handle.

Since the current air defense missiles do not have significant interception and defense capabilities for hypersonic missiles, the oppression ability of hypersonic missiles will force the defender to consider transferring high-value targets and assets to enemy missiles. out of range. Otherwise, they will be exposed to the threat of the opponent's attack. For other possible battlefields in the future, warring countries must also consider whether their military deployments, such as aircraft or precious aircraft carriers, are within the opponent's strike range. Unless they already have the technology to intercept hypersonic missiles, they must carefully consider whether To relocate to reduce the risk of self-destruction.

Duowei: Although Ukraine has continued to negotiate with Russia, it has never made a breakthrough. Russia and Ukraine have fallen into a state of intertwined negotiations. I wonder how you evaluate the battlefield performance of the Ukrainian army?

Qiu Shiqing: Our assessment of the battlefield must go beyond the subjective position and ideology. We can only evaluate the performance of an army based on the actual achievement of the target, otherwise it is easy to fall into the distorted situation of "seeing the tree but not the forest".

Since the start of the war on February 24th, despite Ukraine's local superiority in parts of the Donbass, we have not seen the Ukrainian Armed Forces attempt a large-scale aggressive offensive at the brigade level, nor have we seen specific annihilation of the Russian battalion level. The results of the above forces. We can only see from the results that the Ukrainian army carried out small-scale ambush, sniping, and raids, or transferred troops to cities, such as Mariupol, Mykolaiv, Kharkov (Kharkiv), Samui, etc.

The reason why the Ukrainian army relies on cities to conduct urban warfare is related to the loss of a large number of fighter planes and air defense systems in Ukraine at the beginning of the war. However, even when Ukraine has not completely lost its air superiority, the Ukrainian army has rarely taken tactical actions to eliminate the Russian army on a large scale. It can only attack the supply lines behind the Russian army, or target the commander of the other side to carry out assassination operations. However, these results are difficult to weaken the combat potential and will of the Russian army, but instead put themselves into a situation of passive combat.

So I have reservations about the battlefield performance of the Ukrainian army. I have no doubts about the determination of Ukrainian soldiers to defend the country, and the reason for my reservations is that I have doubts about the Ukrainian military's strategy, command, and ability to achieve its goals.

Russia is well aware that serious negotiations cannot take place until Ukraine is hit really hard; similarly, Ukraine knows that Russia cannot retreat until Russia is not hit hard economically or militarily. Therefore, the negotiations between the two sides may still be deadlocked, because neither side has any reason to make concessions at this time.

Duowei: This time, the United States and NATO continued to transport "street fighting" weapons such as needles and Javelin anti-tank missiles into Ukraine, and "foreign volunteers" also entered the battlefield in Ukraine. I don't know what you think of these foreign aids? Can it really play a role and affect the war situation?

Qiu Shiqing: The weapons provided by NATO and the United States to assist Ukraine have a common feature: they are light and short, and are suitable for defense operations in cities and positions. But for the offensive help, it is far less effective than the long-range heavy weapons.

It is impossible to win a war only by relying on city defense or positional warfare. In the end, it is necessary to destroy the enemy's living combat power in the process of battle to win. Given that Ukraine has lost air superiority, relying solely on anti-tank missiles or short-range anti-aircraft missiles may not be able to turn the tide of the war and have no chance of a decisive victory.

The level of foreign volunteers varies, and it may be incompatible with the integration or command habits of the Ukrainian army, and even affect the combat effectiveness. For this reason, almost all of these foreign volunteers are individually designated as independent combat units, and the tasks they can undertake are also limited. My opinion is that these foreign volunteers are helpful to Ukraine, but more in the effect achieved by propaganda or the media, rather than how many rich results can be achieved after they are actually put on the battlefield.

Multidimensional: After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, discussions on "resuming the conscription system" and "asymmetric warfare" emerged in Taiwan. American think tank researcher Bonnie S. Glaser directly suggested in an interview that Taiwan should adopt a "Porcupine Strategy", that is to use a large number of small and cheap weapons, including coastal defense cruise missiles, short-range, mobile It is difficult for the PLA to land, and it is even more necessary to mobilize civilians to carry out a guerrilla-style counterattack of the whole society to prevent the PLA from advancing. I don't know how you feel about such remarks? Is there any possibility or sign that Taiwan is pushing in this direction?

Qiu Shiqing: I think the "porcupine strategy" suggested by Graiyi, which is currently being used by Ukraine, is to deter war by increasing the price that the opponent has to pay in the war. I can't talk too much about Taiwan's defense strategy, but seeing this Russia-Ukraine war, I think we have to dig deeper into whether the "porcupine strategy" really works in Taiwan? Pulling troops into urban defenses, At the expense of initiative and mobility, will one Mariupol after another be created in various cities in Taiwan? This is why we must carefully observe and study this war.

The original text was published on 2022/4/14 " Multidimensional News "