Populism in China today

When Jan-Werner Müller wrote What is Populism? ”, he probably would not have imagined that Trump, the representative of the populist politicians in his book, would later make such a “six-nation congress” with his supporters. In the 2020 U.S. election, after Trump was defeated by Biden, Trump claimed that there was serious electoral fraud, and the Supreme Court in six states dismissed the claims of the Trump team. After the plea, recounts in Georgia and Wisconsin remained the same, he continued to shout "our elections were stolen." On January 6, 2021, on Capitol Hill, where the election results are about to be confirmed, a rally of Trump supporters stormed the seat of the U.S. Congress, ultimately killing four trespassers and a police officer. This is America's darkest hour.

Miller said that populism was the "permanent shadow" of the representative system: "There was no populism in ancient Athens, and there might have been demagogues in Athens, but there was no populism, because the latter existed only in the representative system." If Miller's assertion was Right, it seems unlikely that populism will emerge in China on the other side of the ocean, because China does not have a real representative system. If populism cannot appear in a country without representation, then the study of populism in contemporary China seems to be an academic misapplication of the concept. This article focuses on the following questions: Is there a substantive populism in China today? I want to prove that Miller's assertion on the relationship between populism and representativeism is not fully applicable to China today, because the main features of populism summarized by Miller have already appeared in China. With corrections and additions, we can more clearly illustrate the soil on which contemporary populism in China grows.

However, the current populism in China is definitely not a copy of Western populism, but has extremely unique roots and forms, and they have begun to enter the field of view of researchers during the great changes at home and abroad in the past two years. What we want to ask is: what possibilities will this kind of populism have in the future political development of China? Does liberalism have the resources to meet the challenge of populism? This article will draw on Maruyama Masao's analysis of fascism to deduce the trend of populism in China to warn of possible risks in future political development.

Miller's definition of populism

As Miller puts it, “Populism is not a fixed, written creed, but a collection of different claims that have an inherent logic.” 1 Although populism has many manifestations, such as anti-establishment, anti-establishment, anti-establishment Elites, wealth haters, xenophobia, etc., but Miller believes that these are not the core of populism. Its core proposition and main feature should be a "moralized anti-pluralism" that believes that "the political community should no longer be divided, it is possible for the people to become a whole, and it is possible for the whole people to have a true representative. "2

Populists tend to claim that only a certain part of the population belongs to the people, which means they tend to exclude a subset of citizens from "the people", as for right-wing populists in the United States, liberal elites and minorities alike. Should not be included in "people". Such a distinction implies a moral antagonism between the morally pure people on the one hand and the corrupt, degenerate elite and social parasites on the other. The people are always noble and the people are never wrong. 3 Not only that, but they also argue that “there is a single, public interest that the people can always discern, expect, and that a politician or party (and, less likely, a political movement) can unreservedly pass policy to Carry out this interest.”4 That is, for populists, the composition of the people, the virtues of the people, the interests of the people, and the will of the people are all clear at a glance, but people other than the people cannot tell the difference. .

Some commentators believe that populism is closer to true democracy than representative democracy, but the reality is that populists guess the "will of the people" based on their definition of "the people" and do not advocate the political participation of citizens. On the contrary, in their view, the actual mechanism of civil political participation, such as elections and voting, cannot reflect the "will of the people", especially when they lose the election. They will always claim that, somewhere, there is some "silent majority" who are either afraid to speak up5 or voted but not counted (as some Trump supporters say this time), Because of these people, the results of the election cannot be considered fair, which is no wonder Trump would plausibly say that his election was "stolen". Precisely because of this opportunistic attitude of populists to the actual political participation mechanism of citizens' political participation (not necessarily against it, especially when they themselves win), populists claim that they "represent the real people" That is, unfalsifiable, which distinguishes populists from democrats who advocate testing the claimed representation of political parties and politicians through the results of normal mechanisms such as elections.

In populist politics, populist leaders and the "people" are often in a relationship of patronage and worship. "A true populist leader is just the opposite of "us" (ordinary people)" and "must be charismatic"6. In turn, populists in power often adopt a "caregiver" attitude towards the population. 7 Nonetheless, ta "must have a direct connection in some sense with the 'substance' of the people, and preferably with the 'substance' of each individual among the people." 8 The "direct connection" referred to here ”, which means that populist leaders should rely as little as possible on intermediaries such as political parties or the media to communicate with the people. In the age of the Internet, such "direct connections" have become more technically feasible, such as Trump, who is jokingly called "Tweeting the country". In the eyes of his supporters, Trump's Twitter is largely More than any of his official speeches reflect his true thoughts.

Does Populism Exist in Contemporary China?

Miller himself explicitly asserts that populism exists only in representative systems, but he does not provide a detailed argument in his book. Understand sympathetically, there are at least three reasons for this: First, promises made to the populace by populist politicians only make sense in representative countries, because they can be exchanged for their votes to take power, whereas in countries where there is no representative system In the country, those in the opposition want to challenge those in power, usually through other means, such as coups. Second, it is only in representative countries that we can say that populists’ claims to represent the people cannot be falsified, because in countries without representative systems, there is generally no realistic mechanism to verify or falsify such representation claims. Finally, only in representative countries, after populists come to power, will they vigorously promote popular patronage politics, because in countries where there is no representative system, the fear that the person in power will not be elected after a few years, the popular patronage politics can be bought. People's hearts, but it is not obvious that they will help them maintain their long-term rule, and in such regimes, small-scale nepotism is more common than large-scale patronage politics.

There are numerous papers on "populism" in the academic literature in Simplified Chinese. However, these papers have a high degree of repetition, and there are space limitations and ideological concerns, so they cannot provide a more systematic discussion. More importantly, they used a definition that was far from Miller's. Two features that frequently appear in these literatures are "anti-establishment" and "anti-elite". For example, in Cheng Tongshun and Yang Qian's article "Populism in Current China", they summarize the basic connotation and characteristics of populism, one of which is: "In the pursuit of equality, absolute equality is required, and everything is opposed to Hierarchical relationship, adhere to the anti-elite, anti-system and anti-authority social criticism stance.” 9 In Zhou Qingzhi’s article “The Socio-Political Implications of the Current Chinese Populist Thought”, Section 3 “The Expression of Chinese Populist Thought”, 2 And the third manifestation is "anti-eliteism" and "anti-existing system". 10

According to Miller, while populists are often anti-establishment and anti-elite, these two are not at the heart of populism: "Populists don't mind representation, as long as they're representatives themselves, and they don't mind either. Elites, as long as they themselves are the elites who lead the people.” 11 This statement cannot be directly applied to China, but judging from the reactions of Chinese netizens to some social topics, the main features of “anti-system” and “anti-elite” may not It is impossible to screen out a group with a definite extension, let alone define them as "populists". In some influential public events, some local governments or some departments are often criticized by the public for improper handling, but this does not mean that a certain part of the public has an "anti-system" tendency, because most Criticism in this case is aimed at specific local governments or departments, not the central government, let alone the entire system. In the past two years, there has even been a trend of equating "anti-system" with "unpatriotic" on the Internet. Netizens' attitude towards elites often changes with other factors. For example, a few years ago, Jack Ma was called "Ma's Dad" on the Internet, and he was even enshrined by some people to bless them with getting rich. In 2018, on the barrage of station B, he was suddenly scolded as a blood-sucking capitalist again. As for Ren Zhengfei, another entrepreneur, most of the online reviews were positive from start to finish. If "anti-establishment" and "anti-elite" are the main features, it is more likely that the anti-statist left (extremely rare in China) fits these two features rather than populists.

If "anti-system" and "anti-elite" cannot be the main characteristics of contemporary Chinese populists, it seems difficult to find groups that can be clearly called "populists". In fact, such a group has already appeared, that is, the "little pink" that has been making a lot of noise in recent years. Some people think that Little Pink should be positioned as an "extreme nationalist", which is true, but "extreme nationalist" cannot cover all the connotations of "Little Pink" (not just a matter of age) . It is Miller's definition of populism that can be applied well to Little Pink. The core part here is "moralized anti-pluralism".

The "moralized anti-pluralism" of populists does not mean that they promote a single value (of course, they can say that they promote "patriotism" as an exclusive value), but that they believe that, " The "people" is a homogeneous whole, or they exclude some people from the "people". This part of the people who are excluded from the "people" is what Xiaopin said "hate the country". Moreover, on the one hand, due to China's one-party autocratic political system, the ruling party is often equated with the "country", and on the other hand, the little pinks have a high sense of identity with the Chinese Communist Party, so the "hate the country party" they say also includes those inertial Those who criticize the Chinese system are the so-called "public knowledge". Little Pink's targeting of the well-known as the cultural elite seems to be a manifestation of the "anti-elite" tendency. In fact, they generally hold positive comments on the political elite, while their attitude towards the business elite is related to the overall trend. . As mentioned earlier, Ma Yun's transformation from "Ma's father" to "blood-sucking capitalist" is not only because Ma Yun once bravely proposed that "996 is a blessing", but also has a certain relationship with the system's attitude towards Ma Yun, which is also from the side It illustrates the affinity between "Little Pink" and the system. The reason why Ren Zhengfei's online comments are mainly positive is not only because he has a better relationship with the system than Jack Ma, but also because Huawei's leading edge in some technical fields makes many Chinese proud. If there are some elites that Little Pink is definitely opposed to, then in addition to the "liberal elites" in the Chinese context, there are also "liberal elites" in the North American context, the latter is often referred to as "white left" in the simplified Chinese world .

Little Pink also believes that the (Chinese) people are morally noble, while the "public knowledge" is degenerate, the people are patriotic, and the public knowledge hates the Kuomintang. The people's judgment is accurate. This judgment is reflected in their awareness of the hypocrisy of the Western mainstream media, and also in the fact that they are good at spotting the bad guys in the masses. Therefore, the little pinks are not tired of "hoeing rape". Bo, even went over the wall to the latter's Facebook to find evidence of "hate the country". At the same time, Little Pink also believes that the (Chinese) people have unified interests, that is, national unity and territorial integrity, economic development and social stability. It is the will of the people to defend these interests to the death. This is why "Hong Kong independence" can inspire them. Deep hatred. In Xiao Pink's view, only by ensuring the leadership of the Communist Party of China can the interests of the people as mentioned above be guaranteed and the will of the people be implemented. The Chinese Communist Party is more qualified than Robespierre to say, "I am the people."

Like populists in the West, Little Pink also has a negative attitude towards public participation, but the former does not completely deny the representative system, while Little Pink has an almost biological aversion to this "Western-style democracy". Not only that, but they are very skeptical that the public can participate rationally in public discussion, which is an important part of public participation. A Shenzhen girl who was studying in Europe debated with supporters of the anti-extradition movement in English on the streets of Germany. She called them Hong Kong independence and wanted to split China. The video won applause on Sina Weibo. However, in the case of Li Wenliang, the girl believed that the reason why the people were so angry was because they were "stoked by some people with ulterior motives." The government should properly restrict the channels of expression, otherwise the country would fall into chaos. 12

Related to this, there is also obvious leader worship in the little pink, but the object of their worship is not a populist leader who turned out, but the deceased "great leader" Mao Zedong and the current state leaders. People Xi Jinping. Chinese people's worship of Mao Zedong has always existed, but in the past, those who worshiped Mao Zedong were middle-aged and elderly people who had experienced the Mao era and missed the Mao era. However, in recent years, the worship of Mao Zedong has been revived among young people. Some of them belong to the progressive left-wing youth who want to revive the left-wing agenda with the help of Mao Zedong's symbols. But the little pink admires Mao Zedong's leadership qualities, admires him to conquer the country from nothing, and has the courage to revolutionize the system he established in his later years, admires him for daring to be tough on the outside world, and ties with the Americans on the Korean peninsula. Rushchev competes for leadership of the socialist camp. There are also some little pinks who transfer this leader cult to Xi Jinping. Although compared with Mao Zedong, Xi's leadership temperament is not obvious, but he has a side of closeness to the people, and this kind of closeness to the people is not like Jiang Zemin with a little bourgeois atmosphere. The common people affectionately call him "Daddy Xi".

It is worth mentioning that if Western populists and China's little pinks have a certain "rebelliousness", then the object of their rebellion is the same, and that is the Western political and social establishment. This is more or less related to the mainstream ideology of the West (the so-called "universal values") controlling the right to speak on the world stage. Although the little pinks grew up under the ideological education of the Communist Party, they clearly perceive The existence of another, more powerful ideology. On the other hand, while Chinese liberals (or anti-statists in a broad sense) have "anti-establishment" characteristics, they are fundamentally different from Western populists: although Chinese liberals are in many They sided with the vulnerable people and criticized the government in public events, but they rarely mentioned "the people", let alone considered themselves "true representatives of the people"; they were self-marginalized to a certain extent and clearly Realize that they are "a small minority" and a "minority"; their ideas have little influence among their ordinary people, but more sympathizers can be found among the cultural and business elites. This is why we say that it is a dislocation to regard "anti-system" as the main feature of contemporary Chinese populism.

A revised theory of populism

Let’s go back to Miller’s assertion: even if Little Pink also has the characteristics of “moralized anti-pluralism”, China is not a representative country, Little Pink’s activities are mainly on the Internet, and they have not yet formed an organization. There are no recognized leaders with the characteristics of populist leaders, and they do not challenge the current regime. Is it a misalignment to define them with "populism"?

We can answer this question from two levels: First, although the main activity of Little Pink is only on the Internet, there has been a trend of extending to reality. After the anti-extradition movement in Hong Kong broke out in 2019, the war of public opinion quickly spread to the mainland. In the context of the mainland, it refers to all those who support the anti-extradition movement) reports and human flesh quickly spread offline. This kind of report is especially serious in the Hong Kong drifting circle and the overseas study circle. Some mainlanders who support the anti-extradition China made relevant remarks on their Facebook and Instagram, and were quickly recognized by the little pink screenshots. These pictures were not only reported to the authorities, Moreover, it was also circulated on Weibo and Moments, and the information of the parties was released in large quantities, and their studies, work, and family members were severely affected. In the first half of 2020, the new crown epidemic raged. Around the Li Wenliang incident and Fang Fang's diary, the tearing state of society was once again exposed. After the "handing knife theory" was set, Little Pink quickly launched a witch hunt, this time targeting the voices who supported Fang Fang, and the main victims were the "public knowledge" in their eyes. For example, Liang Yanping of Hubei University and Wang Xiaoni of Hainan University were punished by their own schools because of their support for Fang Fang. Although Little Pink has not used violence in reality, their attack is no longer a simple "Internet violence", but can cause huge real damage.

Second, although China does not have representative democracy, it has some important characteristics of a "democratic society". This characteristic is: the consciousness of "the people are the masters of the country" and the consciousness of equality. When we say that the Chinese have the consciousness of "the people are the masters of the country" and the consciousness of equality, we do not mean that China is in fact the masters of the country by the people, or that Chinese society is a society that is more equal in many aspects. These two kinds of consciousness, on the one hand, are based on the ideological foundation of the Communist Party of China - Marxism, and on the other hand, they are also deliberately established by the Communist Party in its revolutionary process. Before 1949, the Communist Party of China took the "mass line" as the party's work line in order to mobilize the workers and peasants to rise up for revolution. In 1943, Mao Zedong mentioned in "Several Issues Concerning the Methods of Leadership": "In all practical work of our party, any correct leadership must come from the masses and go to the masses." 13 In another In the article "On Coalition Government", he said: "Another notable mark that distinguishes us Communists from other political parties is that we have the closest contact with the broadest masses of the people. We serve the people wholeheartedly and never leave the masses for a moment. ; everything starts from the interests of the people, not from the interests of individuals or small groups; the consistency of accountability to the people and to the leading organs of the party; these are our starting points.”14 Although the People’s Republic of China is a de facto The Communist Party of China is a dictatorship, but the Communist Party of China publicly declares that it implements a "people's democratic dictatorship". In "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", Mao Zedong explained: The so-called "people's democratic dictatorship" is to "control the democratic aspects of the people and the reactionaries." dictatorship” and “deprive the reactionaries of their voice, leaving only the people a voice.”15

Before and after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Communist Party carried out land reform in the countryside. Weyande wrote in "The Revolution that Derailed": "After destroying the original framework of the powerful, the Communist Party allowed the poor peasants to participate in politics, and these people became the land reformers. Activists in the Communist Party, after being trained and learning the dogma, became a new generation of rural management. After the redistribution of land and property, the Communist Party gained widespread support and shattered the suspicions the world once had.” 16 In the cities, “the power of the property elite that ruled the area during the Nationalist era was completely destroyed. Rural banditry, organized crime, and government corruption that were rampant during the Nationalist government were steadily brought under control. Secret associations and underground sects were suppressed and pervasive. The drug and sex trade have been effectively curbed.” 17 The “exploiting class of the old society” and the social soil that accompanied it were wiped out. At the same time, the Communist Party has established the unit system in cities, offering lifetime employment and benefits such as medical insurance, accident insurance and pensions.

The Cultural Revolution of the Mao era, to a certain extent, provided a new imagination for the consciousness of "the people are the masters of the country" and the consciousness of equality. This new imagination, the so-called "Great Democracy". Wang Hui described this kind of "big democracy" in "Depoliticized Politics, Multiple Compositions of Hegemony, and the Disappearance of the 1960s": "In the early days of the 'Cultural Revolution', factories, schools and institutions with the Paris The social experiment of self-government (including the so-called "Three Generations Association" that appeared later, namely "Workers' Congress", "Agricultural Congress", "Red Congress" and other mass organizations) briefly appeared in various places, which was a reaction to the old. It is an attempt to transform the state apparatus, that is, a cultural-political practice that transcends the state apparatus." "The revolutionary committee formed in the form of "three-in-one" in the late 1960s is a kind of state-party in the mass movement and bureaucratization. The product of a compromise between institutions. This political form contains various elements of the commune movement, such as the election of representatives of workers, peasants, students or soldiers into the leadership of the government and the party at all levels, requiring parties and governments at all levels to Leaders go to villages and factories in batches and regularly to engage in social practice, etc.”18 It should be noted that these have not changed the essence of the one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party, and the above-mentioned autonomous experiments and attempts by the masses to transform the state apparatus are almost short-lived , did not have a visible impact on the subsequent development of the political system, but they can reflect from the side that the common people did not feel that they were inferior to others, and they actively participated in the practice of transforming society whenever they had the opportunity.

Since the reform and opening up, the private economy has risen, the unit system has gradually disintegrated, the gap between the rich and the poor has widened, and class differentiation has become apparent, but these two consciousnesses have not disappeared. ". 19 The "Resolution on Several Historical Issues of the Party since the founding of the People's Republic of China" passed by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee identified the "mass line" as one of the three "living souls" of Mao Zedong Thought. On this basis, Deng Xiaoping put forward that the starting point and end point of all the Party's work are "whether the people support it or not", "whether the people agree or not", "whether the people are happy or not", and "whether the people agree or not". Yu Keping, a scholar within the CCP, believes that since the reform, China has gradually formed influences such as "two sessions", "internal reference", "political education activities", "petitions", "hearings", "conversation meetings" and "network politics". Channels for expressing public opinion and processing mechanisms for decision-making. In international academic circles, this kind of "public opinion politics" is called "authoritarian responsiveness". In the article "Sources of Authoritarian Feedback: A Field Experiment in China", several scholars mentioned that in China, about one-third of county governments will give feedback on the demands expressed by citizens online, the more likely it is In the case of collective action, the more likely it is to report to the higher-level government, the stronger the feedback from the county government. 20

However, as Yu Keping said, these mechanisms, whether it is an expression mechanism of public opinion or a mechanism for public opinion to influence decision-making, are not very standardized. The former lacks sufficient legal and institutional guarantees, while the latter has great uncertainty and arbitrariness. Even so, the awareness of "the people being the masters of the country" and the awareness of equality are still preserved through these mechanisms. Although these two kinds of consciousness do not allow populists to mobilize “the people” to bring practical political benefits, like the representative system, they can also become the soil for the growth of populism, just like the representative system. Miller's analysis of the conditions under which populism exists may not escape the accusation of "Westerncentrism".

The Uniqueness of Contemporary Chinese Populism

Simplified Chinese literature on contemporary Chinese populism has analyzed its roots, but none of these analyses can explain the rise of Little Pink in recent years. In the articles of Cheng Tongshun and Yang Qian, they believe that the current populism is "the product of an enhanced but immature people's awareness of rights"; in Zhou Qingzhi's view, the origin of Chinese populism lies in the "nationalist view of history", "Inequality between the rich and the poor, polarization", "blocked social mobility", "political corruption", and "chaotic social value system"; while Liu Xiaolong's "The Evolution of China's Internet Populist Thought and Its Governance" describes populism The proliferation of 'New Left' is attributed to the influence of the "New Left", the marketing of online opinion leaders and the massive growth in the number of anonymous netizens. 22 Although some scholars focus on finding reasons from changes in the objective environment, while others focus on finding causes from the dynamism of social actors, there is a certain degree of randomness among them. Moreover, these attributions are all related to their judgments about the main characteristics of populism, and the more they believe that the main characteristics of populism are "anti-establishment" and "anti-elite", the more likely it is to trace its roots back to it. reasons, whether objective or subjective.

As we said earlier, "anti-system" and "anti-elite" are not the main features of current populism (little pink), but "moralized anti-pluralism". Why has this moralized anti-pluralism emerged so strongly in recent years? In addition to looking for reasons from China's social and economic situation, we must also see the impact of changes in China's political environment. As I said in "Pink Frenzy and Totalitarianism Outside the System": The Pink Frenzy is, in the final analysis, a "nihilistic mania". 22 This "nihilistic mania" is caused by two factors. From a general trend, the Chinese system has undergone a process of "depoliticization" after the reform. The apparent ideology in command and the ideological vacuum inside form a sharp contrast. It is easy to cultivate cynicism among the people, and cynicism Doctrine is the vulgar form of nihilism. From the perspective of the political trend in recent years, civil society has been strongly suppressed, and different voices are disappearing. The specific manifestations are: organizations that once promoted civil society movements such as Gongmeng and Chuanzhixing were forcibly disbanded, and leaders Xu Zhiyong and Guo Yushan were forcibly disbanded. All were sentenced; human rights lawyers represented by 709 lawyers were collectively arrested and imprisoned; the "Charity Law" and "Overseas NGOs' Domestic Activities Management Law" were promulgated, and the public welfare organizations outside the system were blocked with a sword; Ideological rectification, non-party media, self-media, and influencers were severely censored, and a group of liberal influencers were interviewed and disappeared after being banned; the state exercised stricter control over religious organizations and missionary activities, and promulgated the "Religious Organization". Regulations on the Administration of Business Affairs, arresting some religious people who refused to cooperate; activists who were more active on gender and labor issues were frequently harassed and closely monitored by the authorities, and even detained in severe cases. 23 The result of these policies and behaviors is that the space of meaning and value practice outside the system are compressed to the extreme, the so-called "private domain", leaving only the minimum required by the market economy. This creates "forced nihilism". The fanaticism of nihilism is transformed from cynicism and coercive nihilism. Behind it is that people, as political animals, their desire to realize the construction of meaning in the public field cannot be realized through normal public participation. , its energy can only be doubled out in areas that are not forbidden.

This "nihilistic frenzy" coincides with "moralized anti-pluralism". Precisely because other intrinsic values have been expelled and marginalized, "patriotism" has become the only correct value, and populists (little pink) have constructed their own group identity through this value, placing those who they think "hate the country". excluded and relegated to moral pariahs. At the same time, "patriotism", as a value that transcends the system, also provides solid legitimacy for the existence of Little Pink. This legitimacy sometimes does not even depend on institutional recognition. Miller said that "moralized anti-pluralism" is the main characteristic of populists, but he himself did not explain why Western populists have such a main characteristic, and our analysis puts little pink's "nihilism". Mania" is associated with "moralized pluralism" and explains why "nihilistic mania" arises. With such revisions and additions, we can fully sinicize Miller's theory of populism.

Little Pink has not yet had its own organization, but it already has its own organizational model. Ironically, this organizational model was learned from an otherwise depoliticized group, the Fanquan. The so-called "fan circle", that is, the circle of chasing stars, their emergence is closely related to the rapid development of China's entertainment industry and network technology in recent years. Baidu Tieba has long been dedicated to various stars or idol groups. Since then, various talent shows have invented online voting, and Weibo has developed functions such as hot search, super talk and rankings in accordance with the trend. This is how Sanfentian takes shape. Such a group seems to be the opposite of Little Pink, one side is entertaining to death, and the other side is on the line. Entertainment and politics, however, are intertwined in a very peculiar way in China. Here, politics has the power to kill everything, and stars are no exception. As long as any artist is criticized in a targeted manner by the authorities and their media representatives (such as the People's Daily), their acting career will come to an end (" It's mushy" or "cold"), and the fan circle knows this well. Therefore, they have to do everything possible to "politically correct" their brother in order to obtain official praise, or at least no criticism. Their attitude towards politics, at first, was flattering to cater to, and later became an internalized "what's good for the top, what's good for the bottom". The most typical example is the so-called "814 Fan Circle Unity". On August 14, 2019, various fan circle support clubs jointly organized a large-scale collective expedition in the name of "Brother Ah Zhong". The main battlefields were Facebook and Instagram. In order to overcome the wall and carry out overseas publicity, they specially set up technical guidance, art team, copywriting team and translation team, and received the full help of the team that went on the last expedition - "Diba". In this expedition, they had clear goals, quick mobilization, meticulous division of labor, and strong discipline. They slaughtered, criticized, and anti-gangsters on Facebook and Instagram, just like they usually do for their own "brothers" (referring to their idols). ) as done.

In the summer of 2019 and the spring of 2020, we found that some of the attacks commonly used in fan circles were used by a large number of small pinks to attack the "hate country party". These attacks include cyberbullying, human flesh and whistleblowing. To be fair, these attack methods are related to the interaction methods of social networks, the loopholes in relevant laws, and the characteristics of Chinese politics, but compared with other groups, the use of these attack methods is more frequent in Fanquan (this is because the network The topic on the Internet is becoming more and more "de-public", so the completely insensitive content of entertainment has gradually become the battlefield of public opinion, but on the other hand, it is indeed a feature of the operation mode of the fan circle). For example, if someone posts a Weibo attacking their idol, they will swarm them, fight back under the comments on the Weibo, and send private messages to abuse the blogger. Further, they will flesh out the blogger's school and work unit, and on Weibo Aite (@) the unit, accusing them of not properly disciplining their students or employees. If the situation is serious, they are likely to dig out the content of the blogger's words and deeds that violates customs and morals or Chinese political taboos, and report it to the Internet police and other relevant departments. This set of attack methods has been completely replicated in the crusade against "Hong Kong independence" and "nation-hating party" in the past two years. It can be said that in terms of organization and mobilization, Fanquan has become a teacher of Little Pink.

Coincidentally, the organizational model within the fan circle is indeed an obvious hierarchy. Aside from "BP (white whoring) fans" and "passer-by fans", the main ones who can play a role in the fan group are "fans" and "ordinary fans". "Fentou" is equivalent to the opinion leaders in the fan group. They are very few in number, have a high degree of intimacy with idols, and have a huge right to speak. They can define what is "black" against idols, and can even formulate the internal support club. rule. And "ordinary fans" are more reduced to "data women workers", in addition to daily routines, such as signing in with super chat, making comments under the marketing account, blogging with topics, reporting unfavorable remarks with the anti-black group, and It is often necessary to "play the list" of "krypton gold". 24 Although some scholars believe that the generation of this class is often the result of a “rational” behavior (in the sense of economics), fans can also adjust their class according to their star chasing experience and their own situation. The consequences are not always rational and controllable. For example, fans of Xiao Zhan reported AO3, which was initially initiated by a few "fantou". It can be seen how strong the mobilization power of "fantou" in the fan circle is, and this kind of mobilization Power is again largely endowed by the organization.

Xiaopink and Fanquan are not two completely heterogeneous groups, but have considerable overlap. There are many people in the fan circle who are not forced to participate in the "expedition" because of political correctness, but they themselves agree that "there is no idol in front of the country". This is also consistent with our previous analysis of "nihilism": chasing stars and patriotism are the results of "mandatory nihilism". After the state has suppressed most of the intrinsic values that can give meaning to life, activities that do not violate political taboos, except those that do not involve politics (star chasing), are only absolutely politically correct (patriotic). And the "nihilistic frenzy" generated by "mandatory nihilism" can even explain why fans often act hysterically even in such non-political rice circle topics.

Masao Maruyama's Fascism

Miller said Nazism and fascism should be understood as populist movements, although populism does not necessarily manifest itself as racism, glorification of violence and radical "leadership principles." 26 If fascism is a special form of populism, then Masao Maruyama’s analysis of fascism is instructive, not only showing the affinity between populism and fascism, but also helping us. A deeper understanding of current populism in China.

Like Miller, Maruyama also listed the spiritual tendencies and thought patterns common to fascism:

1) The tendency of national or national supremacy (always likes to manifest as victimization delusions, or frustration, that is, being plundered by the "enemy country" that you underestimate.);

2) the idea that the "natural" superiors dominate (hence the racial differences and preference for stratifying relationships);

3) Have great suspicion and contempt for the potential creativity and rational thinking of the public (only the public is regarded as the object of manipulation, so propaganda and incitement blindly pursue low taste and desire stimulation and emotional resonance);

4) Despise women's ability to be socially active (i.e. keep women locked up at home to have children);

5) Put more emphasis on instinct, will, intuition, and physical strength than intellect and theory;

6) Cynical denial of the general concept of progress;

7) Praises war, ridicules perpetual peace (all related to the last three points, treats social sciences as useless or dangerous, "respects" only natural sciences, and especially military science and technology). 27

Similarly, if the core proposition of populism is “moralized anti-pluralism,” then the core proposition of fascism should be “militant counter-revolution.” Like "anti-pluralism", "counter-revolution" here is not just what it means literally, fascism does not oppose revolution in the sense of "subverting the regime" (after all, fascists in Italy and Nazis in Germany came to power in this way. ), it is against that kind of progressive, egalitarian revolution, and against all progress and egalitarianism.

There are two types of fascism, "bottom-up" and "top-down". Maruyama found that Japanese fascism did not have the "revolutionary" nature of fascism as in Italy and Germany, and the fascist movement did not occupy state institutions from outside in the form of mass organizations. “The fascist movement from below—that is, every convulsive bout of a radical fascist movement became an opportunity, furthermore, to fascism from above. Fascism from within the ruling stratum was based on the military bureaucracy The center, using this radical fascist social dynamic as a springboard, established its hegemony step by step.”28

According to Maruyama Masao's division, the Japanese fascist movement can be divided into three stages. The first stage is the preparatory period, from the Taisho 1989 (1919-1920) to the Manchuria Incident (September 18 Incident, 1931), which can be called "the era of the civil right-wing movement". The second stage is the mature period, from the Manchuria Incident to the "February 26 Incident" (1936), which can be called the heyday of radical fascism. The third stage is relatively long, from February 26 to the end of the Second World War, which can be called "the completion period of Japanese fascism". What Maruyama Masao said happened to be between the second and third stages, with the February 26 incident as the turning point. 29

The February 26 Incident was a failed mutiny, initiated by some young officers of the "King Dao faction" leading more than a thousand soldiers to assassinate the "regulatory faction" at the top of the government and the military. In the end, the coup failed, the participants were declared "rebels", and many were sentenced to death. Kita Ikki and Nishida Shou, who did not participate in any direct action, were also sentenced to death, and Kita Ikki's "Outline of the Japan Reform Act" was the ideological guide for the February 26 Incident.

Paradoxically, after the ruling faction overwhelmed the imperialist faction, it became fascist. Is: Why in Japan, the rise of fascism among the people failed to gain real power? Why did the fascist revolution fail? The answer lies in: "In the process of fascism, the strength of the elements 'from below' is determined by the strength of its domestic democracy. In other words, it is impossible to produce from below without going through a democratic revolution. typical fascist movement". 31

Maruyama believed that both Italy and Germany were capitalist democracies after the end of World War I, and a strong proletarian organization was formed on this basis. After the First World War, the two socialist parties in the parliaments of the two countries (the Italian Socialist Party and the German Social Democratic Party) became the largest parties. Outside parliament, workers in Italy "swarmed in the occupation of factories and production management," and in Germany there was a "Spartacus uprising" led by Rosa Luxemburg and Liebknecht. It was in such a situation that the Fascist and Nazi movements emerged. On the one hand, the democratic system of capitalism guarantees freedom of association and political freedom, and they also learn from the experience of left-wing mass movements and develop their own models of organizing movements. On the other hand, the "weak democratic government" has no The ability to deal with the growing problem of class struggle, while Mussolini and Hitler promised the bourgeoisie that they would destroy the Red Threat with an iron fist. In contrast, Japan before the war had neither a complete capitalist democratic system nor a large-scale class struggle. What has been formed since the Meiji era is nothing more than an "oligarchic system." Before the Manchurian Incident, the real proletariat in Japan was much smaller than the small and medium-sized industrialists and salaried workers. 32 This made Japan's "bottom-up" fascist movement completely below the level of Italy and Germany.

Maruyama said that in order for a bottom-up fascist revolution to succeed, it must be based on a complete democratic system (“after a democratic revolution”), which has certain similarities with Miller’s statement that populism can only appear in representative countries . But from another perspective, fascist movements or populist movements can still appear in countries that have not yet established a complete representative system, such as Japan before World War II, which is why we say that Miller's thesis on the relationship between populism and representativeism is too "Western-centrism" ".

Maruyama believed that the form of fascism's development should not be confused with the speed of its development. Whether a country's fascism is "top-down" or "bottom-up" has nothing to do with its speed of development, the latter is determined by "the development of the revolutionary situation and the intensification and speed of international confrontation" 33 That is, the more a country is in danger of revolution and the more tense it is with other countries, the faster its fascism will develop. However, even if a country is not in objective danger of revolution, but its "ruling class or the petty bourgeoisie who follow them" subjectively judges that revolution is imminent, then fascism is also possible. Such "responses extremely sensitive to infection or erosion of 'heterogeneous' factors", in general, arise where "a higher degree of homogeneity of lifestyle or ideology is maintained". Maruyama said meaningfully: "If this is reversed, in such a society, when revolutionary forces and ideologies fail due to their own 'localization', they will think that revolutionary forces are 'foreign' and are not suitable for their own country. As the confrontation in the international community gradually intensifies, not only the ruling class, but also the public’s sense of fear will continue to expand and deepen, but instead, it will open the way for the coercive domestic integration of fascism.”34

It is worth mentioning that Maruyama believes that there is a close connection between fascism and "nihilism". The "nothingness" of fascism is reflected in the fact that the common denominator of its claims and slogans is only "anti-communism" and "anti-Semitism", which are negative and negative elements. In the face of various social contradictions, only "counter-revolution" and "war means" are used. to process. “The repressive apparatus of the opposition is itself a self-purpose. Once the one-party dictatorship is established, it will last forever ideologically. In the end, maintaining the reproduction of the war system becomes the only supreme political purpose.”35

Conclusion: How does liberalism respond to populism?

Although we do not think that the current populism in China has evolved into fascism, Maruyama's seven-point generalization of the spiritual tendencies and ideological patterns of fascism does not seem to be inconsistent when applied to Little Pink. There is nothing wrong with calling Little Pink a "fighting counter-revolution." The "revolution" here mainly refers not to the proletarian revolution, but to the "color revolution" that has been chasing shadows inside and outside the system. The failure to localize liberalism (whether in modern times or since its reformation) has indeed convinced some people that the liberal democratic system is indeed not suitable for China (corresponding to Maruyama's statement that "if the revolution cannot be localized, the revolution is regarded as foreign. ”). However, in recent years, this kind of accusation of "engaging in color revolutions" has not only been used against liberals, any progressive agenda in China, whether it is women's rights or labor, is often suspected of being manipulated by "foreign forces". More coincidentally, when Maruyama says that such "extreme sensitivity" is more likely to occur "where there is a high degree of homogeneity of lifestyle or ideology," we really have to take a breath: consider Given the situation at home and abroad and the attitude of the Chinese people in the past two years, it is not entirely impossible for China's populism to accelerate fascism in the near future.

From an unfounded point of view, there are two dangers in the present and one danger in the future. "Pink Frenzy" said: "If this movement continues, there will be careerists who are more 'conscious' than Little Pink in the future, who will emerge from within or outside the system to take over the baton of the movement." 36 A “bottom-up fascist revolution” is unlikely to happen in China, but at least it is more likely than a democratic revolution. If it wants to appear, it should happen when the ruling party is severely weakened due to some domestic and foreign changes, and its control over society is severely weakened. At such times, not only will Chinese populism accelerate fascism, but their ability to organize and mobilize must be stronger than that of liberals. In contrast, "top-down fascism" is more likely, when the military's status in the system rose, the state exercised all-round control over society, and the economic model began to evolve towards a wartime economy. Even if neither of the above-mentioned situations would happen, and for unknown reasons, China has established a liberal democratic system, populism will still be a formidable opponent to liberalism, unless such political organizations are included in the constitution at the beginning of the constitution. Limitations, otherwise there is no historical experience to guarantee that liberalism will definitely defeat populism under a democratic system.

Back in the present day, there must be some who think that the aforementioned dangers are exaggerated. Such doubts are not unreasonable. After all, Maruyama predicted that the United States would become fascist through McCarthyism, and it did not happen in the end. At present, the quantitative research on Little Pink is not perfect at home and abroad. We do not know whether there are related organizations, and if so, how many are there? The Industrial Party, the Entrance Examination, etc., but it seems that something similar to Kita Ikki's "Japan Reform Act Outline" has not appeared. In the European Journal of Internal Relations, there is an article "Right-wing populism with Chinese characteristics" worth mentioning. The article studied 1,038 responses on Zhihu and found that China's "well-educated netizens" are very good at attacking liberal democracy and "white left" with the help of Western right-wing populist discourse. The author believes that from these "answers" and "comments", it is quite clear that "racial nationalism" (racial nationalism) and "realist authoritarianism" (realist authoritarianism), both of which are popular in the right-wing populist The same is evident among the activists. 37

How much overlap is there between the "winners in life" on Zhihu and "Little Pinks", we can't make an accurate judgment for the time being, but most of the concepts of the two are compatible, and there are at least the following things in common: 1 ) support the powerful government; 2) support the Chinese Communist Party; 3) believe that the United States is declining and China is rising; 4) oppose the Western hegemony in international affairs and its ideological hegemony (universal values); 5) believe that Westerners are generally There is prejudice against China and the Chinese. If there is any difference between the impressions of "people's winner" and "Little Pink" on the simplified Chinese Internet, it may be due to class (Zhihu users generally have higher education and income than the average level of Chinese Internet users), age (Little Pink) Generally considered to be young people born in the 1995s and 2000s), issues (Zhuhu users discuss more international political issues) and emotions (Zhihu users like to use the tone of "reasonable people", Xiaopin seems to prefer to use intense expression), but there does not appear to be a substantial barrier to the flow of identity between the two. If it can be proved that Chinese populists (little pinks) are to some extent influenced by right-wing populist trends in the West (in the above study, the author did not explicitly call those Zhihu users “populists”), then the current Populism in China may also be discussed in the context of global populist movements.

In his chapter "How to Deal with Populists," Miller offers the following advice to proponents of liberal democracies:

First of all, without clearly defining who is a member of the political body and who is not, this question should be the object of democratic debate, not a once-and-for-all decision based on some immutable standard, the existing community Members and those who wish to join should have a voice.

Second, don't exclude populists (it doesn't work either), other political forces have some kind of obligation to engage with them as long as they operate within the limits of the law (eg not incite violence).

Again, identify true populists and separate them from political forces that also criticize elites but do not use the logic of substituting the part for the whole.

Finally, there needs to be a degree of skepticism about the left-wing strategy of selectively exploiting populist imagery against neoliberal hegemony. 38

While these recommendations are of more or less benefit to liberals in China and indeed all progressives, they are not urgent. The first thing Chinese liberals have learned from these two years of political upheaval should be that the narrative of progressivism has never been so frustrating as it is today, and so unconvincing outside the rulers (where the rulers were never convincing force). For those committed to achieving a democratic China, the challenges far outweigh the opportunities, no matter what the future holds. In front of them are a state apparatus accustomed to repression, and a growing number of fanatical populists on the other. On the liberal side, their dilemma is as follows:

1) The liberals have unrealistic expectations on the middle-class elites. Even if the illusion of "the middle class promoting democracy" has been shattered, they still expect them to take on more social responsibilities and contribute to fostering the future civil society. Be a force to stabilize society in the midst of possible turmoil. 39 However, China's middle class not only lacks such responsibility, many of them have even been captured by Western right-wing populist ideology.

2) In the past few years, there has been a group of prominent figures in the liberals who have completely ignored the reactionary elements underlying populism, enthusiastically embraced "Trumpism", and even compared the Capitol Hill riots to the "Lexington's of the new era". gunshots". The internal divisions of liberalism have reached a point of no return.

3) Since the new crown epidemic, the US government has been inconsistent and chaotic in its response, and the loopholes in the US political system have been exposed, so that nearly 26 million infections and more than 400,000 deaths have occurred in the country (data as of the end of January 2021), The "beacon of democracy" is bleak, and liberalism is in the dust.

These predicaments, coupled with the withering of liberals (many incarcerated) and their waning influence among young people, make the relationship between liberalism and China's future almost "irrelevant". The greatest advantage of liberalism is its connection with the material achievements of modern civilization (such as technology): the reproduction of these achievements requires some institutional and legal guarantees, the latter being closer to the values of liberalism than to populism. A large degree of antagonism; another advantage of liberalism is related to the reform of the "public culture" formed over the past forty years. This public culture has some simple liberal concepts, such as respect for property rights, advocacy of the rule of law, and individualism. Wait. The two magic weapons that liberals are most proud of are "enlightenment" and "reasoning." These can play a role in peaceful times. Considering that liberals also have a certain right to speak in some media, we can indeed have hope. But now that "chaotic times" are approaching, the situation may not give liberals enough time.

From the above analysis, the crisis of liberalism is unprecedented and difficult. I wrote about "Anti-Nationalist Coalition" before. At that time, the idea was to promote some progressive changes. Now I don't have such an extravagant hope. I just want to resist the full impact of totalitarianism inside and outside the system. For liberalism to survive, it must put aside superstitions about the middle class, put aside sexist prejudice, put aside the obsession with race, religion, and ideology, and combine with all the forces of progress. Only in this way can China hope to get out of the two "bad and worse" choices of "authoritarianism or populist totalitarianism".

Notes:

1 Miller, What Is Populism? ", Nanjing: Yilin Publishing House, 2020, p. 14.

2 Ibid., p. 26.

3 Ibid., p. 31.

4 Ibid., p. 33.

5 Ibid., p. 35.

6 Ibid., p. 42.

7 Ibid., p. 39.

8 Ibid., p. 45.

9 Cheng Tongshun, Yang Qian: "Current Populism in China", "Jiangsu Social Sciences", 2016 No. 3.

10 Zhou Qingzhi: "The Socio-Political Implications of the Current Chinese Populist Thought", "Politics Research", No. 5, 2017.

11 Miller, What is Populism? , p. 38.

12 The video and remarks about the girl are all from Sina Weibo "Yalun Yalun".

13 Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Beijing: 2008, p. 899.

14 Ibid., pp. 1094-1095.

15 Ibid., p. 1475.

16 Wyander, The Derailed Revolution, Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2019, p. 63.

17 Ibid., p. 84.

18 Wang Hui, "Politics of Depoliticization", Beijing: Life·Reading·Xinzhi Sanlian Publishing House, 2008, p.14.

19 Yu Keping: "Democracy or Populism: The Politics of Public Opinion in China", "Southern Academics", No. 1, 2014.

20 Jidong Chen, Jennifer Pan, Yiqing Xu (2015) Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China. American Journal of Political Science 60(2)

21 Liu Xiaolong: "The Evolution of China's Internet Populism and Its Governance", Political Science Research, No. 4, 2017.

22 Chen Chun, The Rebirth of Liberalism and Political Virtue, New York: World Chinese Press, 2020, p. 231.

23 For a further discussion, please refer to Chen Chun, "The Fan Circle and Civil Society's Return to Light under the New Crown Epidemic", published on the blockchain platform Matters.

24 Taro puree, little brother: "The rice circle is a collective PUA", https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/LH4i01aYdXGydPuzx8INWw .

25 Ma Zhihao, Lin Zhongxuan: "The Logic of Collective Action of Fan Community and Its Hierarchy Formation", "China Youth Studies", No. 6, 2018.

26 Miller, What is Populism? , p. 121.

27 Maruyama Masao, Thoughts and Actions in Modern Politics, Beijing: Commercial Press, 2018, p. 321.

28 Ibid., p. 61.

29 Ibid., p. 27.

30 Ibid., p. 65.

31 Ibid., pp. 69-70.

32 Ibid., pp. 71-73.

33 Ibid., p. 316.

34 Ibid., p. 274.

35 Ibid., p. 322.

36 Chen Chun, The Rebirth of Liberalism and Political Virtue, p. 234.

37 Chenchen Zhang (2020) Right-wing Populism with Chinese characteristics? Identity, otherness and global imaginaries in debating world politics online. European Journal of International Relations 26(I): 88-115.

38 Miller, What is Populism? , pp. 103-128.

39 Chen Chun, The Rebirth of Liberalism and Political Virtue, p. 202.