自译丨防卫军和魏玛共和国

摘译自Harold J. Gordon. The Reichswehr and the German Republic 1919-1926. Princeston University Press, 1957.

（一）从旧陆军到志愿军团

在德国，唯一显示出凝聚力、战斗精神和对军队、政府忠诚的军事单位就是那些志愿军团。即使这种外部力量有固有的、明显的缺陷；即使这些组织有独立于政治之外的趋势。但是志愿军团的确是控制局势的最有效的力量，是当之无愧的“正规部队”。而这样做的结果就是产生了一支政府无法控制的军队。

1918年11月，在全德国，志愿军团开始如雨后春笋般不断地涌现，并且在没有得到上级军事部门支持的情况下人数剧增。到了1919年1月上旬，有关部门决定接管志愿军团，并在此基础上建立一支由军官领导的、新的大规模的军队。其战斗力要足以镇压国内的骚乱，还要能够抵御波兰或俄国的侵略。

志愿军团给古斯塔夫·诺斯克留下了深刻的印象，他爽快地同意了这个计划。1919年1月4日，他视察了梅克尔将军的国土猎兵志愿团——第一支并且是最好的志愿军团，看着秩序严整、迈着鹅步前进的军队，他对艾伯特说：“放心吧，一切都会好起来的。”

德国杰出的历史学家弗雷德里希·梅尼克清楚地说明了志愿军团与残余的旧陆军的明显区别：“1919年1月13日，斯巴达克派起义的恐怖笼罩着我们长达8天，现在都烟消云散了。除掉这个幽灵——一群胆小的乌合之众是必须的。而这就要依靠一直短小精干而又值得信赖的部队。驻扎在我们附近的帕德博恩骠骑兵团（两个中队只有50个人），只剩下班底壳子，给我的印象就是日渐萎顿，他们显然对于镇压暴动者（起义者）缺乏热情。而 O2ZSXne( 而而而涌进位于设于Podbielskiallee的招募中心（此地位于达勒姆）的志愿者和军官们则带来了清新的气息。这些携带着重武器（比如火炮）的部队一面示威一面向城市进发，这些部队比当初来到此处的那些人更加棘手。好像旧秩序又卷土重来了。但是这些重新穿上军装、佩戴上军衔并且拿起步枪的年轻中尉们能否客观公正地理解这个新的时代？他们好像又让我回想起了不久前那狂热的呼喊声：‘胜利万岁！’”。

梅尼克教授的这番话指出了使用志愿军团的必要性和对这些部队与对政府两者间不同的态度。

新的“正规部队”——志愿军团就像它名字中暗含的意思一样（志愿军团德文为Freikorps，即“自由军团”）——是一群自由人。他们随时可以精确的“消失”如果一个军官想要组建一个连的话。例如：冯·布兰迪斯上尉，他获得过非常多的荣誉并且由于在凡尔登战役中表现神勇被授予蓝马克斯勋章。战后他在柏林附近的诺伊鲁平的一家旅馆里住下，从那里他找到了昔日的战友，他们加入他的行列。这些人又联系到了其他人。布兰迪斯上尉的名望依旧具有强大的召唤力。几周之后，他就建立起了一个营，包括3个步枪连、一个加强重机枪连和一个105毫米榴弹炮兵连。其他的志愿军团也以类似的方式组建。

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不仅仅是这些典型的单位，一些更大的志愿军团——比如近卫骑兵步枪师——就是由一些小的志愿军团联合而成的。此外，还有一些志愿军团的核心是由一个单独的单位或者前德皇军队保留下来的仍然保留着军衔士兵组成的。这种情况一直持续到1919年3月中。

（二）重建秩序

诺斯克和总参谋部完成了一项令人惊讶的成绩。在1919年1月初，德国政府的领袖们都自身难保。全国到处都是起义。在东部地区，没有任何障碍能阻止波兰或苏俄的侵略。无数德国士兵被分割在俄国西部和南部，面临灭顶之灾。但是最近半年，这张以达勒姆的Luisenstift为中心的小小的力量之网一直在不断地壮大，直至扩至整个帝国。 IIf=~gUZ只有那些较小的起义被扑灭了，他们很容易被镇压下去。在东方，苏俄一次次的被击退，通往南部和东部的走廊在不断的加宽，直到最后一支德军部队能顺利安全地通过。在波兰人吞并波森省和西普鲁士之后，他们开始处于被动地位，而这些很可能抵消了同盟国的恐惧。

如果政府与总参谋部没有结成同盟，那么德意志共和国政府几乎不可能在1919年幸存下来，如果没有志愿军团，这个同盟就不可能生存下去。志愿军团的刺刀保护着国会，他们在一定的范围内保持着国家的稳定和领土完整是可能的，他们为国家的内部平稳提供保障是必要的如果破碎的社会经济结构亟待恢复的话。现在，他们的任务完成了。伟大的时刻、收获的时刻，对于志愿军团来说是一个结束。（志愿军团）总是被军事和政治领袖们视为一个临时的权益之计，现在，他们被解散了。而少数军团却在打擦边球，以国防军的辅助组织在暗中继续存在，或者自身结成半政治性的组织。但这些志愿军团却被拒绝了，被剥夺了继承权，导致他们既不能继续留在军队中，又不能适应新国家的平民生活。从1918年11月到1920年3月，经历了兴起、繁盛、衰落的志愿军团运动逐渐销声匿迹了。

（三）临时国防军

临时国防军只是面临紧急情况时的一个临时性的权宜之计。它从没有打算在新旧军队之间架起一座桥梁。无论有什么错误，志愿军团的确是履行了要求它要做的职责并且阻止了国家的分崩离析。可是，当严重的危机过后，拆除和重建的过程就开始了，所有致命的缺陷都开始显露出来并加速了共和国的毁灭。

临时国防军是一支不招人喜爱并且桀骜不驯，但却被视作可以履行职责的军事单位。（军队）领导权的暗斗，以及（军队管理层）大多数军官的严重不满情绪，对于解散各兵种（命令）所显示出顽强的反抗——这都给集中爆发创造了必要条件，并 >*C;x‑‑]\最终以卡普暴动的方式爆发出来。

（四）卡普暴动

经过对暴动原因的谨慎研究，得出（暴动失败）的第一个主要结论是：叛军的领导者存在问题，平民与军队混杂其中，缺乏决心和政治远见，甚至连他们自己都不知道目标和想要达到的政治意图。暴动是在一个难以置信的不负责任的气氛中想象出来的，并且以一种希望渺茫的草率的方式付诸实施。充其量是一次几乎没有希望的赌博。当全体人员准备起事时却缺乏必要的准备、固执地低估了自身的能力而高估了有利因素，叛乱的迅速失败就是命中注定的了。

对卡普和吕特维茨最恰当的评价是：他们不是无政府主义者，而是傻瓜。他们没有剥夺也没有集中营地。他们选择了嗜杀成性的埃尔哈特旅。当卡普暴动结束的时候，暴民与埃尔哈特旅的冲突成了自然爆发的苦难，而且当卡普准备放弃的时候已经没有秩序可言了。

不管暴乱者的改良意愿（或退缩）是源于害怕失败或者被定罪，更有可能是兼而有之，这些都已经无从考证了。不过，可以肯定的是，他们中的大多数人都因退却而免于重罚，特别是当共产主义者和鲁尔及其他地区的起义者的所作所为只能用暴力与恐怖主义来形容，反而喧宾夺主，使得当局对于他们的怒气也快速的消散了。 ­V^?d/kv （相对于那些逃避惩罚的人来说），共产党起先许诺为吕特维茨等党徒争取大赦的党内领导人，此时已经无法与当局讨价还价了，因为价码已经彻底被长长的伤亡名单所淹没。

第二个（失败）原因的结论是，学生作为此次暴动的主力，很多人自己还是浑浑噩噩，无法理解行动的目的，尤其在柏林以外地区。导致混乱原因的有主要有四点： W {RtHbx

第一：国家的整个军事当局处在和艾伯特政府、帝国国防部、吕特维茨将军和第二集群司令部的对立面。至少在某些情况下，给当地指挥官不知道哪个命令是合法的找了个好理由。

第二：引发了全面性的罢工。叛军发现他们正在面临全面的罢工，政府遂发布特殊标准的命令来镇压叛乱。政府在1920年1月13日的条令中说得非常明确：“所有危害到关键产业正常运转的口头、书面或含有同等意味的集体活动都是违法的。”

第三：所有的工人被认为是卡普的士兵和警察，尽管他们是完全忠于西方的。如果志愿军团倾向于认为所有罢工者尤其是武装人员都是共产党人。于是引发了军团和警察为一方、工人为一方的一系列大大小小的严重冲突。而且他们都认为自己是以艾伯特政府的名义与叛乱分子战斗。

第四：引发全面混乱的一个事实就是在罢工者中，有相当数量的共产党人和激进的独立社会党人，他们像卡普一样——或者更甚——意欲推翻政府。

最后，迫使军事当局利用之前卡普的人来镇压共产党和独立社会党人在鲁尔的暴乱以及全国其他地方的骚乱产生的隐患仍将会持续。

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（五）法律地位

经过多年的争论与妥协，新国防军的雏形终于浮出水面。这是一支由职业军人组成的10万人的军队，他们全部的生活和未来都交给了部队。什么样的人会在军队中服役12年，除非这是一个认为军事生涯是一种可以接受的生活方式的人——就像如果他的最终目标是在平民服务中做一个保安那样吗（认为保安也是一种可以接受的生活方式）？这支军队中都是些什么样的人呢？他们不是典范，实际上他们是偶像，因为他们将在军队中连续服役25年。在服役期内，这样的人们无不具有了一颗“军人情结”。

原文：

IMPERIAL ARMY OF FREIKORPS

The only military units in Germany which showed any cohesion, any loyalty to the military authorities and the government, and any fighting spirit were the Freikorps. Despite the obvious defects inherent in such a heterogeneous force, despite the tendency of these formations toward independent action, the Freikorps undoubtedly offered the best available “force in being”. There appeared little prospect of creating an army without utilizing them.

Freikorps had begun to spring up all over Germany in November 1918 and had multiplied rapidly thereafter, initially with little or no encouragement from the higher military authorities. Now, in early January, the authorities determined to take over the Freikorps movement, to supplement the existing Freikorps with new ones under officers chosen from above, and to weld these formations into a sizeable fighting force capable of suppressing rebellion at home and Polish or Russian aggression in the east.

Gustav Noske, who had already been deeply impressed by the possibilities of the Freikorps, fell in readily with this plan. He had, on January 4, 1919, inspected General Maercker’s Landesjägerkorps, the first of the large Freikorps, and certainly one of the finest. Watching the ordered, goose-stepping ranks march past, he had said to Ebert, “ ‘Just be calm. Everything will be all right again.’ ”

The sharp contract between Freikorps troops and remnants of the old army is given clear expression by the eminent German historian, Freidrich Meinecke, who wrote: “13 January 1919. The Spartacist Terror, which dominated us for eight days, appears now to be broken. It was only necessary to commit against this apparition, which was the work of a cowardly rabble, a small but dependable troop. The Paderborn Hussars [which were] quartered near us (two squadrons at fifty men still), youngest [draft] classes, gave me the impression of a daily decaying force—they appeared to me to have little stomach for an energetic struggle against Spartacus. The streaming in of volunteers and officers to the recruiting center established here (in Dahlem) in the Podbielskiallee first brought progress. The troops with artillery, etc. [which] marched to the city from here [to] demonstrate day before yesterday made a far different, stiffer impression than those hitherto seen. It was as if the old world rose again. But will these young lieutenants, who have now again donned their uniforms and march in the rank and file with rifles, also have the judgment [necessary] to understand the new times? A troop of them passing me recently whistled ‘Heil Dir im Siegerkranz.’ ”

Professor Meinecke’s notations point out both the necessity for using the Freikorps and the implicit between the attitude of these troops and of the new government.

The new “force in being,” the Freikorps, were exactly what their name implies—free companies. They were often literally “stamped out of the earth” by an officer who felt urge to form a company. For example, Captain von Brandis, who had won wide fame and the Order Pour le Mérite for his courage at Verdun, settled down at an inn in Neuruppin, near Berlin, whence he had his friends summon old comrades to join them. These men, in turn, gathered others. The fame of Brandis’ name drew still more. In a few weeks he had assenmbled a reinforced battalion, consisting of three rifle companies, an over-strength machine-gun company, and a battery of 105-mm howitzers. Many other Freikorps were formed in just such a manner.

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Not only were there many types of units, but some of the larger Freikorps, such as the Guards Cavalry Rifle Division, were themselves constantly shifting which were of smaller Freikorps. Furthermore, some of the Freikorps which were formed about a nucleus furnished by a single unit or formation of the Imperial Army retained numbers of draftees in their ranks until at least the middle of March 1919.

REESTABLISHMENT OF ORDER

Noske and the General Staff had accomplished an amazing feat. In early January 1919 the leaders of the Reich government were not even safe in their own officers. Rebellion flared everywhere throughout the nation. In the east there was no barrier to halt Polish or Russian invation. Untold thousands of German soldiers were scattered throughout southern and western Russia, threatened with complete annihilation. Yet within six months the little web of power that was originally centered at the Luisenstift in Dahlem spread to cover the entire Reich. Only here and there did minor insurrections break out, and these were easily suppressed. In the east, the Russians were thrown back again and again, and the corridor to the south and east was held wide until the last German units had straggled through to safety. The Poles had been held in check probably have been cancelled out had it not been for fear of the Allies.

Without the alliance between the government and the General Staff, the government of the German Republic could scarcely have hoped to survive the year 1919. With out Freikorps this alliance would have been sterile. The bayonets of the Freikorps protected the National Assembly. The Freikorps pacified the Reich and maintained its territorial integrity insofar it was possible. They provided the domestic peace which was so necessary if the shattered social and economic fabric was to be repaired. Now their task was at an end. Always regarded as a temporary expedient by both military and political leaders, they were now to be dissolved. Some few groups might continue to live a shadow existence on the fringes of the national military establishment as half-despised auxiliaries, or might form themselves into semi-political bands. But these later Freikorps were merely the rejected, the disinherited, those who could not fit themselves into either the military or the civilian life of the new Germany. The mass of the Freikorps rose, flourished, and disappeared between November 1918 and March 1920.

THE PROVISIONAL REICHSWEHR

The Provisional Reichswehr was a temporary expedient created to meet an emergency situation. It was never intend to do more than bridge the gap between the old army and the new. Despite all of this faults, it performed the duties demanded of it and prevented Reich from falling apart. As soon as the most serious crises were past, however, and the process of dismantling and rebuilding commenced, all of its fatal weaknesses came to the fore and accelerated its collapse.

The Provisional Reichswehr was as discontent and unruly a force as could be expected to function as a military entity. The covert struggle for leadership, the acute unhappiness of the majority of its personnel, and the dogged resistance to dissolution displayed by various important formations—all gave promise of a major explosion. This explosion took the form of the Kapp Putsch.

THE KAPP PUTSCH

The first major conclusion to which one is led by a careful study of the Kapp Putsch is that the leaders of the rebels, both civilian and military, lacked determination, political insight, and a clear grasp of their own objectives and of the means by which they could be achieved. The Putsch was conceived in an atmosphere of almost unbelievable irresponsibility and carried out in a hopelessly slipshod manner. At best it was an almost hopeless gamble in face of overwhelming odds. When faulty preparation was coupled with the essential weakness of the insurgents, obstinate underestimation of the enemy, and overestimation of favorable factors, the speedy collapse of the enterprise was foreordained.

The most one can say in favor of Kapp and Lüttwitz is that, while they were fools, they were not nihilists. They made no proscriptions and set up no concentration camps. They held the bloodthirsty Ehrhardt in check. The clash between the mob and the Ehrhardt Brigade at the end if the Putsch was a spontaneous outburst of bitterness at defeat and had not been order by the Kapp authorities who had already abdicated.

Whether the Kappists’ moderation stemmed from fear failure or from conviction, or, most likely, from an admixture of both, probably will never be revealed. Certainly, however, one of the clues to the rapid subsidence of indignation against them and their general success in eluding severe punishment is to be found in this moderation, especially since it was immediately highlighted by the violence and terrorism displayed by the Communists and their allies in the Ruhr and elsewhere. The party leaders who had promised an amnesty to Lüttwitz to avoid bloodshed might not have been able to carry out their bargain had the people been thoroughly aroused by a long casualty list.

A second major conclusion which forces itself upon the student of the Kapp Putsch is that confusion and misunderstanding were widespread, especially outside Berlin. There were four major causes of confusion.

The first was the fact that the military authorities throughout the country were inundated by contradictory orders from the Ebert government, from the Reichswhrministerium, from General Lüttwitz, and from Group Command Ⅱ. In some cases at least, there seems good reason to believe that local commanders did not know which orders were legally binding.

A second cause of confusion was the general strike. The troops found themselves faced with a general strike, allegedly proclaimed by the suppression of all general strikes. The government decree of January 13, 1920 was quite unequivocal: “ ‘Every activity by word or pen or other means which is directed towards halting vital industry is forbidden. ’ ”

Thirdly, workers everywhere tended to consider all soldiers and policemen as Kappists, even in the thoroughly loyal west. Since the troops inclined toward the belief that all strikers and especially all armed workers were Communists, a series of more or less serious clashes resulted between troops and police on the one hand, and workers on the other, with everyone concerned convinced that he was fighting rebels in the name of the Ebert government.

A fourth element contributing to the general confusion was the fact that there actually were, among the strikers, a great number of Communists and radical Independent Socialists who were as determined as Kappists—indeed more so—to destroy the Republic.

Finally, the weakness which forced the military authorities to employ formerly Kappist units to help suppress the Communists-Independent Socialists risings in the Ruhr and elsewhere throughout the Reich heightened the confusion still further.

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THE LEGAL POSITION

As a result of the years of wrangling and of compromise, the sharp of the new Reichswehr finally emerged. It was to be a 100,000-man army of professional solders, of men whose whole lives and being were oriented about the army and its welfare. For what man would enlist in an army for twelve years unless he considered soldiering an acceptable life—even if his eventual goal was a secure berth in the civil service? What man whom the army was not an ideal, indeed an idol, would accept a commission binding him to twenty-five years of unbroken service? During their term of service such men would scarcely grow less “army-minded”!