論工業社會及其未來-一些歷史原則
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可以把歷史想成是兩個部分的總和：一是不規則的部分，由不遵循任何可辨認模式的不可預測事件組成，而另一個是規則的部分，由長期歷史趨勢組成。這裡我們考慮的是長期趨勢。
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第一個原則。如果一個小改變影響了長期歷史趨勢，則此影響的效果幾乎總是短暫的──此趨勢很快就會恢復到原來的狀態。（例子：旨在清理社會政治貪腐的改革運動很少有多於短期的效果； 改革者遲早會放鬆而腐敗捲土重來。 一個給定社會中的政治貪腐程度往往保持不變，或者隨著社會的發展而緩慢變化。通常政治清理只有伴隨著廣泛的社會變革才會是永久性的； 社會的微小變化是不夠的。）如果長期歷史趨勢中的微小變化似乎是永久性的，那只是因為這種變化朝著趨勢已經移動的方向發生，因此趨勢並非被改變而只是被向前推進了一步。
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第一個原則幾乎就是廢話。如果一個趨勢對於微小的變化不穩定，它會隨機遊蕩而非遵循一個確定的方向； 換句話說，這根本不是一個長期趨勢。
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第二個原則。 如果做出的變化足以永久改變長期的歷史趨勢，那麼它將改變整個社會。 換句話說，社會是一個所有部分都相互關聯的系統，你不可能在不改變所有其他部分的情況下永久改變任何重要部分。
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第三個原則。 如果做出的變化大到足以永久改變長期趨勢，那麼就無法提前預測對其整個社會的影響。 （除非其他各樣社會都經歷過同樣的變化並都經歷了同樣的後果，在這種情況下，人們可以根據經驗預測另一個經歷過同樣變化的社會也會經歷類似的結果。）
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第四個原則。 一種新類型的社會不能在紙上被創造出來。 換句話說，你不能提前規劃一種新的社會形式，建立它並期望它會按照設計的方式運作。
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第三個和第四個原則源自於人類社會的複雜性。 人類行為的改變將影響一個社會的經濟以及其物質環境； 經濟會影響環境且反之亦然，且經濟和環境的變化會以複雜、無法預測的方式影響人類行為；諸如此類的。因果的網絡過於複雜以至於無法理清和了解。
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第五個原則。 人們並沒有自覺和理性地選擇他們的社會形式。 社會透過不受人類理性控制的社會進程發展。
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第五個原則是其他四個原則的結果。
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舉例說明：根據第一個原則，一般來說，社會改革的嘗試要不是朝著社會發展的方向前進（因此它只會加速無論如何都會發生的變化），就是改革僅有暫時的效果，因此社會很快就會回到原軌。要使一個社會任何重要方面的發展方向發生持久的變化，改革是不夠的，需要革命。（革命不一定涉及武裝起義或推翻政府。）根據第二個原則，革命永遠不會只改變社會的一個面向，它會改變整個社會；而根據第三個原則，將發生革命者從未預料或期望的改變。根據第四條原則，當革命者或烏托邦主義者建立一種新的社會時，它從來沒有按照計劃運行。
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美利堅合眾國革命並非反例。美利堅合眾國的「革命」不是我們所謂的革命，而是一場獨立戰爭伴隨著一場相對影響深遠的政治改革。 開國元勛們沒有改變美國社會的發展方向，他們也沒有有志於這樣做。他們只是將美利堅合眾國社會的發展從英國統治的阻礙作用中解脫出來。 他們的政治改革沒有改變任何基本趨勢，只是將美利堅合眾國政治文化推向了自然發展的方向。美利堅合眾國社會是英國社會的分支，而英國社會長期以來一直在朝著代議民主的方向發展。早在獨立戰爭之前，美利堅合眾國人已經在殖民地議會中實行了相當程度的代議民主。憲法所確立的政治制度是仿照英國的制度和殖民地議會的制度。有重大的修改，確實──毫無疑問，開國元勛邁出了非常重要的一步。但這一步僅僅是踏在英語世界早已經在走的路上。 證據是英國及其所有主要由英國人居住的殖民地最終形成了與美利堅合眾國基本上相似的代議民主制度。就算開國元勛一時害怕沒有簽署獨立宣言，我們今天的生活方式也不會有太大的不同。也許我們會與英國建立更緊密的聯繫，並且會有議會和首相，而不是國會和總統。沒什麼大不了的。因此，美國美利堅合眾國革命沒有成為我們原則的反例，反而是很好地說明了這些原則。
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儘管如此，在應用這些原則時必須靠常識。 這些原則以不精確的語言表達，允許解釋的自由度，也可以找到例外。因此我們提出這些原則不是將其視為牢不可破的定律，而是作為經驗法則或思考指南，希望可能為關於社會未來的幼稚想法提供部分解藥。應將這些原則牢記於心，每當得出與原則相衝突的結論時，都應仔細重新審視自己的想法，只有在有很好，很堅實理由的情況下才維持原有結論。
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SOME PRINCIPLES OF HISTORY
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Think of history as being the sum of two components: an erratic component that consists of unpredictable events that follow no discernible pattern, and a regular component that consists of long-term historical trends. Here we are concerned with the long-term trends.
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FIRST PRINCIPLE. If a SMALL change is made that affects a long-term historical trend, then the effect of that change will almost always be transitory—the trend will soon revert to its original state. (Example: A reform movement designed to clean up political corruption in a society rarely has more than a short-term effect; sooner or later the reformers relax and corruption creeps back in. The level of political corruption in a given society tends to remain constant, or to change only slowly with the evolution of the society. Normally, a political cleanup will be permanent only if accompanied by widespread social changes; a SMALL change in the society won’t be enough.) If a small change in a long-term historical trend appears to be permanent, it is only because the change acts in the direction in which the trend is already moving, so that the trend is not altered by only pushed a step ahead.
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The first principle is almost a tautology. If a trend were not stable with respect to small changes, it would wander at random rather than following a definite direction; in other words it would not be a long- term trend at all.
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SECOND PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is sufficiently large to alter permanently a long-term historical trend, then it will alter the society as a whole. In other words, a society is a system in which all parts are interrelated, and you can’t permanently change any important part without changing all other parts as well.
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THIRD PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is large enough to alter permanently a long-term trend, then the consequences for the society as a whole cannot be predicted in advance. (Unless various other societies have passed through the same change and have all experienced the same consequences, in which case one can predict on empirical grounds that another society that passes through the same change will be like to experience similar consequences.)
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FOURTH PRINCIPLE. A new kind of society cannot be designed on paper. That is, you cannot plan out a new form of society in advance, then set it up and expect it to function as it was designed to do.
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The third and fourth principles result from the complexity of human societies. A change in human behavior will affect the economy of a society and its physical environment; the economy will affect the environment and vice versa, and the changes in the economy and the environment will affect human behavior in complex, unpredictable ways; and so forth. The network of causes and effects is far too complex to be untangled and understood.
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FIFTH PRINCIPLE. People do not consciously and rationally choose the form of their society. Societies develop through processes of social evolution that are not under rational human control.
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The fifth principle is a consequence of the other four.
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To illustrate: By the first principle, generally speaking an attempt at social reform either acts in the direction in which the society is developing anyway (so that it merely accelerates a change that would have occurred in any case) or else it has only a transitory effect, so that the society soon slips back into its old groove. To make a lasting change in the direction of development of any important aspect of a society, reform is insufficient and revolution is required. (A revolution does not necessarily involve an armed uprising or the overthrow of a government.) By the second principle, a revolution never changes only one aspect of a society, it changes the whole society; and by the third principle changes occur that were never expected or desired by the revolutionaries. By the fourth principle, when revolutionaries or utopians set up a new kind of society, it never works out as planned.
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The American Revolution does not provide a counterexample. The American “Revolution” was not a revolution in our sense of the word, but a war of independence followed by a rather far-reaching political reform. The Founding Fathers did not change the direction of development of American society, nor did they aspire to do so. They only freed the development of American society from the retarding effect of British rule. Their political reform did not change any basic trend, but only pushed American political culture along its natural direction of development. British society, of which American society was an offshoot, had been moving for a long time in the direction of representative democracy. And prior to the War of Independence the Americans were already practicing a significant degree of representative democracy in the colonial assemblies. The political system established by the Constitution was modeled on the British system and on the colonial assemblies. With major alteration, to be sure—there is no doubt that the Founding Fathers took a very important step. But it was a step along the road that English-speaking world was already traveling. The proof is that Britain and all of its colonies that were populated predominantly by people of British descent ended up with systems of representative democracy essentially similar to that of the United States. If the Founding Fathers had lost their nerve and declined to sign the Declaration of Independence, our way of life today would not have been significantly different. Maybe we would have had somewhat closer ties to Britain, and would have had a Parliament and Prime Minister instead of a Congress and President. No big deal. Thus the American Revolution provides not a counterexample to our principles but a good illustration of them.
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Still, one has to use common sense in applying the principles. They are expressed in imprecise language that allows latitude for interpretation, and exceptions to them can be found. So we present these principles not as inviolable laws but as rules of thumb, or guides to thinking, that may provide a partial antidote to naive ideas about the future of society. The principles should be borne constantly in mind, and whenever one reaches a conclusion that conflicts with them one should carefully reexamine one’s thinking and retain the conclusion only if one has good, solid reasons for doing so.