[转贴] 民族主义手记

转贴自S1论坛的chenpony大大的翻译，这篇文章对我很有启发，我也转发过来给大家看看。

原帖地址：https://bbs.saraba1st.com/2b/thread-1923081-1-1.html

George Orwell

乔治·奥威尔

Notes on Nationalism

民族主义手记

Somewhere or other Byron makes use of the French word longeur, and remarks in passing that though in England we happen not to have the word, we have the thing in considerable profusion. In the same way, there is a habit of mind which is now so widespread that it affects our thinking on nearly every subject, but which has not yet been given a name. As the nearest existing equivalent I have chosen the word ‘nationalism’, but it will be seen in a moment that I am not using it in quite the ordinary sense, if only because the emotion I am speaking about does not always attach itself to what is called a nation — that is, a single race or a geographical area. It can attach itself to a church or a class, or it may work in a merely negative sense, against something or other and without the need for any positive object of loyalty.

拜伦曾用过“longeur（冗赘）”这个法语词，还评论道，虽然英语里不巧没有完全对应的词汇，但在英国同类的词和事可多得过分。也有这么一种习惯，几乎影响了我们对每一件事的思考，却一直无人为它定名。我选择“民族主义”这个现存含义最为贴合的词来描述它，不过读者将很快发现，我“民族主义”一词的含义要与各位的直觉相悖，因为我描述的这种情仇并不总是依附于“民族”——民族（nation）即是，一个单一的种族，或是一片地理区域——这情仇也可以依附于教会或阶级，有时它也能逆向而行，只是憎恨某些事物，而不热爱任何对象。

    By ‘nationalism’ I mean first of all the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labelled ‘good’ or ‘bad’(1). But secondly — and this is much more important — I mean the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognising no other duty than that of advancing its interests. Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. Both words are normally used in so vague a way that any definition is liable to be challenged, but one must draw a distinction between them, since two different and even opposing ideas are involved. By ‘patriotism’ I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality.

    之于“民族主义”，我指的是一种习惯，这习惯想当然地认为可以把百万甚至千万的人类像昆虫一样分出种属，贴上“好”和“坏”（注1）的标签。其次——这一点更为重要——我要指个人用民族或集体的概念来自我认同的习惯，他认同时不考虑其善恶之分，并且除增进集体的利益以外，不承认其他任何义务。民族主义不应与爱国主义混淆。这两个词语在日常使用上都意义模糊，对二者任何的定义都有可能遭到质疑，但个人应当在两者间划出明确的界线，因为二者隐含了两种不同，甚至对立的观点。之于“爱国主义”，我指的是对某片土地或某种生活方式的献身，认为这种价值无与伦比，但并不会逼迫他人也接受这价值。爱国主义本质是防御性的，军事上和文化上皆然。而民族主义呢，则与对权力的追求密不可分。每个民族主义者永恒的目标，都是追求更多的权势和威望，但这权势和威望却并不是为他自己所求，而是为了他压抑自己独立性后，所遁入的那个民族或集体所求。

     So long as it is applied merely to the more notorious and identifiable nationalist movements in Germany, Japan, and other countries, all this is obvious enough. Confronted with a phenomenon like Nazism, which we can observe from the outside, nearly all of us would say much the same things about it. But here I must repeat what I said above, that I am only using the word ‘nationalism’ for lack of a better. Nationalism, in the extended sense in which I am using the word, includes such movements and tendencies as Communism, political Catholicism, Zionism, Antisemitism, Trotskyism and Pacifism. It does not necessarily mean loyalty to a government or a country, still less to one's own country, and it is not even strictly necessary that the units in which it deals should actually exist. To name a few obvious examples, Jewry, Islam, Christendom, the Proletariat and the White Race are all of them objects of passionate nationalistic feeling: but their existence can be seriously questioned, and there is no definition of any one of them that would be universally accepted.

     只要把上述内容与德国、日本和其他国家那些更恶劣更明显的民族主义运动相对照，我所指的“民族主义”的特征就很明确了。面对纳粹主义这类我们可以从外部观察的现象，大概所有人都能就此说一番类似的话。但我要再次提醒各位，我选择“民族主义”一词去描述这种现象，纯粹是因为没有更好的选项。我所用的那个延展意义上的“民族主义”，还包括了共产主义，泛政治天主教主义，锡安主义，反犹太主义，托洛茨基主义与和平主义。一个人不需要先忠于任何国家或政府就可以持有这样的民族主义，当然对他自己国家的效忠也更无必要，甚至他所持的民族主义的核心理念，都不一定存在于世。举几个明显的例子，犹太人，穆斯林，基督教信徒，无产阶级，白色人种，这些对象是民族主义移情的关键：但我们需要严肃质疑这些人群是否真实存在，毕竟也不存在对他们的公允的任一定义。

     It is also worth emphasising once again that nationalist feeling can be purely negative. There are, for example, Trotskyists who have become simply enemies of the U.S.S.R. without developing a corresponding loyalty to any other unit. When one grasps the implications of this, the nature of what I mean by nationalism becomes a good deal clearer. A nationalist is one who thinks solely, or mainly, in terms of competitive prestige. He may be a positive or a negative nationalist — that is, he may use his mental energy either in boosting or in denigrating — but at any rate his thoughts always turn on victories, defeats, triumphs and humiliations. He sees history, especially contemporary history, as the endless rise and decline of great power units, and every event that happens seems to him a demonstration that his own side is on the upgrade and some hated rival is on the downgrade. But finally, it is important not to confuse nationalism with mere worship of success. The nationalist does not go on the principle of simply ganging up with the strongest side. On the contrary, having picked his side, he persuades himself that it is the strongest, and is able to stick to his belief even when the facts are overwhelmingly against him. Nationalism is power-hunger tempered by self-deception. Every nationalist is capable of the most flagrant dishonesty, but he is also — since he is conscious of serving something bigger than himself — unshakeably certain of being in the right.

     此处值得再次提醒各位，民族主义情绪的来源可以纯粹是逆向的。例如，托洛茨基主义者将苏联视为敌人时，并未对其他任何集体表现出足量的忠诚心。如果能够理解这里的隐语，也就更能认识我所说的民族主义的本质。民族主义者是一个几乎只用“霸权纷争”模式来思考的人。他可以是一个正向的，也可以是一个逆向的民族主义者——这是在说，他会用自己的民族主义激情去鼓舞他人或诋毁他人——但他的思想总是充斥着“取胜”、“落败”、“凯旋”和“耻辱”。他眼中的历史，尤其是当代的历史，就是强权和霸业无尽的兴衰，历史中的每一个事件在他看来，就是一个又一个的范例，证明他身处的一方正遥遥领先，而他所对抗的一方正节节败退。请注意，不要把民族主义和对成功的崇拜相混淆。民族主义者并不是简单地先去寻找最强者，再与之结盟。恰恰相反，民族主义者是在选边站之后，再来说服自己，自己这方才是最强大的，即使在事实与他的信仰天差地别的情况下，他也有本事忠于自己的信念。民族主义是由自欺情绪引导的，对权力的渴望。每一个民族主义者都有指鹿为马的能力，但他也——毕竟他的意识已献身于比他更宏大的事物中去——坚定不移地相信自己才是正确的一方。

     Now that I have given this lengthy definition, I think it will be admitted that the habit of mind I am talking about is widespread among the English intelligentsia, and more widespread there than among the mass of the people. For those who feel deeply about contemporary politics, certain topics have become so infected by considerations of prestige that a genuinely rational approach to them is almost impossible. Out of the hundreds of examples that one might choose, take this question: Which of the three great allies, the U.S.S.R., Britain and the USA, has contributed most to the defeat of Germany? In theory, it should be possible to give a reasoned and perhaps even a conclusive answer to this question. In practice, however, the necessary calculations cannot be made, because anyone likely to bother his head about such a question would inevitably see it in terms of competitive prestige. He would therefore start by deciding in favour of Russia, Britain or America as the case might be, and only after this would begin searching for arguments that seemed to support his case. And there are whole strings of kindred questions to which you can only get an honest answer from someone who is indifferent to the whole subject involved, and whose opinion on it is probably worthless in any case. Hence, partly, the remarkable failure in our time of political and military prediction. It is curious to reflect that out of al the ‘experts’ of all the schools, there was not a single one who was able to foresee so likely an event as the Russo-German Pact of 1939(2). And when news of the Pact broke, the most wildly divergent explanations were of it were given, and predictions were made which were falsified almost immediately, being based in nearly every case not on a study of probabilities but on a desire to make the U.S.S.R. seem good or bad, strong or weak. Political or military commentators, like astrologers, can survive almost any mistake, because their more devoted followers do not look to them for an appraisal of the facts but for the stimulation of nationalistic loyalties(3). And aesthetic judgements, especially literary judgements, are often corrupted in the same way as political ones. It would be difficult for an Indian Nationalist to enjoy reading Kipling or for a Conservative to see merit in Mayakovsky, and there is always a temptation to claim that any book whose tendency one disagrees with must be a bad book from a literary point of view. People of strongly nationalistic outlook often perform this sleight of hand without being conscious of dishonesty.

     我给出了如此冗赘的定义后，我想应该可以承认，我所谈到的这种思维习惯在英国知识界中流传极为普遍，甚至比在大众中都更具影响。能对当代政治感受深刻的人，几乎不可能真正理性地对待某些议题，因为这些话题与“霸权纷争”过于相关。让我们从无数例子中挑一个出来：试问苏联、英国、美国、盟军的三巨头里，谁对击败德国的贡献最大？理论上，对这个问题可以给出一个理性的，甚至总结性的答案。但在实践中，我们无法作出这样的预测，因为任何愿意为这个问题开动脑筋的人，都将不可避免地陷入“霸权纷争”的思维定式中。因此，他会先按情况选择是要支持俄罗斯、英国还是美国，再为自己的选择寻找论据。同类的问题还有许多，诚实的回答则只能从那些，对问题所涉主体一视同仁的人口中得到，那样的回答也往往毫无价值。因此，我们这个时代军事与政治上的预测，一定程度上是失效的。所有学校中的所有“专家”，没有任何一个能预见1939年《苏德条约》这样的事件（注2）。当这个条约的新闻传开时，人们给出了大相径庭的解释，一切的预测也成了信口雌黄，几乎所有预测和解释都不基于对可能性的研究，而是基于让苏联显得好或坏，弱或强的愿望。政治评论员或军事评论员能够像占星术士一样，从几乎任何错误中幸存下来，因为他们的信众并不指望他们对事实作出评估，而是指望用他们的观点来激发民族主义的忠诚（注3）。那些对美学的评论，尤其是对文学的评论，也出于同样的原因而腐坏。印度民族主义者很难享受吉卜林的作品，保守派也很难领会马雅可夫斯基的价值，而且总有意识形态的方便法门：只要某本书的观点不合他的意，人们就可以从文学角度宣布那是一本拙劣的书。有强烈民族主义观点的人常能在不知不觉中施展这样的诡计。

     In England, if one simply considers the number of people involved, it is probable that the dominant form of nationalism is old-fashioned British jingoism. It is certain that this is still widespread, and much more so than most observers would have believed a dozen years ago. However, in this essay I am concerned chiefly with the reactions of the intelligentsia, among whom jingoism and even patriotism of the old kind are almost dead, though they now seem to be reviving among a minority. Among the intelligentsia, it hardly needs saying that the dominant form of nationalism is Communism — using this word in a very loose sense, to include not merely Communist Party members, but ‘fellow travellers’ and russophiles generally. A Communist, for my purpose here, is one who looks upon the U.S.S.R. as his Fatherland and feels it his duty t justify Russian policy and advance Russian interests at all costs. Obviously such people abound in England today, and their direct and indirect influence is very great. But many other forms of nationalism also flourish, and it is by noticing the points of resemblance between different and even seemingly opposed currents of thought that one can best get the matter into perspective.

     如果只考虑受众的多寡，那英国民族主义中占主导地位的，要数旧式的英国金戈主义（译注，Jingoism，指极端化的爱国主义）。这种民族主义现在仍影响广泛，甚至要比几十年前观察家所预测的流传更广。我这篇文章更主要关心的是知识界的反应，在他们中，金戈主义甚至旧式的爱国主义则都已灭绝，虽然看起来现在又有在小圈子里死灰复燃之势。在这些知识分子里，不消说，占主导地位的民族主义形式，是共产主义——此处要拓展这个词的所指，它要包括共产党员，还要包括“同道”和亲苏派。共产主义者，在我这里的定义是，一个视苏联为其祖国，自认有义务为苏联的政策辩护，并不惜一切代价增进苏联利益的人。今日的不列颠岛上，这种共产主义者显然大有人在，他们直接或间接的影响也非常显著。许多其他形式的民族主义也在人群中蓬勃发展，只有留心不同的甚至看似对立的民族主义思潮间的相似点，才能把握这件事的实质。

     Ten or twenty years ago, the form of nationalism most closely corresponding to Communism today was political Catholicism. Its most outstanding exponent — though he was perhaps an extreme case rather than a typical one — was G. K. Chesterton. Chesterton was a writer of considerable talent who whose to suppress both his sensibilities and his intellectual honesty in the cause of Roman Catholic propaganda. During the last twenty years or so of his life, his entire output was in reality an endless repetition of the same thing, under its laboured cleverness as simple and boring as ‘Great is Diana of the Ephesians.’ Every book that he wrote, every scrap of dialogue, had to demonstrate beyond the possibility of mistake the superiority of the Catholic over the Protestant or the pagan. But Chesterton was not content to think of this superiority as merely intellectual or spiritual: it had to be translated into terms of national prestige and military power, which entailed an ignorant idealisation of the Latin countries, especially France. Chesterton had not lived long in France, and his picture of it — as a land of Catholic peasants incessantly singing the Marseillaise over glasses of red wine — had about as much relation to reality as Chu Chin Chow has to everyday life in Baghdad. And with this went not only an enormous overestimation of French military power (both before and after 1914-18 he maintained that France, by itself, was stronger than Germany), but a silly and vulgar glorification of the actual process of war. Chesterton's battle poems, such as Lepanto or The Ballad of Saint Barbara, make The Charge of the Light Brigade read like a pacifist tract: they are perhaps the most tawdry bits of bombast to be found in our language. The interesting thing is that had the romantic rubbish which he habitually wrote about France and the French army been written by somebody else about Britain and the British army, he would have been the first to jeer. In home politics he was a Little Englander, a true hater of jingoism and imperialism, and according to his lights a true friend of democracy. Yet when he looked outwards into the international field, he could forsake his principles without even noticing he was doing so. Thus, his almost mystical belief in the virtues of democracy did not prevent him from admiring Mussolini. Mussolini had destroyed the representative government and the freedom of the press for which Chesterton had struggled so hard at home, but Mussolini was an Italian and had made Italy strong, and that settled the matter. Nor did Chesterton ever find a word to say about imperialism and the conquest of coloured races when they were practised by Italians or Frenchmen. His hold on reality, his literary taste, and even to some extent his moral sense, were dislocated as soon as his nationalistic loyalties were involved.

     十至二十年前，与今日共产主义最相近的民族主义形式，是泛政治天主教主义。最能代表这种立场的——他更像是一种极端而不是一个典例——正是切斯特顿。他作为一位极有天赋的作家，在压抑了自己的良知和学术道德后，全心全意为罗马公教的政治宣传效力。他生命最后二十来年的产出，不过是“大哉！以弗所人的亚底米阿！”这样单调乏味的重复呼喊，与他本人的聪慧已不再相干。他的每一本书，每一块笔墨，都要讲述天主教对新教或异教的，毋庸置疑的超越。但切斯特顿并不满足于这种智识上的超越：他更要将这种超越转化为民族的霸权与军事的权威，而这正导致了他对拉丁国家，尤其是法国，充满了无知的幻想。切斯特顿未曾在法国久居，他笔下的法国——那片属于天主教农民的土地，农民捧着红酒杯终日颂唱着马赛曲——和现实的法国图景比起来，切斯特顿所描绘的就如同朱清周（译注，Chu Chin Chow，1934年英国音乐剧中人物）在巴格达的饮食起居一般。他的无知不仅让他高估了法国的军力（他认为1914-1918年之前之后，法国军力都强于德国），甚至还让他对战争的进程进行了愚蠢而庸俗的政治美化。切斯特顿在战争诗集中的用词，如《雷邦多》和《自裁曲》，是如此地激昂，让丁尼生的《轻骑旅冲锋》都自惭形秽：或许他搜刮尽了英文里俗气又滥情的词吧。有趣的是，如果拿他惯常写的关于法国和法军的那些浪漫主义狗屁，交由他人，改头换面去写英国和英军，他倒要成为第一个嘲弄这位作者的人。在国内政治上，切斯特顿是位英国本土主义者（Little Englander），仇视金戈主义与帝国主义，自命为民主的好伙伴。而当他转向国际议题时，他就突然可以不露声色地放弃自己的原则。他对民主美德近乎超凡的信仰，并不妨碍他对墨索里尼的钦佩。墨索里尼虽然摧毁了代议制政府，摧毁了切斯特顿在不列颠奋力争取的新闻自由，但墨索里尼毕竟是位意大利人，他让意大利得以强大，信仰的悖论就这样化解了。当帝国主义行径与对有色人种的征服由意大利或法国人所实施时，切斯特顿便一言不发。他对现实的坚守，他的文学品味，甚至他的道德观，只要牵涉到民族主义的议题，就不再复往日的优雅。

 Obviously there are considerable resemblances between political Catholicism, as exemplified by Chesterton, and Communism. So there are between either of these and for instance Scottish nationalism, Zionism, Antisemitism or Trotskyism. It would be an oversimplification to say that all forms of nationalism are the same, even in their mental atmosphere, but there are certain rules that hold good in all cases. The following are the principal characteristics of nationalist thought:

     和切斯特顿的例子一样，可以很明显看出泛政治天主教主义与共产主义之间，有不少的相似性。在苏格兰民族主义，锡安主义，反犹太主义，托洛茨基主义之间也有相近的地方。要说所有形式的民族主义都一样，即使用民族主义者的思维方式去看，也把问题太过简化了，但也有一些放之四海皆准的规律。以下就是民族主义思想的主要特征：

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     Obsession. As nearly as possible, no nationalist ever thinks, talks, or writes about anything except the superiority of his own power unit. It is difficult if not impossible for any nationalist to conceal his allegiance. The smallest slur upon his own unit, or any implied praise of a rival organization, fills him with uneasiness which he can relieve only by making some sharp retort. If the chosen unit is an actual country, such as Ireland or India, he will generally claim superiority for it not only in military power and political virtue, but in art, literature, sport, structure of the language, the physical beauty of the inhabitants, and perhaps even in climate, scenery and cooking. He will show great sensitiveness about such things as the correct display of flags, relative size of headlines and the order in which different countries are named(4). Nomenclature plays a very important part in nationalist thought. Countries which have won their independence or gone through a nationalist revolution usually change their names, and any country or other unit round which strong feelings revolve is likely to have several names, each of them carrying a different implication. The two sides of the Spanish Civil War had between them nine or ten names expressing different degrees of love and hatred. Some of these names (e. g. ‘Patriots’ for Franco-supporters, or ‘Loyalists’ for Government-supporters) were frankly question-begging, and there was no single one of the which the two rival factions could have agreed to use. All nationalists consider it a duty to spread their own language to the detriment of rival languages, and among English-speakers this struggle reappears in subtler forms as a struggle between dialects. Anglophobe-Americans will refuse to use a slang phrase if they know it to be of British origin, and the conflict between Latinizers and Germanizers often has nationalists motives behind it. Scottish nationalists insist on the superiority of Lowland Scots, and socialists whose nationalism takes the form of class hatred tirade against the B.B.C. accent and even the often gives the impression of being tinged by belief in symphatetic magic — a belief which probably comes out in the widespread custom of burning political enemies in effigy, or using pictures of them as targets in shooting galleries.

     着魔不悟。民族主义者尽可能不思考，不言说，不写作，除非是关于他所属一方更优越的话题。很难，甚至没有可能让一个民族主义者去掩饰自己的忠诚。对己方最轻微的侮辱，或者向对手最暧昧的赞扬，都让他感到不安，这不安只能靠做一些尖酸的反驳来缓解。如果讨论对象是一个实存的国家，比如爱尔兰或印度，那他将宣称自己祖国的优越性不仅体现在军事霸权，政治美德中，还体现在艺术、文学、运动、语言的结构，民族的形体美中，甚至体现在气候，风景乃至饮食中。对于旗帜的摆放，标语口号的相对大小，提及国家的顺序这类问题，他将表现出极高的警惕性（注4）。命名法是民族主义的重要一环。通过战争或民族主义革命取得独立的国家，往往会变更其国名，而对周围那些能激发人强烈情绪的国家或集体，也总有几个名字与之相称，每个名字都有不同的言外之意。西班牙内战双方有九、十来个称呼彼此的名字，爱憎的程度各有不同。其中一些名字（如称弗朗哥支持者为“爱国者”或称政府军支持者为“忠诚派”）显然不够恰当，但双方都能接受的称呼也并不存在。所有民族主义者都把传播自己的语言，贬损敌国的语言当作自己的义务，在英语国家间，这种语言的对抗以方言相对抗的形式展开。美国的反英派会拒绝使用起源于英国的俚语或短语，拉丁化与德语化的纠葛，起因也往往是民族主义。苏格兰的民族主义者，则坚持认为低地苏格兰语存在优越性；而那些将阶级仇恨具象化为民族主义的社会主义者们，也煞费苦心地攻击BBC的播报口音；甚至，这还让他们诞生了某种印象，让他们相信这些东西存在某种象征式的魔术——也不奇怪，人们常常也乐于焚烧政敌的肖像，还把它们用作射击场的靶子，自然也会产生出这种迷信来。

     Instability. The intensity with which they are held does not prevent nationalist loyalties from being transferable. To begin with, as I have pointed out already, they can be and often are fastened up on some foreign country. One quite commonly finds that great national leaders, or the founders of nationalist movements, do not even belong to the country they have glorified. Sometimes they are outright foreigners, or more often they come from peripheral areas where nationality is doubtful. Examples are Stalin, Hitler, Napoleon, de Valera, Disraeli, Poincare, Beaverbrook. The Pan-German movement was in part the creation of an Englishman, Houston Chamberlain. For the past fifty or a hundred years, transferred nationalism has been a common phenomenon among literary intellectuals. With Lafcadio Hearne the transference was to Japan, with Carlyle and many others of his time to Germany, and in our own age it is usually to Russia. But the peculiarly interesting fact is that re-transference is also possible. A country or other unit which has been worshipped for years may suddenly become detestable, and some other object of affection may take its place with almost no interval. In the first version of H. G. Wells's Outline of History, and others of his writings about that time, one finds the United States praised almost as extravagantly as Russia is praised by Communists today: yet within a few years this uncritical admiration had turned into hostility. The bigoted Communist who changes in a space of weeks, or even days, into an equally bigoted Trotskyist is a common spectacle. In continental Europe Fascist movements were largely recruited from among Communists, and the opposite process may well happen within the next few years. What remains constant in the nationalist is his state of mind: the object of his feelings is changeable, and may be imaginary.

     见风使舵。对民族主义的坚定信念，并不能让民族主义者拥有不渝的气节，民族主义效忠的对象常常是可转换的。首先，如我上文所说，民族主义的信念常寄托于某个国家之上。常有如下的情况，人们所崇拜的伟大民族领袖、民族运动的创始人，甚至不属于他们所歌颂的国家。有时这些人是彻头彻尾的外国人，有时这些人来自民族成分可疑的地区。比如斯大林、希特勒、拿破仑、德·瓦勒拉（de Valera）、狄斯雷利（Disraeli）、普恩加莱（Poincare）、或比弗布鲁克（Beaverbrook）。泛日耳曼运动一定程度上由英国人休斯顿·张伯伦（Houston Chamberlain）所缔造。在过去半个到一个世纪的历史中，抱持转信民族主义的知识分子也并不鲜见。拉夫卡迪奥·赫恩（Lafcadio Hearne）转向了日本，卡莱尔（Carlyle）与其同时代的人转向了德意志，我们今日的风尚则是转向俄罗斯。更耐人寻味的事实在于，转信后的民族主义者其实还可以再度转信的。那些被崇敬多年的集体或国家，可能一夜过后就变得面目可憎，这层崇拜依赖的关系，几乎是马上就被其他关系取而代之。翻开赫伯特·乔治·威尔斯的初版《史纲》，和他同时期其余的作品，读者可以发现，他对美国的欣赏简直如今日共产党人对俄罗斯的追捧一般，不吝溢美之词。然而只过了几年，这种不假思索的赞美就换成了敌意。几周之内，甚至只消几天，一位偏信的共产主义者就能转换成同样偏信的托洛茨基主义者，这也再平常不过了。欧洲大陆上发生过的法西斯运动，从共产主义者中招募了大批的拥趸，接下来的几年间，相反的过程可能又再次发生。只有民族主义者脑中移情的对象可以改变，甚至可以对想象的事物移情这点，是恒常不变的。

     But for an intellectual, transference has an important function which I have already mentioned shortly in connection with Chesterton. It makes it possible for him to be much more nationalistic — more vulgar, more silly, more malignant, more dishonest — that he could ever be on behalf of his native country, or any unit of which he had real knowledge. When one sees the slavish or boastful rubbish that is written about Stalin, the Red Army, etc. by fairly intelligent and sensitive people, one realises that this is only possible because some kind of dislocation has taken place. In societies such as ours, it is unusual for anyone describable as an intellectual to feel a very deep attachment to his own country. Public opinion — that is, the section of public opinion of which he as an intellectual is aware — will not allow him to do so. Most of the people surrounding him are sceptical and disaffected, and he may adopt the same attitude from imitativeness or sheer cowardice: in that case he will have abandoned the form of nationalism that lies nearest to hand without getting any closer to a genuinely internationalist outlook. He still feels the need for a Fatherland, and it is natural to look for one somewhere abroad. Having found it, he can wallow unrestrainedly in exactly those emotions from which he believes that he has emancipated himself. God, the King, the Empire, the Union Jack — all the overthrown idols can reappear under different names, and because they are not recognised for what they are they can be worshipped with a good conscience. Transferred nationalism, like the use of scapegoats, is a way of attaining salvation without altering one's conduct.

     对于知识分子来说，民族主义的转信有一个更重要的特质，我在前文关于切斯特顿的部分已经简单提过。转信的过程能让民族主义情绪愈加猛烈——让人更庸俗，更愚昧，更恶毒，更虚伪——超过了人投射于祖国，投射于任何真正了解的集体的情感。聪敏的人看到他人笔下对斯大林和红军连篇的谄媚时，他会意识到一定发生了某些错乱，才让这种空洞的废话成为可能。在我们这样的社会里，一个被称之为知识分子的家伙对他的祖国有浓厚的感情，这是很不正常的。舆论——正是他作为一个知识分子所要觉察的那些公众意见——不会允许他那么做。他周围的人都抱持着怀疑和反逆的态度，他出于从众或出于纯粹的懦弱，就也可能采取与旁人一致的立场：此时他就会放下手中紧握的民族主义，但同时也对更真诚的国际主义不置一顾。他仍然自觉需要一个祖国，也自然要去国外寻得。要是找到了，他就能无拘无束地，翻滚于那些他自以为已从民族主义脱身的情感泥沼中。天主，君父，帝国，米字旗，这些曾被推翻的偶像都可以改头换面再次出现，因为它们已然更换了旧时的称谓，所以就可以怀着良知再一次地崇拜他们。民族主义的转信，就如替罪羔羊一般，能让人在不改变其行为的前提下获得心灵的救赎。

     Indifference to Reality. All nationalists have the power of not seeing resemblances between similar sets of facts. A British Tory will defend self-determination in Europe and oppose it in India with no feeling of inconsistency. Actions are held to be good or bad, not on their own merits, but according to who does them, and there is almost no kind of outrage — torture, the use of hostages, forced labour, mass deportations, imprisonment without trial, forgery, assassination, the bombing of civilians — which does not change its moral colour when it is committed by ‘our’ side. The Liberal News Chronicle published, as an example of shocking barbarity, photographs of Russians hanged by the Germans, and then a year or two later published with warm approval almost exactly similar photographs of Germans hanged by the Russians(5). It is the same with historical events. History is thought of largely in nationalist terms, and such things as the Inquisition, the tortures of the Star Chamber, the exploits of the English buccaneers (Sir Francis Drake, for instance, who was given to sinking Spanish prisoners alive), the Reign of Terror, the heroes of the Mutiny blowing hundreds of Indians from the guns, or Cromwell's soldiers slashing Irishwomen's faces with razors, become morally neutral or even meritorious when it is felt that they were done in the ‘right’ cause. If one looks back over the past quarter of a century, one finds that there was hardly a single year when atrocity stories were not being reported from some part of the world; and yet in not one single case were these atrocities — in Spain, Russia, China, Hungary, Mexico, Amritsar, Smyrna — believed in and disapproved of by the English intelligentsia as a whole. Whether such deeds were reprehensible, or even whether they happened, was always decided according to political predilection.

     视而不见。每个民族主义者都有对同一类问题的相似性视而不见的本领。英国的托利党人将坚决捍卫欧洲民族自决的理念，话音未落又坚决反对将其在印度实行，而不会觉得逻辑上有任何的不连续性。对善举和恶行的判断，已经不再根据事件本身的情况，而是根据对此举各方的立场，当然也不再会有愤恨——酷刑、人质胁迫、强制劳役、大规模流放、非法监禁、伪证、暗杀、轰炸平民——只要这些行为是由“我方”所实施，那就绝不会败坏我方的道德。作为触目惊心暴行的展示，自由派出版的《新闻纪实》（译注，并未检索到以“Liberal News Chronicle”为全称的英文报刊）里刊载了德国人吊起俄罗斯人的画面，而在一两年后刊载的一张几乎完全相同的，俄罗斯人吊起德国人的画面，则受到读者热烈的欢迎（注5）。对于其他历史事件的评判也是如此。历史在很大程度上是以民族主义的视角被考察的，宗教裁判，星室法庭的酷刑，英国海盗的劫掠（比如弗朗西斯·德雷克爵士，他能让西班牙囚徒活生生地溺死），雅各宾的专政，兵变的英雄用数百名印度人填充炮膛，或克伦威尔的卒子用剃刀割破爱尔兰妇人的脸，只要人们自认这一切是为了“正确”的事业所做，那这些暴行就会立即变成道德上无害，甚至能积累功德的行为。如果回顾过去的四分之一个世纪，可以发现，全球没有一年曾停止对暴行的报道；这些报道中没有任何一篇——在西班牙、在俄国、在中国、匈牙利、墨西哥、阿姆利则、士麦那——能被英国的知识界一致地相信或鄙夷。这些新闻中的暴行是否应受谴责，甚至，是否真实发生，反要由读者的政治倾向决定。

     The nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them. For quite six years the English admirers of Hitler contrived not to learn of the existence of Dachau and Buchenwald. And those who are loudest in denouncing the German concentration camps are often quite unaware, or only very dimly aware, that there are also concentration camps in Russia. Huge events like the Ukraine famine of 1933, involving the deaths of millions of people, have actually escaped the attention of the majority of English russophiles. Many English people have heard almost nothing about the extermination of German and Polish Jews during the present war. Their own antisemitism has caused this vast crime to bounce off their consciousness. In nationalist thought there are facts which are both true and untrue, known and unknown. A known fact may be so unbearable that it is habitually pushed aside and not allowed to enter into logical processes, or on the other hand it may enter into every calculation and yet never be admitted as a fact, even in one's own mind.

     民族主义者不仅不反对他所在一方犯下的暴行，他还有非凡的本领，能对这些暴行充耳不闻。在长达六年的时间里，英国那些仰慕希特勒的人，蹊跷地居然不知道达豪集中营和布痕瓦尔德集中营的存在。那些大声疾呼，谴责德国集中营的人，也往往不清楚，或者只知一星半点——苏联境内也有同样的集中营。像1933年乌克兰大饥荒这样的涉及了数百万人死亡的世界大事，却逃过了英国亲苏派们雪亮的法眼。许多英国人从未听说过眼下的战争里德国对犹太人的灭绝行动，由他们自己心里的反犹主义，代他们自己将如此沉重的历史罪恶的包袱置之脑后。在民族主义者的脑海里，有些事实既真又假，他明知却又糊涂。他可能无法接受某个事实，他就把这样的事实放到一边，禁止这些它参与脑中的逻辑过程，或者即使在逻辑的推理中考虑了这类事件，也绝不把它当作斩钉截铁的事实来看待。

     Every nationalist is haunted by the belief that the past can be altered. He spends part of his time in a fantasy world in which things happen as they should — in which, for example, the Spanish Armada was a success or the Russian Revolution was crushed in 1918 — and he will transfer fragments of this world to the history books whenever possible. Much of the propagandist writing of our time amounts to plain forgery. Material facts are suppressed, dates altered, quotations removed from their context and doctored so as to change their meaning. Events which it is felt ought not to have happened are left unmentioned and ultimately denied(6). In 1927 Chiang Kai Shek boiled hundreds of Communists alive, and yet within ten years he had become one of the heroes of the Left. The re-alignment of world politics had brought him into the anti-Fascist camp, and so it was felt that the boiling of the Communists ‘didn't count’, or perhaps had not happened. The primary aim of propaganda is, of course, to influence contemporary opinion, but those who rewrite history do probably believe with part of their minds that they are actually thrusting facts into the past. When one considers the elaborate forgeries that have been committed in order to show that Trotsky did not play a valuable part in the Russian civil war, it is difficult to feel that the people responsible are merely lying. More probably they feel that their own version was what happened in the sight of God, and that one is justified in rearranging the records accordingly.

     每一位民族主义者都要在“历史可以改变”这一信条前摔个趔趄。他花大量时间徜徉在一个幻想的世界里，那个世界里的事件都是他自认为“本应”发生的状态——在那个世界里，西班牙的无敌舰队取得了胜利，俄罗斯的革命在1918年就已被镇压——只要一有机会，他就会把幻想世界的只言片语挪到历史书上。我们这个时代大部分的政治宣传，纯粹就是在捏造事实。如铁的事实被隐藏，日期被篡改，发言被断章取义，被偷换概念，以改变其原意。民族主义者认为不该发生的事件，就不再被提及，最终被否认（注6）。1927年，蒋介石将数百名共产党人活煮至死，十年都没过，他就又成为了左派的英雄之一。世界政局的重组将他送进了反法西斯阵营，此时烹杀共产党人的罪恶又变得“不算数”了，或者根本就当不存在。政治宣传的主要目的——当然是——要影响当代的舆论，但那些改写历史的家伙却可能发自心底地坚信，只要他们用力地思考，真的就能把事实植入历史中去。一想到那些为了表明托洛茨基在俄国内战中无足轻重的，精心罗织的假话，个人很难清醒地认识到，那些可靠的人口中说出的只是谎言。更有可能的是，他们认为自己那版的事实正是上帝眼中发生的那一版，只是他们在记录历史时，对历史进行了重新排列而已。

     Indifference to objective truth is encouraged by the sealing-off of one part of the world from another, which makes it harder and harder to discover what is actually happening. There can often be a genuine doubt about the most enormous events. For example, it is impossible to calculate within millions, perhaps even tens of millions, the number of deaths caused by the present war. The calamities that are constantly being reported — battles, massacres, famines, revolutions — tend to inspire in the average person a feeling of unreality. One has no way of verifying the facts, one is not even fully certain that they have happened, and one is always presented with totally different interpretations from different sources. What were the rights and wrongs of the Warsaw rising of August 1944? Is it true about the German gas ovens in Poland? Who was really to blame for the Bengal famine? Probably the truth is discoverable, but the facts will be so dishonestly set forth in almost any newspaper that the ordinary reader can be forgiven either for swallowing lies or failing to form an opinion. The general uncertainty as to what is really happening makes it easier to cling to lunatic beliefs. Since nothing is ever quite proved or disproved, the most unmistakable fact can be impudently denied. Moreover, although endlessly brooding on power, victory, defeat, revenge, the nationalist is often somewhat uninterested in what happens in the real world. What he wants is to feel that his own unit is getting the better of some other unit, and he can more easily do this by scoring off an adversary than by examining the facts to see whether they support him. All nationalist controversy is at the debating-society level. It is always entirely inconclusive, since each contestant invariably believes himself to have won the victory. Some nationalists are not far from schizophrenia, living quite happily amid dreams of power and conquest which have no connection with the physical world.

     通过把世界的另一部分隔绝出去，让人们得以对客观事实无动于衷，这也让寻找客观真相变得越来越难。有时关于那些最重大的事件，也会出现天才般的质疑。例如，眼下这场战争所造成的死亡人数，几百万人乃至几千万人，怎么可能统计得清呢。对灾难连篇的报道——战斗、屠杀、饥荒、革命——往往会让普通人失去实感。个人没有办法验证这些事实，个人甚至无法确认某些事情是否已经发生，不同的信源给予的总是不同的解释。就44年8月的华沙起义来说，到底哪份报纸记载了事实？德军真的在波兰建起了毒气室吗？孟加拉饥荒又该归咎于谁？或许事件的真相还可以被揭露，但几乎所有报纸上所记载的，都将与那个事实相悖，可以原谅那些普通的读者，他们囫囵吞枣般地咽下谎言，或者甚至都没有形成过自己的意见。大众失去真相的那种不安感，让他们更容易陷入疯狂的信念中，既然没有事物可以被确证或证伪，那么最大白于天下的事实也可以被无耻地否认。此外，虽然充斥着权柄、凯旋、挫败、雪辱，民族主义者却对现实世界并不那么感兴趣。他想要的是那种己方优于对手的感觉，他可以靠给对手打分，而不是去核查事实是否如此，来廉价地获取那种快感。所有民族主义者的讨论，都止步于辩论小组的水平。那争论本身也是无所定论的，因为参与的每一方都坚信是自己赢得了胜利。一些民族主义者处在精神分裂症边缘，做着权力和征服的幻梦，过着自满的生活，与现实世界完全断开了联系。

 I have examined as best as I can the mental habits which are common to all forms of nationalism. The next thing is to classify those forms, but obviously this cannot be done comprehensively. Nationalism is an enormous subject. The world is tormented by innumerable delusions and hatreds which cut across one another in an extremely complex way, and some of the most sinister of them have not yet impinged on the European consciousness. In this essay I am concerned with nationalism as it occurs among the English intelligentsia. In them, much more than in ordinary English people, it is unmixed with patriotism and therefore can be studied pure. Below are listed the varieties of nationalism now flourishing among English intellectuals, with such comments as seem to be needed. It is convenient to use three headings, Positive, Transferred, and Negative, though some varieties will fit into more than one category:

     我已尽可能考查了民族主义的各种共通的心理模式。下一件事就是列举出这种种模型，我的总结显然无法面面俱到。民族主义这个议题十分庞大。我们的世界被无量的妄想与憎恶所折磨，这些情感又以极其复杂的方式相互交叠，而其中最可怖的那部分思想欧洲人还未曾见识。本文中，我主要关注的是民族主义在英国知识分子中的影响。英国知识分子相较于一般的英国人而言，他们心里的民族主义还远未与爱国主义相混淆，也因此可以被单独地讨论。以下就是几种在英国知识界中盛行的民族主义，每一例后都附有适当的评论。主要分为三个大类，正向的、转信的、逆向的，其中某些例子可能同时适用于一个以上的分类：

Positive Nationalism

正向民族主义

      (i) Neo-toryism. Exemplified by such people as Lord Elton, A. P. Herbert, G. M. Young, Professor Pickthorn, by the literature of the Tory Reform Committee, and by such magazines as the New English Review and the Nineteenth Century and After. The real motive force of neo-Toryism, giving it its nationalistic character and differentiating it from ordinary Conservatism, is the desire not to recognise that British power and influence have declined. Even those who are realistic enough to see that Britain's military position is not what it was, tend to claim that ‘English ideas’ (usually left undefined) must dominate the world. All neo-Tories are anti-Russian, but sometimes the main emphasis is anti-American. The significant thing is that this school of thought seems to be gaining ground among youngish intellectuals, sometimes ex-Communists, who have passed through the usual process of disillusionment and become disillusioned with that. The anglophobe who suddenly becomes violently pro-British is a fairly common figure. Writers who illustrate this tendency are F. A. Voigt, Malcolm Muggeridge, Evelyn Waugh, Hugh Kingsmill, and a psychologically similar development can be observed in T. S. Eliot, Wyndham Lewis, and various of their followers.

      （一）新托利主义。其典型如艾尔顿勋爵、艾伦·帕特里克·赫伯特，乔治·马尔科姆·杨、肯尼斯·皮克索恩教授（译注，此处或指Kenneth Pickthorn），如《托利党人改革委员会》之类的文本（译注，经检索查找，Tory Reform Committee应该是某个政治沙龙，而非实际的作品名称），如《新英格兰评论》和《十九世纪及之后》这样的报刊。新托利主义的真实动机，就是那种拒绝承认英国的霸权和影响业已衰落的渴望，这也让新托利主义得以区别于普通的保守主义。即使是那些足够现实，能认识到英国的军事地位不再的人，也都会宣称“英国的思想”（这“思想”往往未经界定，模糊不清）必将统治世界。所有的新托利主义者都一致反苏，不过有时也强调反美。这个派别的民族主义在年轻的知识分子，前共产主义者中很受欢迎，后者通常经历过幻灭，也因此对理想的破灭感到失望。一个反英分子突然化身为极激进的亲英派也是常见现象。如弗雷德里克·奥古斯都·弗意革、马尔科姆·马格里奇、伊夫林·沃、休·金斯米尔这样的作家阐明过这种趋势，而类似的心理境遇，则可以从托马斯·斯特恩斯·艾略特、温德姆·刘易斯及他们种种追随者的身上观察到。

     (ii) Celtic Nationalism. Welsh, Irish and Scottish nationalism have points of difference but are alike in their anti-English orientation. Members of all three movements have opposed the war while continuing to describe themselves as pro-Russian, and the lunatic fringe has even contrived to be simultaneously pro-Russian and pro-Nazi. But Celtic nationalism is not the same thing as anglophobia. Its motive force is a belief in the past and future greatness of the Celtic peoples, and it has a strong tinge of racialism. The Celt is supposed to be spiritually superior to the Saxon — simpler, more creative, less vulgar, less snobbish, etc. — but the usual power hunger is there under the surface. One symptom of it is the delusion that Eire, Scotland or even Wales could preserve its independence unaided and owes nothing to British protection. Among writers, good examples of this school of thought are Hugh McDiarmid and Sean O'Casey. No modern Irish writer, even of the stature of Yeats or Joyce, is completely free from traces of nationalism.

      （二）凯尔特民族主义。威尔士、爱尔兰、苏格兰的民族主义都自有一套观点，但它们在反英这一点上是相近的。三个运动的成员都要反对战争，但他们同时又反复自称亲苏，一些狂热的极端分子还会做作地宣称自己要把苏联和纳粹一齐亲。但凯尔特民族主义不等同于仇英。凯尔特民族主义的动机，则是相信凯尔特人在过去和未来的伟大，有强烈的种族主义色彩。相信凯尔特人要比撒克逊人在精神层面更优越——更朴实、更富创造力、更不低俗、更不势利、如此种种——但那种对权力的渴望也潜藏在这些美好的特质之下。其病征之一就是妄想，认为爱尔兰，苏格兰甚至威尔士，可以不受援助地独立，历史上也不欠英国的保护半分。这派思想的典例，是休·麦克迪儿米德和肖恩·奥凯西。没有任一位现代爱尔兰作家，甚至叶芝与詹姆斯·乔伊斯，能完全逃离这种民族主义的束缚。

     (iii) Zionism. This the unusual characteristics of a nationalist movement, but the American variant of it seems to be more violent and malignant than the British. I classify it under Direct and not Transferred nationalism because it flourishes almost exclusively among the Jews themselves. In England, for several rather incongruous reasons, the intelligentsia are mostly pro-Jew on the Palestine issue, but they do not feel strongly about it. All English people of goodwill are also pro-Jew in the sense of disapproving of Nazi persecution. But any actual nationalistic loyalty, or belief in the innate superiority of Jews, is hardly to be found among Gentiles.

      （三）锡安主义。这是一种不寻常的民族主义运动，它在美国的变种要比英国国内的更暴力，更有危害。我将它划分在直接的民族主义，而非转信民族主义中，是因为它几乎只在犹太人中盛行。在英国，出于一些自相矛盾的原因，英国的知识界在巴勒斯坦问题上主要亲以色列，不过还没有到自命以色列人的程度。所有心怀良知的英国人反对纳粹对犹太人的迫害，这其实也算亲犹。但非犹太人很难找到对犹太民族主义的归属感，也很难自发地迷信起犹太人天生的优越性。

Transferred Nationalism

转换民族主义

     (i) Communism.

     （一）共产主义。

     (ii) Political Catholicism.

     （二）泛政治天主教主义。

     (iii) Colour Feeling. The old-style contemptuous attitude towards ‘natives’ has been much weakened in England, and various pseudo-scientific theories emphasising the superiority of the white race have been abandoned(7). Among the intelligentsia, colour feeling only occurs in the transposed form, that is, as a belief in the innate superiority of the coloured races. This is now increasingly common among English intellectuals, probably resulting more often from masochism and sexual frustration than from contact with the Oriental and Negro nationalist movements. Even among those who do not feel strongly on the colour question, snobbery and imitation have a powerful influence. Almost any English intellectual would be scandalised by the claim that the white races are superior to the coloured, whereas the opposite claim would seem to him unexceptionable even if he disagreed with it. Nationalistic attachment to the coloured races is usually mixed up with the belief that their sex lives are superior, and there is a large underground mythology about the sexual prowess of Negroes.

      （三）肤色敏感。那种旧式的对“土著人”的傲慢在英国已大幅消退，而各种强调白人种族优越性的伪科学也都被抛弃了（注7）。在知识界里，肤色敏感只以转信民族主义的形式出现，那即是，转而去相信有色人种的优越性。这种情况在目前的英国知识分子中越发普遍，可能更来自性的受虐倾向或性行为缺失后的挫败感，而不是来自与东方人和黑人民族主义运动接触后生发的感召。即使在那些对肤色议题并不敏感的人群里，狐假虎威与东施效颦的现象也广泛存在。几乎每一个英国的知识分子都会为“白人优于有色人种”的说法感到愤慨，而要是把上一句话的主谓调换一下，变成“有色人种优于白人”，他就会即使不同意这观点，也对那句话无可反驳。民族主义与肤色的暧昧关系，也通常与有色人种性能力更强的信仰相混合，黑人的性能力这一议题甚至还有一整个庞大的，不公开的神话。

     (iv) Class Feeling. Among upper-class and middle-class intellectuals, only in the transposed form — i. e. as a belief in the superiority of the proletariat. Here again, inside the intelligentsia, the pressure of public opinion is overwhelming. Nationalistic loyalty towards the proletariat, and most vicious theoretical hatred of the bourgeoisie, can and often do co-exist with ordinary snobbishness in everyday life.

      （四）阶级敏感。在上层阶级与中层的知识分子间，只是以转信的形式存在——亦即，相信无产阶级要更为优越。知识界内又是那番舆论压倒一切的景象。对无产阶级的民族主义式忠诚，和最恶毒，最理论化的资产阶级仇恨，二者能够也经常共存于寻常势利小人的日常生活中。

     (v) Pacifism. The majority of pacifists either belong to obscure religious sects or are simply humanitarians who object to the taking of life and prefer not to follow their thoughts beyond that point. But there is a minority of intellectual pacifists whose real though unadmitted motive appears to be hatred of western democracy and admiration of totalitarianism. Pacifist propaganda usually boils down to saying that one side is as bad as the other, but if one looks closely at the writings of younger intellectual pacifists, one finds that they do not by any means express impartial disapproval but are directed almost entirely against Britain and the United States. Moreover they do not as a rule condemn violence as such, but only violence used in defence of western countries. The Russians, unlike the British, are not blamed for defending themselves by warlike means, and indeed all pacifist propaganda of this type avoids mention of Russia or China. It is not claimed, again, that the Indians should abjure violence in their struggle against the British. Pacifist literature abounds with equivocal remarks which, if they mean anything, appear to mean that statesmen of the type of Hitler are preferable to those of the type of Churchill, and that violence is perhaps excusable if it is violent enough. After the fall of France, the French pacifists, faced by a real choice which their English colleagues have not had to make, mostly went over to the Nazis, and in England there appears to have been some small overlap of membership between the Peace Pledge Union and the Blackshirts. Pacifist writers have written in praise of Carlyle, one of the intellectual fathers of Fascism. All in all it is difficult not to feel that pacifism, as it appears among a section of the intelligentsia, is secretly inspired by an admiration for power and successful cruelty. The mistake was made of pinning this emotion to Hitler, but it could easily be retransfered.

      （五）和平主义。大部分的和平主义者要么是属于某个无名的秘教，要么只是不愿夺取他人生命，且不会在得到这个观点后继续思考的人道主义者。也存在小部分信仰和平主义的知识分子，他们真实且不会公开承认的动机，似乎是对西方民主制的仇恨，以及对极权主义的推崇。和平主义者的政治宣传，归根结底就是在说此一方和彼一方其实一样坏，但要是有人潜心审阅这些有知和平主义小年轻的作品，他就会发现，这些小年轻根本没有以任何形式，公正地去表达对战争的否定，而是把几乎所有的矛头，都精准地指向了不列颠和美利坚。还有，这些小年轻并不谴责暴力本身，而只是谴责西方国家用以自卫的暴力。俄国人，不像英国人，就不会被他们自卫时所采取的战争手段而遭受谴责，当然地，一切这类和平主义的政治宣传，都会避免提及中国和俄罗斯。它将不会宣称，又是那套，不会宣称印度人应当在与英国人的斗争中放弃暴力。和平主义的文献中充满了含糊的语句，如果那些语句有任何实际意义的话，似乎是要说希特勒那样的政治家要比丘吉尔更可取，似乎是要说，假如暴力达到了某个程度，那暴力就是可以被原谅的。法国沦陷之后，法国的和平主义者们在面对英国同僚免于作出的选择时，大都投靠了纳粹，而在英国，誓言和平联盟和黑衫军的成员有着微妙的重叠。和平主义的作家们亲笔赞扬过卡莱尔，他是法西斯主义的理论之父之一。总而言之，很难不直觉地认为，正如和平主义在一部分知识分子中表现出的那样，不过是受对权力与霸道得胜的，见不得光的崇拜激发而生的。将这种感情寄托于希特勒是错误的，但当然这种感情也很容易就会转换对象。

Negative Nationalism

逆向民族主义

     (i) Anglophobia. Within the intelligentsia, a derisive and mildly hostile attitude towards Britain is more or less compulsory, but it is an unfaked emotion in many cases. During the war it was manifested in the defeatism of the intelligentsia, which persisted long after it had become clear that the Axis powers could not win. Many people were undisguisedly pleased when Singapore fell ore when the British were driven out of Greece, and there was a remarkable unwillingness to believe in good news, e.g. el Alamein, or the number of German planes shot down in the Battle of Britain. English left-wing intellectuals did not, of course, actually want the Germans or Japanese to win the war, but many of them could not help getting a certain kick out of seeing their own country humiliated, and wanted to feel that the final victory would be due to Russia, or perhaps America, and not to Britain. In foreign politics many intellectuals follow the principle that any faction backed by Britain must be in the wrong. As a result, ‘enlightened’ opinion is quite largely a mirror-image of Conservative policy. Anglophobia is always liable to reversal, hence that fairly common spectacle, the pacifist of one war who is a bellicist in the next.

      （一）仇英主义。英国知识界内部的那种对英国揶揄，轻度敌视的态度，或多或少成了知识界入门的一种必修，这种仇英情绪大部分情况下并非虚情假意。在战争中，这种情绪表现为知识界的失败主义，甚至在局势已经明朗，轴心大势已去的时候，这种情绪还坚挺了很长一段时间。新加坡沦陷时，英军被赶出希腊时，很多人还毫不掩饰地表示高兴，而对那些好新闻，如阿拉曼战役的捷报，或不列颠战役中击毁的德军战机数目时，这些人又表现得不愿承认。英国左派的知识分子，当然了，并不真心希望德国或日本赢得战争，但他们又无法自拔地想体验那种，看着自己的国家被羞辱时的愉悦，他们希望看到最终的胜利由苏联，或者可能由美国，而不是由英国取得。在外交政策上，许多知识分子遵循着这样的原则：任何英国所支持的派别一定是坏的。也因此呢，“开明”的意见在绝大多数情况下，不过是与保守派政策相反的镜像。仇英主义很容易反转，这导致了一种普遍的奇景，即某些人在上一场战争还是和平主义者，到了下一场战争就成了好战分子。

     (ii) Anti-Semitism. There is little evidence about this at present, because the Nazi persecutions have made it necessary for any thinking person to side with the Jews against their oppressors. Anyone educated enough to have heard the word ‘antisemitism’ claims as a matter of course to be free of it, and anti-Jewish remarks are carefully eliminated from all classes of literature. Actually antisemitism appears to be widespread, even among intellectuals, and the general conspiracy of silence probably helps exacerbate it. People of Left opinions are not immune to it, and their attitude is sometimes affected by the fact that Trotskyists and Anarchists tend to be Jews. But antisemitism comes more naturally to people of Conservative tendency, who suspect Jews of weakening national morale and diluting the national culture. Neo-Tories and political Catholics are always liable to succumb to antisemitism, at least intermittently.

    （二）反犹主义。关于这点目前还没什么明证，因为纳粹的迫害使得同情犹太人成为了每个善于思考的人的必要。任何教育水平够高的人，听到“反犹主义”一词，就会理所当然地宣称与自己无关，反犹主义的言论也会被小心地从各类文学作品中剔除。而实际上的反犹主义则早已泛滥人间，即使在知识界内也是如此，对反犹主义普遍的缄默可能更助长了这种仇恨。左派人士也不能幸免，他们的态度有时受其对手托洛茨基主义者和无政府主义者更亲犹这一事实的影响。保守倾向者的反犹主义就要自然得多，保守倾向的人士怀疑犹太人会腐坏国家的道德，稀释民族的文化。新托利主义和泛政治天主教主义很容易就会陷入反犹主义的泥沼里，或者至少会不定期地陷进去。

     (iii) Trotskyism. This word is used so loosely as to include Anarchists, democratic Socialists and even Liberals. I use it here to mean a doctrinaire Marxist whose main motive is hostility to the Stalin regime. Trotskyism can be better studied in obscure pamphlets or in papers like the Socialist Appeal than in the works of Trotsky himself, who was by no means a man of one idea. Although in some places, for instance in the United States, Trotskyism is able to attract a fairly large number of adherents and develop into an organised movement with a petty fuerher of its own, its inspiration is essentially negative. The Trotskyist is against Stalin just as the Communist is for him, and, like the majority of Communists, he wants not so much to alter the external world as to feel that the battle for prestige is going in his own favour. In each case there is the same obsessive fixation on a single subject, the same inability to form a genuinely rational opinion based on probabilities. The fact that Trotskyists are everywhere a persecuted minority, and that the accusation usually made against them, i. e. of collaborating with the Fascists, is obviously false, creates an impression that Trotskyism is intellectually and morally superior to Communism; but it is doubtful whether there is much difference. The most typical Trotskyists, in any case, are ex-Communists, and no one arrives at Trotskyism except via one of the left-wing movements. No Communist, unless tethered to his party by years of habit, is secure against a sudden lapse into Trotskyism. The opposite process does not seem to happen equally often, though there is no clear reason why it should not.

     （三）托洛茨基主义。人们用这个词指代的对象很广泛，它囊括了无政府主义者、民主社会主义者甚至自由主义者。我用这个词所要描述的，是那种教条马克思主义者，且他主要的政治观念是反斯大林政权的。比起去阅读托洛茨基本人的作品，托洛茨基主义可以从行文晦涩的小册子，或如《社会主义呼吁》这类的文集中，得到更好的研究，毕竟托洛茨基不是个思想单一的人。虽然在许多地区，比如在美国，托洛茨基主义可以吸引大批的信徒，并发展成一个有组织的，有他们小小元首的运动，但这一运动的灵魂本质上是逆向民族主义的。托洛茨基对斯大林的反对，与共产主义者对斯大林的支持没有区别，而且，就像大部分的共产主义者一样，他们想要的不是去影响外部的世界，而只是觉得他们和斯大林的这种“霸权纷争”对自己有利。此处的正反两方，都对单一对象有着痴迷的执着，也因此都同样失去了基于对可能性的讨论产生理性意见的能力。事实是，托洛茨基主义者到哪都是受迫害的少数派，而对他们常用的指控，亦即指控他们与法西斯勾结，显然是无理取闹的，这甚至还造就了一种印象，认为托洛茨基主义在思想和道德层面都高于共产主义；但二者是否真有区分，这一点值得怀疑。托洛茨基主义者的那些老典型，大部分都是前共产主义者，也没有人能不途径某个左派运动，就能抵达托洛茨基主义的领地。除非是那种常年把自己与其党派绑定的人，否则没有任何一个共产党人能够免于凭空堕入托洛茨基主义。相反的过程似乎不常出现，却并没有什么明确的理由来限制那样的事不应发生。

  In the classification I have attempted above, it will seem that I have often exaggerated, oversimplified, made unwarranted assumptions and have left out of account the existence of ordinarily decent motives. This was inevitable, because in this essay I am trying to isolate and identify tendencies which exist in all our minds and pervert our thinking, without necessarily occurring in a pure state or operating continuously. It is important at this point to correct the over-simplified picture which I have been obliged to make. To begin with, one has no right to assume that everyone, or even every intellectual, is infected by nationalism. Secondly, nationalism can be intermittent and limited. An intelligent man may half-succumb to a belief which he knows to be absurd, and he may keep it out of his mind for long periods, only reverting to it in moments of anger or sentimentality, or when he is certain that no important issues are involved. Thirdly, a nationalistic creed may be adopted in good faith from non-nationalistic motives. Fourthly, several kinds of nationalism, even kinds that cancel out, can co-exist in the same person.

     在以上对民族主义的分类中，我似乎对民族主义夸大其词，做想当然地简化，做子乌虚有的假设，偏废了民族主义也存在正面动机这一点。这是无可避免的，因为我这篇文章的目的，是想要解析出，鉴定出那些存在于我们脑中的，使我们思考脱轨的那些思维倾向，那些思维倾向不会单独纯粹地存在，也不会时刻不停地生效。去纠正我上文中不得不做的，对民族主义想当然地简化，这件事很重要。第一，人们无权假定他人，无权假定所有知识分子都受到了民族主义的感染。第二，民族主义也可以是间歇的，可以是有限的。一个有智之人可能对他自知是迷信的东西半信半疑，他可能会把这种迷信久存于脑内，只在愤怒或感伤的时候，或他认为面对的议题无关紧要的时候，才又会老调重弹。第三，民族主义的信条也可以善意地，以非民族主义的动机去接纳。第四，多种的民族主义，甚至那些势不两立的民族主义，都可以在同一个人的心中共存。

     All the way through I have said, ‘the nationalist does this’ or ‘the nationalist does that’, using for purposes of illustration the extreme, barely sane type of nationalist who has no neutral areas in his mind and no interest in anything except the struggle for power. Actually such people are fairly common, but they are not worth the powder and shot. In real life Lord Elton, D. N. Pritt, Lady Houston, Ezra Pound, Lord Vanisttart, Father Coughlin and all the rest of their dreary tribe have to be fought against, but their intellectual deficiencies hardly need pointing out. Monomania is not interesting, and the fact that no nationalist of the more bigoted kind can write a book which still seems worth reading after a lapse of years has a certain deodorising effect. But when one has admitted that nationalism has not triumphed everywhere, that there are still peoples whose judgements are not at the mercy of their desires, the fact does remain that the pressing problems — India, Poland, Palestine, the Spanish civil war, the Moscow trials, the American Negroes, the Russo-German Pact or what have you — cannot be, or at least never are, discussed upon a reasonable level. The Eltons and Pritts and Coughlins, each of them simply an enormous mouth bellowing the same lie over and over again, are obviously extreme cases, but we deceive ourselves if we do not realise that we can all resemble them in unguarded moments. Let a certain note be struck, let this or that corn be trodden on — and it may be corn whose very existence has been unsuspected hitherto — and the most fair-minded and sweet-tempered person may suddenly be transformed into a vicious partisan, anxious only to ‘score’ over his adversary and indifferent as to how many lies he tells or how many logical errors he commits in doing so. When Lloyd George, who was an opponent of the Boer War, announced in the House of Commons that the British communiques, if one added them together, claimed the killing of more Boers than the whole Boer nation contained, it is recorded that Arthur Balfour rose to his feet and shouted ‘Cad!’ Very few people are proof against lapses of this type. The Negro snubbed by a white woman, the Englishman who hears England ignorantly criticised by an American, the Catholic apologist reminded of the Spanish Armada, will all react in much the same way. One prod to the nerve of nationalism, and the intellectual decencies can vanish, the past can be altered, and the plainest facts can be denied.

     我自始至终都在说“民族主义者像这样”，“民族主义者像那样”，这是我为了说明问题，而刻意选择那些极端的，接近疯狂的民族主义者举的例，这类民族主义者的脑中已不再有平静，对争权夺势以外的世界失去了兴趣。这样的人其实也相当普遍，但并不值得浪费**去消灭他们。在现实生活中，如艾尔顿勋爵、邓尼斯·诺威尔·普列特、休斯顿夫人（译注，此处或指Lucy, Lady Houston）、埃兹拉·庞德、范西塔特勋爵（译注，此处有重名，应指Robert Vansittart）、科林神父（译注，此处或指Charles Coughlin）这类人，以及簇拥着他们的那些阴沉的小团伙，我们都应当与之斗争，而没有必要再指出他们在智识层面的缺陷。考察对民族主义的盲信这件事没那么有趣，而且也没有哪位民族主义者能写出一本多年以后仍值得一读的书，这点反倒减轻了他们万年的遗臭。但谁要是说很多人在做判断时，其心智仍能不受民族主义欲望的左右，谁要是说民族主义还没有造成恶劣的影响，这样空口的宣称并不能解决眼下急迫的问题——印度、波兰、巴勒斯坦、西班牙内战、莫斯科审判、美国黑人、苏德条约或其他——这些问题无法被，甚至从未被以理性的态度去讨论。艾尔顿、普列特、科林，这三位将同样的谎言再三重复的大嗓门先生，就是最极端的案例，但如果我们还意识不到，我们在不自警的时候有变成他们的可能，那我们就是在自欺欺人。要是有人说话不够得体，或者踩到了某人的痛处——可能是迄今未有人知晓其存在的痛处——那最正直无私，最温和厚道的人，可能突然就变成了恶毒的冲锋队员，唯对手的“弱点”是图，而不在乎他为了“得胜”说了多少谎言，不在乎他有多少的逻辑错误。劳合·乔治以反对布尔战争的身份在下议院发言，宣称如果把英国的**加总在一起，那得到的杀死的布尔人数要超过全体布尔人的数目，根据记录，阿瑟·贝尔福站起来高声喊到，“无赖！”。很少有人能揪出这种小失误。被白人女性冷落的黑人，听到英国被美国人无知地批评的英国人，想到西班牙无敌舰队的天主教辩护者，也大都会做同样的反应。只要一刺激到民族主义的神经，知识分子的体面就不翼而飞了，为了自我辩护，他们可以修改历史，也可以否认最朴素的事实。

     If one harbours anywhere in one's mind a nationalistic loyalty or hatred, certain facts, although in a sense known to be true, are inadmissible. Here are just a few examples. I list below five types of nationalist, and against each I append a fact which it is impossible for that type of nationalist to accept, even in his secret thoughts:

     如果一个人怀有民族主义式的忠诚或仇恨，那一些尽管他已知的事实，他也仍然不可接受。以下就举几个民族主义者的典型。我将在下文列出五种民族主义者，我也将同时列出一个事实，这事实对于那位民族主义者来说，即使在他最不自觉的思绪中也无法承认：

     BRITISH TORY: Britain will come out of this war with reduced power and prestige.

     英国托利党人：不列颠脱离这场战争时，势力和威望将被减损。

     COMMUNIST: If she had not been aided by Britain and America, Russia would have been defeated by Germany.

     共产主义者：如果没有英国和美国的援助，德国就会击败苏维埃。

     IRISH NATIONALIST: Eire can only remain independent because of British protection.

     爱尔兰民族主义者：爱尔兰正是因为英国的保护才得以独立。

     TROTSKYIST: The Stalin regime is accepted by the Russian masses.

     托洛茨基主义者：斯大林政权得到了苏联大众的认可。

     PACIFIST: Those who ‘abjure’ violence can only do so because others are committing violence on their behalf.

     和平主义者：宣称自己“放弃”暴力，只是因为有他人代而行之。

     All of these facts are grossly obvious if one's emotions do not happen to be involved: but to the kind of person named in each case they are also intolerable, and so they have to be denied, and false theories constructed upon their denial. I come back to the astonishing failure of military prediction in the present war. It is, I think, true to say that the intelligentsia have been more wrong about the progress of the war than the common people, and that they were more swayed by partisan feelings. The average intellectual of the Left believed, for instance, that the war was lost in 1940, that the Germans were bound to overrun Egypt in 1942, that the Japanese would never be driven out of the lands they had conquered, and that the Anglo-American bombing offensive was making no impression on Germany. He could believe these things because his hatred for the British ruling class forbade him to admit that British plans could succeed. There is no limit to the follies that can be swallowed if one is under the influence of feelings of this kind. I have heard it confidently stated, for instance, that the American troops had been brought to Europe not to fight the Germans but to crush an English revolution. One has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that: no ordinary man could be such a fool. When Hitler invaded Russia, the officials of the MOI issued ‘as background’ a warning that Russia might be expected to collapse in six weeks. On the other hand the Communists regarded every phase of the war as a Russian victory, even when the Russians were driven back almost to the Caspian Sea and had lost several million prisoners. There is no need to multiply instances. The point is that as soon as fear, hatred, jealousy and power worship are involved, the sense of reality becomes unhinged. And, as I have pointed out already, the sense of right and wrong becomes unhinged also. There is no crime, absolutely none, that cannot be condoned when ‘our’ side commits it. Even if one does not deny that the crime has happened, even if one knows that it is exactly the same crime as one has condemned in some other case, even if one admits in an intellectual sense that it is unjustified — still one cannot feel that it is wrong. Loyalty is involved, and so pity ceases to function.

     只要一个人不动用他民族主义的激情，那以上的例子都是显而易见的：但对被我点名的人而言，这些事实让他们痛苦难耐，不得不一再地抵赖，并为他的诡辩建起复杂的理论来。再说回对这场战争的预测中那些骇人的失败吧。知识分子的判断被他们的党派情感所动摇，因此准确性上还不及普通民众高，我认为这么说是没有错的。比如说，左派知识分子一般会认为，战争在40年时就已经输掉了，德国42年就会攻下埃及，日本则永远不会被赶出他们侵占的土地，而英美联合对德的轰炸行动则不会对德国有半点影响。他会这么想，是因为他痛恨英国的统治阶级，而无法相信英国的军事计划能够成功。如果一个人的思考受到了这种感情的影响，那他为狡辩说谎吞下的银针将是无穷无尽的。我还听到过这种自信的宣言，“美军抵达欧洲，不是为了与德军作战，而是为了镇压英国的革命”。一个人得是知识分子才会相信这样的蠢话：普通人可没那么傻。当希特勒进犯苏联的时候，英国的信息部发布了“大趋势”警告，认为苏联可能在六周内崩溃。而在另一面，共产党人把战争的每一个阶段都描述成苏联的胜利，甚至当苏联被推下里海，损失百万的时候，也认为这是胜利。这样的例子不必再多做说明。关键是只要有恐惧、仇恨、妒忌的情感，再染上了对权力的崇拜，个人感知现实的能力就会衰退。而且，和我之前提及的一样，对与错之分，也变得不再黑白分明。任何一件，甚至所有的犯罪行为，只要是由“我方”所犯下，那就一定能被民族主义者所容忍。即使有人不否认那已经发生的犯罪，即使有人心里明白，这个罪行和其他那些已被承认的罪行毫无区别，他也还是会选择宽恕，在其他一些情况下，即使有人承认了这样的罪行，而且也有足够的智力知道这样做并不合理，他也仍然无法体会到这样的罪行是一种错误。对民族主义的忠诚介入了，同情心就失效了。

    The reason for the rise and spread of nationalism is far too big a question to be raised here. It is enough to say that, in the forms in which it appears among English intellectuals, it is a distorted reflection of the frightful battles actually happening in the external world, and that its worst follies have been made possible by the breakdown of patriotism and religious belief. If one follows up this train of thought, one is in danger of being led into a species of Conservatism, or into political quietism. It can be plausibly argued, for instance — it is even possibly true — that patriotism is an inoculation against nationalism, that monarchy is a guard against dictatorship, and that organised religion is a guard against superstition. Or again, it can be argued that no unbiased outlook is possible, that all creeds and causes involve the same lies, follies, and barbarities; and this is often advanced as a reason for keeping out of politics altogether. I do not accept this argument, if only because in the modern world no one describable as an intellectual can keep out of politics in the sense of not caring about them. I think one must engage in politics — using the word in a wide sense — and that one must have preferences: that is, one must recognise that some causes are objectively better than others, even if they are advanced by equally bad means. As for the nationalistic loves and hatreds that I have spoken of, they are part of the make-up of most of us, whether we like it or not. Whether it is possible to get rid of them I do not know, but I do believe that it is possible to struggle against them, and that this is essentially a moral effort. It is a question first of all of discovering what one really is, what one's own feelings really are, and then of making allowance for the inevitable bias. If you hate and fear Russia, if you are jealous of the wealth and power of America, if you despise Jews, if you have a sentiment of inferiority towards the British ruling class, you cannot get rid of those feelings simply by taking thought. But you can at least recognise that you have them, and prevent them from contaminating your mental processes. The emotional urges which are inescapable, and are perhaps even necessary to political action, should be able to exist side by side with an acceptance of reality. But this, I repeat, needs a moral effort, and contemporary English literature, so far as it is alive at all to the major issues of our time, shows how few of us are prepared to make it.

     民族主义兴起和蔓延是个庞大的话题，在此就不便多说了。从它在英国知识分子中表现的形式看来，它其实是对外部世界丑陋战争一种扭曲的倒影，爱国主义和宗教信仰的崩塌后，使罄竹难书的恶行成为可能。如果沿着这种思路继续探索，那我们可能走向某种保守主义，或政治寂静主义。有人可能这样辩解，例如——其中甚至可能有些妙论——爱国主义可以预防民族主义，君主制能保卫人民免于独裁，有组织的宗教能够抵御迷信。然后，还可以这样辩解：世上压根就不存在没有偏见的理念，世上所有的主义，所有的信条，都潜藏了相同的谎言，潜藏了愚蠢而野蛮的谎言；这些诡辩也常被拿去作为一个人不参与政治的理由。我不接受这样的诡辩，现代世界一个被称作知识分子的人，绝不可能只是不关心政治就能脱离政治生活。我认为个人必须参与政治——广义上地参与——并且应当拥有自己的偏好：亦即，个人必须认识到，有些理想在客观上要比其他理想更好，即使这所有的理想都由同样糟糕的手段来推进。至于民族主义的爱憎，正如我之前所说，那也是我们大部分人思想的一部分，无论每个人对民族主义喜欢与否。是否有摆脱的可能？我不知道，但是我相信我们能够与之抗争，而这正是道德应做的事。我们首先要去探索真实的自己，发现自己真实的情感，并为不可避免的偏见留出余地。如果你讨厌，害怕俄罗斯，如果你嫉妒美国的富庶和霸权，如果你鄙视犹太人，如果你在面对英国统治阶级的时候，心怀自卑感，你不可能只靠动动脑筋，就摆脱这样的感受。但你至少可以认识到你有这样的情感，你要阻止这样的情感去干涉你精神上的判断。在政治行动中，冲动是不可避免的，有时甚至是必要的，但这样的情感冲动，也应当与接受现实的能力并存。但要做到这一点，我重申，需要道德的努力，而对当代的英国知识界，就它对今日天下大事的反应来看，我们还中少有能做出这种改变的人。