【轉貼】米尔斯海默：国际关系和世界形势的分析

米尔斯海默：国际关系和世界形势的分析
Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine.
Isaac Chotiner is a staff writer of THE NEW YORKER.
来源：中美学者智库 20240205
（上）
导读 美国著名国际关系学家及芝加哥大学教授米尔斯海默（John Mearsheimer），系"中国威胁论"的极力鼓吹者之一，认为美中冲突不可避免。
作为进攻性现实主义（offensive realism）的主要理论家，米尔斯海默认定日渐富强的中国大陆将不遗余力地将美国挤出亚洲太平洋地区，然后向印度洋扩张，并最终取代美国。美中两国间注定会在印太地区明争暗斗，争奇斗艳。双方博弈的结果便是美中之间激烈而危险的安全竞争，这种竞争类似于美苏冷战期间的那种对抗。
米尔斯海默的很多观点与川普总统是英雄所见略同。而我们知道，川普前总统如果不出意外的获得共和党初选的话，有可能成为下一任美国总统。也就是说，米尔斯海默关于国际关系和世界形势的分析和信念，有可能为2025年1月20日上任的下一任美国总统付诸实践，如果川普赢得今年11月的大选的话。

现实主义
现实主义理论认为国家主要关心的是权力平衡。这里的国家主要指世界大国。而米尔斯海默认为"实力是世界政治通行证" （the power is the currency in international politics），大国非常关心自己相对于其他大国的实力。如果本国实力软弱，其他大国就会占你的便宜，甚至欺负你。以俄罗斯为例。苏联解体后，俄罗斯即坚决反对北约的扩张。尽管俄罗斯人明确表示，北约的扩张是对俄罗斯的威胁，美国还是在1999年推动了北约的扩张（捷克、匈牙利和波兰加入）。5年后的2004年，北约再次东扩（斯洛伐克、保加利亚、罗马尼亚、斯洛文尼亚、以及波罗的海沿岸国家爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛等七国，成为北约组织的正式成员国）；然后，在2008年，北约表示阿尔巴尼亚、克罗地亚和马其顿符合北约成员资格标准。阿尔巴尼亚和克罗地亚次年即加入北约。美国为何能无视核武大国俄罗斯的强烈反对，坚持东扩，一而再、再而三地缩小俄罗斯的安全空间呢？因为俄罗斯很虚弱，可以说非常虚弱。因此极其强大的美国觉得，它可以把北约的扩张推到俄罗斯边境并让其接受。这就是现实 -- 当自身实力不济在国际政治中软弱时，你得逆来顺受。自然你想变得非常强大，比所有对手都强大，这才是最好的生存方式。

【余案：弱肉强食、贏者通吃！這個叢林法則正是地球生物的通貨（the currency）、通行証。人這種生物號稱「類」其實從未成爲共存共榮的「類」。從來都是依照叢林法則行事的畜生。】

米尔斯海默的"进攻性现实主义"认为，对安全以及最终对生存的需求，使国家成为侵略性的实力最大化者。除必要时临时联盟外，各国不但不合作而且不断寻求削弱竞争对手的力量，增强自己的力量。进攻性现实主义认为整个国际社会体系处于无政府状态，没有中央权威来约束国家行为，也没有中央权威对违反规则秩序的国家采取有效惩罚。这就决定了为确保国家的生存，国家必须采取"自助"原则，一国只有将本国生存与发展置于自己的实力之上才是最明智之举。朝鲜（拼死发展核武）可视作这方面的例子之一。而乌克兰独立后自废武功，将本国命运交由其他大国，也是国家实力与民族生存的生动案例。
需要指出的是，米尔斯海默为代表的进攻性现实主义理论认为政治体制并无优劣之分 -- 民主国家和非民主国家、自由国家、法西斯国家或共产主义国家都无所谓。所有国家都希望最大限度地提高其相对实力，而不管国内的政治秩序如何。这样的现实主义可能让大多数西方人抓狂；因为他们认为民主国家是好的政治体制，共产主义国家的独裁国家或其他什么国家是坏的政治体制。现实主义则没有好人/坏人、好政体/坏政体之分；只有为生存发展而争权夺利的国家。所以，就有了川普无视顾忌地与朝鲜的金正恩三次会面。世界也可以期待川普与普京冰释前嫌把盏言欢，如果两人当选各自国家总统的话。

【余案：秦暉所謂（文化無優劣制度有好壞）之説，明顯就是源自這個白左世界潮流的。然後就到處惹是生非挑起戰端鼓吹顔色革命以謀其私。這種把戲玩得太多太濫，反抗反彈就在所難免了。看看當今世界，你還能否認，這種各懷鬼胎的假理想主義纔是當今世界叢生問題的根源嗎？】

国际新秩序
大约从1990年/1991年到2017年时期是美国独大的单极时代。但这一时期的美国以非现实主义的方式行事，奉行几乎随心所欲地自由霸权外交政策。由于没有可与之抗衡的国家存在，美国是地球上唯一的大国，大国政治对美国来说无关紧要。以对华关系为例，华盛顿奉行的政策是帮助中国大陆致富，将北京融入世贸组织等国际机构，然后让它成为一个负责任的利益相关者，最终让它成为一个像美国那样的国家。美国政策制定者认为一旦中国大陆成为自由民主国家，北京将从此与邻为善地和美国幸福地生活在一起。当然，北京得服从命令听指挥，随美国人的指挥棒转。

【余案：白左跟赤納本質上的惺惺相惜，纔是美國背棄早已捨棄蘇維埃國際共產主義的俄羅斯，反而一廂情願拼命扶植赤納中國的深層動機。昨天普京回答Tucker Carlson提問時也説到這個問題。他說赤納經濟規模已是俄羅斯十倍。要説西方面臨的威脅，牠們纔是呀。你幹嘛針對我呢。普京接手的俄羅斯積貧積弱。大概在西方眼中，恰是容易下口的肥肉吧。趁你病攞你命。有吃不吃豬頭三。大國遊戲，如此荒謬。完全沒有價值觀的約束認同。真要説，東昇西降，此之謂也。】

所以在单极时代，美国奉行自由主义政策，美国的行为非常自由，完全不用考虑现实主义。但大约在2017年或2018年时，美国意识到自己的政策有问题。在川普总统的领导下，美国变得非常现实，政府开始对北京采取遏制政策。拜登政府上台后，也对中国采取现实政治行为。与川普总统不同之处的是，拜登总统用自由主义言论来掩饰其现实政治行为。所以，如果你听拜登和他的副手们说话，他们口中高谈的是自由主义，在自由主义的天鹅绒手套下面是赤裸裸的武力威胁讹诈。

【余案：那些深層政府主導的美國政治，目空一切，以爲自己早就取代上主，成爲任意操弄世界的自由意志了。可惜事實上牠們並非可以爲所欲爲的力量。非不願乃不能也。小二黑的終極目標就是靠借債來毀滅美國。老川年輕時就説過，實在看不下去了，衹好挺身而出。欲挽狂瀾於既倒的心態啊。衹是時不我予呢還是猶存一綫希望一綫生機？看看高院怎麽説吧。我是很悲觀的。】

之所以如此，是中国大陆已变得如此强大，甚至有些咄咄逼人，以至于让很多美国人感到害怕。这有点违反"韬光养晦"基本原则 -- 低调行事，不要挑衅。美国人发现北京正变得越来越强大，他们在持续增加国防经费。他们认为中国大陆试图取而代之，正成为一个真正的威胁，因此必须予以遏制。面对美国遏制，中国人感觉美国正蛮横地阻碍自己的正当崛起。于是，在美中两国的的眼中，彼此皆视对方日愈咄咄逼人，各自在安全措施方面不断加码。这就是现况：双方安全竞争加剧。从修昔底德式竞争关系出发，一旦快速崛起的中国大陆的经济成长到引起守成大国美国介意的阶段，相互猜疑和战略对冲便不可避免。
在一个单极的全球秩序中，美国制定规则并强行实施规则，其他国家只要遵守规则即可。美国既是警察，也是法官，并且是负责行动实施的行政部门，简言之美国掌管一切。所以世界有一个自由的国际秩序（冷战时期的西方秩序），它基本上是由美国管理的。美国赢得了冷战，苏联消失了，美国所做的是将西方秩序转变为自由的国际秩序。但在一个多极世界，你有另外两个大国，中国大陆和俄罗斯，而中国大陆是美国的实力接近竞争对手。

【余案：說「美国赢得了冷战」恐怕言過其實了。沒錯「苏联消失了」。但未必是因爲西方「贏」。西方貪天之功據爲己有而已。按照意識形態的爭持遠未結束這個「現實」來看，蘇俄所代表的國際共產主義勢力通過孫猴子鑽進敵腹的謀略，逐步佔據了西方的高教媒體掌握了聲量龐大的話語權，使得西方社會這幾年沉疴發作，一系列「覺醒主義」「取消主義」等等，大行其道甚囂塵上，正在逐步銷蝕西方的傳統價值根基，藉此達到最終毀滅西方的終極戰略目標。普京三番幾次警告世人，這些白左意識形態正是蘇俄意識形態的翻版，是二戰乃至冷戰遠未結束的後遺癥。到底鹿死誰手還是一個懸置的疑問。世人稍一不慎，靠上主價值奠基的西方文明必崩壞於頃刻之間。這也就是何以將今天美國的何去何從看得如此重，如此性命交關的原因。此乃神魔之間的終極之戰。乃是人世間能否存續的終極之戰。豈可掉以輕心？】

然而，随着中国人越来越强大，他们开始对美国制定规则的命令感到不满。中国人会想要制定自己的规则，或者说他们希望以对中国人更有利的方式改变规则。于是，北京努力创建自己的秩序：亚投行、一带一路倡议等等。当然，美国人也在着力维护自己建立的秩序：AUKUS、QUAD和IPEF等等。所以，我们回到一个看起来很像冷战的局面 -- 一个中国大陆领导的秩序和一个美国领导的秩序。这两个新兴的地区秩序，仿如冷战期间苏联领导的秩序和美国领导的秩序。而之前美国领导的自由的国际秩序，则基本寿终正寝。当然，在这两个地区秩序之上，还有一个包括联合国和不扩散组织在内、影响力江河日下的国际秩序。

美国关注的区域
美国的战略核心利益在四个地区：西半球、东北亚、中东/海湾和欧洲。无疑，西半球是地球上对美国最重要的地区。美国是西半球的霸主，没有面临任何威胁。在他三个地区中，东亚和欧洲具有巨大的重要性。海湾地区对美国也重要，是因为石油。只要海湾向世界各地供应石油，美国就会非常关心该地区，当海湾石油对中国人的经济运行举足轻重的时候尤其如此。
追溯历史，从1783年独立，直到21世纪初，美国都视欧洲为世界上最重要的地区。冷战期间，美国认为东北亚具有战略重要性，因为主要的威胁来自苏联，所以华盛顿关心东北亚。现在美国在历史上首次认为东亚或亚洲在战略上比欧洲更重要，因为今天亚洲的威胁来自中国大陆。一旦中国大陆成为威胁，东南亚就变得与东北亚同等的重要。所以现在美国关心的东亚包括东北亚和东南亚。但东南亚人觉得美国没有给予他们足够的关注，或许是美国在欧洲和乌克兰战争中陷入了困境的原因。但一旦美国全力以赴地关注东亚，而不再是乌克兰 -- 这肯定会在未来某个时刻发生 -- 美国就会非常关注东南亚。

北约东扩与乌克兰
作为冷战期间苏联死敌的军事联盟北约，冷战结束后扩展到俄罗斯边境，肯定会被俄罗斯人视为生存威胁。美国有门罗主义，不希望西半球出现任何其他大国。根据门罗主义，美国以外的任何大国都不能与西半球其它国家结成军事联盟，当然也不能将军事力量转移到西半球。当苏联人在1962年把导弹运进古巴时，就引发了古巴导弹危机，且险些酿成核大战。同样的基本逻辑也适用于俄罗斯人。当北约在乌克兰推动橙色革命，使乌克兰成为亲西方的国家，要把乌克兰纳入北约，不断东扩至俄罗斯边界时，俄罗斯人明确表示这绝对不能接受。
俄罗斯人明确表示，如果美国领导的北约坚持这样做，他们将摧毁乌克兰。这时的布什政府中的决策者，本应退缩。但是，他们继续推，推，推地将俄罗斯人逼到墙角。2014年2月，当俄罗斯人占领克里米亚时，乌克兰顿巴斯地区就开始了内战。这之后，美国政策制定者本应让步，就像俄罗斯人在古巴危机时那样。可奥巴马政府，川普政府，和拜登政府却加倍努力地继续对俄罗斯紧逼不舍，直到2022年2月24日，把普京逼上梁山，开启了一场仍在进行的巨大战争。这是否与拜登个人有关，尚待商榷。不过拜登在乌克兰问题上一直特别强硬，他在奥巴马政府处理乌克兰事务时，就是乌克兰问题上的超级鹰派。因此，当他在2021年1月成为总统后，似乎对接纳乌克兰加入北约很上心，最终导致了战争爆发。

【余案：此處值得深思！明知今日普京俄羅斯早已不是當年的蘇聯。你還有什麽理由一門心思要毀滅這個本質上屬於基督教文明的超級大國呢？幾十年來一以貫之的國策如不能找到更好的理由，就衹能得出判斷說，歐美西方已經站在堅持基督教的今日俄羅斯對立面了。我一直强調指出，二戰以至於冷戰遠未終結。當年的法西斯納粹共產國際衹是移形換影像葛蘭西法蘭克福學派主張的那樣學孫猴子鑽進了西方文明的心腹之處，從内部從根子上進行顛覆西方文明根基的偉大事業。今日在美國甚囂塵上的「覺醒主義」、「取消主義」等等，不正是正在勝利推進的敵基督勢力嗎？普京明確的反對態度，顯然是歐美的白左政壇必欲置普京俄羅斯死地的理由。這方面的動機較之地緣政治的歷史糾葛，顯然更爲深刻有力。】

对于乌克兰入北约可能引发的危险，不仅仅是约翰·米尔斯海默，德国领导人默克尔和法国领导人尼古拉·萨科齐均发出过警告。20世纪90年代的国防部长佩里（Bill Perry）及川普和拜登政府的参谋长联席会议主席米利将军（General Mark Milley），也都曾警告说，如果北约东扩得太远，将会使对俄关系爆炸，最终导致乌克兰的破坏。但美国领导的西方不信邪，拒绝接受俄罗斯的讹诈，不相信北约东扩会成为问题。为何西方如此自信？
有两个原因 -- 其一便是单极时刻。单极时刻的美国奉行自由霸权政策，不认为北约东扩会对俄罗斯人构成威胁。麦克福尔（Michael McFaul）在担任美国驻莫斯科大使时，曾多次告诉普京，北约的扩张不是针对俄罗斯的，也不是对莫斯科的威胁。许多美国政策制定者一厢情愿地认为，北约的扩张对俄罗斯没有威胁，因为美国是一个温和的霸主。所以，美国一直在推动它。第二个原因，就是一超独大的美国睥睨天下，傲慢地相信可以将北约东扩强加给俄罗斯人。至于俄罗斯人喜欢与否，那是他们的问题，不关美国人的事。咱美国的国力举世无双，可以做她愿意做的任何事情，包括北约东扩。即使俄罗斯人不爽，他也得接受。这既是大国的无理傲慢，也是丛林法则的残酷现实。

地缘政治
东欧任何国家，包括乌克兰，都想加入北约，这完全可以理解，因为入约后这些国家就可依赖美国的安全保护伞了。但问题是：如果你试图加入北约，俄罗斯人将如何反应？事实证明，当乌克兰将加入北约组织一事付诸实践后，俄罗斯人决心压垮乌克兰，他们要摧毁乌克兰这个国家。这意味着一个国家真的只有两个选择：一是试图加入北约，但最终被摧毁；其二便是不考虑加入北约。这样一来当事国便不会有美国的安全保护伞，但可让俄罗斯放心，也就不存在被俄罗斯压垮的可能。
不加入北约、没有美国的安全保护伞但完整的乌克兰，与现在有美国支持、希望加入北约却残破不全满目疮痍的乌克兰，孰优孰劣，孰好孰坏，相信当事国和旁观国均有自己的判断。客观上，如果保持中立，不激怒俄罗斯、对俄罗斯的安全关切表示理解和尊重，乌克兰人的日子本可让很多国家羡慕。现在，芬兰已加入北约，瑞典正在路上。这其实非常愚蠢。首先，芬兰和瑞典没有理由加入北约。他们在冷战期间不是北约成员，苏联对他们的威胁比今天的俄罗斯大得多。事实上，今天的俄罗斯对芬兰或瑞典都不构成威胁，至少在他们加入北约之前是这样。芬兰和瑞典加入北约只会让俄罗斯人感到更加不安全，因为瑞典和芬兰不再保持中立。北极地区的美国人和加拿大人再加上瑞典人和芬兰人，俄罗斯人感觉被孤立了。于是，俄罗斯人开始与中国人谈论让中国人帮助他们应对北极地区任何潜在的冲突局势或危机。北极地区很可能会出现危机。更令世界焦心的是，俄罗斯将更多地依赖核武器，尤其是在北极地区。由于常规力量有限，核威慑、核胁迫对俄罗斯人来说将更加重要。因此，美国正在应对一个糟糕的情况，并使情况变得更糟。毫无疑问，美国领导人在冷战期间并不完美，但他们能清晰地认识到权力的局限性。可自20世纪90年代以来，美国的政策制定人一错再错，使我们今天在世界上面临的形势比冷战时期要危险得多。

【余案：與其將責任歸咎於不同世代政客的個體優劣，倒不如正視當代歐美政壇政客恰恰就是敵基督教育系統跟媒體以及高科技巨頭培育與豢養的，牠們敵視西方的傳統價值，敵視這一價值體系的基督教根基。所謂一錯再錯，衹是這個敵視的必然結果，而不是偶然因素碰巧結合在一起了。】

俄乌战争和美国对乌克兰的支持，促使俄中两国之间形成了一种非常特殊的友谊或伙伴关系。毫无疑问，美国对中国大陆的政策和对俄罗斯的政策使俄中紧密地结合在一起。北京认定与莫斯科存在一种唇亡齿寒的关系，因而对确保俄罗斯不会在乌克兰战场上失利有着根深蒂固的兴趣。因此，中国大陆会尽一切努力确保俄罗斯人不会输掉俄乌战争。在这一由美国造成的不对称相互依存关系中，中国人依赖俄罗斯人，但俄罗斯人更依赖中国人。由于中国人的支持，乌克兰战争可能会持续很长很长一段时间。因为俄罗斯人和乌克兰人难以就如何划分乌克兰领土达成一致，也不会就乌克兰是中立国还是西方成员达成一致。所以，所能期望的最好的结果就是乌克兰和俄罗斯之间的冷和平。就像是朝鲜的三八线那样，停战但不会是一个有意义的和平协议。
然后，当你考虑美国的最大竞争对手中国大陆时，人们会同意说北京是俄乌战争的既得利益者。因为只要战争继续下去，美国就会被困在欧洲对付俄罗斯，而不能将全部力量转向东亚专注于国力迫近的中国大陆。鉴于俄罗斯是美、中、俄三大国中最弱的国家，美国本应：第一，与俄罗斯建立某种密切关系；第二，全力以赴地对付中国大陆。美国实际上却把俄罗斯人推向中国人的怀抱。到目前为止，中国人是俄乌战争的胜利者。对北京来说，乌克兰战争继续下去未见得是一件坏事。

【余案：此處似乎值得進一步探討。昨天普京在訪談中所表示的「挑撥離間」其實是他一以貫之的態度。跟上面所説的完全一樣，歐美西方對俄羅斯的敵視，直接導致俄羅斯不得不倒向中國（假意與赤納結盟）。按照某種陰謀論的判斷，這是美國深層政府蓄謀已久的戰略，就是通過各種匪夷所思的倒行逆施來徹底摧毀美國以至於整個西方文明陣營。普京面露微笑問道：你美國早已債臺高築，敞開的邊境讓數以百萬計的難民長驅直入，這些問題你怎麽解決？勇敢面對這些問題，不是比毀滅俄羅斯更有利可圖嗎。是否「有利」看對誰來説了。本來就立心毀滅歐美西方文明的那些心腹大患處心積慮要幹的事，恰恰就是明修棧道暗度陳倉呀。牠們跟赤納之間到底有怎樣的合謀關係。現在當然很難看清楚。當然也是陰謀論啦，坊間傳言中美早就合謀來肢解俄羅斯讓赤納一雪百年國恥。豬頭習特拉就能藉此超越毛賊東的歷史地位永垂不朽了。是耶非耶，端視上主如何看如何應對了。人力有限。衹能祈禱。】

（下）核悖论
在乌克兰战争延长的假设下，美国向乌克兰分配资源，亚太地区的力量平衡因此会减少。这让包括东北亚、东南亚，以及澳大利亚在内的许多亚洲国家感到紧张和担心。
在过去的一年里，我们看到美国的利率从25个基点上升到了5%左右。这意味着，美国政府债务超过34万亿美元，和美国政府运转的成本增加。这将影响到对乌克兰的援助。正常逻辑，美国人会向乌克兰人施加压力，让他们坐到谈判桌上，与俄罗斯谈判并达成协议，从而停止乌克兰战争。俄乌停战能够缓解许多经济和政治问题，并使美国能够专注于中国大陆。但这仅是某些人的一厢情愿，因为有很多事情它就没有逻辑，而是由决策人的个人好恶和情感决定。因此停战不会发生， 除非俄罗斯人一劳永逸地解决了乌克兰定位的问题 – 乌不入北约，保持中立。

【余案：還是一句話：並非「没有逻辑」，而是跟你不一樣的「邏輯」，例如中國邏輯以及，美國深層政府邏輯，等等。】

的确，美国正考虑如何结束这种局面，因为政策制定者们认识到了美国面临的问题。但美国尚未意识到当2008年4月时任北约秘书长夏侯雅伯表示，未来会接纳格鲁吉亚和乌克兰加入北约时，即种下了俄乌战争的祸根。现在芬兰（已经）和瑞典（正在）加入北约，又引起了新的麻烦 -- 北极。北极加上乌克兰，美国还有多少关注东亚的能力？美国陷入了一堆麻烦，且一时半会儿还没有出路。
俄罗斯在乌克兰战场上使用战术核武器的情况根本不可能发生，因为俄罗斯人不可能在战场上失败。乌克兰人没有能力在乌克兰境内决定性地击败俄罗斯军队。美国或西方在乌克兰的的目标是第一：在乌克兰境内击败俄罗斯军队；第二：通过毁灭性制裁削弱其经济；第三：让俄罗斯政权更迭；第四：审判普京。如果美国或西方接近实现这些目标，俄罗斯人几乎肯定会转向核武器。这就存在一个反常的悖论，即美国或西方越有可能成功实现其政策目标，俄罗斯人就越有可能使用核武器。别把普京当白痴，更别说还有中国大陆。因此，美国或西方应该不希望乌克兰人在战场上决定性地击败俄罗斯人。

台海和南海
台湾是我们谈论最多的问题，对中国大陆来说，台湾的重要性不仅仅其战略地位，更有精神情感因素 -- 北京视其为神圣领土，认为她的归属关乎中华民族。美国将台湾视为一项伟大的战略资产，持续深化与台湾的紧密盟友关系。至于美国因台湾问题与中国大陆开战，目前不太可能。但随着时间的推移，随着中国大陆经济的增长和军事能力的增强，凡事皆有可能。如果美国人或台湾人做任何激怒北京的事情，中国人就会发动武力统一行动，即使胜算不大也在所不惜（类似日本二战时贸然偷袭美国珍珠港）。中国人明白无误地划出的不可触碰红线，意味着台海是一枚易爆的雷。
然后就是南中国海。北京视南海为一个中国湖泊，一片巨大的中国水域。中国大陆认为南海属于中国，并将一些岛屿军事化。对此美国人不同意，大多数中国大陆的邻国也持异议。南海有可能因此发生重大冲突并升级，菲律宾与中国大陆对一些岛屿所有权的争执便是实例。由于美国与菲律宾签有防御条约，美军有可能介入菲中间的冲突，以维护美国的信誉。由于重大事件升级后的演变难以预测，南海实际上比台海更危险，因为菲中真正开打的话，美军不可能袖手旁观。这就是为什么美国及其盟国韩国、日本在台湾周围增加军事部署、保持足够威慑的原因。

台海及俄乌战争
中国大陆会竭尽全力增强其孤立台湾和发动两栖攻击的能力，而美国及其盟友日本人和澳大利亚人，将全力以赴地阻止北京获得那种能力。最后鹿死谁手，让我们拭目以待。但随着时间的推移，你会发现战争与否是一个政治决定，很多时候政治家们甘冒失败的风险也要开战。典型的例子是1941年12月日本对珍珠港的袭击。这些决定偷袭珍珠港的日本人并非疯狂失去理智，而是一流的战略家。他们明白，日本获胜的可能性很小。他们不想攻击美国，但非这样不可。因为政治 -- 美国正在扼杀日本经济。1940年，美国切断了对日本的废铁出口，1941年，又停止了对日的石油出口。日本人想要结束这些禁运的企图，被美国一一驳回。最终，日本人认为自己的生存岌岌可危，除拼死一搏外别无选择。因此，尽管他们知道在军事上获胜的机会渺茫，却还是孤注一掷地在夏威夷打响了第一枪。
因此，台湾局势的演变可能会出现这样的情况：因为知道美国人会出面保护，台湾或宣布独立。于是北京作出反应："这是不可接受的。我们可能会付出巨大的代价；我们甚至可能在短期内失败，但这是不可接受的，我们必须枪炮上膛舰出海，随时实施断然行动。" 所以这不仅仅是军事计算；在威慑局势中，政治考量也很重要。如前所述，其他国家在面对类似形势时困兽犹斗地以命相博的案例殷鉴不远。因此，美国必须非常小心，不要让中国人陷入这样的境地：尽管胜算难料，他们别无选择，只能对台采取军事行动或攻击钓鱼岛。几可肯定深谋远虑、工于算计的中国大陆知道"上策伐谋，其次伐交"，不会主动发兵台湾。但如果北京采"其次伐兵，其次攻城"的下策断然出兵对台，美国肯定会联合日本，可能还有澳大利亚，共同介入。
如果2024年乌克兰和台湾的情况发生变化，引发变化的不会是美国政治，而是国际体系变化的结果。因为美国外交政策精英对美国应该如何行事的看法实际上相当一致，共和党和民主党的外交政策仅略有不同。奥巴马总统和川普总统竞选时都表示他们将从根本上改变美国外交政策。但他们执政后，外交政策机构阉割了他们。如川普想要摆脱欧洲，结束北约，致力于改善与普京的关系。但这些都没有发生 -- 外交政策机构太过强大，即使川普2024年再次当选，他也无法改变很多事情。奥巴马的运气跟川普是半斤八两。2009年他在接受《大西洋杂志》的离职前采访时承认，政府部门的变形怪体（川普口中的"深层政府"）打败了他。

【余案：果不其然！但焉知這不是小二黑一手造成一手操縱的？】

回到乌克兰人的战场攻势，它其实是美国向俄罗斯人传递一个强有力的信息，即他们应该坐到谈判桌前，我们应该结束这场战争。乌克兰人非但在战场赢不了俄罗斯人，而且有更大的可能性输掉战争 – 目前双方战场胶着状态不可持续。乌克兰需要美国和欧洲国家的不断资金物资的投入，方能把战争打下去。可当美国人和欧洲人正在支付一路朝北的电费和高物价时，他们的政府即使愿意向乌克兰人提供美元或欧元，也会三思而后行。一招不慎，选民就会炒她/他们鱿鱼。

美中冲突的宿命
随着中国大陆的实力越来越强大，美中安全竞争变得愈发危险。相当多的中国大陆人想要证明，中国可以和平崛起。但是，川普总统入主白宫以及拜登上任后美中关系的持续恶化，正反复证明米尔斯海默攻势现实主义的正确。美中再也不会回到2016年之前那种关系了。因为两国亚洲的地缘政治政策南辕北辙：从北京的角度来看，中国大陆统治亚洲非常合理。把美国人赶出亚洲，建立中国的门罗主义是符合逻辑。但从美国的角度，当然也从中国大陆邻国的角度来说，让大陆成为地区霸主毫无道理。美国人以及中国大陆的邻国肯定反击，他们会竭力遏制北京。正是这种竞争双方均认为自己的战略理性且合理，让美中和其它国家最终陷入激烈的安全竞争，从而出现我们之前讨论的那样的状况 – 爆发战争。米尔斯海默承认这是大国强力政治的悲剧，但也是所有人，不管接受与否，必须面对的残酷现实。

* 约翰·米尔斯海默（John Mearsheimer）美国著名国际关系学家及芝加哥大学罗兰·温德尔·哈里森杰出服务教授（R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor）。对于中国大陆挑战美国霸权这一命题，米尔斯海默的核心观点是：如果北京经济持续增长，它在军事上也将持续扩张，试图像美国统治西半球那样统治亚洲。届时，美国将不惜一切代价阻止中国大陆实现地区霸权。中国大陆的大多数邻国，包括印度、日本、新加坡、韩国、俄罗斯和越南，将与美国联手遏制中国。其结果将是一场激烈的安全竞争，很有可能演变为一场惨烈的战争。简言之，中国的崛起不可能是平静的。
米尔斯海默1970年毕业于西点军校（United States Military Academy/ West Point），1974年获得南加州大学（University of Southern California）国际关系学硕士学位，1980年取得康奈尔大学（Cornell University）博士学位。1978年至1979年间，米尔斯海默也在华盛顿特区的布鲁金斯学会兼当研究员。1980年至1982年间，他到哈佛大学威瑟海德国际事务中心进行博士后研究。自1982年以来，米尔斯海默一直是芝加哥大学政治学系执教。近年来他的理论受到越来越多的关注，在包括中国大陆和澳大利亚在内的印太国家拥有持续增多的拥趸，他本人也受邀访问许多国家，包括印太和欧洲国家。

Chotiner, I. (2022). Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine. THE NEW YORKER.
链接 https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine
For years, the political scientist has claimed that Putin’s aggression toward Ukraine is caused by Western intervention. Have recent events changed his mind?
By Isaac Chotiner /March 1, 2022
The political scientist John Mearsheimer has been one of the most famous critics of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Perhaps best known for the book he wrote with Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Mearsheimer is a proponent of great-power politics—a school of realist international relations that assumes that, in a self-interested attempt to preserve national security, states will preëmptively act in anticipation of adversaries. For years, Mearsheimer has argued that the U.S., in pushing to expand nato eastward and establishing friendly relations with Ukraine, has increased the likelihood of war between nuclear-armed powers and laid the groundwork for Vladimir Putin’s aggressive position toward Ukraine. Indeed, in 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea, Mearsheimer wrote that “the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for this crisis.”
The current invasion of Ukraine has renewed several long-standing debates about the relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Although many critics of Putin have argued that he would pursue an aggressive foreign policy in former Soviet Republics regardless of Western involvement, Mearsheimer maintains his position that the U.S. is at fault for provoking him. I recently spoke with Mearsheimer by phone. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed whether the current war could have been prevented, whether it makes sense to think of Russia as an imperial power, and Putin’s ultimate plans for Ukraine.
Looking at the situation now with Russia and Ukraine, how do you think the world got here?
I think all the trouble in this case really started in April, 2008, at the nato Summit in Bucharest, where afterward nato issued a statement that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of nato. The Russians made it unequivocally clear at the time that they viewed this as an existential threat, and they drew a line in the sand. Nevertheless, what has happened with the passage of time is that we have moved forward to include Ukraine in the West to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. Of course, this includes more than just nato expansion. nato expansion is the heart of the strategy, but it includes E.U. expansion as well, and it includes turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy, and, from a Russian perspective, this is an existential threat.
You said that it’s about “turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.” I don’t put much trust or much faith in America “turning” places into liberal democracies. What if Ukraine, the people of Ukraine, want to live in a pro-American liberal democracy?
If Ukraine becomes a pro-American liberal democracy, and a member of nato, and a member of the E.U., the Russians will consider that categorically unacceptable. If there were no nato expansion and no E.U. expansion, and Ukraine just became a liberal democracy and was friendly with the United States and the West more generally, it could probably get away with that. You want to understand that there is a three-prong strategy at play here: E.U. expansion, nato expansion, and turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.
You keep saying “turning Ukraine into a liberal democracy,” and it seems like that’s an issue for the Ukrainians to decide. nato can decide whom it admits, but we saw in 2014 that it appeared as if many Ukrainians wanted to be considered part of Europe. It would seem like almost some sort of imperialism to tell them that they can’t be a liberal democracy.
It’s not imperialism; this is great-power politics. When you’re a country like Ukraine and you live next door to a great power like Russia, you have to pay careful attention to what the Russians think, because if you take a stick and you poke them in the eye, they’re going to retaliate. States in the Western hemisphere understand this full well with regard to the United States.
The Monroe Doctrine, essentially.
Of course. There’s no country in the Western hemisphere that we will allow to invite a distant, great power to bring military forces into that country.
Right, but saying that America will not allow countries in the Western hemisphere, most of them democracies, to decide what kind of foreign policy they have—you can say that’s good or bad, but that is imperialism, right? We’re essentially saying that we have some sort of say over how democratic countries run their business.
We do have that say, and, in fact, we overthrew democratically elected leaders in the Western hemisphere during the Cold War because we were unhappy with their policies. This is the way great powers behave.
Of course we did, but I’m wondering if we should be behaving that way. When we’re thinking about foreign policies, should we be thinking about trying to create a world where neither the U.S. nor Russia is behaving that way?
That’s not the way the world works. When you try to create a world that looks like that, you end up with the disastrous policies that the United States pursued during the unipolar moment. We went around the world trying to create liberal democracies. Our main focus, of course, was in the greater Middle East, and you know how well that worked out. Not very well.
I think it would be difficult to say that America’s policy in the Middle East in the past seventy-five years since the end of the Second World War, or in the past thirty years since the end of the Cold War, has been to create liberal democracies in the Middle East.
I think that’s what the Bush Doctrine was about during the unipolar moment.
In Iraq. But not in the Palestinian territories, or Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, or anywhere else, right?
No—well, not in Saudi Arabia and not in Egypt. To start with, the Bush Doctrine basically said that if we could create a liberal democracy in Iraq, it would have a domino effect, and countries such as Syria, Iran, and eventually Saudi Arabia and Egypt would turn into democracies. That was the basic philosophy behind the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine was not just designed to turn Iraq into a democracy. We had a much grander scheme in mind.
We can debate how much the people who were in charge in the Bush Administration really wanted to turn the Middle East into a bunch of democracies, and really thought that was going to happen. My sense was that there was not a lot of actual enthusiasm about turning Saudi Arabia into a democracy.
Well, I think focussing on Saudi Arabia is taking the easy case from your perspective. That was the most difficult case from America’s perspective, because Saudi Arabia has so much leverage over us because of oil, and it’s certainly not a democracy. But the Bush Doctrine, if you go look at what we said at the time, was predicated on the belief that we could democratize the greater Middle East. It might not happen overnight, but it would eventually happen.
I guess my point would be actions speak louder than words, and, whatever Bush’s flowery speeches said, I don’t feel like the policy of the United States at any point in its recent history has been to try and insure liberal democracies around the world.
There’s a big difference between how the United States behaved during the unipolar moment and how it’s behaved in the course of its history. I agree with you when you talk about American foreign policy in the course of its broader history, but the unipolar moment was a very special time. I believe that during the unipolar moment, we were deeply committed to spreading democracy.
With Ukraine, it’s very important to understand that, up until 2014, we did not envision nato expansion and E.U. expansion as a policy that was aimed at containing Russia. Nobody seriously thought that Russia was a threat before February 22, 2014. nato expansion, E.U. expansion, and turning Ukraine and Georgia and other countries into liberal democracies were all about creating a giant zone of peace that spread all over Europe and included Eastern Europe and Western Europe. It was not aimed at containing Russia. What happened is that this major crisis broke out, and we had to assign blame, and of course we were never going to blame ourselves. We were going to blame the Russians. So we invented this story that Russia was bent on aggression in Eastern Europe. Putin is interested in creating a greater Russia, or maybe even re-creating the Soviet Union.
Let’s turn to that time and the annexation of Crimea. I was reading an old article where you wrote, “According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine Crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian president Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a longstanding desire to resuscitate the Soviet Empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine as well as other countries in Eastern Europe.” And then you say, “But this account is wrong.” Does anything that’s happened in the last couple weeks make you think that account was closer to the truth than you might have thought?
Oh, I think I was right. I think the evidence is clear that we did not think he was an aggressor before February 22, 2014. This is a story that we invented so that we could blame him. My argument is that the West, especially the United States, is principally responsible for this disaster. But no American policymaker, and hardly anywhere in the American foreign-policy establishment, is going to want to acknowledge that line of argument, and they will say that the Russians are responsible.

You mean because the Russians did the annexation and the invasion?
Yes.
I was interested in that article because you say the idea that Putin may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in Eastern Europe, is wrong. Given that he seems to be going after the rest of Ukraine now, do you think in hindsight that that argument is perhaps more true, even if we didn’t know it at the time?
It’s hard to say whether he’s going to go after the rest of Ukraine because—I don’t mean to nitpick here but—that implies that he wants to conquer all of Ukraine, and then he will turn to the Baltic states, and his aim is to create a greater Russia or the reincarnation of the Soviet Union. I don’t see evidence at this point that that is true. It’s difficult to tell, looking at the maps of the ongoing conflict, exactly what he’s up to. It seems quite clear to me that he is going to take the Donbass and that the Donbass is going to be either two independent states or one big independent state, but beyond that it’s not clear what he’s going to do. I mean, it does seem apparent that he’s not touching western Ukraine.
His bombs are touching it, right?
But that’s not the key issue. The key issue is: What territory do you conquer, and what territory do you hold onto? I was talking to somebody the other day about what’s going to happen with these forces that are coming out of Crimea, and the person told me that he thought they would turn west and take Odessa. I was talking to somebody else more recently who said that that’s not going to happen. Do I know what’s going to happen? No, none of us know what’s going to happen.
You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?
No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests.
I thought you said that he was not interested in taking Kyiv.
No, he’s interested in taking Kyiv for the purpose of regime change. O.K.?
As opposed to what?
As opposed to permanently conquering Kyiv.
It would be a Russian-friendly government that he would presumably have some say over, right?
Yes, exactly. But it’s important to understand that it is fundamentally different from conquering and holding onto Kyiv. Do you understand what I’m saying?We could all think of imperial possessions whereby a sort of figurehead was put on the throne, even if the homeland was actually controlling what was going on there, right? We’d still say that those places had been conquered, right?
I have problems with your use of the word “imperial.” I don’t know anybody who talks about this whole problem in terms of imperialism. This is great-power politics, and what the Russians want is a regime in Kyiv that is attuned to Russian interests. It may be ultimately that the Russians would be willing to live with a neutral Ukraine, and that it won’t be necessary for Moscow to have any meaningful control over the government in Kyiv. It may be that they just want a regime that is neutral and not pro-American.
When you said that no one’s talking about this as imperialism, in Putin’s speeches he specifically refers to the “territory of the former Russian Empire,” which he laments losing. So it seems like he’s talking about it.
I think that’s wrong, because I think you’re quoting the first half of the sentence, as most people in the West do. He said, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” And then he said, “Whoever wants it back has no brain.”
He’s also saying that Ukraine is essentially a made-up nation, while he seems to be invading it, no?
O.K., but put those two things together and tell me what that means. I’m just not too sure. He does believe it’s a made-up nation. I would note to him, all nations are made up. Any student of nationalism can tell you that. We invent these concepts of national identity. They’re filled with all sorts of myths. So he’s correct about Ukraine, just like he’s correct about the United States or Germany. The much more important point is: he understands that he cannot conquer Ukraine and integrate it into a greater Russia or into a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. He can’t do that. What he’s doing in Ukraine is fundamentally different. He is obviously lopping off some territory. He’s going to take some territory away from Ukraine, in addition to what happened with Crimea, in 2014. Furthermore, he is definitely interested in regime change. Beyond that, it’s hard to say exactly what this will all lead to, except for the fact that he is not going to conquer all of Ukraine. It would be a blunder of colossal proportions to try to do that.
I assume that you think if he were to try to do that, that would change your analysis of what we’ve witnessed.
Absolutely. My argument is that he’s not going to re-create the Soviet Union or try to build a greater Russia, that he’s not interested in conquering and integrating Ukraine into Russia. It’s very important to understand that we invented this story that Putin is highly aggressive and he’s principally responsible for this crisis in Ukraine. The argument that the foreign-policy establishment in the United States, and in the West more generally, has invented revolves around the claim that he is interested in creating a greater Russia or a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. There are people who believe that when he is finished conquering Ukraine, he will turn to the Baltic states. He’s not going to turn to the Baltic states. First of all, the Baltic states are members of nato and—Is that a good thing?
No.
You’re saying that he’s not going to invade them in part because they’re part of nato, but they shouldn’t be part of nato.
Yes, but those are two very different issues. I’m not sure why you’re connecting them. Whether I think they should be part of nato is independent of whether they are part of nato. They are part of nato. They have an Article 5 guarantee—that’s all that matters. Furthermore, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering the Baltic states. Indeed, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering Ukraine.
It seems to me that if he wants to bring back anything, it’s the Russian Empire that predates the Soviet Union. He seems very critical of the Soviet Union, correct?
Well, I don’t know if he’s critical.
He said it in his big essay that he wrote last year, and he said in a recent speech that he essentially blames Soviet policies for allowing a degree of autonomy for Soviet Republics, such as Ukraine.
But he also said, as I read to you before, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” That’s somewhat at odds with what you just said. I mean, he’s in effect saying that he misses the Soviet Union, right? That’s what he’s saying. What we’re talking about here is his foreign policy. The question you have to ask yourself is whether or not you think that this is a country that has the capability to do that. You realize that this is a country that has a G.N.P. that’s smaller than Texas.
Countries try to do things that they don’t have the capabilities for all the time. You could have said to me, “Who thinks that America could get the Iraqi power system working quickly? We have all these problems in America.” And you would’ve been correct. But we still thought we could do it, and we still tried to do it, and we failed, right? America couldn’t do what it wanted during Vietnam, which I’m sure you would say is a reason not to fight these various wars—and I would agree—but that doesn’t mean that we were correct or rational about our capabilities.
I’m talking about the raw-power potential of Russia—the amount of economic might it has. Military might is built on economic might. You need an economic foundation to build a really powerful military. To go out and conquer countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states and to re-create the former Soviet Union or re-create the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a massive army, and that would require an economic foundation that contemporary Russia does not come close to having. There is no reason to fear that Russia is going to be a regional hegemony in Europe. Russia is not a serious threat to the United States. We do face a serious threat in the international system. We face a peer competitor. And that’s China. Our policy in Eastern Europe is undermining our ability to deal with the most dangerous threat that we face today.
What do you think our policy should be in Ukraine right now, and what do you worry that we’re doing that’s going to undermine our China policy?
We should be pivoting out of Europe to deal with China in a laser-like fashion, number one. And, number two, we should be working overtime to create friendly relations with the Russians. The Russians are part of our balancing coalition against China. If you live in a world where there are three great powers—China, Russia, and the United States—and one of those great powers, China, is a peer competitor, what you want to do if you’re the United States is have Russia on your side of the ledger. Instead, what we have done with our foolish policies in Eastern Europe is drive the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. This is a violation of Balance of Power Politics 101.
I went back and I reread your article about the Israel lobby in the London Review of Books, from 2006. You were talking about the Palestinian issue, and you said something that I very much agree with, which is: “There is a moral dimension here as well. Thanks to the lobby of the United States it has become the de facto enabler of Israeli occupation in the occupied territories, making it complicit in the crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians.” I was cheered to read that because I know you think of yourself as a tough, crusty old guy who doesn’t talk about morality, but it seemed to me you were suggesting that there was a moral dimension here. I’m curious what you think, if any, of the moral dimension to what’s going on in Ukraine right now.
I think there is a strategic and a moral dimension involved with almost every issue in international politics. I think that sometimes those moral and strategic dimensions line up with each other. In other words, if you’re fighting against Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1945, you know the rest of the story. There are other occasions where those arrows point in opposite directions, where doing what is strategically right is morally wrong. I think if you join an alliance with the Soviet Union to fight against Nazi Germany, it is a strategically wise policy, but it is a morally wrong policy. But you do it because you have no choice for strategic reasons. In other words, what I’m saying to you, Isaac, is that when push comes to shove, strategic considerations overwhelm moral considerations. In an ideal world, it would be wonderful if the Ukrainians were free to choose their own political system and to choose their own foreign policy.
But in the real world, that is not feasible. The Ukrainians have a vested interest in paying serious attention to what the Russians want from them. They run a grave risk if they alienate the Russians in a fundamental way. If Russia thinks that Ukraine presents an existential threat to Russia because it is aligning with the United States and its West European allies, this is going to cause an enormous amount of damage to Ukraine. That of course is exactly what’s happening now. So my argument is: the strategically wise strategy for Ukraine is to break off its close relations with the West, especially with the United States, and try to accommodate the Russians. If there had been no decision to move nato eastward to include Ukraine, Crimea and the Donbass would be part of Ukraine today, and there would be no war in Ukraine.
That advice seems a bit implausible now. Is there still time, despite what we’re seeing from the ground, for Ukraine to appease Russia somehow?
I think there’s a serious possibility that the Ukrainians can work out some sort of modus vivendi with the Russians. And the reason is that the Russians are now discovering that occupying Ukraine and trying to run Ukraine’s politics is asking for big trouble.
So you are saying occupying Ukraine is going to be a tough slog?
Absolutely, and that’s why I said to you that I did not think the Russians would occupy Ukraine in the long term. But, just to be very clear, I did say they’re going to take at least the Donbass, and hopefully not more of the easternmost part of Ukraine. I think the Russians are too smart to get involved in an occupation of Ukraine.
Isaac Chotiner is a staff writer at The New Yorker, where he is the principal contributor to Q. & A., a series of interviews with public figures in politics, media, books, business, technology, and more.