Military Changes in the Taiwan Strait | The "Four Fears" of Military Reunification of Taiwan are being overthrown by the People's Liberation Army

After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the public opinion in Taiwan has a sharp rise in the discussion of "Wu Tong". Not only is there a heated discussion among the people about "Will the United States come to the rescue?" The Tsai Ing-wen government has also reported that one-year compulsory military service may be resumed, causing many Taiwanese college students People panicked and said that they "consider taking a leave of absence to join the army", so as not to prolong the military service and affect future career plans. On March 30, the Taiwanese think tank "Taipei Forum Foundation" held a "Taiwan Security Lecture", inviting Ji Zhong, a researcher of the "China Strategic Foresight Association" and a senior assistant researcher of the "National Policy Research Foundation", to "counter the national army against the communist army". Capabilities and Challenges of Invading Taiwan", analyzes the actual situation of Taiwan's navy, and discusses the substantial effect of extending the service period in enhancing Taiwan's military power. This is the first of a series of reports (two in total).

The second part of a series of reports: Military changes in the Taiwan Strait | If the CCP "must fight", can the extension of the service period "save the Taiwan army"

The PLA's Past Military Reunification Assessments

First, from the perspective of "the PLA in the past", it evaluates the combat capability of the Taiwan military in the "military unification" situation from the four aspects of "strategic early warning", "joint suppression", "joint air defense" and "defense system" .

In terms of "strategic early warning" , Jie Zhong pointed out that according to the analysis of scholars in mainland China in the past, the Taiwan military can use various means and channels, or rely on the strategic reconnaissance capabilities of other countries (the United States) to monitor the rear, coastal areas and depths of the PLA's strategic campaigns. , the implementation of all-round, all-weather reconnaissance surveillance and tracking search. In the "joint suppression" section, some scholars in mainland China also believed that if the PLA wanted to cross the sea, the Taiwan army would launch air strikes, destroy and prevent it from landing operations in various forms of firepower. It has the ability to conduct all-round raids against fixed targets and logistics forces such as airports, ports, logistics bases, and transportation hubs of the PLA.

In the field of "joint air defense" , Jiezhong analyzed that the Taiwan military currently has the ability to transmit the military information obtained by the main radar stations, the Air Force E2 early warning aircraft, and the radar of maritime ships back to the Hengshan command post, and conduct multi-target threat assessments. To provide information for the combat staff to dispatch front-line troops, there have been comments in mainland China that the Taiwan military relies on the Internet-based information system to combine air defense early warning and detection, command and control, and firepower engagement systems to form an organic whole. As for the "defense system" , Jie Zhong also said that mainland Chinese scholars used to believe that after "decades of battlefield construction", the Taiwan army has formed a solid defense body, and the coastal areas of Taiwan's main island have also built "fortifications with permanent preparations" The main island fortification defense system combined with field fortifications.

To sum up, Jie Zhong believes that the PLA’s previous assessment of the “Wu Reunification” situation has the following four characteristics. First, considering the Taiwan military's strategic early warning capabilities and intelligence support from other countries, the PLA may judge that it is extremely unlikely that it will conceal its campaign attempt and launch a strategic surprise attack on Taiwan; It is believed that the logistics support system will be in danger of paralysis; third, if the PLA launches an air attack on Taiwan, it will generate unpredictable threats and challenges; fourth, the PLA may also want to avoid the landing troops in the process of sailing and amphibious operations. , encountered the fierce firepower of the Taiwan Army's anti-landing system.

On the whole, Jie Zhong believes that the PLA's evaluation of Taiwan's defense capabilities was quite good in the past, "in fact, it is higher than many Taiwanese people." But Jie Zhong also reminded that the PLA has been promoting a series of military reforms since 2015, until 2025. Since then, various main battle equipment has been put in place one after another, and software conditions such as officer training and operational guidelines have also been updated, and the PLA 's military strength will inevitably increase significantly; " The comparative advantage of the military will also cease to exist due to the advancement of the military reform.

Mobilization and reform of the joint logistics system

First of all, Jie Zhong pointed out that the mobilization of the People's Liberation Army and the reform of the joint logistics system will improve the speed of preparations and greatly reduce the warning time of the Taiwan military. Taiwan's "strategic early warning" advantage is no longer significant.

Jie Zhong quoted that according to the estimates of scholars in mainland China, the medium- and long-range projectile forces needed to fight against Taiwan are as high as several hundred thousand, and the consumption of materials will approach 30 million tons, and the oil will exceed 5.8 million tons. In order for such huge materials to be delivered to the point quickly, timely, accurately and continuously, the transport vehicles required by the PLA are estimated to require more than 2,800 special railway trains, nearly one million vehicles, more than 2,000 aircrafts, and more than 2,000 aircrafts. 7,800 ships.

And such a large-scale transportation, it is impossible to escape the detection of modern surveillance technology. Therefore, the PLA is adjusting the mobilization system and the joint logistics support system, "logistics" military materials through military-civilian integration, and may even directly recruit logistics operators to transport military materials during wartime. Jie Zhong said that after 2025, the PLA's goal is to complete the delivery and loading of combat materials within 24 hours for the group army and within 4 hours for the brigade (regiment) level.

Jie Zhong further pointed out that the People's Liberation Army is also regularly setting up supply bases near the staging areas of the troops attacking Taiwan. The specific method is to store the weapons, ammunition and equipment needed to attack Taiwan near the high-speed rail station or airport on the southeast coast. When a large force has to move from the hinterland of mainland China to the southeast coast, it is only necessary to move the personnel to the station by high-speed rail or civil aviation aircraft, get off the train (aircraft) and go to the preset supply base to collect combat supplies, and then arrive by a very short maneuvering distance. The strategic delivery base can complete the pre-war preparations. In addition, Jie Zhong also believes that the PLA is preparing for a "strategic delivery base system", that is, planning mobilization centers in various places, and integrating with surrounding warehousing companies, grain companies and even hypermarkets to speed up mobilization.

Jie Zhong analyzed that although the Taiwanese army advertises the "combination of standing strikes, back-up defending the territory, and interdiction", in actual mobilization, the standing forces must first be pushed to the coastline to cover the mobilization and formation of the reserve forces; when the reserve forces are mobilized After the formation, switch with the standing unit and pull the standing unit back to the tactical position for maneuvering strikes. But now the preparation time of the PLA has been greatly shortened, and the above process will become a major weakness of the Taiwan army: if the Taiwan army is attacked by the People's Liberation Army before the handover of the standing force and the reserve force has been completed, both troops will be in the "shouldn't be". In the tactical position, forced to engage with the People's Liberation Army, the Taiwan Army's defense plan is bound to be in chaos.

In addition, Jie Zhong also believes that the mobilization of the PLA and the reform of the joint logistics system will weaken the combat effectiveness of the "joint suppression" of the Taiwan military. It pointed out that in order to speed up mobilization and logistical preparation, the PLA has begun to "shuffle" the joint logistical support network and base system along the southeast coast, and has greatly increased logistical supply points, delivery support points, and troop gathering points. As a result, the existing "attack target list" of the Taiwan military must be greatly updated, and the weapons required for "joint suppression" must also be expanded. However, the resources of the Taiwan military are limited at the moment. If the density of weapons for "joint suppression" cannot grow in tandem with the supply points on the other side, the effectiveness of the Taiwan military's source-strike firepower can only continue to decline.

The first island chain "kill chain" is taking shape

Jie Zhong pointed out that the PLA can now use satellites to monitor the periphery of the first island chain 24 hours a day, so all developments in the area will be collected and consolidated by satellites, inland radar surveillance systems, early warning aircraft and naval warship radars, and will be sent back to the PLA's joint efforts. Combat Command Center. After the command center receives the information, its system will automatically screen the priority order of threats and the order of engagement based on the information. In the foreseeable future, the PLA will continue to develop an attack order suggestion system and explore related technologies to create saturation attacks.

Jie Zhong said that if the PLA achieves this goal, given the relatively backward air defense capabilities of the main battleships of the Taiwan Navy, the probability of survival is extremely low in the face of a saturated attack by the PLA. As a result, in the Taiwan-Pengzhou defense operation plan, the Navy's most important combat power preservation plan, that is, the "dark sea dredging" of the main fleet, cannot achieve the goal of preserving combat power. The "kill chain" around the first island chain "That's how it took shape.

The PLA's strategic delivery capability has been improved

Jie Zhong said that when the People's Liberation Army discussed "Wu Reunification" within the People's Liberation Army, it attached great importance to the ability to make quick decisions. First, only a quick decision can be made to avoid military and economic intervention by foreign forces; secondly, if the "military reunification" is too long, there will be many dreams, and other countries that have disputes over territorial sovereignty with China, as well as separatism in Xinjiang and Tibet, may take advantage of it. Machine breeds trouble. Therefore, the People's Liberation Army has always advocated that the "army reunification" should not be launched, and that once it is launched, it must be resolved quickly.

Jie Zhong pointed out that according to the calculations of scholars in mainland China, if the "Wu Tong" is to fight quickly, the first wave of troops will have to deliver the main force of about 12 to 15 brigades from the air and sea, and about half of them will need Fast delivery by air. Therefore, the PLA has continued to improve its strategic delivery capabilities in recent years. It is expected that from 2025 to 2035, at least eight 075 amphibious assault ships will join the battle sequence. Some Western think tanks even believe that the PLA may produce as many as 21 075 amphibious assault ships. , to perform air maneuver operations.

In addition, the PLA will also produce 200 large transport aircraft from 2025, reaching the projected energy of six brigades in one air transport. If things go on like this, the PLA's air strategic delivery and cross-sea attack on Taiwan will reach the threshold, and the Taiwan military's response time will be cut again.

Changes in the PLA's joint landing on the island

Jie Zhong analyzed that the current implementation of the PLA's landing operations can be roughly divided into four stages: fleet sailing, transport ship transfer, landing ship transfer, and assault ashore. After 2025, the People's Liberation Army will have the ability to operate beyond the horizon or even "shore-to-shore" (all-round, full-time, full-airspace landing), and can take air vehicles or hovercraft from the southeast coast and directly cross the strait, as much as the ground firepower of the Taiwan military can. Within the reach, there will be no large-scale assembly of PLA ships. In this way, the killing effect of ground firepower will be very limited, and the speed of the PLA across the strait will also be increased.

Jie Zhong quoted Chinese scholars as speculating that if the "Wu Reunification" happened in the near future, the Taiwan army only needs to deploy 70,000 to 80,000 people to defend 15% of the key beaches; but by 2025, the Taiwan army must deploy 300,000 people Guard 80% of most areas. Jie Zhong emphasized that what the PLA will carry out in the future is a "full depth strike", that is, while attacking the coastline, it also simultaneously strikes all political and military targets on the island of Taiwan. Therefore, the existing positional position, defensive direction, tactical position and direction of firepower of the Taiwan Army actually need to be readjusted.

The original text was published on 2022/4/1 " Multidimensional News "