Russia's "coup": Why Putin "lost power" after Kharkiv's retreat?

Since September 10, the front line of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has changed, which has detonated the follow-up propaganda attack and defense.

The Ukrainian side claims that it has launched a violent offensive around Kharkiv, recovering more than 3,000 square kilometers of lost territory, including the strategic hub Izyum, which was occupied by Russian forces for five months; at the same time, Russia The army completely retreated, throwing away their helmets and armor, and fled in a hurry, and many armaments fell into the hands of the Ukrainian army. The Ukrainian side even released a video, exposing the embarrassing scene of Russian prisoners of war being tied to the ground, as well as a picture of the Ukrainian flag showing the Ukrainian flag in front of the municipal building after the Ukrainian army entered the important place of Kupiansk.

But Russia says something different. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense on the 10th, the Russian army is "active withdrawal", the goal is to regroup the Russian troops in the Balakliia and Izum areas to strengthen the strength in the direction of Donetsk. , similar to the considerations that were used to evacuate the suburbs of Kyiv. And the Russian side emphasized that during the withdrawal process, the Russian army also launched a large-scale attack, including dispatching aviation, rocket artillery and artillery units, which wiped out more than 2,000 Ukrainian troops and foreign mercenaries, as well as more than 100 armored vehicles and artillery.

When looking closely at the photos released by the Russian army, the convoys were lined up in a long line, and it seemed that they were acting in an orderly manner. The words seem to be persuasive; however, judging from the changes in the front, even if the Russian army claimed that the withdrawal was to focus on "liberating Donbass", it was unwilling to carry out general mobilization across the country, resulting in insufficient troops to deal with multi-line attacks. It is also an undeniable reality that we can only be forced to abandon the Kharkiv regional front.

Although the success or failure of a battle can hardly be called a "strategic turning point", the shrinking of the front in the direction of Kharkiv has given the West and Ukraine a pretext for propaganda. Since September 11, the public opinion topic of "Putin's coup d'etat" has begun to ferment on the media and social platforms again, and its rhetoric is the same as "Putin has cancer" that has been reported many times since February: if the source is not "exclusive to Ukraine" , is the "unnamed Putin cronies", and the content has changed from blood cancer, brain cancer, Parkinson's disease, etc., to intelligence high-level attacks, Russian military high-level attacks, emergency martial law in Moscow, and Putin under control.

In all fairness, it will take time to see how much strategic significance the contraction of the Kharkov front in the north can have when the Russian army has opened up the Crimea land bridge and occupied most of the land in the Donbas region; Gossip news such as Putin's cancer and the "Russian coup" provide a multi-faceted lens for the outside world to observe the thinking logic of the West and Ukraine.

Three logics behind the "coup"

First of all, compared with the frequent occurrence of "cancer", "coups" often occurred in periods when the Russian military's results were relatively insignificant. For example, all circles found that the Russian army could not make a quick solution, and chose to transfer to the Donbas in mid-April to "fight a dead war". The talk of a "coup d'etat" began to spread in May, until May 20, when Russia announced control of Mariu. Mariupol has gradually ceased. After the setback of the Kharkov front, the so-called "Moscow has changed" rumors have also spread in a flash, and even spread to the Chinese public opinion field, perhaps until the Russian army announces a new situation. The result will be silent again.

From this context, part of the propaganda of the "coup d'etat" is to amplify the battlefield defeats of the Russian army, and even to exaggerate the atmosphere of "defeats like mountains". Even if Russia did not have a coup d'etat at all, and even had a certain degree of initiative on the battlefield, the West and Ukraine would still use this to actively "camp" and use the media's setback and delay in the Russian offensive to cover up the heavy losses of the Ukrainian army. The fact that the strategy continues to be passive, and even "bold predictions" that Russia is about to retreat. For example, Kyrylo Budanov, director of the General Intelligence Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (GUR), said on May 14 that the war against Russia is progressing smoothly, will usher in a turning point in mid-August, and will end at the end of this year, "to overthrow the war with Russia." Russian President Vladimir Putin's coup is underway".

Second, the "coup" propaganda is also intended to outline a "divided Russia", and its narrative paradigm is roughly as follows: Putin starts a war with his own will, and is eventually overthrown by a powerful department that is unwilling to make mistakes again and again, or by the members of the State Duma collectively. Books, joint forced palace. In addition to being linked to the development of the front, this narrative is sometimes combined with all kinds of bizarre inferences. brewing a coup d’etat”; combined with the anti-war protests of some media people or political elites, it became a “widespread request for Putin’s resignation in the political circle”, such as the article “All parliamentarians request Putin’s resignation in writing” that has been fermented on the Chinese Internet since September 11 In fact, it was only the "all members" of the Moscow Lomonosovsky District Duma (Parliament) who jointly signed to demand Putin's resignation, but it was rendered by social platforms as Russia's "all members of the State Duma" demanding Putin's resignation.

In addition, on August 21, the daughter of Russian scholar Alexander Dugin died in a car bomb attack. At that time, some Western media said that "it may have been done by the Russian security services", and the short-term purpose was to "intimidate loyalists to the Kremlin". The ultimate goal is to overthrow the Putin regime. Such claims are the same as the unsubstantiated "coup" propaganda, all of which aim to exaggerate Putin's regime as shaky and unsustainable.

Third, in addition to obscuring the defeat of the Ukrainian army and exaggerating the difficulty of maintaining Putin's regime, the "coup" propaganda cannot rule out the strategic purpose of promoting a real "coup".

Looking at the factual basis of the "coup" propaganda, apart from groundless speculations such as "Putin is suffering from cancer", there are generally negative news such as the defeat of the Russian army on the battlefield, opposition in Russian politics, and assassination in Russia. In this context, the "coup" propaganda has hidden a political agenda that emphasizes Russia's "incompetence", which will encourage internal divisions in the Kremlin to a certain extent, while dampening Putin's political prestige.

In the final analysis, the essence of the "coup" propaganda is the psychological warfare launched by the West and Ukraine against Russia and the world: when the Russian army continues to advance, the fact of the Ukrainian army's defeat is blurred; when the Russian army is frustrated or stagnant, it improves the morale of the Ukrainian army. ; From a long-term perspective, it implies the strategic goal of subverting the Putin regime.

Why "coup" propaganda is not easy to come true

However, despite the ups and downs of the "coup d'etat" propaganda and a certain market among readers around the world, the probability of its occurrence in the current time and space is very small, for three reasons.

First, the Russian military is highly monitored by intelligence agencies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the KGB was partially reorganized into the Federal Security Service of Russia and gradually expanded under Putin. In early 2000, Putin, acting president, approved a series of new laws that expanded the FSB's participation in military counterintelligence activities; in 2004, the FSB's Military Counterintelligence Department was promoted to a full-fledged unit and quickly grew into a federal security agency The largest department of the bureau began to deploy a large number of personnel to the Russian army. It is very difficult for the army to form an effective insurgent group under such circumstances.

Of course, the possibility of the Federal Security Agency "rising up" cannot be ruled out. However, this bureau is often a high-risk department under anti-corruption operations. Many officials have been imprisoned on charges of corruption and treason, and witnesses are often from within the FSB. Therefore, the bureau has long permeated a culture of suspicion of mutual distrust, which to a certain extent prevented the formation of anti-government forces.

Second, Putin's public opinion base is quite solid. After the outbreak of the conflict on February 24, the Kremlin upgraded the administrative punishment for "defaming the reputation of the Russian army" into a criminal crime at the fastest speed, with a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison. So far, at least 70 people have been prosecuted for this. The aforementioned More than seven people were taken away for investigation after "all deputies" of the Lomonosovsky District Duma in Moscow signed a petition calling for Putin's resignation. This move has strongly suppressed public opinion, making it difficult for large-scale anti-war voices to emerge in society. At present, in addition to the hard-liners who have room to criticize the "excessive mercy" of the Russian army, the liberal media, under today's high-pressure control, can no longer Freely shape the trend of public opinion that advocates armistice and is relatively pro-Western.

In addition, Putin has always been reluctant to carry out national mobilization. This move has stabilized the hearts of the people to a certain extent, and can prevent the anger of ordinary people from flocking to the Kremlin. After all, it is one thing to shout patriotism in the rear, but it is another time to go to the battlefield in person. At the same time, Putin continued to link this "special military operation" with the "Great Patriotic War" and shouted "anti-Nazi" slogans, which indeed aroused historical resonance among certain people.

In all fairness, it is impossible for Russia to have no anti-Putin voices. This is true among the people and the political circles. However, under the current situation, it is extremely difficult for it to form an organized political force. put out. Therefore, in the absence of a large-scale call for a truce in public opinion, neither the military nor the intelligence agencies seem to have the name of launching a "coup d'etat".

Third, the Kremlin should be careful to deal with the differences between the high-level elites and oligarchs, and try to control the damage as much as possible, including mobilizing the elites to obey the state’s decision-making and jointly resisting sanctions with patriotic discourses; and strive to maintain the economic operation. After all, wealth is an important basis for maintaining nepotism. ; Hide the "different positions" of oligarchs and senior officials on the war as much as possible, create an atmosphere of solidarity and avoid further divergences; Provide economic support for Russian companies that cooperate with import substitution, such as the forced nationalization of some foreign companies' assets that have withdrawn from the Russian market , of course, also threatens local Russian companies that are unwilling to cooperate with the government.

To a large extent, as long as the Russian economy does not collapse and there is a lack of systemic anti-Putin and anti-war voices among the people, Putin's support base will be relatively stable. However, if there is a major reversal of the situation on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield, such as the Russian army's successive defeats and the forced withdrawal of the Russian army from the Donbass, etc., the Russian public opinion is bound to be furious, and Putin will inevitably face the biggest challenge since he came to power. Opposition forces also have a high probability of forming alliances, and they will become the backbone of the coup d'état.

However, if the Russian army can continue to hand over new victories, the Putin regime will have room to promote new power projects, that is, for the 2024 presidential election and Putin's succession, use the wartime high-pressure control system to carry out a drastic team reorganization. with cleaning. Of course, the premise is that the results of the Russian army must be convincing enough to accumulate enough political prestige for Putin.

In short, although the West and Ukraine continue to create a "coup d'etat" narrative, today's Russia's internal political atmosphere is obviously still a long way from this great change. Just as the Russian-Ukrainian front continues to change due to the rise and fall of military strength, the confrontation between Putin and the "coup" is bound to be a protracted war.

Original published URL:

2022.9.13

Russia's "coup": Why Putin "lost power" after Kharkiv's retreat? | Hong Kong 01 https://www.hk01.com/sns/article/814121?utm_source=01articlecopy&utm_medium=referral