China and Ukraine: Xi Jinping plays Russian roulette

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Cracks emerge in 'endless' Sino-Russian friendship

Vincent Kolo International Socialist Road

"Sun Tzu's Art of War" says: "Those who do not know the plans of the feudal lords cannot make friends with each other" - if you don't know what your neighbors are thinking, you should not form an alliance with them. When Xi declared at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics that his friendship with Putin "has no end", he apparently did not heed his grandson's admonition. Just 20 days later, Putin's forces invaded Ukraine.

Everyone is speculating how much Xi Jinping and the "Xi core" actually know about Putin's plans for war. Are they kept in the dark? It seems unlikely. Is Xi Jinping, like Putin, betting on a quick and landslide victory for the Russian military? Seems like a reasonable guess. Does Xi Jinping know more but not tell other top CCP leaders? possible. In any case, both dictators grossly misjudged the situation. And such mistakes can ultimately threaten their position on power.

There is a rift within the Chinese regime that is hard to hide, and there is considerable opposition to Xi's pro-Putin line, partly reflected in Beijing's conflicting messages. As Keji Zhongze, a senior commentator on China affairs, said, within the Seventh Standing Committee of the Politburo, the ruling organ of the Communist Party of China, there are differences on the alliance with Russia: "Seven people have different opinions." Disagreement over Ukraine's war stance, coupled with the partial rollback of economic policies promoted by Xi, is likely to intensify the power struggle within the Communist Party.

Xi Jinping wanted "stability over everything" on the eve of the 20th Party Congress and expected to be crowned a lifelong dictator like Putin, but now is the worst time for him. The anti-Xi faction, led by Premier Li Keqiang and backed by some red capitalists and retired officials, is still too weak to overthrow Xi, but they are increasingly openly opposed to Xi's policies. To implement policies at such a severe stage of crisis, the Xi Jinping regime must become more authoritarian and centralized, turning the instability into a vicious circle.

'Great disagreement'

Hu Wei, vice-chairman of the Public Policy Research Center of the State Council Counselor's Office, wrote: "China cannot be tied to Putin and needs to be cut as soon as possible." The importance of the article is that it is rare to openly criticize Xi Jinping's line (without naming names, of course) and has considerable support among the top ranks of the party. Hu Wei said that the war "caused great differences in the country" and that "supporters and opponents are incompatible". He warned: "It is estimated that there is still a window period of one or two weeks (cutting with Russia), and China may lose room for maneuver and must act decisively."

Hu's comments were the sharpest expression yet of China's ruling class disagreement over Xi's "wolf warrior diplomacy", and the Sino-Russian alliance is the latest and most controversial point on the issue. A considerable number of CCP officials and their capital circles believe that Xi Jinping's nationalist line is increasingly counterproductive—destroying the economy and fueling U.S. imperialism's anti-China rhetoric. However, because the alliance with Russia was supervised by Xi Jinping himself, it was difficult for the CCP regime to ride a tiger. At best the tone may now be revised rather than substantively changed. Hu Wei advocates "cutting" with Putin, which also means that it will seriously attack the "strongman" image that Xi Jinping has worked hard to create in the past decade.

The degree of difficulty Beijing will encounter also depends on the development of the war. If it is a long-term war that lasts for several months, and the Russian army strengthens terrorist bombing of the surrounded cities, it will be more difficult for the CCP to maintain "false neutrality", which is a nightmare for them. A worse scenario for Xi is the fall of Putin, whether due to a mass movement or a "palace coup", which would shock China. So, while trying to be ambiguous, the Xi regime will try to help Putin stay in power.

Xi Jinping has sought to project an image of a nationalist strongman who dares to stand up to the United States, and the Chinese regime's paradoxical "neutrality" in the Ukraine war has undermined his authority. Externally, the CCP’s rhetoric towards Biden is vague and polite, keeping its distance from Russia, while its domestic propaganda promotes nationalism and is highly pro-Russian. Parts of the masses have noticed the stark contrast, which undercuts Mr. Xi’s nationalist propaganda while exposing the hypocrisy of his global image as a “peacemaker.” The "Great Translation Movement" was launched by groups mainly of overseas Chinese to translate into English the arrogant nationalist, racist and sexist rhetoric on state-controlled media and social media. The movement reflects some Chinese people's distaste for the CCP's false propaganda.

"The Truman Doctrine"

For Putin and Russian capitalism, the Ukraine war may be comparable to the disastrous decision to invade Iraq in 2003. The then US President George W. Bush totally underestimated the depth of the national political quagmire into which they had jumped. Putin has misjudged the situation in all respects - from the strength of the Russian military, the level of Ukrainian resistance (Putin is paying the price for his ignorance in his violent attacks on Lenin's ideas on national issues), to the world situation and Western imperialism. Great response. Xi Jinping has so blatantly aligned his regime with Putin's that, whether or not China is officially a target of sanctions for pro-Russia, it risks diplomatic isolation and an accelerated decoupling from the West at a potentially devastating economic cost.

The International Socialist Way (ISA) explained that the war in Ukraine changed everything. The Financial Times, which advocates for Western capitalism, described the moment as a "geopolitical fulcrum" and urged Washington to adopt a replica of the 1947 Truman Doctrine, which divided countries into pro- and anti-American camps. In the short term, Russia's aggression against Ukraine has strengthened the power of Western capitalist governments, making them shockingly beefed up, using unprecedented state intervention in financial markets in sanctions against Russia, and more successfully wrapping their policies in defending "democracy". "against the cloak of "authoritarian".

The new Cold War between China and the United States for several years has experienced a "Great Leap Forward" since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The acceleration of economic deglobalization is inevitable. The Russian aggression has, at least in the short term, allowed the European Union and the U.S.-led camp to bridge internal divisions. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called for the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in Japan, while Germany jumped to the world's third largest military spender. The Ukrainian war cleared the post-1945 world order from participation.

"Disaster Capitalism"

This level of Western solidarity is something Chinese foreign policy has been trying to prevent since Obama and Trump became US presidents. Therefore, Putin's war has greatly contributed to Biden's strategy of building a "democratic" imperialist alliance to contain China and Russia. Xi Jinping's substantive support for a Russian aggression makes it easier for U.S. imperialism to use the conflict against Russia as a cover for what is essentially a proxy war against China's long-standing primary goal. The nature and scale of Western sanctions against Russia are a crucial part of this proxy war.

The sharp escalation of the conflict between the West and Russia is inseparable from the conflict between China and the United States. Biden has been pushing for a stronger alliance with Europe, particularly using NATO, to reverse Trump's isolationist "America First" policies. Its purpose is to isolate China in international politics and to increase pressure on China in disputes in the Indo-Pacific region such as the South China Sea and Taiwan. In the long run, Asia is more strategically important to U.S. imperialism than Ukraine and Eastern Europe. All this means that the Ukraine war is a preview of future global conflicts.

Socialists oppose Russian aggression and Putin's imperialist attempts on the one hand, and NATO and US imperialism on the other. The purgatory situation facing the Ukrainian people is a wake-up call to the suffering humanity faces under “disaster capitalism” — in addition to climate catastrophe and deadly pandemics, the specter of military conflict between nuclear powers roams the world . We counted on heroic anti-war protests in Russia and also pointed to the need for working-class internationalism - first of all in solidarity with the Ukrainian masses, but also in the fight against the militaristic and anti-worker policies of all bourgeois governments. We refer readers to the detailed socialist analysis published by the ISA at internationalsocialist.net.

The words and deeds of all imperialist forces are hypocritical. Putin blatantly denies Ukraine's rights as a nation-state. Wang Yi told the world that China "firmly advocates respecting and safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries", but at the same time domestic media only reported pro-Russian war news and refused to use the word "invasion". The decisions of Biden, Johnson and Scholz are not based on the interests of the Ukrainian people, but rather for maximum geopolitical gain in Putin's problems. The political maneuvering between the United States and NATO over the years using the Ukrainian bourgeois right-wing government as a pawn has also contributed to sowing the seeds of war. Today, NATO intends to “fight to the last soldier in Ukraine”, extolling the heroic Ukrainian resistance, but at the same time trying to limit the conflict to the zone – as in the “rejected” Polish fighter incident.

China as a superpower

This is the most serious international crisis the Chinese regime has faced since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of Stalinist dictatorships in Eastern Europe 30 years ago. This is the first serious crisis China has faced as the second superpower - an imperialist power with a global scope of interests, mega-corporations and huge investments to defend as it competes fiercely with the United States. In 1992, China was not even among the top ten economies in the world. China was a nobody at the time focusing on domestic problems (the restoration of capitalism after the political upheaval of 1989). Today, as the world's second-largest economy, China is far more integrated into the global financial and trading system than Russia, the world's 11th-largest economy. For Chinese capitalism, the threat of being shut out of Western markets by sanctions is greater than the equivalent threat to Russia.

Socialists oppose sanctions. Sanctions are a tool of financial capital in the most powerful countries of capitalism, which can then be used against workers in their struggle against socialism. In Hong Kong and Xinjiang, the ISA opposes Western sanctions, warning that sanctions will not stop the CCP from state repression, but will weaken and disintegrate mass struggle. The strength of sanctions against Russia is immeasurable, but we oppose sanctions not based on the strength of sanctions, but on which class is sanctioning and for what purpose.

5.5% GDP growth?

At a time of war in Ukraine, China will suffer huge economic losses even as the CCP’s diplomatic stunts (pro-peace in words, Putin in practice) try to shield it from U.S. and Western sanctions. China is the world's largest oil importer, importing 70% of its oil and 40% of its natural gas. In 2021, international crude oil prices have risen by 60%, and since the Russian army entered Ukraine, oil prices have risen by 11%. The end result will be an increase in coal use and even a faster worsening of climate damage.

China's Agriculture and Rural Affairs minister warned in March that this year's wheat harvest "could be the worst ever" due to last year's heavy rains. China will need to increase its wheat imports by about 50%, and since Russia invaded Ukraine, wheat prices have surged 50% to record highs. A quarter of the world's wheat is exported from Russia and Ukraine, but sanctions and wars have disrupted the supply of wheat to the world market. Soaring global food prices have threatened mass starvation and "bread riots" in many developing countries.

But at a time when China's economic growth is severely slowing, what could hit China's economy hard is the threat of secondary sanctions - China being dragged into a network of sanctions led by the United States and primarily targeting Russia. On March 5, at the National People's Congress, the Chinese government announced a GDP growth target of 5.5 percent for 2022, the lowest target in nearly 30 years. Most economists doubt that this goal can be achieved. The figure appears to be more of a "confidence boost" than a realistic target - the IMF and others forecast China's economy to grow by 4.8% this year, but if the government proposes anything less than 5% The goal of economic growth is tantamount to admitting defeat and having a negative impact on itself.

Even without the dangerous economic consequences of the war in Ukraine, the Chinese economy faces serious problems: a slow collapse of the real estate sector, rising unemployment, sluggish consumption, and a lockdown to prevent the spread of the Omikron variant supply chain disruptions. The Xi Jinping regime insists on continuing its "dynamic clearing" policy, but this policy has suffered a complete failure in Hong Kong - there are currently more than 1 million confirmed cases of the new crown in Hong Kong, and the new crown death rate has become the highest in the world. Morgan Stanley predicts that China's economy will see zero growth in the first quarter due to the impact of the Omikojon variant. The property market, the main driver of China's economic growth, has contracted for six months in both prices and sales, despite a U-turn in government policy, easing credit controls and monetary policy, and abandoning Xi Jinping's proposed real estate tax.

The CCP did not anticipate Putin’s war and did not prepare for it. At such a critical turning point in the Sino-US Cold War, the exact factors that the Xi Jinping regime was completely at a loss for, largely exposed the fragility and internal contradictions of its regime. The first wave of the epidemic in Wuhan, the mass movement in Hong Kong in 2019, and the trade war launched by Trump in 2018—Xi Jinping overturned again and again! Now Zhuge Liang sees in hindsight that the 5,000-character joint statement issued by China and Russia on February 4 announced an “unlimited” strategic partnership between the two sides—Xi Jinping even described it as a “winner alliance”, which has now been He backfired. It was the Chinese state leader, not Putin, who volunteered the new deal. Xi Jinping mainly wants to increase his own authority on the stage of the Beijing Winter Olympics, which are largely boycotted by leaders (21 this year, compared to 68 in 2008). For Xi Jinping, his energies are focused on being re-elected at the 20th Party Congress, and the Olympics are nothing more than the electoral rallies in bourgeois democracy — nothing but fireworks and patriotism.

"Like two brothers"

"It is important for the top leaders of the two countries to compare the strategic partnership between the two countries to 'back-to-back'—meaning that the two countries are like two brothers, protecting each other's rear..." The CCP's Global Times (February 13 in English) version) as commented. This description may not stand the test of history. Now Chinese diplomats are constantly trying to avoid problems and avoid sanctions that the West sees as Putin's "accomplice". Since the Feb. 4 statement, the two sides have not made much real progress — just expanding or wrapping existing energy and technology cooperation between the two countries. Its purpose is simply to signal a common front against the United States. But now that Putin has provoked the biggest war in Europe in 80 years, Xi Jinping has seriously miscalculated.

Xi Jinping is betting that his regime can take advantage of military tensions in Europe by forcing a Biden administration to shift its focus away from the Indo-Pacific and China. Like Putin, Xi Jinping may have misunderstood that divisions between US and European imperialism (especially Germany) would widen. Furthermore, the current situation shows that the two dictators are not "brothers" and that the alliance between the two sides is really just a matter of strategy. Xi Jinping sees Russia as increasingly dependent on China and sees China as its "big brother", in contrast to the Cold War in the 1950s, when both countries were Stalinist dictatorships and the Soviet Union was China's "big brother." If Putin's aggressive diplomacy and threats against Ukraine are successful and Western capitalism has only superficial protests (as it did with Xi Jinping's crackdown on Hong Kong), this could strengthen Xi Jinping's calculations about Taiwan.

Therefore, whether or not Xi Jinping fully understands the plan to invade Ukraine beforehand, he may also relish the situation that Putin is causing trouble for the West and China is watching from the other side. On February 24, though, all those positives turned into negatives.

Xi Jinping may become the leader of China who has "lost Europe". Using trade diplomacy and touting European "sovereignty" to try to divide the European Union (especially Germany, which is very dependent on China's economy) and the anti-China policy of the United States, Biden, has always been an important feature of China's diplomacy. This route took a heavy hit last year (the failed China-EU trade deal, Xinjiang sanctions, Merkel's retirement, the "Lithuania incident"), but the war in Ukraine and China's relationship with Putin may be the final nail in the coffin. U.S. imperialism will of course also consciously counteract, and they will be more successful in the shadow of war.

Divergence between imperialism

On March 18, part of the call between Biden and Xi Jinping was also addressed to Europe. The speeches of the leaders of the two countries were also deliberately addressed to Brussels, and especially to Berlin. Biden warned of serious "consequences" if China provided Russia with military aid, or helped it circumvent Western sanctions, which they claimed to have evidence of. The U.S. is actually drawing a "red line" toward China and is also pressuring Europe to support this position. The serious impact of Russian sanctions makes this threat very real to Beijing.

The EU is already divided over whether to tighten sanctions on Russia. An EU diplomat told The Times there were now three camps emerging. The first is the so-called hardline "sanctioning faction", which includes Poland and the Baltic states, which are geographically closest to the theater of operations and therefore most affected by military escalation. They advocate tougher sanctions, such as a complete ban on imports of Russian energy. On the other side is the "opposition", led by Germany and backed by Italy, Hungary, Greece and Bulgaria, all opposed to tightening sanctions. Then there are the rest of the countries.

These internal divisions are in line with earlier divisions on China—Orban’s Hungary is pro-China, and traditionally pro-China Germany (China will account for 38% of German automakers’ sales in 2021), On the other end of the spectrum is Lithuania, which fell into a "David and Goliath" conflict with China last year, which has since turned into a larger EU trade crisis. The war in Ukraine has already hit Xi Jinping's signature Belt and Road initiative. Like the sanctions and other effects of war, this damage may be permanent, even long after the war is over. Ukraine is an important strategic partner of the Belt and Road Initiative, and of course so is Russia. Poland, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia are all BRI participating countries that support Ukraine, while Belarus, another member state, supports Russia. The CCP is trying to use the "Belt and Road" to create "peace and cooperation", and now what an irony!

The current developments will force Beijing to undertake a major reassessment of the entire Belt and Road Initiative. The Belt and Road has encountered major problems, unfinished projects and disputes due to the growing debt crisis in many participating countries. In Eastern Europe, billions of dollars worth of Chinese investment projects are now in jeopardy because of Putin's war, including nearly $3 billion in Chinese construction projects in Ukraine alone. China's "17+1" China-CEEC cooperation (a Chinese investment forum that overlaps with the "Belt and Road") may also fall apart. Lithuania withdrew from this economic and trade cooperation last year, and the Western powers that dominate the EU have always regarded the "17+1" bloc as China's encroachment on the EU's "backyard". This stance may lead to a stronger counterattack by Western China and force the small country that has become a "pawn" to withdraw from the "17+1".

Taiwan and Ukraine

The Ukrainian conflict also has implications for Taiwan's future, but not as Xi Jinping initially envisioned. China's foreign ministry has always insisted that "Taiwan is not Ukraine," focusing on issues of legitimacy and "sovereignty," and Putin has proven that "sovereignty" cannot stop an insatiable capitalist regime from invading. China claims Taiwan is not a "country" but disagrees with Putin over whether Ukraine's sovereignty should be respected.

For socialists, our position is based on more fundamental considerations: national consciousness (both Ukrainians and Taiwanese), democratic expectations, fear of dictatorship and military invasion. Under capitalism and imperialism, the masses in both Taiwan and Ukraine are unfortunately caught between larger powers that have no intention of achieving true peace or democracy at all.

Xi may think that the conflict in Ukraine will prompt the United States to divert military resources to Europe and increase pressure on Japan through an alliance between China and Russia, thereby strengthening Xi's control over the Taiwan Strait. Perhaps he hoped that Russia's swift and overwhelming victory in the war would expose the West's image of a paper tiger. None of this happened, instead the opposite happened. Xi Jinping's strategy to "unify" Taiwan appears to be more problematic than before. However, this does not mean that there will be no war or Chinese invasion in the long run, as some people mistakenly believe. Including small groups in Taiwan, who left the ISA last year, who see China's threat of force as a "bluff" -- naive to conclude that there is no need to link the struggle for independence with socialism and the common struggle with Chinese workers .

The tragic progress of Putin's invasion so far, as well as the heavy (unconfirmed) losses suffered by Russia, should serve as a wake-up call for hardliners in the PLA that an invasion of Taiwan would be a big mistake. The Russian army's combat experience is far superior to that of the Chinese army, and a land attack on Ukraine is more direct and easier than landing on Taiwan; and military experts estimate that the difficulty of landing an attack on Taiwan is at least the same as the Normandy landing in 1944. Xi Jinping will not risk a war unless he is confident that he will win, because a military defeat would spell the end of his regime. But Putin is also confident. So if the Ukrainian war has any effect on China, it will make the Chinese military doubt its own strategy and will undergo a major reassessment.

If Putin's plan is to occupy Ukraine, a goal that looks increasingly unrealistic today, the United States and NATO will certainly respond by funding right-wing rebels in Ukraine. This may succeed in weakening Moscow's resolve, but it will take years and many lives, but it will also often hinder and undermine the real mass struggle. This situation is also a troubling issue for the CCP’s Taiwan hawks. Even assuming that the People's Liberation Army can successfully invade Taiwan and rule an island of 23 million people, most of whom don't want to be ruled by Beijing, would lead to exhaustion and disintegration of the CCP's occupying forces over time.

Nationalism on the rise

Rising nationalist sentiments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait made the situation even more volatile. Support for Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen/DPP government and its pro-US militarization policies has grown over fears that Putin's invasion could inspire his "best friend" Xi Jinping to attack Taiwan.

A March poll by the Taiwan Institute for International Strategy showed that 70.2 percent of Taiwanese were "willing to fight to defend Taiwan," compared with 40.3 percent of respondents in the same poll last December. Like other governments, the DPP is using the crisis to create "national unity" to stifle class struggle, and to push for more pro-capital trade deals with the US and Japan in exchange for their "protection". Tsai Ing-wen is also pushing to increase spending on armaments and extend compulsory military service.

In China, the online “wolf warrior” nationalism that the CCP has been promoting for years, now also intertwined with adoration of Putin and support for Russia, is now at risk of spiraling out of control. "Little Pink" and other social media nationalists, some of whom are close to fascism, have become so assertive that their vicious rhetoric is no longer aimed only at gays, feminists, "Taiwan independence elements" and Hong Kongers, and even It will also target former CCP nationalist flag-bearers (such as Hu Xijin, who stepped down as editor-in-chief of the Global Times last year). For Beijing, these nationalist pressures are becoming increasingly difficult to contain, and there may be less “room for manoeuvre” in the CCP’s policy, making it harder to adopt a more “pragmatic” foreign policy when necessary.

For the Asian, European and global working classes, the Ukrainian war was the beginning of a more dangerous and turbulent period of capitalist disorder. To end this war and avoid future wars, the working class must settle accounts with capitalism and imperialism. Organizing anti-war actions and launching anti-war protests is a good start, but these are not enough. Under the current circumstances, what is needed is much more than pressure or calls on the government to change its policies. The working class also has to overcome disorganization, lack of voice, lack of power. Rebuilding a strong socialist workers' movement against capitalism and militarism is more urgent now than ever.