Interview with Zhang Dengji | What strategic options does Beijing have in the five endings of the Russia-Ukraine conflict

On February 24, 2022, Russia announced the launch of a "special military operation" against Ukraine, and then divided its troops into Ukraine. In the eastern region, the Russian army joined the Donetsk People's Army and the Luhansk People's Army to attack, with the purpose of "recovering" the "lost" of the two republics, forming the East Ukraine offensive; the northeastern front, the Russian army and the Belarusian army cooperated to fight In the southern region, the Russian army moved north from Crimea to occupy Kherson; in the northern front, the Russian army went south from Belarus to surround Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. At present, Kharkiv, Mariupol and other cities are caught in a hot war, and the Russian army still has the initiative; Russia and Ukraine have also experienced four rounds of delegation negotiations, but so far there has been no significant breakthrough.

At the same time, non-traditional fronts such as finance, economy and trade, media, technology, and cognition have been launched simultaneously. The West has imposed severe sanctions and boycotts on Russia, and the intellectual community has also faced fierce confrontation for this geopolitical upheaval. On March 10, local time, Taiwan's "Republic of China Institute of International Relations" held a current affairs symposium on "Russia-Ukraine Situation - Reflection and Prospect". And Professor, discussing the changes in the international pattern affected by the situation in Russia and Ukraine, as well as the relevant enlightenment for both sides of the strait. This is the second in a series of reports (two in total).

Series 1: Interview with Zhang Dengji｜The Two Keys to the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: Ethnic Fault and Land and Sea Controversy

Duowei: You mentioned the strategic triangular relationship between China, the United States and Russia. How would you rate the actions and reactions of these three parties in this conflict?

Zhang Dengji: The first is Russia. When this conflict broke out, Russia did cross the border first, and even invaded Ukrainian territory west of the two "republics" in the east of Ukraine, and then the Russian army headed south from Belarus to Kyiv. Vladimir Putin's decision exceeded my earlier expectations. However, as mentioned above, as long as the regular army is dispatched, even going to the Udong prefectures is bound to be costly, so there must be a reason for this important decision. What's more, the sword points to the capital. If Russia cannot gain an absolute advantage, then Udong and Crimea may be lost in the future; even if a puppet government is established, it will be difficult to last long.

Russia hopes to subdue Ukraine with the blitzkrieg and get the alliance under the city, which is to force Kyiv to negotiate, rather than to rule by itself. If you ask if there is a plan for Russia to send troops this time, I think it is, but I don't want to "Iraqize" Ukraine. What's more, it will be very troublesome if Ussi appears "Chongqing in Ukraine". Russia has a painful experience in Afghanistan and should not want to repeat it in Ukraine.

The United States also has its dilemma. Joe Biden's midterm elections are approaching. Although the Biden administration has achieved results in reducing unemployment, inflation remains high. Now that Russia has imposed severe sanctions, prices are bound to skyrocket. But in politics, Biden has no room to show weakness to Russia, nor does he dare to ease relations with China, because this will attract opponents to attack. It can be expected that in 2024, the two parties in the United States will probably increase their weight in the direction of being tough on both China and Russia. Unless there is a "color revolution" in Russia, U.S.-Russian relations should be hostile for a long time.

If Washington does directly intervene in Ukraine this time, it will fall into a real predicament, that is, it will have to exert pressure on both Eastern Europe and the "Indo-Pacific" in the future, and the burden will be too great. However, if the intervention is not enough, it will make it clear to the outside world that the United States does not provide direct support to Ukraine at all, and the prestige and credibility of the major powers will be problematic.

Beijing, for the time being, appears to be a half outsider, so it retains its flexibility. The US threatened to sanction China together this time, but exposed its own double standards, because India and Israel did not join the extreme pressure on Russia, but the United States did not threaten to sanction Israel and India, which invisibly hurt its own morality. point. China may want to take a position that is to play the role of a neutral power, expressing its respect for territorial integrity, but also opposing unilateral sanctions. From this point of view, Beijing is currently cautious and has not lost points for the time being.

But whether Sino-US relations will be eased because of this, I personally find it very difficult, because Sino-US relations and mutual trust have been damaged. As the mainland scholar Yan Xuetong said, since the era of Barack Obama, the relationship between China and the United States has been reduced to a "fake friend" relationship, and now it is a "quasi-hostile" relationship with zero-sum competition, and the two sides can no longer communicate sincerely. What's more, it is now a period of change in the international order, and it is even more difficult for the United States to get rid of the complex of maintaining unilateral hegemony.

In addition, it can be seen that China and Russia have become "closer" this time, including Putin's visit to China during the Winter Olympics to issue a joint statement, and rumors that after Putin left China, CCP high-level meetings were held overnight, which was considered by the U.S. intelligence community as "China knew in advance about Russia." to invade Ukraine". Of course there can be no evidence for such an allegation. I think Putin is at most showing Xi Jinping and even Emmanuel Macron "what conditions are not met" to send troops, not the date of sending troops. But it is an indisputable fact that Russia intends to "stabilize China" before taking action.

After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the outside world is concerned about whether the strategic focus of the United States will move from the Indo-Pacific to Europe. Of course, the United States does not dare to take this development lightly, so there will be some important American officials visiting Taiwan in the near future. However, on the one hand, Beijing maintains pressure on Taiwan, including the presence of warships in the waters off Lanyu. Taiwan has recently discussed whether to mass-produce medium and long-range missiles and extend their service periods, which can also be regarded as a response to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Obviously, there is indeed a phenomenon of "linkage" between Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait issue.

Duowei: What do you think of the future trend of the Russian-Ukrainian war and its possible impact on the Taiwan Strait? What strategic options does Beijing have?

Zhang Dengji: Actually, Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait issue have a lot in common, that is, they are approaching the door of China and Russia. The relatively loose issue in the past has gradually become the core issue of the competition between major powers.

Today's Russia lacks economic innovation and has an aging population, mainly relying on energy and military advantages to support its appearance. But Russia's historical memory will also tell him that "the family must be kept." I don't think Putin has misestimated Russia's capabilities and wants to engage in "Great Slavism". It is more about maintaining peripheral security, that is, ensuring the survival of the Russian state. Of course, many people will say: "Now Russia is threatening the small country Ukraine, who dares to attack Russia?" This statement is intuitive and reasonable, but now that science and technology are changing with each passing day, the long-range detection and offensive systems will change the original means of deterrence. This is why Russia is rapidly developing hypersonic missiles, because NATO deploys missile reconnaissance and defense systems in front-line countries. On the surface, it is said to defend against Iran. In fact, in Russia's view, it is to turn its nuclear weapons into scrap iron. If nothing happens, once there is an "accident" in the East and the West, Russia's ability to counterattack and strike will be greatly reduced. International politics emphasizes "self-help" rather than "trust"; if Russia wants to deploy something similar in Cuba, the United States will not sit idly by.

As for the future direction of the war, unless one side is completely eliminated, negotiations will continue. At first, Ukraine did not want to negotiate the issue of sovereignty, but only wanted to discuss the establishment of a "humanitarian corridor" in exchange for delay in exchange for larger and direct support from the West. But now that the battlefield advantage is gradually lost, it can no longer be avoided; from the Russian perspective, unless it is sure to overthrow the current regime in Ukraine, Moscow will still participate in the negotiations. The United States also wants to use sanctions to encourage a "color revolution" within Russia, but it seems to be very difficult at present.

I personally agree that the longer the war drags on, the more painful the Ukrainian people will be, and the Russian people's livelihood will also be severely hit. Even global prices will soar and everyone will suffer. However, if we start from the academic "extreme thinking", we can also deduce several possible battle scenarios based on the positions and requirements of all parties, and discuss the choices and profits and losses of various actors.

There are about five possible outcomes of the Ukrainian war, ranging from the extreme of Russian defeat to the extreme of victory. The army was forced to retreat to the eastern and western states of Ukraine; 3. Russia and Ukraine were at war for a long time, and Ukraine lost the east, and the central government retreated to Lviv in the west; Wudong; 5. The Russian army occupied Ukraine and established a new proxy regime.

The first result is that Russia can be described as a fiasco, which may lead to regime change or nuclear weapons risk; and Ukraine not only successfully recaptured Ukrainian East, but may also join NATO. The second outcome is that Russia is still defeated, and the Putin regime will continue to be unstable; Ukraine may become Iraqi, and its regime will be effectively integrated into NATO. The third result is that the war has been stalemate for more than half a year (after Biden’s midterm elections), the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been protracted, and the Putin regime is still at risk of instability; but Ukraine may also become Libyan, and there is no room to join NATO; the United States will also choose Shake off Western Europe and turn back to escalating sanctions on China. The fourth outcome is that Russia wins a small victory, Ukraine may become Afghan, and it will not be able to join NATO; the United States will turn back to pressure China to sanction Russia. The fifth result is that if Russia wins the battlefield, then Ukraine’s fate is still Afghanization, and it cannot join NATO; the United States is forced to fight against Russia to the maximum extent for a long time, so it needs to ease Sino-US relations to a certain extent, and it will be effective to contain Russia. In this scenario, Beijing may gain a strategic hub.

Based on the above five results, if the first or second type appears in the end, it will be considered a winner for Washington, and it can suppress Russia, NATO and expand again, and at the same time seal the Pacific and turn back to restrain China. To achieve high scores and suppress Trump can be described as "three birds with one stone". However, at present, Russia may have regained a certain amount of battlefield initiative, leaving the United States lacking the political space to solve Russia and then China, and its strength cannot simultaneously exert high-intensity pressure on the east and west fronts. It wants to actively operate the triangular relationship between China, the United States and Russia. very difficult. Therefore, in the end, it is not impossible for Beijing to have a "period of opportunity" in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

In this conflict, Moscow’s costly and aggressive approach taught Beijing a lesson, and what happened to Ukraine actually taught Taiwan a lesson. No matter if you kill two birds with one stone or "three birds with two stones", the price of becoming a stone in the battlefield is extremely high. History cannot be replicated or repeated, but perhaps the experience and wisdom of Sweden and Finland are still better than Ukraine, which should be something Taiwan should learn from.

The original text was published on 2022/3/16 " Multidimensional News "