Epidemic control reverie and outlook to 2022: Analysis from the perspective of legality

Epidemic Public Opinion Control Reverie and Outlook for 2022

Li Porou 2022/3/29 Posted in Hongdi

Since the end of 2019, it has been more than two years since the epidemic began. The author had an analysis of the epidemic in January 2022, but received a lot of objections. ([The author's article in January 2022 is in the appendix.] In the face of a new round of epidemics in China, the author believes that the article in January is still valuable. This article adopts Mr. Zhao Dingxin's legitimacy model, which divides the legitimacy into Three ideal types - "performance legitimacy", "procedural legitimacy", and "ideological legitimacy". Based on the article in January, analyze the public opinion and development of the epidemic. 【About Mr. Zhao Dingxin's three For individual legitimacy, see Zhao Dingxin: The Politics of Legitimacy: State-Society Relations in Contemporary China (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 2018).]

At the beginning of the article, briefly explain what the three legalities are:

1. "Ideological legitimacy" is the country's mainstream core value, which Mr. Zhao Dingxin summed up as four principles: 1. "Ideology" with the nature of a general outline; 3. Unfalsifiability; 4. Extremely stable (ideas that can be accepted without force, such as the male-centered idea in Confucianism).

2. "Performance legitimacy" is the government's performance. In the case of an epidemic, the best indicators to measure the government's performance are the epidemic prevention and control capabilities and economic development. In the post-Mao era, the bankruptcy of the old ideological legitimacy brought about the government's reliance on performance legitimacy. Especially after the third wave of democratization, the government's reliance on performance legitimacy has further increased.

3. "Procedural legitimacy" refers to the procedures for the generation of regimes or leaders, such as elite-led monarchical authority, or a popular-led electoral system. Under a democratic system, different people have the right to participate in politics on social issues that they care about, creating a sense of social identity, and part of the national ideology will naturally be accepted by the public. In Western countries, procedural legitimacy is the main source of legitimacy; in China, performance legitimacy is the main source of legitimacy.

[Excerpt from Zhao Dingxin: The Politics of Legitimacy, pp. 29-40. 】

In the face of the emerging epidemic, there are generally two voices, one group advocates coexistence, and the other group advocates clearing. Coexistence policy is currently

The policies adopted by most Western countries, in addition, countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore are also gradually liberalizing; in contrast, the zero-clearing policy is a policy adopted by the Chinese side. In order to maintain their respective policies, corresponding speeches are required. Therefore, the governments of all parties have produced two types of government-led speeches:

1. Coexistence theory (referring to the mainstream Western media), claiming that the epidemic is not terrible and coexists with the epidemic

2. Terrorism (referring to Chinese mainstream media), claiming that the epidemic will have a great impact, so it needs to be cleared

In addition to government-led speeches, there are also people-led speeches. Such remarks are often difficult to distinguish between true and false, but they can lead to

There is a lot of panic, or the indignation of the people. (For example, the injustices of epidemic control circulating on social media) The articles collectively refer to them as "rumors", which does not mean that they are all false, but that they do not match the mainstream speech of the government:

3. Coexistence rumors (referring to some people's remarks that contradict mainstream terror theory)

4. Terrorist rumors (referring to some people's remarks that contradict the mainstream coexistence theory)

In a country with a lack of legitimacy, the government does not have the "cultural hegemony" like the West, and there will inevitably be a large number of rumors that do not conform to mainstream speech, that is, the Tacitus trap. Under the current control of public opinion, it seems that everyone supports the government's zero-clearing policy, but all of this is based on economic development, that is, based on "performance legitimacy". If performance legitimacy declines, it is hard to imagine such a situation. Is the public opinion control still effective? There are many such examples, such as the report on the bombing of the Yugoslav embassy and the report on the Xiamen PX incident. The following will use the student movement in 1989 to confirm this statement.

In the face of the economic turmoil (performance) brought about by the price reform and the crisis of three beliefs (ideology) brought about by the reform [namely belief, trust, confidence. ], the lagging political system reform (procedure), and the student movement in China broke out in 1989. In the initial stage of the student movement, the government did not report positively on the student demonstrations, and even called the student movement "turmoil" on April 26 to suppress ideology. But there was no ideological legitimacy at this time, and as a result, the public did not believe the government's reports, but rather the rumors that emerged. For example, in the Xinhuamen incident on April 20, 1989, students were generally willing to believe that the "Xinhuamen Massacre" (that is, they were beaten by the police at Xinhuamen) really happened at that time, rather than accepting what the government said. "The bloodshed in front of Xinhua Gate was caused by the students smashing the windows of the bus." However, according to research by scholars, the blood in front of Xinhua Gate was indeed caused by the glass of the bus, but the public is more willing to believe the former narrative. [Zhao Dingxin: "State, Social Relations and the 1989 Student Movement" (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2017), introductory part. 】

As the movement grew, the government began to make concessions and began to report positively about the movement. For example, on April 28, People's Daily made a relatively positive report on the movement. [See "Beijing University Students Take to the Streets", "People's Daily", April 28, 1989, first edition, People's Data. ] On April 29, the moderate 429 editorial drafted by Bao Tong was published. [See "Maintaining the overall situation and maintaining stability", "People's Daily", April 29, 1989, first edition, People's Data. ] Zhao Ziyang, the then general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, then told Hu Qili and Rui Xingwen, who were in charge of media propaganda, to let go of public opinion, and the reports of the parade continued to increase. Even if the rumors persist, the effect of the rumors is not insignificant. In other words, the government's reporting conforms to what the people say. [Zhao Dingxin: "State-Social Relations and the 1989 Student Movement", pp. 284-285. 】

However, after the reform forces lost power and declared martial law on May 20, the government once again stepped up its ideological suppression, and rumors appeared again in large numbers. Such as "Deng Xiaoping died", "Li Peng was shot by a policeman", "More than 20,000 civilians were massacred" and so on. Rumors undoubtedly intensified the movement and shaped the masses' understanding of the movement, which is why the movement has mobilized so many Beijing citizens. [Zhao Dingxin: "State, Social Relations and the 1989 Student Movement", pp. 291-293. See also Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link eds., The Tiananmen Papers (New York: Public Affairs, 2001, compiled by Zhang Liang).】

In a society lacking ideological and procedural legitimacy, when performance legitimacy is damaged, it will inevitably lead to a legitimacy crisis. In a crisis of legitimacy, the media appears to be left and right. If the media reports contrary to what the people say, it will cause rumors, and if the media follow the people's reports, it will lead to the further expansion of the movement. The difference is that in Western countries with relatively high procedural legitimacy, public opinion changes with media reports, rather than media reports changing with public opinion. Mainstream values are what Gramsci called "cultural hegemony".

Such an example can be reflected in the coverage of the riots in London by Western media in 2011. In the face of the demonstrations in north London and August 6, 2011, the United Kingdom dispatched 16,000 police officers and arrested more than 3,000 people. , quelled the riots. Then-Prime Minister David Cameron gave an extremely harsh assessment of the London demonstrations, even more so than the 426 editorial. But unlike China, the British media has always stood on the government's side and guided the public's opinion without creating a crisis of legitimacy. Surprisingly, 68% of people surveyed by the British newspaper The Sun on August 8 and 9 attributed the riots to "criminal behaviour" or "gang culture" rather than to the legality of the regime. sex. (In fact, the recent Canadian truck driver incident can also be used as an example) Mr. Zhao Dingxin commented on the incident as follows:

“They don’t think that the root cause of unrest lies in their system, they don’t doubt the source of their power, they don’t worry about international repercussions, they don’t fear public outrage leading to revolutions or coups, or because they support repression. I don't know if British politicians understand why they take a hard line in the face of riots so easily. But I know that democracy and liberalism based on law are still British mainstream values, or the British regime enjoys high ideological legitimacy and procedural legitimacy.” [For a narrative and evaluation of the London riots, see Zhao Dingxin: The Politics of Legitimacy, pp. 313-323. 】

But in countries where legitimacy is lacking, it is difficult to do so. Those who retell the official speech are dubbed "Little Pinks",

People are more willing to believe private messages (such as reposted videos on WeChat), believing that events are far worse than what the government says. The author is not here to say that government reports are necessarily accurate; what I want to express is that in a society lacking mainstream ideology, the generation of non-mainstream radical speech (whether true or false) will undoubtedly have a larger chain reaction. Therefore, the author has come up with a model whose premise is: in a society with low legitimacy, there will inevitably be "rumors" that contradict the government-led speech, namely:

1. Coexistence Theory--->Terrorist Rumors--->Legitimacy Crisis (This can be understood as a version of the uncontrolled Wuhan epidemic)

Continue the theory of terror--->the economy continues to decline--->the crisis of legitimacy

2. Terrorism ---> Coexistence Rumors<

Changed to Coexistence ---> Terrorist Rumors ---> Legitimacy Crisis

After describing the concept of legitimacy and the preconditions, the model will be explained below. The first is the first line. At the beginning of the new crown epidemic in Wuhan, the Chinese government did not pay attention to the epidemic, and advocated coexistence (there was no coexistence at the time, which can be understood as minimizing the harm of the virus), and the whistleblower said that For "rumour spreaders". [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNW7sGOWUZ0 ] As a result, terrorist news about the epidemic spread rapidly in private. Although the Chinese government has a strong ability to supervise public opinion, such "rumors" are still in the air. It spread very fast on WeChat, and the supervision was out of reach (no evidence is given here, if you have an impression, you can recall the news that "hospitals are full of dead people" circulating on their WeChat at that time). If the government continued to promote coexistence at that time, it is hard to imagine that such horrible "rumours" would not endanger the legitimacy of the government and cause a crisis of legitimacy. This also intuitively shows that even if the supervision of public opinion is tough, there is still a lot of room for terrorist rumors to survive. As an old saying goes, it is better to defend the mouth of the people than to defend the river.

So why haven't so many "coexistence rumours" been heard after the government declared terror? My argument is: "Coexistence rumors" are easier to control than terror rumors, and the government's promotion of terror theory also conforms to the public's concerns about the epidemic to a certain extent, just like the positive reports of the public on the student movement in the 1989 student movement. Same. In a society with low legitimacy, the masses are more willing to believe that the epidemic is terrifying rather than harmless. Most people don't care about "freedom" related to "coexistence rumors", but more about "life" related to "horror rumors".

The second line shows a series of problems that arose after the government carried out a zero policy corresponding to the theory of terrorism. If it continues to clear, economic activity will decrease, gdp will drop, unemployment will rise, small businesses will go bankrupt, and consumption will decrease. [GDP growth year by year since the reform and opening up, see World Bank data, https://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2020&locations=CN&start=1978 ] Currently, through monetary loosening, Promote consumption and maintain growth, but consumption does not seem to be as powerful as expected, and banks have not raised interest rates to withdraw money. If the zero-clearing policy continues, can the company maintain a high supply to meet demand? And in the real estate market that supports corporate mergers and acquisitions, will the damage to the corporate economic market affect the existing real estate market? Of course, the economic analysis here may be too crude. But what I want to say is that liberalization will not necessarily bring economic growth, but clearing it will definitely bring economic downturn, which is beyond doubt. Economic growth is the biggest politics in China today. If there is a problem with the economy, the legitimacy will inevitably be hit. This also means that coexistence is a choice that must be faced.

But can the Chinese government really choose to coexist? Or, can he cope with the consequences of coexistence? In a country of 1.4 billion people, the highly contagious virus has undoubtedly brought about a sharp rise in infections and consequent deaths. Even if the fatality rate of the new variants is not high, such figures undoubtedly exist. What is more noteworthy is that the effects of such figures in China and Western countries are not the same. As I said earlier, the 1989 study Even if the rhetoric adopted by the government and the London riots are similar, the results are unlikely to be the same. Just imagine if there were as many infections and deaths in China as in the United States (look, today it is 80 million and 990,000 [ https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker ] /#datatracker-home ]), even if the virus is not as bad as imagined, its follow-up effects are unlikely to be the same as those in the United States. Because the government lacks fundamental procedural legitimacy (and performance legitimacy based on economics is hard to say). To put it more bluntly, after two years of promoting the theory of terror, will the public really believe in the government's coexistence theory? Can the government really turn a corner? The author thinks that it is inappropriate to imagine the public as a mob following the media (if this is how to explain the generation of rumors?), the public will not always believe the arguments of the mainstream media. In fact, the government used the theory of terror in response to the voice of the people, and it is almost impossible for the Chinese people to believe in the theory of coexistence. What's more, the death of the epidemic is easy to generate rumors, and the death of one million people in China and the death of one million people in the United States are completely different (not to mention that in a country with four times the population of the United States, such a number of people) only more).

Judging from the current policy, such rumors obviously exist, and government regulation cannot completely destroy rumors in all aspects. (Otherwise, where did the news on WeChat come from?) Here again, it is stated that the “rumours” in the article have no true or false orientation, but are just folk speeches that are inconsistent with government-led speeches. At present, it is more likely to be complaints about clearing and panic about the virus in some places. The author has seen a lot of price gouging and panic buying of food caused by material shortages. There are also videos of jumping off buildings, and some others. There is panic in the place because of the positive test. Of course, the communication scope of the author is not representative, but the recent debate on coexistence is obviously very different from the consistent clearing of the previous two years.

Combined with the current situation, if the prevention and control of the new crown epidemic is effective, it can be used as a bonus item for Xi Jinping's performance project, providing legitimacy for re-election, which is why the zero-clearing policy has been implemented. The tighter the clearing, the better the leadership, but correspondingly, if the number of people infected with the epidemic rises, it will have a direct impact on the legitimacy of re-election. On is not a good option. In societies lacking procedural legitimacy, there may be a succession debate as leaders change. The epidemic may become a breakthrough before the conference. If the zero-clearing policy goes bankrupt before the conference, the number of infections and deaths rises, and terror rumors begin to ferment (will it be fueled by the opposition in the party?), then it will inevitably shake the legitimacy of re-election. . There is still a period of time before the second half of the year, but if the strong policy remains, will economic problems arise, and will the cost of the closure of the city continue to be bearable? The current policy swings, such as the different approaches in Shanghai and Shenzhen, and the different voices from the central and local governments, make it hard to believe that the current leadership is monolithic. The struggle before the congress was fierce, and if you look at history, you can find that the succession issue that started in the late years of a Chrisma leader has never been resolved. The party congress is just a recognition process that recognizes the political struggle ahead. [For the operation mechanism of the Party Congress, please refer to Wu Guoguang: "The Theater of Power: The Operation of the Communist Party Congress System" (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2018). ] In 1942, the Yan'an Rectification Movement solved the problem of the Soviet faction led by Wang Ming (approved by the Seventh Congress), resolved the issue of Gaogang and Rao Shushi in 1954 (approved by the Eighth Congress), resolved the issue of Liu Shaoqi in 1966 (approved by the Nine Congress), and resolved the issue of Lin Biao in 1971 (approved by the Tenth Congress). approved by the National Congress of the Communist Party of China), solved the Gang of Four problem in 1976 (approved by the Eleventh National Congress), then Hua Guofeng stepped down (approved by the Twelfth National Congress), resolved the Hu Yaobang issue in 1987 (approved by the Thirteenth National Congress), and resolved the Zhao Ziyang problem in 1989 (under special circumstances, Approved by the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee, the 14th National Congress established a new line after the 1992 Southern Tour); the succession was relatively stable in the following 20 to 30 years. In 2014, the problems of Xu Caihou and Zhou Yongkang were solved (approved by the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, see the third historical resolution's criticism of the previous corruption problem) (the Party Congress in the Mao era had no procedures, and it was decided to open every few years. Mao, but generally speaking, there will be a wave in five to ten years). It can be seen that political struggle is not a fantasy at all. The more intense the struggle is before the conference, it is often a year or two before the conference. If Bo sings red and black before the conference, it is obviously a political achievement project. Many friends have already analyzed the possibility of the current re-election. What the author wants to express here is that the debate on the epidemic will likely be the main breakthrough point for re-election. (There are a lot of variables before the 20th National Congress. Will the conference be postponed under the pretext of the epidemic because of intra-party struggles? I don’t know)

To sum up, the author is not optimistic about the current prospects. The lag in the reform of the political system will eventually yield its due results. The author does not believe in a regime that has not carried out a thorough reform of the political system after 40 years of reform, or even started to regress. Still able to transition smoothly. Even the preparatory constitution of Cixi will not be delayed for 40 years. She has always said that the time for political reform has not come, and the economic development is not enough. Is it necessary to prepare for the constitution for 100 years? I also don't think the current regime can solve the new crown problem smoothly. Is there another round of political reckoning at the upper levels, or new turmoil? unknown.

Due to time constraints, the source of the article is not indicated in many places, such as the death toll of the new crown epidemic, infectious capacity, economic problems, the current new crown policy, the source and content of the existing rumors (or non-mainstream speech) and the content of the rumors, and A summary of current dissatisfaction remarks. I hope that friends can have supplements below, and complete the source. I'm so sorry.

appendix:

A little cranky (2022/1/13)

If we pay close attention to the epidemic and clear up zero, economic exchanges will stagnate (or inflation?) (originally "economic downturn leads to inflation"), and the country will be closed down, but the economic downturn (originally "inflation") has a threshold, which is somewhat contradictory An inevitable explosion, a blowout explosion. The current tune is: the "epidemic terror theory" is promoted in China, and the "epidemic coexistence theory" is promoted abroad. But if the country is to be opened for economic growth, how will the government step down under the inevitable increase in patients? What will most people think if the government preaches the "coexistence theory" again? What happens to a government that lacks procedural legitimacy when it loses its performance? If you jump left and right, more people will see the truth clearly, and will it cause the impact of September 13? I state my opinion below.

I think that if the policy is liberalized, the number of infections increases, and the government advocates coexistence, it will definitely bring panic, people will no longer believe what the government says, the government points east, and the people face west. Terrorist propaganda is hard to come back from, and the government will be blamed at home and abroad for the increased death toll. Although it is still less than other diseases, it is still a powerful weapon in China. The reaction caused by the hundreds of thousands of deaths in China due to the new crown and the hundreds of thousands of deaths in the United States is different, not to mention that the liberalization will only lead to more deaths than the United States. Even if 60 million people in the United States are infected and 800,000 to 900,000 die, it does not affect the normal operation of the government, because the government has procedural legitimacy and certain ideological legitimacy, and the government's "coexistence theory" is believed by some. I can't imagine what will happen to China with 800,000 deaths due to the new crown (you can refer to the example of thousands of people infected in Wuhan), it must be rumors, and there must be turmoil in oppression and anti-oppression.

Therefore, because of this, the government has to pay close attention to clearing, and the reason for clearing is the "epidemic terror theory". Clearing can be regarded as the performance legitimacy of the government. As long as the virus is more terrifying, the government's performance is higher and the regime is maintained. But the economy is destined to be unable to maintain high growth, and economic growth is the biggest performance in China today, and the biggest politics in China today. If the repressive policy remains, and the contagion remains unabated or higher, how can the government continue?

Authoritarian governments with low procedural legitimacy and low ideological legitimacy have already lost at the beginning of the epidemic! At the beginning of the epidemic, rumors spread from thousands of people. If the government has been talking about "coexistence theory" (and not the "terrorism theory"), then "terrorist rumors" will continue to come out. I divide it into four categories:

5. Coexistence theory (referring to mainstream Western media),

6. Terrorism (referring to Chinese mainstream media),

7. Coexistence rumors (referring to some people’s remarks that contradict mainstream terror theory),

8. Terrorist rumors (referring to some people's remarks that contradict the mainstream coexistence theory)

That is, "theory" is the mainstream of the government, and "rumor" is the mainstream of the people

Premise: Under the low legitimacy of the regime, there must be a lot of rumors, that is, the Tacitus trap

My simple model is:

Continue the theory of terror--->the economy continues to decline--->the crisis of legitimacy

Start policy as Terrorism--->Coexistence Rumors<

Changed to Coexistence ---> Terrorist Rumors ---> Legitimacy Crisis

The starting policy is Coexistence ---> Terrorist Rumors ---> Legitimacy Crisis (this can be understood as an uncontrolled version of the Wuhan epidemic)

At this time, someone will definitely say: "Hey, I don't think there seem to be many coexistence rumors now. Do people in China still believe in the theory of terror? My friends are very nervous." My argument is: "Coexistence. Rumors are easier to control than horror rumors. Because most people don't care about "freedom" related to "coexistence rumors", but more about "life" related to "horror rumors". Most people only rise up when personal safety is involved, so the spread of "coexistence rumors" is far less than that of "horror rumors." In other words , "terrorist rumors" are far more harmful to the government than "coexistence rumors" because it is claimed to be related to everyone's life . With the number of infections under control, most people don't care about freedom or not. But when the economy is down, how does the transition from the "terror theory" to the "coexistence theory" turn? Was the theory of terror that the government promoted before shooting itself in the foot?

My personal point of view is that no matter what means (coexistence/terrorism theory) rumors are inevitable, because "coexistence rumors" are more controllable and terror theory can be implemented. In contrast, the "coexistence theory" cannot survive in China, and the government cannot implement the "coexistence theory" for a long time from the beginning, using (Wuhan as a template, unless the Chinese government can survive the epidemic for a relatively long period of time, but Obviously this is difficult to do). In fact, the government used the theory of terror in response to the people's call. It is almost impossible for the Chinese people to believe in the theory of coexistence (if the government's rhetoric in January 2000 was the theory of coexistence, I believe that most of you, including you, would not believe it). The theory of terror has been successfully implemented so far, only because the economic problem has not yet erupted, so the authoritarian state whose legitimacy is based entirely on performance has lost at the beginning, and he cannot deal with such a lasting surprise. After the liberalization, either the credibility will be greatly damaged again, or there will be another round of purges in exchange for credibility (like after Mao's death, the original Cultural Revolution line will be completely abandoned to gain popular support), or there will be social unrest. And if it continues, unless the epidemic subsides, "terrorist rumors" will spread, and the government will likely face a crisis of legitimacy.

The authoritarian state is like a edifice that is about to collapse, and the next few years may be turbulent years (a family's words). Before a natural disaster like the new crown, it seemed indestructible, but in fact it fell. The best time for political reform has been missed (I personally think that it would be more secure to do it at the end of the last century or the beginning of this century, of course, it's just my own nonsense). It now seems only a matter of time before the government will sooner or later receive the retribution for the lag in political reform.

Maybe I am a little extreme, I also think that what I said is nonsense, and some friends will definitely say that I am "scallion, wheel", but I thought about it and found that this is indeed my idea, so I want to share out for discussion. Who likes turmoil? Everyone knows that turmoil is far worse than the result of active reform. Or it is difficult to democratize after the turmoil, at most it is the change of dynasties after the bloody storm, who knows. In short, I think the best time has passed (maybe I am too pessimistic), how to let it be said in the future, anyway, if you like to scold, just treat it as my nonsense.

In this darkest moment of liberalism, I still want to keep a ray of light in my heart

The general trend of the world, the mighty...

Reddit:

https://www.reddit.com/r/China_irl/comments/trnhb1/Dream of Public Opinion Control of the Epidemic and Prospects for 2022/

Google doc:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/19C1jduEsNMhoJ1ndqUvIbEJizVL8swDJygKBhtMihLI/edit?usp=sharing