From 'Indo-Pacific Economic Framework' to 'Defending Taiwan': America's Dilemma to Contain China

On May 20, the first Asia-Pacific tour under US President Joe Biden was launched. Looking at the itinerary, Biden first flew to Seoul on the 20th, and held a US-South Korea summit meeting with the new South Korean President Yin Xiyue on the 21st. He flew to Japan on the 22nd and held talks with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the 23rd. The US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) summit was held on the 24th.

Considering the current international situation, this visit can be described as being carried out under three special backgrounds.

First, the US pressure on Russia has reached a critical value, and China will be its strategic focus in the next stage. At present, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is still raging, but the United States has begun to return to the Indo-Pacific, which shows that the development of the war is still within the controllable range. Whether the outcome is that after Russia encroached on Ukraine’s territory, the two sides signed a ceasefire agreement, or Russia and Ukraine repeatedly consumed each other, the United States should believe that there is no sign of the situation spilling out of control in the short term, and this is the beginning of active operations in the Indo-Pacific region.

Second, the United States intends to strengthen the alliance between the United States and South Korea. Biden's visit to South Korea first and then to Japan this time broke the past practice of "Japan first". Such an arrangement may be related to the change of the South Korean government and the holding of the QUAD summit, that is, the United States intends to increase the proportion of South Korea's role on the basis of the existing Indo-Pacific strategy. As early as the eve of the visit, the news that "South Korea may join QUAD" was widely reported in the international media.

Third, the proposal of the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" (IPEF) symbolizes that the United States intends to deepen the confrontation with China in its economic and trade industries. On the afternoon of May 23, Biden officially announced the launch of IPEF in Tokyo, Japan, and 13 countries including the United States, South Korea, Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and Brunei became the initial members. According to previous news, "trade", "clean energy, decarbonization and infrastructure", "supply chain strengthening", "tax and anti-corruption" will become the four major elements of the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework".

However, whether the above actions can really achieve the effect expected or rendered by the United States, I am afraid it will take time to see.

"The peninsula changes to the sky" with heavy thunder and little rain

First of all, the US visit to South Korea seems to have been deliberately arranged, but the actual effect is more like repairing relations and avoiding the separation of allies, rather than further enhancing South Korea's strategic role. Such a phenomenon has exposed the first challenge of the Indo-Pacific strategy: some Asian countries are afraid of "choosing the side of China and the United States".

Looking back at the South Korean election in March 2022, the current President Yoon Seok-yue once showed a tough stance against China, including proposing to purchase and deploy the THAAD system, expand nuclear deterrence, strengthen the trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan and South Korea, and promote South Korea to join QUAD, or at least join QUAD in climate change. Changes and cooperation mechanisms in the field of epidemic prevention, etc. However, observing the relevant trends after he came to power, not only did he not "actively fulfill" his pre-election promises, but he also launched a series of diplomatic interactions with China. From a practical perspective, Beijing has its own considerations to maintain regional stability, avoid turbulence on the peninsula, and guard against the infiltration of the US Indo-Pacific strategy, but Yin Xiyue is not without room for communication. Judging from the interaction between China and South Korea as of today, Yin Xiyue's tough proposition before the election may be more due to winning the election and asking for a bilateral price between China and the United States.

Biden's priority visit to South Korea this time has sparked rumors in the media that "South Korea may join QUAD", but after all, it will not be able to overcome the reality of the game between China and the United States. On May 22, senior U.S. government officials told the White House press corps that the U.S. is not considering allowing South Korea to join QUAD for the time being.

Looking at the joint statement of the United States and South Korea, in addition to emphasizing "the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, which is the basic element of the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region," there are also age-old issues such as North Korea's denuclearization and the strengthening of US-South Korea semiconductor cooperation; such as sensitive The THAAD deployment and nuclear intimidation issues are not mentioned. And perhaps to avoid provoking North Korea, as early as May 18, Jake Sullivan, the US President's National Security Adviser, emphasized that, unlike former Democratic President Barack Obama, Biden will not visit South Korea this time. North-South Military Demarcation Zone (DMZ).

The key to the above-mentioned development is still South Korea’s face-to-face with political reality, that is, while being pro-American, it avoids participating in strongly targeted regional mechanisms such as QUAD; cooperation”, South Korea’s participation in IPEF is the reason.

Judging from the information released so far, although IPEF has an unspoken agenda of "targeting China", it is more likely to become an irrelevant "regional big bye".

First, although this framework has the intention of creating a "supply chain alliance", the United States has not provided a return for market access. In contrast, the "Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific" (CPTPP) reached in 2018 and the The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) provides a more complete function of regional economies. The United States is reluctant to return to the CPTPP due to the consideration of internal public opinion and the rebound of the labor market. The newly established IPEF is not as deeply integrated as the former, and its effectiveness must be discounted. Unless the United States is willing to vigorously transfuse this mechanism in the future, it should be difficult to achieve fundamental adjustments to the Indo-Pacific semiconductor supply chain in the short term.

Second, as South Korea stated, this framework does not "exclude China", that is, it does not require participating countries to disconnect supply chains with China. This background may be one of the reasons why ASEAN and other countries can participate with confidence, that is, they can maximize their regional participation and avoid the dilemma of being forced to decouple from China and fall into the cold war.

"Taiwan Strait Surprise" is grandstanding

The "Taiwan Strait Surprise" staged in this Asia-Pacific trip reflects the second challenge of the US Indo-Pacific strategy: in the face of China's rising power, it is necessary to pay attention to finger safety when cutting sausages.

On the eve of Biden's trip on May 18, the United States launched a series of "Taiwan card" manipulations. First, it declared to support Taiwan as an observer to participate in the 75th World Health Assembly (WHA), which opened on May 22; second, 52 US senators jointly signed, calling on Biden to include Taiwan in the IPEF. However, on the same day, Yang Jiechi, Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister, also had talks with Sullivan, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of the United States, and Lin Fangzheng, Foreign Minister of Japan, regarding the Taiwan issue and "Japan and the United States join forces to fight against China". Arguments, express a solemn position.

Since then, the "Taiwan Strait Surprise" created by the United States has been shattered one by one. When it comes to participating in the WHA issue, Taiwan's expectations have failed again. Not only has it been unable to participate as an observer, it has not even received an invitation letter, and American support has become empty talk again; and on IPEF affairs, Sullivan was already on his way to Tokyo, Japan on the 22nd. , In an interview with the media on Air Force One, he said that the IPEF list has been determined, and Taiwan was neither invited to attend the launch ceremony nor included in the list at the time of launch. "But the U.S. still seeks to deepen its economic partnership with Taiwan in semiconductors, supply chains, and more."

However, despite the low-key end of the above-mentioned issues, Biden personally created the biggest "Taiwan Strait surprise" in recent days during his visit. On the morning of May 23, when Biden answered questions from reporters after the US-Japan summit, he said in shocking words that China has no right to seize Taiwan by force, and the United States intends to use force to defend Taiwan. This statement caused an uproar, and White House officials quickly reiterated that the US policy toward Taiwan would remain unchanged.

Looking back, this is not the first time the U.S. government has "fired the fire" against Biden. In August 2021, when he was interviewed by the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), he stated that Afghanistan is different in nature from Taiwan, South Korea and NATO, which is an "entity that has reached an agreement" with the United States; in October 2021, Biden participated in American cable news. When asked at a CNN town meeting in Baltimore whether the U.S. would defend Taiwan if it was attacked from the mainland, the U.S. responded affirmatively: "Yes, we have a commitment to do so." In both cases, both This has sparked discussions about "the United States will defend Taiwan", and officials have consistently clarified that "the policy toward Taiwan will remain unchanged."

In all fairness, whether Biden's "use of force to protect Taiwan" this time is a slip of the tongue or a deliberate design, it is all the damage to the prestige of the United States' own great power. If it is a slip of the tongue, the outside world will inevitably question the health status of the US leader, otherwise why would they slip the tongue multiple times on the same dispute; if it is deliberately designed, as long as the number of times is more than one, other countries may be bored with the game "The Wolf is Coming" and become curious When the United States faces the Taiwan issue, is it only a matter of lip service and clarification after crossing the line?

As for the operation of the United States in assisting Taiwan in participating in the WHA, joining the IPEF, and military defense, "remorse after the fact" can be said to be the main axis of the operation, and its true attitude towards the "Taiwan card" is also clearly visible: I hope to contain Beijing, but never turn it over. In other words, it is hoped to give up the deep effect in exchange for the prolongation of the duration, or to play the shallower effect. From another perspective, the US’s cares and hesitation about cutting sausages is not because of the existing space, due to China’s growing strength and the more frequent demonstration of diplomatic bottom-line thinking, which leads to the fact that when it is in action, it is also “sliced sausages”. "reflection?

In the final analysis, when China's national strength and foreign awareness change, the US Indo-Pacific strategy will inevitably fall into the game of cutting sausages with China. China's deterrence may not be able to stop the United States' containment, but it may force the United States to abandon some unrealistic and dangerous ideas, thereby reducing the real lethality of the Indo-Pacific strategy.

After the QUAD summit on the 24th, the four countries of the United States, Japan, India and Australia should also issue a joint statement. From the perspective of the recent strategic layout of the United States, the Taiwan Strait issue should have a high probability of appearing and become one of the "objects of concern" of the four countries. However, after the statement, can a new mechanism be introduced that will substantially change the external structure of Indo-Pacific security and even the Taiwan issue? I am afraid that the two core questions of the Indo-Pacific strategy will still be asked in the end: whether allies are willing to take risks and choose sides, and how does the United States analyze and measure China’s deterrence.

Original published URL:

2022.5.24

From "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" to "Defending Taiwan": The Dilemma of the US Containing China | Hong Kong 01 https://www.hk01.com/sns/article/773573