1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences

Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) Memorandum 1986 (translated from English translation)

[Then SANU President Dobrica Josic]

Due to stagnant social development, economic difficulties, increasingly tense social relations, and open inter-ethnic conflicts, Yugoslavia has deep concerns. The severe crisis engulfed not only the political and economic spheres, but also the entire system of law and order in Yugoslavia. Laziness at work, corruption and nepotism, lack of confidence and disregard for the law, bureaucratic stubbornness, growing suspicion among individuals, and blatant egoism by individuals and groups have become everyday phenomena. The resulting blow to moral values and the reputation of leading institutions, as well as distrust in the competence of decision makers, spreads apathy and resentment among the public and leads to alienation from law and order. An objective examination of Yugoslav reality shows that the current crisis could lead to social unrest with unforeseen consequences, including the disastrous possibility of the Yugoslav state split. No one can turn a blind eye to this reality and future. Of course, our nation's oldest institution of scientific and cultural creation cannot remain indifferent.

At this catastrophic time, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences feels obliged to express its views on the state of society, as it believes this will help us find a solution to our current predicament. However, the nature of this document compels us to confine ourselves to key issues of Yugoslav reality. Regrettably, these issues include the undetermined and difficult status of the Serbian nation, which has been highlighted by recent events.

In order to understand the primacy of the nation in the current practice of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, it is necessary to consider the influence of the Comintern on the Communist Party of Yugoslavia between the two world wars. The strategy of the Comintern during this period stemmed from the conclusion that, after the failure of the proletarian revolution in Western Europe, the communist parties in Eastern, Central and Southern Europe had to rely on national movements, albeit explicitly anti-socialist, based on national unity. The idea of non-class solidarity. Stalin crushed all objections to this strategy (for example, Sima Marković, one of the founders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia). In this spirit, Sperance (Edward Cadel) theoretically proposes and develops a solution to the national problem in his book The Development of the Slovenian National Problem (Razvoj slovenskoga narodnoga vprsanja), which in general Provided the ideological theory for Yugoslavia's development towards a union of sovereign republics and autonomous regions, culminating in the 1974 constitution.

The two most developed republics, which achieved their national goals through this constitution, are now the most ardent defenders of the existing system. Because of the political position of their leaders at the center of political power, they held the initiative (before and after the decisive years of the 1960s) on all issues affecting the political and economic system. They shape the social and economic structure of Yugoslavia according to their wishes and needs. This structure represents most of their national goals being achieved, and now it seems only normal for them to defend a structure that has taken them so long to build.

Needless to say, separatism and nationalism are active on the social scene. But people don't realize that the 1974 constitution made this trend ideologically possible. The intensification and competition of separatism and nationalism has brought (nation) states farther and farther apart to a critical degree. The manipulation of language, and the confinement of scientific and cultural experts to the ranks of the republics and regions, sadly marked the growing power of particularism. All new ethnogenesis theories are the unfortunate product of local closed, regional ideological and logical shackles, and signal the dissolution of a shared past, present, and future. It's as if everyone wants to escape the collapsed house as quickly and as far as possible. This mentality warns us that a political crisis has reached a tipping point that threatens the integrity and stability of Yugoslavia. Kosovo is the most obvious manifestation.

In modern society, any form of political oppression and discrimination based on ethnicity is unacceptable. The Yugoslav solution to the ethnic problem was initially a model of a multi-ethnic federation, in which the principle of unity of state and policy was successfully combined with the principle of political and cultural autonomy of the minorities. Over the past 20 years, the principle of unity has gradually weakened and the principle of national autonomy has been strengthened, which in practice has become the autonomy of the parts (republics, usually not single nations). The weaknesses of this model from the start are becoming more apparent. All nations are not equal: Serbs, for example, are not given their own national rights. Unlike minorities, some Serbs, who live in large numbers in other republics, have no right to use their own language and script, to organize politically and culturally, or to develop their own national unique culture. The unstoppable persecution of Serbs in Kosovo shows that those principles that protect the autonomy of minorities (Albanians) do not apply when it comes to minorities within minorities (Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks and Gypsies in Kosovo) Be applicable. Yugoslavia today cannot be considered a democracy, given the existing forms of ethnic discrimination.

... Yugoslavia is not so much a community of citizens, nations and states, all equal before the law, as a community of eight equal regions. But even such equality does not apply to Serbia, as its special legal and political status reflects a tendency to place the Serbian nation under constant supervision. The guiding principle behind this policy is "one weak Serbia, one strong Yugoslavia", which has evolved into an influential mind-set: if rapid economic growth of Serbs, the largest nation, is allowed, it will affect Yugoslavia posed a threat to other ethnic groups. Therefore, (the authorities) seized every opportunity to erect more and more obstacles in the path of the economic development and political consolidation of the Serbs. One of the most serious of such obstacles is Serbia's undecided constitutional status, which is currently fraught with internal conflict.

In fact, the 1974 constitution divided Serbia into three parts. The autonomous provinces in Serbia are defined as equal to the republic, except that the name is not defined as the republic and does not have the same number of representatives in the federation. They can remedy this shortcoming by intervening in the internal affairs of Serbia itself through the common parliament of the Republic of Serbia (while their own parliament remains fully autonomous). The political and legal status of Serbia itself is rather ambiguous - Serbia is neither a republic nor a province. Relations with the Republic of Serbia are quite chaotic. As an organ of the Assembly of the Republic, the Executive Council is actually the Serbian native executive council. That's not the only absurdity in the limits of power. The overly broad, institutionally established autonomy of the provinces has created two new rifts within the Serbian nation. The truth is that the forces that support self-government and separatism insist on increased self-government, but this will be difficult to achieve without the moral and political support of those republics that have not been wiped out by separatism.

The relationship between Serbia and the provinces cannot be reduced to just a formal legal interpretation of the two constitutions, and even legal interpretation cannot be the main relationship. The relationship between Serbia and the provinces is mainly the relationship between the Serbian nation and the state. A nation that has regained its national status after a long and bloody struggle, a nation that has achieved civic democracy, and a nation that lost 2.5 million relatives in two world wars, was decided by a bureaucratic party committee to establish 40 people in New Yugoslavia. Years later, only it is destined to have no country of its own. In peacetime, a more painful historic failure cannot be imagined.

The expulsion of the Serbian nation from Kosovo is a spectacular testimony to its historic defeat. In the spring of 1981, a very special, but still open and full-scale war, prepared by administrative, political and legal changes in different periods, was waged against the Serbian people. Through the skilful use of various methods and tactics, through the division of functions, through the active and barely veiled support (more harmful than external support) of certain political centers within Yugoslavia, this open war has been going on for nearly Five years, but it has not been recognized and given the correct name. It lasted longer than the entire Yugoslav War of Liberation (from April 6, 1941 to May 9, 1945). The Bali (anti-communist nationalist) uprisings involving fascist forces in Kosovo and Metohija before the end of the war were defeated militarily in 1944-45, but appear to be undefeated politically. In its current form, under the guise of new content, it is far more successful and is on the verge of victory. The final battle against neo-fascism has not been achieved; all measures so far have only been to move this aggression out of the streets, in fact, its racially motivated, whatever it takes to pursue its goals has only been reinforced. In order to incite and intensify racial hatred, harsh sentences are even deliberately imposed on young criminals.

The physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the Serb population in Kosovo and Metohija was Serbia's greatest defeat in its war of liberation between Olasak in 1804 and the 1941 uprising. The blame for this failure lies mainly in the legacy of the Comintern still present in the national policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the acquiescence of the Serbian communists to this policy, as well as the ideological and political naivety and long-term opportunity of a whole generation of Serbian politicians after the war doctrine. They are always on the defensive, always more concerned with how others perceive them and their indecisive interpretations of Serbia's status than with real facts that affect the future of the country they lead.

Kosovo is not the only region where ethnic Serbs are discriminated against. The absolute (rather than just relative) drop in the number of Serbs in Croatia is enough to justify this assertion. According to the 1948 census, there were 543,795 Serbs in Croatia (14.48% of the total). According to the 1981 census, their number had dwindled to 531,502, or only 11.5% of the total inhabitants of Croatia. After 33 years of peace, the number of Serbs in Croatia was even lower than in the first census conducted shortly after the war, when the impact of the war on the number of Serbs in Croatia was well known.

Lika, Kordun and Banja remain among the least developed regions in Croatia, which greatly encourages Serb migration to Serbia and migration to other parts of Croatia. In other parts of Croatia, Serbs, as newcomers, are a low-status minority that is very easy to assimilate. In any case, Serbs in Croatia face a complex and rather effective policy of assimilation. This policy prohibits all Serb associations and cultural institutions in Croatia, which have a rich tradition dating back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and pre-war Yugoslavia. The policy also imposes an official language with the name of another nationality (Croatian), thus making ethnic inequality concrete. The constitution makes the language compulsory for Serbs in Croatia, and the nationalist-inclined Croatian linguists are systematically and organized to distance the language from the Serbo-Croatian languages spoken in other republics, thereby Weakening ties between Serbs in Croatia and other Serbs. This willingness to act not only interrupts the continuity of the Croats' own language, but also eliminates the international terminology that is very valuable when communicating with other cultures, especially in the field of science and technology. But Serbs in Croatia are not only culturally isolated from their homeland, their homeland is also unable to keep abreast of the economic or cultural conditions surrounding it through contacts with foreign compatriots, as some peoples in Yugoslavia do. The integrity of the Serbian nation and its culture in Yugoslavia is a matter of life and death for the Serbian nation.

With the exception of the Independent State of Croatia in 1941-45, Serbs in Croatia have never been more persecuted than they are now. Addressing their national status must be seen as a pressing political issue. If no solution is found, the result could be disastrous not only for Croatia, but for Yugoslavia as a whole.

Large numbers of Serbs living outside Serbia, especially Serbia itself, are larger than some other countries combined, making the question of Serb status quite important. According to the 1981 census, 24% of Serbs (1,958,000) live outside the Socialist Republic of Serbia, which alone is much larger than the number of Slovenes, Albanians, Macedonians, and almost the same as Muslims. Outside Serbia, there are 3.285 million Serbs, or 40.3% of its total population. Serbs have been split most strongly in the secession process that dominates Yugoslavia. The purpose of this process is to completely destroy the national unity of the Serbian people. For decades and centuries, we have striven to be a united nation, but the current course of Yugoslav society goes against it.

For more than half a century, Serbia has endured the stigma and obstacles of being a jailer in other Yugoslav countries, unable to draw support from its own history. Many aspects of this history itself have even been called into question. Due to the narrowness and lack of objectivity of official historiography, the bourgeois-democratic traditions that Serbia successfully fought for in the 19th century were, until recently, obscured by Serbian socialism and labor movements. The real contribution of Serbian bourgeois society to law, culture and the state is downplayed and limited to the point of being distorted. It cannot provide spiritual and moral support, nor can it be a foothold for maintaining or restoring historical confidence. The Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and all Yugoslav youths, including the Bosnian youth, experienced a similar fate, their courageous and honorable efforts for liberation being forcibly embedded in the historical context of class struggle. The proponents and creators of this ideology were Austrian Marxists, staunch opponents of the national liberation movement.

Influenced by official ideology, the cultural achievements of the Serbian people are being alienated, usurped or vilified by others, or ignored and degraded; the language is being replaced and the Cyrillic script is gradually disappearing. In this regard, the field of literature is becoming the main arena for capriciousness and anarchy. No other Yugoslav nation's cultural and spiritual integrity has been so brutally challenged as the Serbian nation. No other nation's literary and artistic heritage has been ravaged and suppressed like the Serbian nation. Political standards of official ideology were imposed on Serbian culture, overriding scientific or historical principles.

After the violent ethnic conflicts of the World War, chauvinism seems to have lost its vitality and even went down the road of annihilation. This appearance has proven deceptive. It didn't take long for nationalism to pick up again, fueled by every change to the constitution. Nationalism is driven by superiors; its main proponents are politicians. The root cause of this multifaceted crisis is that socialism was ideologically defeated by nationalism, and the centrifugal process of nationalism brought Yugoslav society to the brink of destruction and destroyed the old value system.

Its roots lie in the ideology of the Comintern and the national policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia before the war. In this policy, the revanchism of the Serbian nation as an "exploiting" nation had a profound effect on the fate of national relations, social organization, economic systems, and moral and cultural values since World War II. The Serbian nation has been plagued by historical guilt and has been the only nation that has not resolved its own national problems and has not gotten its own country like other nations. Therefore, the first action must be to remove the burden of this historical guilt on the Serbian nation, categorically deny its privileged economic status between the two world wars, and avoid denigrating Serbia's contribution to the liberation struggle and the creation of Yugoslavia.

The complete national and cultural integrity of the Serbian people is their historical and democratic right, regardless of which republic or province they live in. The realization of equality and independent development is of profound historical significance to the Serbian people. In less than fifty years, and over two consecutive generations, the Serbian nation has endured such a severe test—twice facing physical extermination, forced assimilation, religious conversion, cultural genocide, ideological indoctrination, and Intellectually and politically disarmed by the denigration and abandonment of one's own traditions under imposed guilt. As this century of technological soaring draws to a close, they cannot but leave behind a trauma that cannot be ignored. In order to have a future in the international family of civilized nations, the Serbian nation must have the opportunity to rediscover itself and become a promoter of history, must rediscover its own historical and spiritual existence, must face up to its economic and cultural interests, and must find Modern social and national goals to inspire current and future generations.

The depressing status quo of the Serbian nation, and the increasingly violent expressions of chauvinism and Serb phobia in some circles, have spurred a revival of Serbian nationalism. Serbia's growing national sensitivities could lead to volatile and even dangerous responses. Under no circumstances should we ignore or underestimate these dangers for a moment. But the principled struggle against Serbian chauvinism cannot be based on the ideology of historical guilt and egalitarian political domination. The rejection of this egalitarianism, which is fatal to spirit and morale, and its outdated lies and injustices, is a prerequisite for the development of the democratic, Yugoslav, humanistic part of contemporary Serbian culture.

The lack of proper representation of ordinary citizens and the working class in the committees of the Federal Parliament cannot simply be attributed to the gain of nationalists; it is also the result of an attempt to place Serbia on an unequal position, thereby weakening its political influence. But the biggest disaster is that the Serbian nation does not have a state like all other nations. It is true that Article 1 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia states that Serbia is a state, but the problem immediately arises: one has no power in its own territory, no way to protect the personal property of its citizens, no way to prevent genocide in Kosovo, What kind of country is there where there is no way to prevent Serbs from migrating from their ancient homeland? This status underscores the political discrimination against Serbia, especially when one recalls that the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia imposed internal federalism on Serbia, creating a permanent source of conflict between Serbia itself and the provinces. Aggressive Albanian chauvinism in Kosovo cannot be contained unless Serbia ceases to be the only republic whose internal relations are dictated by others.

The Federal Constitution formally established the equality of all republics, but this became worthless in practice as it forced the Republic of Serbia to renounce many rights and powers in favor of autonomous provinces whose status was to a considerable extent governed by the federation. constitutional control. Serbia must declare publicly that this is an imposed arrangement. This is especially true of the status of the provinces, which have effectively become republics, seeing themselves more as part of the federation than of the Republic of Serbia. The Yugoslav constitution not only did not take into account the state of the Serbian nation, but also created insurmountable difficulties for the establishment of such a state. In order to meet Serbia's legitimate interests, amendments to the constitution are inevitable. The autonomous province must become a true part of the Republic of Serbia, and the autonomy of the province must be guaranteed not to undermine the integrity of the republic, so that it is possible to act in the common interest of the wider society.

The unpleasantness of Serbia's statehood is not the only flaw that must be corrected through constitutional revision. The 1974 constitution turned Yugoslavia into a very unstable community of nations prone to alternatives to Yugoslavia, as is clear in recent statements by Slovenian public figures and earlier positions taken by Macedonian politicians. This led to the danger of further disintegration of Yugoslavia. The Serbian nation cannot wait meekly for the future in this state of uncertainty. Therefore, all peoples in Yugoslavia must be given the opportunity to express their wishes and intentions. In this way, Serbia can declare and define its national rights. Discussion and agreement on this must precede a review of the Constitution. Of course, Serbia can't take a negative stance in the process and just wait for others to have their say, as she has often done in the past.

Serbia must fight for equality and have the same decision-making power as other peoples on key political and economic issues. For more than four decades, Serbia's negative attitude has been harmful to Yugoslavia as a whole, because she has not been based on her longer national traditions, a heightened sense of national independence, and her rich experience in fighting against those infringing political freedoms in her own country. Offer ideas and critiques. Unless the Serbian nation within Serbia participates equally in the entire decision-making and implementation process, Yugoslavia cannot be strong, and the existence of Yugoslavia as a democratic, socialist community will be questioned.

The entire period of Yugoslav society and Serbian development apparently ended with an outdated and worn-out ideology, a general stagnation, and an increasingly apparent setback in the economic, political, moral and cultural spheres. This situation urgently calls for a profound, prudent, rational and decisive reform of the entire official ideology and social organization of the Yugoslav National Community and its rapid integration into the modern world through social democracy. The human resources of the entire nation must be maximally involved in social reform so that we can be a productive, enlightened and democratic society, able to survive on the fruits of our own labor and creativity, and able to make our Reasonable contribution.

On this occasion, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences reiterates its willingness to use all the resources at its disposal to advance this daunting undertaking and the historical aspirations of our generation.