After the war, Shoudong's "Kosovo Model": What does Putin want to say to the West?

On April 26, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with UN Secretary-General António Guterres at the Kremlin. After the two talked for nearly an hour, Putin not only agreed with the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross to participate in the civilian evacuation of the Azov steel plant, but also expressed his position on three key issues.

First of all, on the issue of Russia-Ukraine negotiations, Putin said: "Although military operations are underway, we still hope to reach an agreement on the diplomatic track." Putin mentioned that Russia and Ukraine had "successfully achieved major achievements after the talks in Istanbul." "Breakthrough", but the relevant forces subsequently created "provocations" in Bucha that had nothing to do with the Russian army, which led to a huge change in the position of Ukrainian negotiators, who began to backtrack on security issues and shelved Crimea and Donba. The status of the two "Republics" of Sri Lanka. But despite this, negotiations continued online, and Putin stressed that "hopefully this will lead to some positive results."

Second, in the dispute over the sovereignty of Udong, Putin invoked the judgment of the United Nations International Court of Justice against Kosovo, that when exercising the right of self-determination, no country's internal territory is obliged to apply to the country's central authority to declare sovereignty. Putin emphasized that the Donbas region also has the same right to declare its sovereignty. Although Guterres replied that "the United Nations does not recognize Kosovo as an independent entity", Putin refuted that "but the International Court of Justice did recognize this."

Putin further emphasized that if the Kosovo model sets a precedent, the "republic" of the Donbass will naturally also apply. "Many countries in the world, including our opponents in the West, treat the Kosovo issue in this way", Putin also mentioned that the two "republics" in the Donbas region have asked Russia to provide them with military assistance, "We have the right to do so, In full compliance with Article 51 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations."

Third, regarding the question of Russia's international positioning and identity, Putin said that Russia has always supported the United Nations. "Just a few years ago, we heard people say that the United Nations is obsolete and that it is no longer needed. This happens whenever the United Nations deliberately prevents someone from achieving their goals on the international stage," Putin also agreed. "Some of our (UN) colleagues are speaking a bit oddly when they talk about a rules-based world order. We believe that the main rules should be based on the UN Charter and other documents adopted by the organization, not some Documents written by people in order to achieve their own purposes and ensure their own interests.”

Putin finally pointed out that Russia has always emphasized that no other world organization can be like the United Nations, so it is necessary to cherish this institution created after World War II to resolve disputes.

Deja Vu in Kosovo and Udon

Looking at the above statement of Putin, although it is intended to show goodwill to the United Nations, it also reveals his two current attitudes towards the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Among them, "the recognition of the independence of East Ukraine has a precedent for Kosovo" can be said to be throughout the speech. .

First, although Russia stated that it would not give up negotiations and was willing to seek a diplomatic solution with Ukraine, it also used Kosovo as an example to reiterate that the independence of the Donbas region is imperative, just as Ukraine must agree that Crimea belongs to Russia. There is no room for concessions on the first issue; second, Russia is not a "heterogeneous" in international relations. Even if it starts a war and dismembers the territory of other countries, there is indeed a problem of international perception, but there is a precedent for Kosovo in the West. In this context, Russia is in the same position as Europe and the United States. The "moral level", the Western "helping others" and the Russian "cross-border requirement" are essentially the same.

Looking back at the Kosovo dispute, Putin cited this example because he shared some similar situations with Wudong Fenghuo. In 1991, local forces in Kosovo held an independence referendum, with a voter turnout of 90% and as many as 98% of those who supported Kosovo independence, but the result of the referendum was declared invalid; since 1995, there have been many conflicts between Kosovo guerrillas and Serbian security forces, and the situation is rapid. Out of control and detonating the war, NATO even attacked the Yugoslav alliance in 1999, forcing the latter to accept the presence of peacekeepers to take over Kosovo. Since then, Kosovo has been substantively independent under the mandate of the United Nations, and Serbia has only nominal sovereignty over it, but no ruling ability.

Over the years, in the face of Kosovo's growing calls for independence, Serbia has always adhered to the bottom line of "autonomy without division". In the end, Kosovo saw that the negotiations were fruitless, and it was convenient for Kosovo to declare independence on February 17, 2008. In this situation, although Serbia has resorted to a number of sanctions and pressured other countries not to establish diplomatic relations with it, it is ultimately difficult to resist the backing of NATO and the United Nations for Kosovo, and both sides of Kosovo have been bleeding for many years. In the end, Serbia could only declare that it "will never give up its sovereignty over Kosovo", and at the same time promise to "never use force to prevent Kosovo's independence", knocking down its teeth and swallowing blood.

On February 18, 2008, in Mitrovica, a small town on the Seko border, a demonstration was held by Ko Serb residents to protest against Kosovo's official decision to declare Kosovo's independence by referendum. (Getty Images) The evolution of the Udon problem is slightly different from that of Kosovo. The two "republics" of the Donbass became virtually independent after the Crimea crisis in 2014, and started an eight-year armed conflict with the Ukrainian government forces. Kyiv was unable to exercise direct control over them. Russia also secretly assisted the Ukrainian civilian armed forces. And in 2022, it announced the recognition of the independence of Udong, and then directly commanded the army to "liberate Donbass".

Compared with the case of Kosovo, the 8-year conflict between Udong and Kyiv is actually more like the war situation from 1995 to 1999, rather than the post-war split from 1999 to 2008; and the intervention of NATO and the Russian army, The process is also slightly different. NATO supported Kosovo to declare independence in 2008 after the large-scale bombing of Serbia in 1999. The Russian army has supported the civil armed forces in Uruguay for a long time since 2014, and announced the recognition of the independence of Udong in 2022. At the same time increase the code to fight.

But in the context of these two cases, the political elements that Putin intends to extract are obvious: the people have the right to exercise self-determination after being oppressed, and foreign countries can also send troops to intervene and implement diplomatic recognition under the banner of "humanitarianism". In 1999, NATO bombed Yugoslavia on a large scale on the grounds of "stopping genocide", which was widely praised in later history writing. Madeleine Albright, then US Secretary of State and active in fighting, is still called "democratic democracy". Defenders”; even though the United Nations did not recognize Kosovo’s independence, as Guterres stated, the International Court of Justice declared on July 22, 2010 that Kosovo’s independence from Serbia “does not violate international law”, and it has been today 86 UN member states recognize Kosovo and even have diplomatic relations with it. Therefore, no matter how "outrageous" what Russia is doing today is just "retracing the old road of the West".

Two messages from Putin

However, Putin cited the Kosovo precedent, in addition to satirizing the moral double standards of Europe and the United States and ignoring introspection, but also intending to convey two real political signals.

First, there is no turning back. Just as NATO will not hesitate to bomb Serbian civilians and also strive to maintain Kosovo’s independence, Russia’s military deployment to Ukraine this time, no matter what strategic goal it is to achieve, from resisting NATO’s eastward expansion, liberating Donbas, to As predicted by the outside world, to seize Odessa's estuary to the sea, Ukraine is bound to undergo a process of "transformation" until Russia thinks it will come naturally. This means that Ukraine cannot return to its past, just as Kosovo cannot become an autonomous province of Serbia.

Looking back at the development of the war, the "liberation of Donbass" is more like a fulcrum used by Russia to move the regional situation. Judging from the fact that it immediately surrounded Kyiv at the beginning of the war, sent a negotiating delegation, and put forward several major demands, Moscow originally tied the "liberation of Donbass" with "stopping NATO's eastward expansion", and hoped that Ukraine would attack itself "for this time." Finnishization", not only ceded the sovereignty of Crimea and Donbass, but also carried out internal reform, suppressed extreme anti-Russian sentiment, banned extremist organizations such as the Azov Battalion, and made an explicit promise not to join NATO.

However, from the perspective of actual development, the situation obviously does not follow the script imagined by Russia, but it is impossible to return empty-handed. Therefore, "liberating the Donbass" has become the lower limit of action, and transforming Ukraine to "stop NATO's eastward expansion" will become a another line of action. Under this circumstance, the situation began to slide towards the "North Korea model", that is, the Russian army no longer "bound hands and feet" and stuck to the state of special military operations, but began to let go of the big fight just like in the Syrian battlefield. With the Russian army taking advantage of the battlefield, Ukrainian territory outside the Donbass can only be occupied one after another. Now Russia is not only ruling in Kherson, but has also begun the reconstruction of Mariupol. Rubles are expected to be issued in the occupied territories, and there is no possibility of the above-mentioned areas returning to Ukraine.

Even if Putin said that he would not give up negotiations with Ukraine, just as Serbia and Kosovo have negotiated for many years without results, after all, there must be a change in the situation outside the negotiating table to force one side to acquiesce to a fait accompli. For Serbia, it is the substantive support of NATO and the United Nations for Kosovo; in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, it is the substantive occupation and tearing of Ukraine by the Russian army. Regarding the Russia-Ukraine negotiations, Putin's position has always been the same, that is, Ukraine must be "transformed" to meet Russia's security needs; Ukraine's choice space is very limited from beginning to end, if not promised Russia at the beginning of the war. The condition is to be forced to face the reality of Ukraine being divided after the loss of life. After all, NATO obviously has no intention of repeating the Kosovo script in 1999 and risking large-scale bombing of the Russian mainland for Ukraine.

Second, even though Putin has a tough attitude, he still believes that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is only "nicotine in the region." If the West is willing, this matter does not need to rise to the bloc of major powers. Although the conflict in Kosovo was tragic, it did not completely break the EU, the United States and Serbia. At that time, even if Russia opposed Kosovo’s independence, it believed that this move would make Chechnya and others follow suit and break the chains that bound the conflict, but it did not comprehensively. Challenging the United Nations and NATO systems, let alone raising the matter into a new cold war between the East and West bloc.

In Putin's view, the Russian-Ukrainian war is not only for "reforming Ukraine", but also for drawing a clear red line against NATO, not the beginning of a complete break with the West, nor the restoration of various doctrines circulating in the outside world, as if Russia is about to launch a "new Mongolia" Westward expedition". When contemporary media and intellectuals analyze the foreign policies of eastern authoritarian regimes, they are often accustomed to applying a certain "grand narrative" derived from history. Putin was also forced into various interpretation frameworks such as "Great Slavism", "Great Russianism", and "Neo-Eurasianism" because of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Will continue to kill until the end of the horizon.

But in fact, whether it is Erdogan or Putin, historical discourse is more of its propaganda mechanism to achieve internal mobilization and rally people's hearts. From the perspective of today's Turkey and Russia's strength, it is necessary to return the country to the vast territory and tens of thousands of people in the imperial era. Coming to the DPRK is tantamount to asking for fish. The two countries are mostly in the post-Cold War era. They maintain and expand their national interests from a pragmatic perspective. Any doctrine can exert a certain influence as long as it meets the needs of its current policy, but it will not It is always the main theme of policy.

Therefore, rather than saying that Russia sent troops to Ukraine this time, it is to practice Eurasian ambitions and create an anti-sea power alliance. It is better to say that Russia regards Ukraine as a sacrifice for "re-communication" with NATO from a traditional geopolitical perspective. All the operational chips such as Sino-Russian relations and Russia-India relations should be pooled as a shield against Western economic sanctions and the encirclement and suppression of public opinion. Putin is well aware that Russia's invasion of Ukraine will inevitably lead to regional tensions and cause Europe, the United States, and NATO to resort to various anti-Russian measures. After refusing to use rubles to buy Gazprom, it must finally turn to Germany to buy Gazprom. The "housework" of Russia and Ukraine does not necessarily cause Europe's "self-defense", let alone the beginning of a new Cold War or even the third world war. .

Vladislav Surkov, a former assistant to Putin, wrote the article "The Lonely Half-Blood" in 2018, mentioning that Russia has traveled eastward for 400 years and westward for 400 years, and now must walk out of the "third way", In other words, it became the "Third Rome" after the fall of Rome and Constantinople. Such an argument can be compared to Putin's mentality today: to protect Russia's national interests to the greatest extent, one cannot completely abandon his political ties with the East and the West. In other words, no matter how intense the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is, Sino-Russian relations, U.S.-Russian relations, and European-Russian relations have always been tools that Putin uses to "complement each other." It will not give up its interaction with the United States and Europe because of this, let alone cut itself off from the United Nations and start anew. Just like the "Third Rome" that came from its name, it has inherited the halo of Rome after all.

Original URL: Udong's "Kosovo Model" after the war: What does Putin want to say to the West? | Hong Kong 01 https://www.hk01.com/sns/article/764961