Putin's highest goal: the "Finnishization" of Ukraine

On March 12, local time, the Ukrainian media "Weekly Mirror" disclosed that, from "reliable diplomats", it was informed of Russia's new 6-point truce conditions: first, Ukraine gave up its request to join NATO and maintained a neutral position. Russia will guarantee the security of Ukraine; second, make Russian the second official language of Ukraine and remove all restrictions on Russian; third, recognize Russia's sovereignty over the Crimean Peninsula; fourth, recognize the "Donetsk Republic" ” and the independence of the “Republic of Luhansk”; fifth, denazification of Ukraine, prohibition of ultra-nationalist, Nazi and neo-Nazi political parties, repeal of existing laws glorifying Nazis and neo-Nazis; sixth, demilitarization of Ukraine, complete renunciation of Ukraine Offensive weapons, becoming a demilitarized state.

Such conditions are said to have been proposed by the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers during their talks in Turkey on March 10. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that if Ukraine agrees to Russia's conditions, the Russian military will cease fire immediately. However, the "Weekly Mirror" also stated that if the above-mentioned six conditions are agreed, Ukraine is no different from "surrendering", and according to Russian President Vladimir Putin's request, the first five points must be included in the Ukrainian constitution. For the Ukrainian political arena, where Russia is the largest, it is nothing less than an earth-shaking change.

Since the outbreak of the conflict, Russia's requirements seem to be constantly changing, but in fact, the ideas are the same, and the main axis is becoming clearer day by day. During the Russian military operation on February 24, Putin expressed his desire to "demilitarize" and "denazify" Ukraine; on March 7, Russia first mentioned four points of ceasefire: demilitarization of Ukraine and recognition of Crimea as belonging to Russia, recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, amending the constitution to remove the text of joining NATO and giving up joining "any alliance"; today's 6-point condition, there are more explicit requirements such as guaranteeing the status of the Russian language and banning the Nazis.

To sum up, the four symbols run through Russia’s conception of the post-war order in Ukraine: the transfer of some territories, diplomatic neutrality, armament reduction, and combating extreme anti-Russian sentiment. Such a request outlines the desired outcome of Putin's operation: a "Finnishized" Ukraine.

The mocked "neutrality policy"

Looking back at history, the Finnish experience can be described as a lesson for Ukraine.

In 1939, Joseph Stalin launched the Winter War against Finland in order to expand the buffer zone of the Soviet Union. The two sides fought bloody and snowy battles for a long time, and finally signed a ceasefire agreement. In 1941, Finland chose to cooperate with Nazi Germany to enter the Soviet Union, which resulted in The latter fought back violently in 1944, and the Finnish leader eventually flew to Moscow for peace talks and a peace treaty with the Soviet Union: ceding parts of Pechenga, Karelia and Salla , a few islands in the Gulf of Finland, and leased Porkkalanniemi to the Soviet Union for 50 years. The Soviet Union also demanded reparations from Finland, which had to pay the Soviet Union a huge sum of up to $300 million over six years.

In addition, the Soviet Union also asked Finland to "self-rectify": allow the Communist Party of Finland to become a legal political party in Finland after revising some party constitutions; ban Finnish political parties that the Soviet Union considered fascist; expel up to 200,000 German troops in Finland, otherwise the Soviet army Will be "personally driven"; reorganize the Finnish Defence Forces under Soviet supervision, abandoning armament upgrades. All of the above requirements are complied with and implemented by Finland.

From 1946 onwards, two Finnish presidents established a post-war neutralization policy, from Juho Kusti Paasikivi (1946-1956) to Urho Kekkonen (1956-1981). He established deep mutual trust with Stalin and Leonid Brezhnev successively, refused to join NATO externally, suppressed hatred against the Soviet Union internally, and extensively self-censored in the media, publications, textbooks and other fields, and cut two su-fen The presentation layout of the war avoids arousing the historical hatred of the people and affects the neutral space in politics. In addition, for the election, candidates with too anti-Soviet stance were often disqualified or forced to withdraw from the election, also to avoid the resumption of anti-Soviet policies.

Such a tactical practice, known as the "Basikivi-Kikkonen route", continued until the end of the Cold War and was derogated in the West as "Finlandization". The New York Times in 1979 even sneered at Finland: "In a deplorable state, a weak nation has succumbed to a mighty neighbor and made a disgraceful and disgusting act of its own sovereign liberty. An embarrassing concession." However, such an idealistic condemnation, in the eyes of Finns back then, was a cruel sneer from the depths of history.

Looking back at the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939, Finland's guerrilla resistance attracted global attention, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States all supported it, and up to 12,000 foreign volunteers came to participate in the war. However, if you look closely at the content of "foreign aid", Sweden, a neighboring country to Finland, is worried about angering the Soviet Union, so it refuses to send troops and strictly guards its neutrality. However, some Swedish people who have not received complete military training came to help out, forming the main body of 12,000 "foreign volunteer soldiers"; Because Germany signed the "Non-aggression Pact" with the Soviet Union, Germany was reluctant to provide actual combat assistance; the United States was out of reach and pursued "isolationism", so it could only sit on the sidelines; Britain was at war with Germany, so only The old guns and cannons in stock were sent to the Finnish army. Although the latter two countries agreed to send troops, their real purpose was to seize the Swedish iron ore producing areas, and Finland was still left alone.

Such a harrowing experience with nowhere to go taught post-war Finnish leaders a lesson: Finland's survival and independence were in their own hands, and Finland was safe only when the Soviet Union "felt safe." European and American countries can speak with high-sounding and beautiful words, but Baskivi and Kikkonen understand that weak Finland cannot expect Western aid. He also maintained close contacts and dialogues with government officials at all levels of the Soviet Union, and proved himself "trustworthy" with actions.

And it was also under the efforts of the two leaders that the Soviet Union's "trust" gave Finland room for development: the Soviet Union not only reduced the amount of post-war reparations, but also extended the payment period; in 1955, the Soviet navy and artillery units withdrew from Finland; in 1956 , the Soviet Union returned early Pokhara, which should have been loaned to 1994. At the same time, Finland gradually expanded its trade cooperation with the West, reduced its trade with the Soviet Union, and joined the European Free Trade Association. Since the 1960s, Finland has increased the proportion of military reserves and defense budgets, and has moved towards a "comprehensive" system that relies on large areas of land and civil defense. Defense" route. The above-mentioned measures were all carried out under the watchful eyes of the Soviet Union, and Moscow was able to prevent most of them, but because the two sides shared a high level of mutual trust, there was no apparent conflict.

Under the post-Cold War narrative dominated by Europe and the United States, "Finnishization" has become synonymous with the self-denial of a small country, but looking back on the historical context, the Finnish leaders after the war actually strengthened their ties with the Western camp by virtue of sophisticated internal and external operations. Maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union, in the end Finland did not join NATO, nor became a satellite state of the Soviet Union, and was able to thrive as a highly industrialized free economy with a large reserve army.

Ukraine's future

For today's Ukraine, it is also facing a similar situation and strategic choice.

After the war began, the Ukrainian military and civilians were just like Finland in the past. Although they were small in size, they had a strong will, but after all, they were unable to fight against the rolling steel torrent. Although they caused damage to the Russian army, the situation was over and the situation was irreversible. The same is true during the war. The slogans were shouted loudly, praising the Ukrainians (Finns) for their strong will to resist, and showing the enthusiasm of global solidarity. In fact, they were transporting old asymmetrical combat weapons (old guns and cannons), rhetoric and unrealistic. It is doubtful whether it intends to create an Eastern European version of Afghanistan, so that the Russian army is trapped in the quagmire of war.

Under this situation, Kyiv's "best option" is unfortunately the same as Finland's back then, which is to go to the negotiating table and negotiate with Moscow. Looking at the conditions put forward by Putin, they are also similar to the Soviet Union's requirements for Finland in the past: to transfer some territorial sovereignty, reduce internal hatred, maintain neutrality externally, and eliminate possible military threats to Moscow.

In the past, Finland paid Pechenga, Karelia and other places. Today, Russia demands the independence of Crimea and Ukraine. In the past, the Soviet Union forced Finland to ban "fascist" political parties. All are to put out the anti-Soviet/anti-Russian sentiment that has already started a prairie prairie. This time, the Russian side clearly proposed to confirm Russian as the "second official language", which is intended to prevent Ukraine's increasingly strong "de-Russification" policy, and let the past Russian schools, radio stations, and news stations that were forced to close were reopened, so that it was possible to maintain pro-Russian public opinion for a long time; although the Soviet Union did not expressly demand that Finland not join NATO, it directly stationed troops in Finland until it was confirmed that Finland was indeed neutral. After that, it withdrew its troops. Today, it is asking Ukraine to amend its constitution and give up its membership in NATO to ensure its neutrality. In the past, the Soviet Union led the reorganization of the Finnish Defense Forces. Today, Moscow requires Ukraine to give up offensive weapons.

The conditions of the four major areas are in the same vein as the logic of 1944. Putin’s calculation is similar to that of Stalin. It is not out of ideological conceptions such as “Great Slavism” that he decides to launch a war, but from a geopolitical perspective, to create a strategy for the country. The buffer zone, and knowing that the West can only provide rhetorical assistance, it does not hesitate to violate international law at the cost of military and civilian lives, Russia's economy and reputation.

That said, the context of "Finnishization" today is somewhat different than it was in 1944. Today's Russia no longer has the strength of the Soviet Union in the past, so it has tolerated NATO's many eastward expansions until it is close to the door, and this is the bet that the country will send troops to Ukraine; the current international environment is not a war era, and Russia is not the same as the Soviet Union back then. Russia is a huge system, so the gradually fermenting economic sanctions will inevitably swallow up some of its development achievements. Even if the war is over, the global anti-Russian witch hunt will continue; and now Russia and Ukraine are talking about fighting, if Ukraine lacks visionary and courageous political elites , the peace treaty may continue to be difficult, and the delay will only increase the uncertainty.

But whether or not Putin's plan is ultimately realized, the experiences of Finland and Ukraine are cruel manifestations of international politics. As Finnish President Kikkonen said: "A country's independence is not absolute, and there is no country that does not need to succumb to historical inevitability." "It was a cowardly act, but did nothing, stand on the high ground of public opinion to incite conflict and even continue to "fight the fire". Kikkonen's words are enough for the weaker to learn from: "Experience tells us that a small country does not confuse foreign policy plans with emotions at all. room for both positive and negative emotions.”

The original text was published on 2022/3/18 " Multidimensional News "