Brief Analysis of Huayuankou Embankment Burst and Changsha Fire

Abstract: Huayuankou dyke burst and Changsha fire are extraordinary measures realized by the Nationalist government under the policy of the scorched earth war of resistance. This paper analyzes the impact and causes of the two incidents respectively. Although Huayuankou dyke rupture brought huge economic losses and casualties, it was also of great military significance. The Changsha fire was completely negative. The reason for Huayuankou's dyke burst was the plan formed by the National Government after long-term planning, and the decision of the Changsha fire was a reflection of the mistakes of the highest decision-making level.

Key words: Changsha fire; Huayuankou burst

On June 17, 1938, the Havas News Agency in Paris: "Republic", the official newspaper of the Socialist Party, commented on the breaking of the Yellow River in China: "When King Louis XIV of France invaded the Netherlands, the Netherlands used the break of the dyke as a self-defense plan, and its people Although it suffered a temporary flood, its territory was finally preserved. In the winter of 1812, when Napoleon I attacked Russia, Russia also prevented the French army from advancing, and burned the city of Moscow to Napoleon I. Lead a large army and defeat it. Like this, when a certain nation is attacked by outsiders and is in danger of perishing or becoming a slave, it often uses floods and cold winter weather to defend against the enemy, and it is strange and safe? China has already decided to release two great dragons, namely the Yellow River and the Yangtze River, to control the Japanese army to the death. Even if ten Chinese lives were exchanged for one Japanese life, it would not be a problem. This telegram was published after the Yellow River burst its banks. The author of the telegram clearly praised the determination of the Chinese military and civilians to fight against the Japanese. The two examples directly mentioned in the text were that the Netherlands burst its embankment to defend against Louis XIV, and Russia burned the city to defend against Napoleon. However, a very similar scene appeared on the anti-Japanese battlefield a hundred years later. That was the Huayuankou burst in June 1938 and the Changsha fire in November. And there's a lot to ponder about these two incidents.

1. The impact of Huayuankou dyke burst and Changsha fire

The Huayuankou dyke burst incident occurred on June 9, 1938, at the beginning of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War. On May 19, the Japanese invaders captured Xuzhou and invaded westward along the Longhai line. Zhengzhou was in critical condition and Wuhan was shaken. On June 9, the Nationalist government ordered the opening of Huayuankou, a ferry crossing on the south bank of the Yellow River, located 17 kilometers north of Zhengzhou City, Henan Province, China. Taking advantage of the incident of the strategic destruction of the embankment during the flood period of the Yellow River, a scorched-earth policy was attempted. Prevent the Japanese army from advancing westward along the Yellow River. The incident caused flooding in the east side of the Pinghan Railway. Caused by the artificial diversion of the Yellow River's embankment, a large area of the Yellow River was formed, which was historically known as the Huayuankou embankment.

The Changsha fire broke out in the early morning of November 13, 1938. After the fall of Wuhan, Wuhan's institutions, factories, and a large number of refugees and wounded soldiers poured into Changsha, making Changsha with a population of more than 300,000 at that time suddenly increased to more than 500,000. In addition, Changsha used to be the rear of the Battle of Songhu and the Battle of Nanjing. Changsha has accumulated many strategic reserves and business is very prosperous. But it also made Changsha's position in China's war of resistance improved unprecedentedly. On November 8, the Japanese army entered northern Hunan and bombed Changsha and Hengyang. On the 9th and 11th, Linxiang and Yueyang fell one after another, and China and Japan confronted Xinqianghe. The situation in Changsha was very serious. At that time, in order to prevent the military materials from being acquired by the Japanese army, the government stipulated the scorched-earth war of resistance. But before the plan was officially implemented, a series of accidental factors made the fire completely out of control, eventually killing more than 30,000 people in Changsha, burning down more than 90% of the city's houses, and causing an economic loss of about 1 billion yuan.

The impact of the two incidents is quite different. The impact of the Huayuankou dyke rupture is two-fold. On the one hand, it has caused a heavy disaster to the Chinese people who have suffered from war and chaos, and caused huge economic losses. 450,533 hectares of cultivated land was submerged in Henan, accounting for 32% of the original cultivated land. Among them, Fugou accounted for 95% of the original cultivated land. Anhui has submerged 284,958 hectares of cultivated land, accounting for 22% of the original cultivated land, and Jiangsu submerged 109,108 hectares of cultivated land, accounting for 14% of the original cultivated land, with a total of 844,259 hectares of submerged cultivated land. Second, the rupture of the dyke at the Huayuankou of the Yellow River caused many deaths and displacement. 1,172,639 people fled in Henan, accounting for 17.3% of the original population, and 325,589 died, accounting for 4.8% of the original population. The number of people who fled in Jiangsu was 202,400, accounting for 5.6% of the original population, and the number of deaths was 160,200, accounting for 4.8% of the original population. In Anhui, 2,536,315 people fled, accounting for 28% of the original population, and 407,514 died, accounting for 4.5% of the original population. A total of 3,911,354 people fled, accounting for 20.3% of the original population, and 893,303 died, accounting for 4.7% of the original population. Third, it caused huge direct economic losses. Calculated in terms of pre-war fiat currency converted to RMB, Henan lost 1.93285 trillion yuan, accounting for 22% of the original property. Anhui lost 2,526.58 billion yuan, accounting for 23% of the original property. Jiangsu lost 321.03 billion yuan, accounting for 5.3% of the original property. The total loss was 4,780.67 billion yuan, accounting for 18.4% of the original property. According to the reduction of agricultural income, Henan has 2,245.27 billion yuan, Anhui has 1,810.46 billion yuan, and Jiangsu has 691.67 billion yuan and more. The two items of property and agricultural income reduction have reached 8,528.08 billion yuan. As for the loss of soil variation, water conservancy damage, etc., due to lack of data, the statistics could not be counted. The indirect economic loss is immeasurable, and it can be seen that the economic loss is staggering enough. [i] However, the military significance of the Huayuankou breach cannot be underestimated. First, the favorable situation created after the Yellow River breach allowed the Chinese army to annihilate many Japanese troops and directly curbed the pursuit of the Japanese army. Second, the strategic purpose of preventing the Japanese army from advancing westward and going southward disrupted the Japanese army’s plan to attack Wuhan from both the north and south to destroy China, completely isolating the originally connected north and south battlefields, forcing the Japanese army to switch to attacking Wuhan by taking a detour to Hefei and Anqing. If the Huayuankou breach had a positive military impact, then the Changsha fire was completely negative. According to Hua Xuanen, deputy of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment of the Changsha Guard, recalled later, the Changsha fire lasted for two nights and one day before it went out on its own. , the whole city was scorched, and at a glance I could see the broken walls, more than 4,000 wounded officers and soldiers were burned to death; some citizens died in the urban area, some drowned in the Xiangjiang River; I thought I could make a fortune, but when I was alert, it was too late to flee the scene; all the people left behind in the mansion were blocked by bricks and stones at the front and back doors, and none of the poor, the old, and the weak were able to move around. It was a shame! Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Changsha on the evening of the 16th and witnessed the tragic situation after the disaster in Changsha. At the same time, people's grievances boiled, and people wrote on the remnant walls: "The army is under the city, the chairman Zhang Huang is at a loss. The flames are soaring, and the whole city is scorched", "The telecommunication is distorted, and it is a big mistake. The culprit, shirk responsibility", "New wall" The river belongs to Yueyang, and Changsha Xinhe has one less wall. This wall separates two houses (Yueyang house and Changsha house), and it seems ridiculous to mix them into one house", "three heads and one fire..." and so on. After the incident, the enemy plane threw the photos taken after the fire in Changsha after the disaster, and printed "Please see who killed and set fire". [ii] Comparing the effects of two events is difficult because the effects of the two are different. The process of Huayuankou bursting was carefully planned by the Kuomintang government, but the process of the Changsha fire was the result of the negligence of officials in Changsha, so it is difficult to compare. But if you want to compare the causes of the Huayuankou dyke burst and the Changsha fire, it can be compared.

2. Reasons for the dyke burst at Huayuankou

Mr. Qu Changgen described the reasons for Huayuankou dyke rupture in the article "Review of the Decision-making Process of Huayuankou Dike Break in 1938": "The plan of replacing soldiers with water and conquering the enemy with yellow has gone through the process of China's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. A relatively long period of deliberation and thinking, discussions and trade- offs , and the final implementation at a specific location is due to the sudden change of the battlefield situation."

The first is the incubation stage. In 1935, China and Japan signed the Hemei Agreement and the Qin-Turkey Agreement in succession. On August 20, the German consultant Falkenhausen raised the issue of resisting Japan to Chiang Kai-shek and proposed the method of using rivers to block the enemy. It must advance to the line from Cangzhou to Baoding in Hebei, and the Yellow River is the last line of defense... It is advisable to make artificial flooding in a planned way to thicken its defense." And Chiang Kai-shek also commented on this point of "last line of resistance". [iv] At this time, this plan was only an idea, and the specific plan was very different from the later implementation, but this proposal was the first time someone proposed to use the flooding of the Yellow River to stop the enemy. Between 1937 and 1938, China and Japan had many large and small conflicts near the Yellow River, which made the Yellow River issue sensitive again. On April 13, 1938, during the Battle of Xuzhou, Chen Guofu submitted to Chiang Kai-shek the "Replacement of Water with Water". Soldiers' Proposal ""Taierzhuang Victory, the whole country is jubilant, and the future of the Anti-Japanese War may turn into a better place from now on, but the south bank of the Yellow River is not easy to suffer, and the floods are so bad that the enemy will break the embankment and control me. If I can win the death of Wuzhi and other counties The rules can be used to counterattack with water at any time. The terrain on the north bank of the Yellow River near the mouth of the Gaiqin River is low, so if the embankment breaks at any point on the south bank of the lower reaches, it only needs to be broken on the north bank of the Qinhe mouth, and all the yellow water can go north to Zhang and Wei. Danger can be solved, but the enemy is in danger. The enemy is cruel and unbearable, and it should be prevented.” [v] Chen Guofu’s suggestion is inevitably a bit too optimistic. He believes that using water to control the enemy is a tool for counterattack. There is still a long way to go between the Taierzhuang victory and the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, but he proposed to prevent the enemy from breaking the embankment first. The Japanese also had plans to break through. According to Lieutenant General Hashimoto Qun, who was the chief of staff of the First Army of the Japanese Army at that time, in the "Recalling Answers", "The Second Army will cross the river to attack Shandong. The strategy must be reported to the central government, which is Sakurai's most proud place, but the enemy will strike first." [vi] On May 14, 1938, the war situation continued to deteriorate, and the Japanese army cut off the fast lane for the retreat of hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops to the west. 15 In order to prevent the army from being surrounded and wiped out by the Japanese army, the Japanese Kuomintang authorities decided to abandon Xuzhou and withdraw to the west. On the 19th, the Japanese army occupied Xuzhou. On the 26th, He Chengpu, a senior staff officer of the Japanese Army Command, clearly put forward a proposal to dig the Yellow River to prevent the enemy from advancing westward. "The current peach news of the Yellow River, in the west of Kaocheng, the tortuous part of Lanfeng is the most powerful. If the construction breaks, the Yellow River will go straight to Xuzhou along the old road, and the land will not flood, which will make the enemy's mechanized troops ineffective, and it will be enough to destroy them. Fighting power, its attempt to open up Jinpu came to nothing. [i] " However, since Chiang Kai-shek was organizing the Battle of Lanfeng, he did not comment on this proposal. But when Lanfeng lost the battle, breaking the bank and blocking the enemy had to be put on the agenda.

The second is the decision process, which can be reflected from the perspective of the external environment and the discussion process. On May 28, Shangqiu fell, and the battle of Lanfeng deteriorated. On the 31st, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the entire army to retreat, leaving 32,39 troops in Kaifeng and Zhongmu to block the enemy and cover the main force to retreat west. On June 8, Zhongmu and Kaifeng fell one after another, and Zhengzhou, an important town in the Central Plains, was in an emergency. Zhengzhou is located at the key point of the Pinghan and Longhai communication lines, and it is the only place for the Central Plains to go westward and southward. It is also the last important military town in North China. If the Japanese army occupied Zhengzhou, it would not only mark the opening of the northwest rear of China to the Japanese army, but also cut off international aid from the northwest. More importantly, the wartime capital Wuhan was under direct threat from the Japanese army. At this time, the troops have been unable to organize an effective defense. The only hope of defending Zhengzhou and the Pinghan-Longhai line is pinned on the Yellow River. The discussion process within the National Government was determined by the extension of the Yellow River defense issue to the Yellow River's dyke burst. On May 20, the commander-in-chief of the First Theater Command, Cheng Qian, sent a call to Chiang Kai-shek about paying attention to the Yellow River river defense. "The river defense troops stretch for hundreds of miles, and the fortifications along the river are connected and connected... A temporary river defense committee was set up in the theater to directly urge the river defense agencies, military , the river work should be taken into consideration, not only will it not interfere with the work of fundamental river management, but also the convenience of military temporary river defense.” [ii] Also in the meeting of the General Office of the Military Commission on May 15, the issue of the Yellow River was also mentioned as a very important issue. Location. As the war situation continued to deteriorate, Yan Xunfu, the chief of staff of the First Theater on the day of the fall of Kaifeng, proposed to break the Yellow River embankment, which could stop the enemy in eastern Henan, and Zhengzhou could be protected after the embankment was broken. During this period, there was an endless stream of suggestions related to the breach of the embankment from the front line. Also on June 1st, China's Supreme Military Conference held in Wuhan decided to break the Yellow River, in order to create a large-scale flooding and prevent the enemy from advancing westward.

3. Causes of the Changsha Fire

The direct cause of the Changsha fire was the dereliction of duty by the Kuomintang military and political authorities in Hunan. But we can analyze it carefully. Why did the Kuomintang government order Changsha to burn the city?

The first was the unprecedented pressure from the military. Guangzhou and Wuhan fell one after another in October 1938. Hunan, located in the middle of the Guangdong-Hanzhou line, immediately changed from the rear to the front, and it was unable to defend the capital of Chongqing and ensure the rear of the southwest. Hunan was very important. . And Changsha is even more "the place of importance". "Those who are fighting for the south should not be allowed to go to Changsha, and those who do not want to go to the north will not be able to sweep Changsha, and then there will be no support for the horse's head." Changsha's strategic position has risen suddenly, and The Chinese army was defeated again and again. In order to avoid the situation in Changsha that Wuhan did not burn down the city in time, leaving behind materials to help the enemy, Changsha's order to burn the city must be extremely resolute.

The second is the decision-making error of judgment. Judging from Japanese historical data, the Japanese army at the end of 1938 had no plan to continue to launch an offensive. "Strive to limit the expansion of the war situation, adopt a tight and lasting position, and leave a number of mobile corps near Hankou. That is, the area west of Huangfan District, Henan Province will be abandoned in order to occupy the vicinity of the three towns in Wuhan. South to the vicinity of Yuezhou, a long-lasting front is formed on the southern bank of the Yangtze River east of Wuhan, and the main purpose is limited to controlling various points along the river bank. [iii] "Decided to suspend the pursuit near the front line of Yuezhou and Tongcheng", "turned to the alert posture" , its "The Sixth Division, after entering the village detachment to capture Yuezhou, urgently ordered the detachment to return to Wuchang by water", "The Ninth Division ... roughly assembled its forces in the area between Xianning and Yuezhou." [iv]

4. Association of Huayuankou dyke burst and Changsha fire

We know that the Huayuankou dike burst occurred on June 10, 1938, and the Changsha fire occurred on November 13, 1938. Both incidents occurred in 1938, more generally in the pre-war period. At this time, the Japanese army is in full swing, while the Chinese army has repeatedly retreated, and the battlefield situation has continued to deteriorate. It is inevitable that the decision-making level is too pessimistic about the war situation. In this case of broken jade tiles, it is understandable to choose the broken arm map.

However, if we link the two and analyze, we will find that the two are closely related to another city, that is, Wuhan.

When we look at this history from the perspective of future generations, we all know that after the Battle of Wuhan, the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression entered a stage of stalemate. As the high-level commanders at the time, it was impossible for them to realize that the edge of the Japanese army had begun to fade when Wuhan fell at the end of October. In other words, the Changsha fire in early November made the decision-makers understand that the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression had entered the second stage.

Then if we analyze the relationship between the Huayuankou dyke burst and the Changsha fire from the perspective of the Japanese army, it will be more obvious. Huayuankou's dyke rupture undoubtedly caused huge trouble for the Japanese army in its strategic deployment. Although the goal of occupying Wuhan was finally achieved, the isolation of the northern and southern battlefields caused the sharp decline of the southern battlefield. If we imagine that the Huayuankou dyke did not burst, the Japanese army occupied Wuhan from the north and the south, and their combined momentum to attack Changsha in the south would not be a problem.

[i] "Advice on Replacing Soldiers with Water" Vol. 2

[ii] "Official Letter from the General Office of the Military Commission of the Nationalist Government", Case File 3489 of the Second Historical Archives of China 787

[iii] Japanese "Sino-Japanese War" 2 "Modern History Materials" 9, 1964, pp. 269-270.

[iv] Japanese Defense Agency's "China Incident Army Combat History" Vol. 2, Volume 1, page 198.